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FOREWORD
 
This report was-prepared by the Martin
 
Marietta Corporation under Contract NAS8-25619
 
"Space Shuttle Propulsion Systems On-board
 
Checkout and Monitoring System Development Study,"
 
for the George C, Marshall Space Flight Center of
 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
 
The report is comprised of four volumes:
 
Volume I - Summary 
Volume II - Propulsion System
Definition and Criteria 
Volume III - OCMS Criteria 
and Concept 
Volume IV - Appendices 
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A-i 
NONENCTATUIE
 
I. Definitions
 
BIT: 	A single binary digit. The smallest informational element of
 
a digital system.
 
BUILT-IN-TEST EQUIPMENT (BITE): An integral part of a functional unit
 
which serves to test and/or provide status on that functional
 
unit, but does not participate in performing the unit's principle
 
function
 
BYTE: 	A specified number of BITS.
 
CHECKOUT: The process of determining whether or not specified physical
 
quantities or operations meet their prescribed criteria. The
 
process can include such functions as data acquisition, processing,
 
storage, display, stimulus generation, etc.
 
CONTROL: The act or process of initiating, regulating and/or terminating
 
the operation and performance of a functional element in a prescribed
 
manner.
 
CONTROLLER: A device which governs the state or performance of a
 
particular functional element in a prescribed manner, e.g. engine
 
controller.
 
DATA BUS: The transmission line(s) along which the system computer(s)
 
communicate with the various Digital Interface Units, controllers,
 
peripheral-equipment, and other computers.
 
DATA COMPRESSION: The process of screening and selecting data such that
 
only desired information is retained for further processing and/or
 
storage.
 
DESIGN REFERENCE MODEL: The baseline configuration.
 
DIAGNOSIS: The determination of the state or condition of an element
 
or parameter through evaluation of available data.
 
DIGITAL INTERFACE UNIT: An intermediary unit between the computer(s)
 
and another device which formats that device's output for communi­
cation to a computer, and accepts and translates a computer's
 
transmissions to the device.
 
FAULT ISOLATION: The processing of analyzing a malfunction or abnormality
 
to the extent of determining which functional element is defective,
 
where the functional element is ordinarily a Line Replaceable Unit.
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NOMENCLATURE (Continued)
 
FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT: A unit which performs a characteristic action. Parts,
 
components, assemblies, and subsystems are functional elements
 
of increasing complexity.
 
GAS PATH ANALYSIS: An assessment of engine performance that is made
 
through evaluation of a set of measured values of pressures, temp­
eratures and/or flow rates.
 
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT: (for checkout and monitoring) That equipment,
 
in addition to the onboard equipment, which is needed to accomplish
 
the functions of checkout and monitoring.
 
LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT: A component or group of components that can,
 
as a unit, be removed and replaced in the normal vehicle mainten­
ance area. Such criteria as allowable replacement time spans and
 
degree of complexity of post-replacement calibration form a basis
 
for Line Replaceable Unit selection.
 
MAINTENANCE: Those functions and activities associated with restoring
 
the vehicle to an operational condition between flights.
 
MEASUREMENT: A physical quantity or event whosfrimagnitude or time of
 
occurence is of significance.
 
MONITORING: Repetitive acquisition and evaluation of needed data.
 
POGO: An oscillatory instability resulting from a dynamic coupling
 
between the fluid and structural elements of the vehicle.
 
PROCESSING: The manipulations and operations performed on data from
 
the time and place it is acquired to the time and place it is
 
used in its final form.
 
SELF CHECK: The process by which a functional element assesses its own
 
operational integrity and readiness.
 
SENSOR: A functional element which responds to a physical quantity
 
or event and converts that response to transmissible data which
 
is proportional t6 the magnitude of the quantity or indicates
 
occurence-df the event.'
 
SINGLE POINT FAILURE: A functional element whose inability to operate
 
within prescribed limits would cause loss of vehicle, crew, and/or
 
mission objectives.
 
STIMULUS: An excitation or forcing function which is applied from an
 
external source at a prescribed place and time.
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NOMENCLATURE (Continued)
 
TIMELINE: A representation of a sequential series of events which
 
depicts the time of occurence and duration of each event.
 
TRANSDUCER: Same as sensor.
 
TREND ANALYSIS: The process of evaluating successive samples of the
 
same data to forecast end of useful life and/or incipient failure
 
as an aid to maintenance operations and to mission or vehicle
 
configuration decisions.
 
II. Abbreviations and Acronyms
 
Note: Measurement nomenclature is defined in the measurement section.
 
A/B Airbreather or airbreathing
 
APS Auxiliary Propulsion System
 
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
 
BITE Built-In Test Equipment
 
Cc Combustion Chamber
 
CCC Central Computer Complex
 
CCU Channel Control Unit
 
Cf Thrust Coefficient
 
C* Characteristic Exhaust Velocity
 
DIU Digital Interface Unit
 
DRM Design Reference Model
 
6V Changein Velocity
 
EPL Emergency.Power Level
 
FNEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
 
FPB Fuel Preburner
 
PSI Fire Switch #1 (Engine Start Signal)
 
FS2 Fire Switch #2 (Engine Shutdown Signal)
 
GHe Gaseous Helium
 
GH2 Gaseous Hydrogen
 
GN2 Gaseous Nitrogen
 
COX Gaseous Oxygen
 
GSE Ground Support Equipment
 
C & N Guidance and Navigation
 
HPFTPA High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Assembly
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NOMENCLATURE (Continued) 
HFOTPA High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Assembly 
Ign Igniter or Ignition 
KSO Kennedy Space Center 
LE2 Liquid Hydrogen 
L02 Liquid Oxygen 
ICX Liquid Oxygen 
LPFTPA Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump Assembly 
LPOTPA Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Assembly 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
EPL Minimum Power Level 
MR Mixture Ratio 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
NPL Normal-Power Level 
OCMS Onboard Checkout and Monitoring System 
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System 
OPB Oxidizer Preburner 
P1L Payload 
RCS -Reaction Control System 
TCA Thrust Chamber Assembly 
TPF Terminal Phase Finalization 
TPI Terminal Phase Initiation 
TYC Thrust Vector Control 
- VAB Vertical Assembly Building 
WTR Western Test Range 
APPENDIX B - FMEA DATA SHEETS
 
B-I 
The objectives of the failure modes and effects analysis
 
(FMEA) were to determine the potential propulsion failure modes
 
and resulting effects on the subsystem, system, crew and
 
mission, and establish the criticality of the failure; and
 
identify candidate failure detection methods for each failure
 
mode to aid in establishing propulsion system measurement
 
requirements. The groundrules and approach used in conducting
 
this analysis are described in Volume II, Chapter III. This
 
appendix contains the FNEA analysis sheets.
 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.1.1 & 4.1.1.1 
Fuel Turbopump A 
Low Pressure Boost fuel pressure from engine 
interface to inlet of high pres-
sure fuel T.P.A. supply coolant 
flow to extendible nozzle 
(orbiter only). 
Low pressure/flow output 
during start or steady 
state, within control 
range. 
Low 
Very low or complete loss 
of pressure/flow output 
during steady state. 
Low 
* Critical component 
FAILUREMODE AND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 2 & 4.D 
SUBSYSTE1.1 4 1 
ASSEBLY 1 3 1 A 4 1 1 
SHEET I of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMIENDATEONSFOR 
MISSION 
FERAT[0HS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION ETECTION METHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS .. CATEGORY 
Limits available range of 
adjustment far other petforsanee 
00STER 
control 
No effect (dependson 
ang analyis). 
No effect Pumprpm, inlet 
vibration.. 
and discharge pressure Torque check using a controlled gas 
source at ached. maintenaunc cycle 
ooster A(4) 
B(4) 
demands CREITERt No effect (depends on 
cntrol range analyis). 
could add to bearing condition 
tien 
iWorm- C(4) 
Orbter A(4)
B(4) 
C(4) 
probable cavitaton of B00STER Los of redundancy. No effect Vitiation, pump rpm, inlet and discharge Booser A(4) 
D.2.P T.P A, prAactur engine CBITER Los of one engine Posible missi.on loss. pressure. 2) 
cutoff, pssble burn-through of C(4) 
orbiter 
A(4) 
B(2n) 
0(Z4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 

NAMEDRAWNG 
 FNCTIN OFPROBABILITY
NUMBER 	 COMPONENT 

1.1 1.2 & 4.1.1.2 High Pres- Increase fuel pressure from 

sure Fuel T.P A.* L.P.F.T.P.A. discharge to provide: 

1) Drive fluid for L.P.F.T.P A, 

2) nigh pressure fuel to cool
 
H.P.O.T.P.A. turbine bearings,

3) 	High pressure fuel for com­
bustion in preburners, and
 
main TCA, 1 
4) 	High pressure fuel for nozzle/ 

combustion chamber coolant, 

tank pressurization. 

PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT MLFUNCTION 
OF 
OCCURRENCE 
Low pressure/flow output 
during steady state, but 
within control range. 
Low 
Very low or complete loss 
of pressure/flow output 
during start or steady 
state operation. 
Low 
Excessive leakage prior 
to start. 
Medium 
Loss of coolant flow 
output to H.P.O T.P.A. 
Low 
Critical component
 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYST 1.0 &4 0 SUBSYSTEM 1 1 & 4 1 ASSEMBLYI 1 1 & 4 1 1 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON IISSIO 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
DETECTION HETHO) OTHERECOMMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
Limits adaptability to other 
potential p eformnce irregu-
larities (dopends upon antrol 
BOOS7ER 
ORBITER 
No eliet. 
No effect 
Ho effect Vibration, inlet pressure, outlet 
pressure, pump rpm, preburner 
chamber pressure/temp 
Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
range analysis) Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Premature shutdvm. OOSTEO Ioss of dulunoy. mOOSTuR Ho effect. Vibration0 ilo pressure, outlet pressue, pump rpme, preburner 
B.oostr 4(4) 
(2B) 
ORBITER toss of one engine. ORBITER Mission les. chamber pressure/temp C(4) 
Orbiterl 4(4) 
B(2B) 
B~cessive leakage 
through chamber 
to exterior Safety hmzard. Possible launch delay. Vehicle IL sensors 
unc cycle 
leak check at Booster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
Orbiter A(4) 
R(4) 
C(3) 
OTPAturbine bearing failure, 
premature engine shutdown 
30051R less 
ORBITER toss 
of redundancy 
of one angne. 
BOOSTER No effect 
OUDST= Probable miusion lass 
Valve position discete Booster 4(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(2a) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.1.3 Low Pressure Oxidizer 
Turbopump* 
Provide pressure boost from 
engine interface to H.P.O.T.P.A. 
receives driving force from 
first stage discharge of 
H.P.O.T.P.A. 
Low pressure/flow output 
during start or steady 
state, within control 
range. 
Low 
Very low or no flow out-
put at start or steady 
state. 
LOw 
*Critical components.
 
FAILURE MODE ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS 	 SYSTEM 1 0 ASSEMBLY1 1 1 
SUBSYSTEM 1 1 SHEET 1 of 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIO 
RECOMMEIDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHERRECOM4MEHOATIOIS CATEGORY 
Limits available range of BOOSTER No effect (depends No effect. Pp rpm, vibration, inlet and dis- Torque check using a controlled gas Booster A(4)
adjustoent for other per- upon control range analysts) charge pressure source at seed Moint. cycle B(3) 
fer.ance demands. ORBITER Same could add Cobearing condition 0(4) 
inforation 
Orbiter A(4)
 
(3) 
C(4)
 
Possible cavitation of BOOSTER,ORBITUR: Probable Possible Imnard r vehiclecrew Pump rpm vibration, inletand dis- Booster (4) 
H P 0 T.P.A, premature engine multiple engine loss. charge pressure. B(2B) 
cutoff; loss of engine. C(I) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(I ) 
ona 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
\AMIE DRA.INGNUMBER FUNCTION OFCOMPONENT 
1 1 1 , High Preseure Oxidizer 
turbopump* 
Increase o\idizer pressure from 
discharge ot LPOTPA to provide' 
1) 	Intermediate pressure output 
tor main comb chamber to drive 
LPOTPA turbine, to supply oxid 
to tank pressurization heat e\­
changer, 
2) 	To supplN high pressure o\L­
dizer for preburner combustion 

FAILURE MODE
FUNCTON OFPROBABILITY 	 OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
PRIMARY 	 REDUNDANT 
Reduced pump flow/pres- Low 
sure output, within con­
trol range 
Low pressure flow output 	 Low
 
Loss of output 	 Low
 
Reduced restriction to Low
 
seal cavity purge flow
 
Excessive leakage of fuel Medium
 
into hot gas manifold
 
prior to launch.
 
"critical component 
FAILURENODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 &4 0SUBSYSTEM 1 & 4 1 ASSEMBLY1 I I &4 1 1SHEET 1 of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR MISSIONOPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Limits adaptability to other No effect, depending upon control No effect Vibration, shaft displacement, pump Boos.e r A(4) 
performance degradation range analysis RM inlet pressure discharge pressure 
(first and second stage) preburnar eham-
B(4) 
0(4) 
bar pressure/temp sealcavity oxid 
vent thrust balance cavity pressure Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Premature engine shutdon due 
low periormance 
to Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss 
Lose 
of redundancy 
of one engine 
Boost.. 
Orbiter 
No affect 
Mission loss 
Vibration, pump RIM!inlet pRessuse, 
discharge pressure 
Booster A(4) 
0(2A) 
0(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
0(4) 
Loss of engine, possible fire Engine los Loss of mission and possible toss Same as line 1 above. Booster A(4) 
of craw B(2B) 
0(15) 
Orbit.r A(4) 
0(4) 
E(IS) 
No affect REeess .age of COle(secondar, Potential puning problem mus.t be Seal cavity pressure Booster A(4) 
failure) evaluated in design B(3) 
C(3) 
Orbiter A(4)
.(3) 
0(3) 
Ercesaive fuel leakage out of 
nozle (rquires double failure) 
Possible safety hazard Depends upoa design and capability 
of inerting purse Noy be a 
Leak chaeks at ached. maint cycLe Boosrer A(4) 
(2n) 
launch delay 0(4) 
Orbiter A(4)
3(4) 
C(3) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
1.1.1.5 & 4.1.1.5 Fuel Pre-
burner 
Supply fuel rich hot gas to high 
pressure fuel turbopump assembly 
and main combustion chamber, 
1 1.1.6 & 4.1.1 6 Oxidizer 
Preburner 
Supply fuel rich hot gas to high 
pressure oxid. TPA and main com­
bustion chamber. 
1.1.1.7 & 4.1.1.7 Hot Gas 
Manifold 
Support fuel and oxid. TPAs; 
stipport fuel and oxid. preburners, 
support oaid. heat exchanger; 
transport loads from all 
gimballed components to gimbal 
block. Gas plenum ducting fuel 
rich turbine and heat exchanger 
hot gas to main combustion chamber 
FAILURE MODE 
PRIMARY 
1) Crack in lox channel 
with burning upstream 
of face 
2) Orifice plugging 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1) Low 
2) Low 
Same as 1.1.1.5. Low 
Structural fatigue. Lov 
_________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS 	 SYSTEI: 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY:2.1.1 &4.1.1 
SUBSYSITM 1.1 &4.1 SHEET 1 of 1 
1115S10N 
RECOIEIOATIONS FOR OPERATIONS / CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM DETECTION OTHER ECOIENDATIONS CATEGORY 
FAILUREEFFECT ON 

MISSION 	 JIETHOD 
1) less of performance; less of 1) Booster: Loss of redundancy 1) Booster: No effect 1) Preburner Lox flow Zoostert A(4) 
engine, prom. ure shutdown Orbiter: loss of one engine Orbiter: Eision loss Praburner chamber pressure B(4) 
2) No effect 2) No effect 2) No effect Preburn r temperature C(4) 
2) No effect
 
Orbiter- A(4) 
1114)
 
0(4)
 
Sa. a.shaowe. Sao as above. Se ad aboe. Sooe as av. Booster. 	 A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Csbiter: A(4) 
1(4) 
c (4) 
premaure engine cutoff and Possibl severe thermal or BosteCr de of vehicle and eew Failure would be reflected princpally Booste : A(4)
 
structural failures of other nechanical dsmago to neighboring Orbiter' Loess of vehicle and crew in main coabuetion chamber pressure. B(IS)
 
componenrs 5 particularly iter. engine and other systaems. 7h engine cotroller would c..nd C(1)
 
connecting lines which wold in an cmergeny shutdown, but extensive
 
turon result in cross leakages of dana;. would result before zero thrust rbitr A(4)
 
hot gas, fuel, and oxidizer; condition. B(4)
 
fire exploin haar. Recommend postflight inspection. C(I)
 
-
COMONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAYE 
1.1.1 8 & 4.1.1.8 Fuel Main 
Valve* 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
Provides on-off control of fuel 
flow from 3rd stage of high pres­
sure fuel TPA to engine systems. 
FAILURE 
PRIMARY 
Fails to open at start. 
MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Closes prematurely after 
engine reaches NFL 
Low 
Failure to close at 
shutdown 
Low 
Opens slowly. Low 
Closes slowly. Low 
Internal and external 
leakage beyond spec. 
limit. 
* Critical component 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1o & 4 0 ASSEMBLY:1.1 1 & 4 1.1 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4 1 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMEIDATIONSFOR 
ISSIOd 
0PERATIONS - - - CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONIETHOD OTHER ECOMIENDATIOINS CATEGORY 
Engine fails to start Booster 
Orbiter 
less of redundancy 
tOss of one engina 
Booster 
Orbiter 
NO effect 
ission loss 
Valve position discrete. Interlock with other engine sequnces. Booster. A(4) 
C2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
c(za) 
Engine cutoff with f.vere engine 
daroge Possible shrapnel 
Possible =ultiple engine damage Possible vehicle/crew loss Volvo position discrete This requires a double failure, baseden ports nalysis Valve is desiogned Booster AM)A(2) 
to foil uon C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)0)(2) 
NO effect No effect - prevalve redundancy Bo effoct Valve position discrete Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
c(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)c(4) 
Delay in 
sequence 
start, or possible 
shutdown 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Possiblo loss 
redundancy 
Poss.ibl loss 
engine 
of 
of ne 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Possible ojosion loss 
Valve posicion 
discrete 
analog, valve position Redundancy recosended 
wiodings 
in drive notor Booster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
Fuel rich shutdown - no effect No effect No effoet Valve position analog Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
otbiter A(4) 
B(4)Q4) 
SeO text No effect No effect Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME DRAWING 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
________ NAME__________ NUMBER 
1.1.1.9 & 4.1.1.9 Oxidizer Provides on-off control of oxid. 
Main Valve* flow from first stage output of 
H.D.O.T.P.A. to main injector 
and oxid. heat exchanger. Valve 
is powered on & off, no power 
for maintenance. Fails open on 
loss of power & will close on 
AP. 
FAILURE MODE 
PRIMARY 
_____________________________ 
Failure to open at start. 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Closes prematurely after 
engine reaches NPL. 
Failure to close at 
shutdown. 
Opens slowly. 
Closes slowly. 
Excessive leakage in 
closed position beyond 
spec. limits. 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Critical component
 
FAILURE RDE ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY1o1.1 & 4.1.1 
SUBSVSTEI I 1 & 4.1 SHEET i of 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIOd 
RECOMI4E,DATIONSFOR OPERATIONS 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM KISSto DETECTIONIlISzOm OT7HERRECOILIENDATIONS - CATEGORY 
Engine rail. o stur. B ooter 
Orbiter 
Loon of 
Los of 
redundsay 
s. egine 
B..eer 
Orbiter 
No EEet, 
Mission loss 
Valve posi.ion discotse teterleek ih seart sequence 
Redundant control circuits bere? 
Thy noet Interlock with shutdown 
Boc.ter: A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
sequence. 
Orliter A(4)15(4) 
resatcur engi.e ac oua. 
Engine deage due to shrapnel, 
Posaible multiple ceine Ias. Poasible loe of vehicle/crew. Valve position discrete Requiresr double failure based oaparts 
analysis. Valve is designed to iail 
open 
Boaser. A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A() 
B(4)
C(2A) 
Penine' swatdown iso-rc, 
dosage to wain C. clnb, 
extended shutdown iaPslse 
i affete Possible loss or veisicl/elew. Valve position discreteo Notice psetfiro purge should hce linked Booesters 
with or valve closure Requires 
stage .. prevalve to close Redundancy 
provided by this valve 
OrIter: 
A(4a)
1(4) 
C(I ) 
(A) 
B(4) 
c(1 ) 
Belay In star, or possible 
sequee shtdow. 
oaer 
Orbiter 
Possible loss 
radundanc. 
Possible loss 
o 
of one 
B...ster 
Ozbitcx-
No fi.c . 
Possible loss of 
mission 
Valve posiion dL.cree 
position aealog. 
Valve Redund. 
wotar 
y rac 
m'y? 
sndcd in drive Be.nter. A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
Qxid. rich at shutdown - possible 
cain C.C. daeoge Possible 
extended shutdow in.ulae. 
No effect Possible loss of Vehicle/crew Val.ve po.lon anlog. Use satae o prealve fr redundancy Bo.sero A(4) 
B(4) 
C(I I 
Orbiter: AM4 
B(4) 
See text Syatwe leak checks at 
maitenance cycle. 
scheduled nsocetur; A() 
C() 
Orbiter. A( ) 
1( ) 
CC I 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.1.10 & 4.1.1.10 Fuel Con-
trol Valve, Oxidizer Preburner* 
Initiates, controls, and terminates 
fuel flow to the oxidizer preburner, 
Provides mixture ratio and thrust 
control. Fails static on loss of 
power. 
Failure to open at start. Low 
Premature closure, Low 
Failure to close at 
shutdown. 
Low 
Slow response; 
Erratic action, no respons 
to commands at steady 
state. Shift in position 
for given power demand. 
Low 
Internal and external 
leakage beyond spec 
limits. 
Low 
* Critical component 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
i.i.i.ii & 4.1.1.11 Oxidizer 
Control Valve, Oxidizer Pre-
burner* 
Controls oxidizer flow to the 
oxid. preburaer. One circuit 
controls flow to approx. MEL, 
the second controls above MPL. 
provides on-off as well as con­
tinuous flow contrbl. Fail 
close on loss of power. 
Fails to open at start 
Closes prematurely. 
low 
Low 
Failure to close at 
shutdown. 
Low 
Slow response, erratic 
operation. 
Low 
Internal and external 
leaks beyond spec. 
limits. 
* Critical component 
FAILURE9)DE AND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 
ASSEITBLY-1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SHEET i of 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILUREEFFECTON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOIMEiDAtIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER ECOMIENDATIONS 
MISSION 
OPERATIONS CRITICLITY 
CATEGORY 
Engine fails to start. Boostor 
Obiter 
Les 
Loss 
of 
of 
redundancy 
one engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Mission loss 
Valve position discrete Redundant motor winding, 
con.idered. 
should be Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
c(4) 
Premature engine shutdown. 
Possible preburnor, TPA, 
injector damagedue to high M R. 
Boostert 
Orbiter: 
Loss of 
Loss of 
redundancy 
one engine 
Soster 
Obitaer. 
o efict 
Mission loss 
Calve position anaog. anis vaive Is coigined to tail static.Premature losure requires a structural 
failure interns1ly hie would affect 
Orbiters A(4) 
B(4) 
C(MA) 
BoOSte. A()
c(23 
0(4) 
Continued fuel flow util 
main Valvecloses 
fuel NOeffet No effect. Valve position analog. 
pressure balance, not now identified 
plus a second failurein valve. Orbiter 
gooster. 
A(4) 
B(4)
C(2A) 
A") 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Pailure Es fellow M.R./thrust 
commands* Possible premature 
shutdown due to out-af-spec. 
engine. 
Toster. 
Orbiter 
__________________________C(4) 
Loss of redundancy Booster 
Loss of one engine Orbiter 
No effect 
Mission loss 
Valve position analog 
chamber pressure. 
preburner Same as above. 
Orie.B(4) 
Booster. A(4) 
B(3A) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
See text. Same as above. Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
0(4) 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 
SUBSYSTEM 
1.0& 4.0 
1 I &4.1 
ASSEMBLY 1.1.1 & 4 1 1 SHEET 1 of 
FAILURE EFFECT ON .ISSION. 
RECOMIIEhDATIOilSF R OPERATIONS-CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONVETHOD OTHERECOIHMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Engine falls to start Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss of redundancy. 
lss of ono engin. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
NO effect. 
Iission loss, 
Valve position discrete Recommend 
winding, 
considering redundant motor Booster A(4) 
B(21)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4)
B(4) 
C(ZA) 
Premature engine cutoff Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss 
Loss 
of redundancy 
of one engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No fect. 
Mission loss 
Valve position enalso. Sane a shove Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(ZA) 
Extended burn time - increased 
shutdown hpulse, internal engine 
damage due to high M.R.. in pre-
No effect, thrust 
msated properly, 
not to- Booster. 
Orbiter 
Possible vehicle 
separation difficulty. 
NOeffect duo to OS 
Valve position analog Sane as above Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(1) 
burner. and PC$ operation. 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Engine fails to respond to M.R./ 
thrust commands - out of spec 
condition with premature shut-
Booter 
Orbiter 
Possible loss 
redundancy 
Possible loss 
of 
of one 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect. 
Possible mission loss. 
Valve position analog 
chamber pressure 
Proburner Booster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
down (possible). engine Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
c(3) 
See text. 
ca 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1 1.12 & 4.1.1.12 Oxidizer 
Control Valve, Fuel Preburner 
Controls flow of oxidizer to fuel 
preburner. Provides on-off as 
well as continuous control. One 
circuit provides for flow up to 
MPL, and a second provides control 
above MPL. Valve is powered open, 
powered for main stage and 
powered to close, OR will close on 
loss of power. 
Fails to open at start. 
Closes prematurely. 
Low 
Low 
Failure to close at 
shutdown. 
Low 
Slow response, erratic 
operation, shift in 
position for a given 
power demand. 
Low 
Leakage, internal and 
external, beyond spec 
limits. 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTE4 MISSION RECOMMEINDATIONSFORDETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS DCATEGRY 
Engine fails to start. Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Loss of oe engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Mission loss 
Valve position discrete, 
in start sequence. 
Recommend redundant 
be considered. 
motor windings Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
C (ZA) 
Pre..trm engine shotdown. Boosters 
Orbiter. 
N. effet 
loss of con engine 
aoet. r 
Orbiter 
NO erac 
Mission loss 
Valve 
valve 
peaiLo discrete, 
position anelog 
BoOSter A(4) 
B(2B)teM) 
Orbitzer: A(4) 
B(4) 
Extended burn time - incraased 
shutdown impelse, internal engine 
damage duo to high H R. in 
Thrust not terminated properly. Booster 
Orbiter. 
Possible vehicle 
eparation difficulty 
No effect - OHSand 
Valve position a.log, -. Booster: A(4) 
BO(B)C(I 
prencrnst RCS compensate 
Orbiter : A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Engine fail, to respond to M.t./ 
thrust commands. Out-of-eoc 
condition with possible premature 
shutdown. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Possible loass 
redundancy 
Possible loss 
engine 
of 
of one 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Possible mission loss 
Valve position analog. 
Preburner chamber pressure, 
Preburner chamber temperature. 
Recommend redundant 
be considered. 
motor windings Booster: A(4) 
B(3) 
C() 
Orbiter. A(4) 
e(3) 
See tort. 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT 
FUNCTIONN 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
OCUROFCMALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1 1.1.14-1 & 4.1.1.14-1 
Interconnect Articulating 
Lines. Low Pressure Fuel TPA 
Discharge Line 
Duct fuel from LPFTPA to inlet of 
HPFTPA. Provide flexibility for 
gimballing and misalignment. Vac-
uum jacketed to control fuel qual­
ity, prevent formation of liquid 
air. 
Loss of vacuum due to 
rupture may be a line or 
bellows jacket. 
Low 
1.1.1.14-3 & 4.1 1.14-3 Low 
Pressure Fuel Turbopump Turbine 
Drive Lines 
Duct fuel from HPFTPA Ist and 3rd 
stages to turbine drive inlets on 
LPFTPA. Vacuum jacketed to control 
fuel quality and prevent formation 
of liquid air. 
Loss of vacuum due to 
rupture may be a line or 
bellows 
Low 
1.1.1.14-2 & 4.1.1.14-2 Low 
Pressure OTPA Discharge Line 
Duct oxidizer from L P. OTPA to in- Loss of vacuum jacket, ice 
let of H.P OTPA. Provide flexi- formation, with potential 
bility for gimballing and misalign- line rupture at gimballing 
ment. Bellows are vacuum jacketed cycle 
to prevent ice formation in convo­
lutions 
Low 
1.1 1.14-4 & 41.1.14-4 Low 
Pressure OTBA Turbine Drive 
Line 
Duct oxidizer from first stage dis-
charge of H.P. OTPA to Turbine in­
let of L.P OTPA Provide flexi­
bility for gimballing and misalign­
ment. Bellows are vacuum jacketed 
to prevent ice formation in convo­
lutions 
Same as above. Low 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0SUBSYSTEM I 1 & 4 1 ASSEMBLY1 I I & 4.1.1SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RECOIEIDATIONS FOR OPERATONSRITICALIT 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMIENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Possible failure to Booster 
start Liquid air 
foretton-safoty hazard, Orbiter 
possible effect on molded 
cables, hydraulic lines 
Liquid air formation-
safety hazard, possible 
effect on molded cables, 
Safety hazard loss of 
redundancy 
Safety hazard 
Depends upon analysis of safety 
.pet Possible launch delay 
Surface temperature aaurocent on each 
v..... a.. lion, or direct va....ares 
(Latter preferred di. to dsirability 
to know conditions prior to loading I 
Test vacuum at scheduled malntenance 
cycle Copartmenr pure may be 
adequate Launch delay mayb necessary 
Booster 
Orbiter 
A(4) 
B(2B) 
M(4) 
A(4) 
B(2B) 
0(4) 
hydraulic lines Beyond 
se altitude, proble. 
no longer xi.ta 
Sam as ebove Som as above Sa. a oab vo Sae abeve Sa as above Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
c(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Premature shutdown (Small lea 
A large rapture couldresultin 
major dmssge) Pre-valve closure 
would prevent further loss 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss of redundancy 
Loss of one engine 
Boostor 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Possible nission less 
Surface tomp sees or direct vacuum 
mass (latterpreferred) 
Check vacuum at ached saint cycle and 
afterdelivery to pad. Launch delay may 
be necessary Coprearsnt purge my 
preclude ice formation Frost would 
Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
save no effect Orbiter A(4)
R(4)
c(n) 
Same as above S as above Sam a v.s as above Same as above Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
R(4) 
GIZA) 
COMPONENT 
NAME 
IDENTIFICATION 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1 1 1 15-t 
Suction Line 
4.l.l.15-2a Fuel Duct tuel from eng./veh. inter-
face to LPF TPA. Protect fuel 
qualitv via a vacuum jacket. 
Prevent form. of liq. air. 
Loss of vacuum. Low 
1.1.1.15. 
I.l.2 ., 
1,1.3.2, 
1.1.o.4, 
1.1.S..., 
-.1.1.1.5 
l Other Lines as 
Identiried in 
Component Listing 
As described in component 
listings, 
Structural fatigue 
failure only. 
Low 
1.3 2 
.1 72 
.1..4 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS AIALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 
SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4.1 
ASSEMBLY 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SHEET 1 of 2 
FAILUREEFFECT ON MISSOd 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOIMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
Booster engine may fail to start Loss of redundancy. None. Vacuum checks at scheduled 
maintenance cycle. Fuel auction 
tasperara at str.(4) 
Booster: A(4) 
BI3) 
Orbitor A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
DRAINGFUNCTION 
DRAWING 
OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUMBER 
1.1 1.16 & 4 1.1.16 Oxidizer 
Recirculation Select Valve 
Provide recirculation prior to 
engine start, and flow oxid. from 
Failure to shuttle to 
recirC. position prior 
Low 
first stage H.P.O.TPA to LPO TPA to loading. 
turbine. 
Must be in turbine position prior 
to start. Fails to turbine 
position on power failure. 
Failure to shuttle to Low 
turbine position at 
start. 
FAILUREIME ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM: 1.0 & 4.0 ASSERBLY: 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SUBSYSTEM-1.1 a 4.1 SlIEr I ofI 
FAILURE EFFECT ON missxici 
RECOMMEi.OATIONSFOR p-TIO/ CRIICAIT 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMENDATIOIS C T If 
Propellant loading hold. -- probable mlon launch delay. Valve poitlo diatete. -- Boster: A(4) 
B(3)
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4 
BIB)
C(4) 
Engine fails to start Flow disruption in aid. foedline. Misson te minaton. I V.lve poaition discrer. Interlock ith start sequence. Booter: A(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4)
31,zs)
c(Z3) 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
FUNCTIONITYOO FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME DRAWINGNUMBER FUNCTION OFCOMPONE T PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.1.17 & 4.1.1.17 
circ. Select Valve 
Fuel Re- Provide on-off select of fuel 
recirc, line to tank or to 
L.P.F. TPA for start-assist 
Flows from third stage of H P.F. 
TPA must be in turbine position
prior to start. 
Failure to shuttle to 
recire. position prior 
to loading. 
Low 
Failure to shuttle to 
turbine position at 
start. 
Low 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS 	 SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY:1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 MEET 1 of 1 
FAILURE ONFFECT HISSIG4RECOOMIEhDATIONSFOR OPERAT1IONS
DETECTION 	 OTHERSUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 	 METHOD ECOIX*ERDATIONS CCATEGOY 
Propellant loading hold. 
-- Probable launch delay valve position discrete. 	 Interlock vitih loading- Broster.- A(4) 
ready sequence. B(3) 
C(4) 
orbiter: A(4) 
C(mA) 
Fails to start. Disruption of fuel flev in the Mission cermlnation. Valve position discrete. Intrlock gith start seqn. 
feel feed line.
 
TI 
ce 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION DANGFUNCTION OF FAILURE MODE 
_____________ PROBABILITY OF 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.1.18 & 4.1.1.18 
circ. Control Valve 
Fuel Re- Provide start transient control 
of fuel to L.P. TPA turbine to 
Fails to open for 
recirculation and 
Low 
assist in bootstrap period, start-up. 
Fails to off position. Shutoff 
not required. Fails to closed 
position on loss of power. 
Required to be open during
recirculation and loading
operation. Fails to close to minimum Low 
flow position after start. 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 &4.0 ASSEMBLY1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 SEET 1 of i 
FAILURE EFFECT ON ISSI 
RECOMMaENDATIONSFOR OPERAROS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OIHER RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Possible inadequate bleed-tn, 
failure to start. 
Booster 
Orbiter. 
Lose of redundancy 
Possible los of one 
engine 
Booter: 
Orbiter: 
Do effect 
Possible mission loss 
Valve position discrete. interlock with propellant loading 
sequence, and start sequence. 
Booster: A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
orbiter: A(4) 
8(a)C A 
Possible L.p F TPA overspin, 
cavitation, with premacure engine 
shutdown (depends upon bootstrap 
Boster-
Orbiter ° 
Loss of 
Loss of 
redundancy 
ene engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect I 
Possible mission loss 
Valve position discrete. Booster: A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
system design and regulator 
performance). Pressure 
regulation redundancy lost. 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(IA) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FUNCTION O FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1 1.1.19 & 4.1.1.19 
circ. Regulator 
Fuel Re- Limit the pressure in the recirc. 
line ahead of the bellows, select 
valve, and turbine drive/tank 
Fails to regulate pressure. Low 
press, system. 
(See 1.1.1.19 Recirc. ControlValve.) Provides redundant 
pressure regulation. 
Low 
Fails to open during Low 
recirculation. 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 ShEET i of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR MISSIOOPERATIOS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHERRECOiMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
O effect . 
redundancy provided by 
control valve. 
recite. 
NO effect U0 effect Pressure, regulator output. -- Booster A(4) 
-(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(',) 
B(4)C(4) 
If double failure occurs, the Both 
L P.P TPAwould overspin, 
and potentially te bello.s 
section would fail. Engine lass 
Pos.fible fire. 
(Depends upon design of bellows -
if it can withstand fullpressure, 
the only effect is presatoro 
Engina loss. Both Pos.ible hazardous 
condition. 
Misslon termination. 
Pressure, regulator output. Low pressure portion should be 
designed to take full pressure. 
L DP. TPA overepln tripshould be 
utilized. 
Genster: 
Orbiter: 
A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(I 
A(4) 
3(4) 
0(1 I 
engine shutdown.) 
Improper chill down 
failure to start is 
-
possble. 
Booster 
Obiter 
Loss 
Loss 
of redundancy 
of o.e ..g. . 
Booster. 
Orbiter 
Se effect 
Possible mission loss 
Bleed point temperature, 
recirculation line. 
possibly in -- eoostr: A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(ZA) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
1.1.2.1 & 
4.1.2,1 Main injector 
Uniformly distribute TPA exhaust 
gases flowing from gas distribution 
plate and oxygen discharged from 
H.P.O.T.P.A. first stage, into 
combustion chamber, 
1.1.2.2 & 
4.1.2.2 Main Combustion 
Chamber 
L 
Contain internal pressures and 
transmits thermal loads from 
combustion gases to fuel regener-
ative coolant. Contains side 
loads. Transmits loads from nozzle 
to main injector, and provides 
forward support of nozzle extension 
drive mechanism. 
1.1.2.3 Booster Nozzle Remove heat from combustion gas by 
regen. cooling. Transmit thrust, 
side, and thermal loads to com­
bustion chamber. Condition coolant 
for fuel tank pressurization. 
4.1.2.4 Orbiter Nozzle Same as 1 1.2.3. Transmit forces 
from extendible nozzle to 
combustion chamber. 
1.1.2.5 & 
4.1.2.5 Gas Distribution Plate 
Uniformly distribute high pressure 
TPA turbine exhaust gases flowing 
from the hot gas manifold to the 
main injector. 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1) Crack in lox channel 
with burning upstream 
of face 
2) Oxid. torus crack or 
rupture 
3) Orifice plugging 
(secondary failure) 
1) Crack internally with 
fuel loss into chamber 
2) Inter-channel leakage 
(Both of above would 
result in loss of 
cooling efficiency) 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Same as above. Low 
Same as above. Low 
Cracking or deformation 
with nonuniform flow 
distribution to injector. 
Low 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMLY 1.1.2 & 4.1.2 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 SHEET of 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMNEIDATIONSF R 
MISSI,I 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMIENDATIONS CATEGORY 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Loss of eginc-premature 
shutdw 
Abrupt engine loss 
Premature shutdown 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Booster. Lose of redundancy. 
Orbiter: Loss of one engine. 
Multiple engine loss 
Booster: No effect 
Orbiter: Loss of one engine 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Booster. 
Orbiter: 
Possible 
Booster 
Orbitar: 
No effect 
Mission loss 
loss of vehicle/crw 
No effect 
loss of mission 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Oxid 
--
MiR , 
flow, Be; I.,, .R 
hdaber pressure 
Inspection and leak checks at 
scheduled maint cycle 
Booster: 
Orbiter. 
A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(I ) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(L ) 
Loss of performance 
shutdown 
with premature Booster. 
Orbiter-
Loss 
Loss 
of redundancy 
of one engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
to effect 
Mission loss 
Mixture ratio, C* san. as above Booster- 11) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
O(2A) 
Same as above Some as above Same as above Seae as above Same as ebove. Booster: A(4) 
0(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)O(IA) 
Same as above. Snen s above. gets as above. Same as above Same at above. Booster: A(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(m) 
loss of performance may be 
sufficient to cause out of spee 
performance short of total 
Boster 
Orbiter 
Lss of redundancy 
Possible loss of one 
engine 
Booster: 
Orbiter: 
No effect 
Possibla mission loss 
Chamber pressure, C*, I 
P 
Visual inspection not very proctical. 
Run-to-run perforaance oeuparisons 
by trend analysis is reoemndd 
Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
structural collapse. 
Orbiter: A(4) 
3(4)C(m4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION RAIGFUNCTION OF FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.3.1 & 4.1.3.1 Igniter, Provides ignition source for main Fails to ignite Low 
Main Combustion Chamber* combustion chamber 
Continues to burn. 
 Low
 
Hard start. Low
 
* Critical components 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY1 1 3 & 4 1.3 
SUBSYSTEM1 I &4 1 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION RECORMEIDATIONS FORDETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIOINS OPERATIONS CCAO Y 
CATEGORY 
Engine fails to tasr Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss of redundancy 
Loss of one engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effoct 
M sion loss 
Valvo position discrete, ignition do--
toetor, ignitr current main conbustion 
Booter 
Bs 
A(4)(21) 
chamber pressure C(4) 
main TcA Burnout, loss of per-
formance, pressture shurdoes 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss 
Loss 
o redundancy 
of oe engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No affect 
Mission loss 
Seao as above, plus 
sntsennco cycle 
leek checks at Recommend redundant valves be considered 
Orbiter 
Booster 
A(4)
B(4)
C(2A) 
A(4) 
(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
Capable of 
start 
ithstrnding hard No effoct Mo effeot Laok check at mainsteonco 
C C pressure 
cycle, win Booster 
B(4)C(2A) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME DRAWINGNUMBER 
1 1 3.2 & 4.1.3.2 Fuel 
Preburner Igniter* 
FUNCTION OF
COMPONENT 

Provide ignition source for fuel 

preburner at start. Operates 

from oxidizer and fuel propel­
lant inlet, valve cowarand, and
 
28 vdc.
 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Fails to ignite or pre-
mature loss of ignition. 
Low 
Continues to burn. Low
 
Hard start due to leakage Low
 
in oxidizer valve beyond
 
spec. limit.
 
* Critical component 
FAILUREMODEANDRFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 1 3 & 4 1 3 
SUBSYSTEM 1 1 & 4 1 ShEET I of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIOR 
RECOMMELDATIMOSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALNY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Engine fails to start, 
hil M.R and internal 
daage 
possible 
engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss 
Los 
of redundancy. 
of o engine. 
B.oos.ter 
Orbiter 
No effect. 
Mission loss. 
Bxid vaLve position discrete pro-
burner chamber pressure ignition 
detector 
Redundant oxidizer 
conidered 
valve should be Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
Preat.re hut 4o of engine Booster Loss of redundancy. Booster No effect. Oxidizer valve position discrete. -- Booster A(4) 
due to loss of power. Orbier Loss of one engine Orbiter Mission loss B(2B)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
Engine capable of withstanding 
limited hard start 
Boost r 
Orbiter. 
No effoct 
No effect 
Boo ter 
Orbiter 
No effect 
No effect 
leek checks at mAintenance cycle, 
preburner clamber pressure 
-- Booster A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
0(4) 
C 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MRALCION OCCREC 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1 3 3 & 4.1.3.3 
Preburner Igniter 
Oxidizer Provides ignition source for 
oxidizer preburner at start. 
Operates from oxidizer and fuel 
propellant inlet, valve command 
and 28 vdc. 
Fails to ignite or pre- 
mature loss of ignition. 
tow 
Continues to burn. low 
Hard start due to leakage 
in oxidizer valve beyond 
spec limit. 
Low 
FAILURE MODE ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLYW3 M 4.1 3 
SUBSYSTEM I 1 . 4 1 SHEET 1 of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
SUBSYTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMIIEHDATIONS FOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS 
OPERTIORS 
M" CATEGORY 
Engine fails to start. Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss 
Loss 
of redundancy 
of one angein. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Mission loss 
Oxidizer valve position discrete, 
preburner chamberprssure ignition 
Redundant o'Idizer 
considered. 
valve should be Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
detector 0(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)C(2A) 
Premature shutdc.n of engine 
due to loss of power. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
oss 
Loss 
of redundancy 
of one engine 
Booster 
Orbicer 
No effect 
Mission loss. 
Oxidizer valve position discrete -- Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
0(2A) 
Engine capable of withstanding 
limited hard start 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
No effect. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
No effect. 
Leak checks at maintenanco 
Preburner chamber pressure 
cycle. -- Booster A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
1.1.4 1 & 4 1 4 1 Gimbal 
Block 
NAMEDRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
Transfer loads from all gimballed 
components to vehicle. 
PRIMARY 
Bearing failure. 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PAL TY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
1.1 4.2 & 4 1 4 2 Gimbal 
Actuator and Power Pack * 
Positions the rocket engine for 
thrust vector control 
Actuator goes hardover 
and remains there. 
Low 
No response of actuator to 
command (remains at null). 
Low 
Unstable actuator position 
(oscillation) 
Low 
Unmodulated actuator posi-
tion (full extend or full 
retract positions only). 
Low 
Slow response Medium 
* Critical componento 
FAILURE MODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 1 4 & 4 1 4 
SUBSYSTEM 1 I & 4 1 SHEET I of 2 
FAILUREFFECT ON MISSIOd 
RECOIMENDATIONS FOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSIOn DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS C"CAORCATEGORY 
Requires 
engine 
excessivetorquetomove Possible sluggish engine position 
response 
None Actuator position as compared to com-
mond (roa) 
InstallAP transducer across actuator 
piston, utilize in ground testing with 
Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
rop rcrront meaurestme 0(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B4)
0(4) 
Possible Stuetural Do a.e Booster 
Orbter 
Loseof TVC on one 
. engine 
Unable to coetrol velh-
cle Engine shutdown 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No affect (vompenseted 
by flightcontrolsys-
to) 
Mission lossa,failsafe, 
Actuator position .aa...u.r 
to command 
compased Booster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
required increased burn timeof 
iatLuLn engine 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(3) 
c(2A) 
Lose of TVOon one engine No effecr (compensated by fli1 ht Some as above Booster A(4) 
control system) B(3)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Oscilleaion of engine thrust 
vector 
Oscillatory excitation of vehicle 
(until actuator can be locked in 
null., thenno effect) 
Actuator position 
for oscillation 
measurement analyzed Lock actuator in null position when 
this failuremode is detected -
Booster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Possible Structural Damoe Unstable thratr vector in one 
plane 
Pos.ble vehicle flight in.cebil- Actuator position
ity (until actuator can be looked to commeend 
-. asuremn compared Lock acuautor in null position when 
this failure mode is detected 
Booste r A(4) 
B(3) 
in null, then no effect) 0(4) 
orbiter A(4) 
BIB)0(4) 
Poor TVC No effcect(assume compensation by 
flight control system) 
Same as above Booster A(4)
R(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Excessive null shift. Medium 
Loss of position accuracy Low
 
(hysteresis).
 
Actuator fails to lock at Low
 
null when engine is shut
 
down. 
Actuator fails to lock at Low
 
null when coinnanded (to 
correct for mission effects
 
of other failure modes) 
FAILURENODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 
SUBSYSTEM 1 1 & 4 1 
ASSEMBLY1 14 & 4 1 4 
ShEET 2 of 2 
SUBSYSIEM 
FAILUREEFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOIDM4EOATIONSFOR 
DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOIIMENDATIONS 
MISSIO 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
Poor TVC No effoct So. as above Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
Poor rVC Loss of plght control stability 
margln (until actuator can be 
locked in null, lhn no effect) 
Sane as aovo lock actuator in null position when 
this failure modo is detected 
Booster 
"(4)
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
0(4) 
Orbiter A(4)B(3) 
Possible Structural Damage Actuator cull position switch Booster 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Ona engine shutdown nocessary to 
correct for vehicle oscillation 
Booster No effect 
Orbiter Masaiss la., fal safe,increased burn tito of 
reonaintng engine 
Actuator aull position switch 
Orbiter 
Booster 
Orbiter 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(2A) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT 
1.1.5.1 & 4.1 5 1 Engine Provides power distribution, 
Controller management of data from vehicle 
and engine, and data processing.
Provides interface to enable 
engine to respond to vehicle 
commands and for receipt and 
distribution of electrical power. 
Performs start and stop sequencing 
of engine. Provides thrust, mix-
ture ratio, and TVC in response 
to vehicle commands. Aids in 
POGO suppression. Provides 
checkouts necessary to respond 
to vehicle with engine-ready 
signal. Automatic nulling and 
locking the engine on shutdown. 
Initates shutdown based on checks 
and monitoring. 
FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
First failure in any 
module results in: 
Medium 
a) loss of one data in­
put channel redun­
dancy, 
b) loss of one 16 chan­
nel module; 
c) Loss of one total 
channel; 
d) loss of channel 
switching 
Second failure of like- Low 
module (excludes C.C.U. ­
only one module). 
FAILURE OE A(D EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM: 1.o & 4-0 ASSEILY: 1.1.5 & 4.1.5 
SIWSU: 1.1 &4.1 SIUT i or 
FAILURE EFFECT ON mJSSa" 
RECO4E,DATIONS FOR PERATIW CALIT 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEIM MISSION DETECTIONI4ETHOD OlIER RECOaEENDATIOIS CATEGOR 
los of relemoaney. No effect. oter/Odoite: Possible 
delay. 
hournb ateornal checik 
codales. 
xoveal status of ooser: A(4) 
R() 
C(4) 
Corrt: A(4) 
B(2m) 
Prenature rogine sbhutdoin. Booe.e: 
Obiter : 
Itoss 
sLoe 
of tredundarcy 
of rengine. 
Deatre: 
Orbiter: 
No effect 
lossible mission lon. 
Ss as abovr. Soos:t. A(4) 
s(2) 
C(4) 
Orbitr:, A(4) 
C(2&) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.5.2-1 & 4.1.5.2-1 Ignition 
Control Harness (Excluding 
Ignition Valve Control) Fuel 
Preburner Oxid Preburner, Main 
Combustion Chamber 
Conduct 28 vdc from engine con-
troller to spark exciter on com-
mand. 
Loss of continuity, or high 
resistance in primary har­
ness, or loss of conduction 
due to short. 
Low 
Loss of redundant harness Low 
1.1.5.2-2 & 4.1.5.2-2 Valve 
Control Harness (All Electric 
Valves) 
Conduct do and ac power from con-
troller to valves 
See individual valves -
Failure mechanisms of har­
ness result in loss of 
power conduction, which is 
a fail-to-operate or pre­
mature closure mode in­
cluded under each electric 
valve. 
Low 
* Critical components 
_________________________ 
MODE EFFECTS SYSTEM: ASSEMLY:FAILURE AND ANALYSIS 1 0 & 4 0 1.1.5 & 4.1.5SIBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 SEE I of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON tISSO I 
RECO.E:DATIONS FORSUBSYSTEM SYSTEM OPERATIOn CRIEICRLIWMETHODMISSION DETECTION RECOMMENDATIONSOTIHER MAEGOAT 
loss of redundancy in ignition None No. Ignitor coret Doostor: A(4) 
system 
 B(4)
 
C(4)
 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
Engine fails to reach ML Boote, Loss of redundancy Boester No effect Igniter current Boosa r: A(4)Orbiter Loss of oce engine Orbiter: ision los 3(=) 
c(4) 
Orbirtr A(4) 
_________________________C(2A) 
1L, 
NQ 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAEDRAWING NUMBER FUNCTION OF COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1.5.3 & Harness (Control 
4.1 5.3 Instrumentation) 
Provide electrical connection 
between transducers and engine 
controller inputs (primary signal 
path). 
Open circuit, 
Short circuit. 
Low 
Loss of insulation 
resistance 
Medium 
Secondary signal path, Same as above. Low 
FAILURE lODE ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY1.1.5 & 4 1.5 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 &4 1 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OThERRECOMMNDATIONS - CATEGORY 
toss of redundancy Wo effect f deterred prior to engine 
possible launch delay. 
srr- Shnt calibrations, 
redundant channels 
plus comparison of - Boostr 1(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
Loss 0£ redundancy No effect If detected prior to engine start Shunt calibrations, plus comparison of Booster: A(4) 
possible launch delay redundant channn1 B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4)
5(4) 
Pro.turn onsno shudu Booster tosr of rcdondoncy a.o.ter No eff. ..So o,' A(4) 
Orbiter Loss of one ongine Orbiter Possible mission Ioss B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
c(24) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________C___m_ 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
AHE 
DRAWINGNUMBER FUNCTION OFCOMPONENT 
FUNCTON 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODEOFPROBABILITY 
REDUNDANT 
OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1 1.5.4 & 4.1.5.4 Sensors 
Pressure (continued) 
- Provide pressure data for control 
loops (primary). 
Change of output sensi-
tivity with pressure. 
Medium 
1 1.5.4 & 4.1.5.4 
Pressure 
Sensors - Provide pressure data for control 
loops (primary). (Backup) 
Loss of signal; reduction 
of sensitivity; zero off-
Low 
set (appears as a change
in sensitivity during 
operation); change of out­
put sensitivity with 
pressure. 
1.1.5.4 & 4.1.5.4 Sensors - Provide temperature data for Sensitivity change. Low 
Temperature mixture ratio control loop 
(primary). 
Open circuit. Low 
1.1.5.4 & 4 1.5.4 Sensors - Provide temperature data for Sensitivity change; 	 Low 
Temperature 	 mixture ratio control loop open circuit.
 
(primary). (Backup)
 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 &4 0 ASSEBLY- 1 1.5 &4.1 5 
SUBSYSTEM1 1 &4 1 SHEET2 of 2 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS 
fISSIOn 
OPERTIONSSCATEGORY CRITIcALITY 
Loss of redundancy - minor in-
croase In error band of mixture 
ratio control 
No effect No effect Comparison of redundant data. Booster: A(4) 
H(4)
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B1(4)
C(4) 
Loss of controls 
shutdo.n 
premature Booster 
Orbiter 
Lose 
toss 
of 
of 
redundeacy 
one engine 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
Possible mission loss 
Requires comparison wLthin controller 
of at least a third parameter 
Boaster A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
0(24) 
Desn of redundany -minor in-
crease in error bond of mirturo 
ratio control 
No0 itct. It detect ad prier to cas 
start, laeh delay possible 
ce.apars of redundat data Weoster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
OrUre. A(4) 
23(4) 
C(4) 
Same as above. Sane as above Sa a above Same as above Booster. A(4) 
B3(4) 
c(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
Le. of control 
surdomn. 
Preature Booster 
Orbiter-
o s 
loss 
of redundancy 
of one engine 
Booaster 
Orbiter. 
No affect. 
Possible mission loss 
Requires coparsonla. 
third paraeeter 
th at least a Boaster A4(4) 
3(2)
C(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
IN(4) 
C(24) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
1.1 5.4 & 4.1 5.4 Sensors -
Flow (turbine meters) 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
Provide volumeric flow data for 
mixture ratio control loop. 
FAILURE MODE 
PRIMARY 
Loss of signal, one coil. 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
N 
Low 
Erratic output signal, 
loss of signal (in both 
coils simultaneously); 
or loss of output from 
second coil after loss 
from first coil. 
Low 
1.1.5.4 & 4.1.5.4 Sensors -
Pressure 
Provide pressure data for control 
loops (primary). 
Loss of signal. Low 
Zero offset. Medium 
Reduction of sensitivity. Low 
Improper output from shunt 
steps. 
Medium 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4.0 ASSEROLY1.1 5 Q 4 1.5 
SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4 1 SHEET I of 2 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIOR 
REOMEDATIONS FOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTTER RECOMMIENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Loss of redundancy - minor in-
crease In error band of mixture 
No effect. If detected prior to engine 
start - launch delay possible 
Continuity check Comparison 
redundant coil output 
vitli Booscr A(4) 
BE(3) 
ratio control C(4) 
Orbtr: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
LObssof redundant flog.eas. 
Use of bacup sy.t results 
in an increased error band 
Booster 
Orbite 
No effect. 
Na offect. 
Dooster. 
Orbiter 
No effect 
f eaffet. 
Comparison of both coils Booster: A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
in M R. control 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Loss of redundancy, minor in.-
crase in error bnd of mixture 
No ffect If detected prior to engine 
start, launch delay possible 
Comparison of redundant date Channels. 
shunt calib check may be used on 
Booster. A(4) 
B(2B) 
ratio control. ground tests. C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4)0(4) 
° 
Some as above Same as above Same as above Same as above Booster A(4)B(2B) 
0(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
0(4) 
Sane as above Same as above. Same as above Sme,. above Booster: A(4)SCaB) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Same as above Some as above Saie as aboa Same as above Booster A(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4)
B(4) 
C(4) 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
DRAWING ~~FUNCTIONOF FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OFMLUCINOCREC 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1,6 1 Fuel Tank Pressurant Prevent backflow of tank Gls into Failure to open. Low 
Check Valve engine. 
Failure to close at Medium 
shutdown. 
1 1 6.2 Oxidizer Tank Fres- Prevent backflow of tank gox into Failure to open. Low 
surant Check Valve. engine 
Failure to close Medium 
1.1.6 3 Oxidizer Meat Heat oxidizer to desired thermo- No primary failure mode Low 
Exchanger dynamic conditions for main oxid other than gross struc­
tank pressurization tural 
1 1 6 4 Interconnect Lines Conduct fuel rich gas to and from All: No primary failure Low 
Hot Cas Inlet 1 1.6.3. Conduct oxid to 1 1 6.3. mode other than gross 
Hot Gas Outlet Conduct oxid from 1 1.6 3 to in- structural 
Oxid Inlet 
Oxid Tank Pressure 
terface. Conduct OH2 from check 
valve to interface. 
Fuel Tank Pressure 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1 0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY- 1 1 0 & 4 1 6 
SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4.1 SHEET 1 of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSld 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS'FOR DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS OPERATIONS CRITICALITY CATEGORY 
1% flow now goes through engine 
Slight change in I R 
Assuming one engine can supply 
sufficient gas for tank NO 
effect 
No effect Valve position discrete. Need check valves with built-in prox-
imity sensors 
Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
c(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(2B) 
GUs in manifold volume would ox-
bhoot our of malfunctionidg check 
valve No adverse effort 
Tank exhaust thrugh nozzle On 
reentry propellant tank would 
probably collapse Inability to 
fill at adequate rate 
Possible rentery hazard, 
termination 
mission Valve position discrete, 
achedmaint cycle 
lok chock at Redundant sbutoff required Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(IS) 
Orbitec A(4) 
B(4)
0(15) 
Same as above Samea be Sa a bove Same as abvo Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Same as above excePt that manifold 
volae would be evacuated only 
when oxid valves are opened 
Sameas bov Sane as above Same as above Sameas above Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(1S) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)C(1S) 
.... System leak check. at sched -lt Design and test for adequate safety Booster A(4) 
cycle argin B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
------ Sam as above B-ooster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FUNCTION 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT 
1.1.7.1-la Preburner Oxidizer 
Purge Solenoid 
Valve 
Provides helium to preburners. 
Oxidizer circuit downstream of 
shutoff. For purging prior to 
FSt and after FSe, purge is on 
prior to launch on both stages, 
and orbiter purge remains on 
during boost phase. 
FAILURE MODE 
PRIMARY 
Fails to open at start, 
or premature closure at 
start. 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Fails to close at start 
of engine. 
Low 
Fails to open at shutdown, 
or premature closure. 
Low 
Fails to close after 
shutdown. 
Low 
Operates slowly. Low 
FAILUREMODEAD EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY1.1.7 & 4.1.7 
SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4.1 SHEET I of 3 
FAILUREFFECTON MISSIO 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS OPERATIONS CRITICALITY CATEGORY 
Possible failure to come to NPL 
due to icing in platelets 
Engine cutoff. Possible hard 
start. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss of redundancy 
Loss of one ensine 
Booster. NO effect 
Orbitert Possible mission loss 
Valve position discrece. Interlock with launch sequence 
Consider parallel redundant valves 
Booster: 
Orbiter 
A(4) 
B(2B) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
H(4) 
No effectat start. 
Check valve prevencsback-flow of 
lox No effect at sbutdnwa. 
Shutoff redundancy lost. 
(See check valve analysis.) 
No effect. No effect. Valve position discrete .. Booster: 
Obirer. 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(4)C(4) 
Prebuner face burning. 
Possible turbine damage 
No effect No effect. Valve positien discrete. Would require inspection at 
maintenance cycle. 
next Booster; A(4) 
B(4) 
Orbiter 
C(4)
A(4) 
B(4)C(4) 
No affect None. System valve 
shut off. 
must be No effect. Valve position discrete. Stage shutoff redundancy. Beoster: A(4)
s(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
c(4) 
Possibly same effect as 
to open at shutdown, 
failure No effect NOeffect. Valvo position analog. Examination of valve trace would reveal 
time sensitive wear changes. 
Booster. A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
w
 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 	 FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF
 
FUNCTIONMALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT
 
1.1.7.1-lb & 4.1.7.1-lb rrovideo helium purge to entire Fails to open prior to Low
 
Main TCA Fuel Purge Solenoid engine system fuel circuits start, or premature

Valve 	 downstream of main fuel valve. closure at start.
 
Required prior to FSi for air/
 
moisture evacuation; Post-FS2 to
 
control shut down mixture ratio.
 
Operates on 28 vdcleommad,
 
fails closed on loss of power. Fails to close at start. Low
 
Opens slowly at start. 	 Low
 
Fails to open at shutdown, Low 
or premature closure at 
shutdown. 
Fails to close after Low
 
purge complete.
 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY 1.1.7 & 4.1.7 
SUBSYSTEM 1.1& 4.1 ShEET 2 of 3 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION RECOMMENDATIORS FORDETECTIONIETHOD OTHERRECOIRENDATIOIS 
MISSION 
OPEEATIUNS CIIALITYCCA YCATEGORY 
looster 
Orbiter 
Probable liquid air in 
fuel y te. at start, 
probabledetonation 
No effect 
Booster 
Orbiter. 
Possible failure to 
start due to ice in 
system 
No effect 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Probable loss of 
rodundancy 
No effect 
Valve position discrete Interlock with start equeaa Booster 
Orbiter. 
A(4) 
B(2B)0(4)C(4) 
(altitude start) B(4) 
, B(4)C  
Check valve provides shutoff 
redundancy. Slight change in 
start characteristic due to 
excess heli. 
No effect 
race. 
No effoct. Valve position discrete 
haf..C(4) 
. ooster A(4) 
(4)
0(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)c  
No effect. No effect. No effect. Valve position disacrte, .. Booster A(4) 
with functional check at maintenance 
cycle. 
B(4) 
0(4) 
Possible M R. problem resulting 
in main injector damage. 
No affect. No effect. Valve position discrete ain injector inspection at 
maintenanceecle. 
Orbiter 
Booster 
A(4) 
R(4)
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
.(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
No effect. Exessilvehellus usage No affect. Valve position discrete. Dooster 
C(4) 
A(4)
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter' A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 

NAEDRAWING 

NAME NUMBER 
4
1.1.7 i-ic & .1.7.1-ic 

Main TCA Oxidizer Purge 

Solenoid Valve 

FUNCTION OF 

COMPONENT 

Provide on-off control of helium 

purge to main combustion chamber 

oxidizer passages, to prevent ice
 
formation and H2 entry prior to
 
start, and to control mixture
 
ratio at shutdown.
 
FAILURE MODE 
PRIMARY 
Fails to open prior to 
start. 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Fails to close prior to 
start. 
Low 
Fails to open at shutdown 
or'opens slowly at 
shutdown, or premature 
closure. 
Low 
Fails to close after 
shutdown. 
Low 
Opens slowly at start. Low 
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FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEfl MISSION 
RECWOIEIDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOIIMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS 
~CTEGORY 
Possible los, of chamber 
performance. 
Burnout with premature shurdown. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
loss of redundancy 
No effect 
(altitude start) 
No effect Valve position discrete. Interlock with start sequence. Boster: 
Orbiter 
A(4) 
B(ll) 
C(4) 
A(4)
B(4)
0(4) 
Check valve provides shutoff 
redundancy, slight change in 
starte characteristic. 
No effect. No efect. Valve position discrete. .. ooster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter' A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Probable injector damage. No effect. No effect. Valve position discrete Injector inspection at maintenance Oooster A(4) 
cycle, possible malfunctioning engine 
on next flight 
Orbiter: 
B(4) 
0(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
No effect. Excessive use of Ols No effect. Valve position discrete 
-- Booster A(4) 
1(4) 
O(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
D(4) 
C(4) 
No effect. No effet. No effect. Valve position discrete Probably will open slowly 
Functional at maintenance 
at shutdown. 
cycle 
gooter. A(4) 
H(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
B(4) 
G(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FUNCTION OF 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT 
1 1 7 1-ld High Pressure OTPA Provide on-off control of helium 
Cavity Seal Purge Valve, purge to the cavity seal between 
Solenoid. the oxidizer and fuel effluent 
from the high pressure OTPA pump 
and turbine, for overboard dump. 
To be on prior to loading propel­
lants and during engine burn, 
booster and orbiter. This valve iE 
is designed to fail open. 
energized open.)l 
(tn­
1 1 7 1-le Engine System Purge Provide on-off control of purge 
Control Solenoid Valve. gases to main fuel and oxidizer 
suction lines prior to propellant 
loading. Selects: 1) Fuel Line, 
2) Oxid line, 3) Both on, 4) 
All off. 28 vdc valve, multiple 
inputs, fails to all-off position 
on power loss Valve must be in 
"both-on" position prior to pro-
pellant loading, and must be in 
off position at the start of load­
ing. 
1 1.7.1-lf Two-Way GNa/GHe Provide selection of GN2 or GHe as 
Select Solenoid Valve. purge gas, prior to propellant 
loading, and during flight Fails 
in GHe position with loss of power 
Must be in GHe position prior to 
fuel purging, and prior to prop. 
loading. 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Failure to open prior to 
loading propellants and 
engine start. 
Low 
Fails to actuate to oxid 
position. (Or "both") 
Low 
Fails to actuate to fuel 
position (or "both") 
Low 
Fails to return to off 
position at loading 
Low 
Fails to shuttle to GN2 
position, or to return to 
GHe position. 
Low 
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FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION RECOIMEIDATIONSFOR DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OPERATIONS CRITICALITY CATEGORY 
Possible detonation at start 
(See racomdtions Launch delay Valve position discrete Interlock with leading sequence ready system Loading should not proceed vn-
Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
lessthis valve indicates open C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Pos.Ible moisture in system Es-
gins fails to someto full power. 
possible TPA damage due to plugged 
passages Premature shutdown 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Launch delay 
Las..h delay 
Booster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
No effect 
Valve position dieretes Interlock with loading ready signal; 
establish procedures 
Booster A(4) 
I(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B() 
Sara as above Sae as above Some as above Som as above Same as above Booster 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
.(3)
c(4) 
Ielium would enterfuel,o id, or 
both su.tion lines during leading 
No effect 
-- Possible launch delay Valve position discrete Interlock "off" position with loading 
ready signal 
Boaster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
No effect Interlock system and 
procedure resuires Gio position for 
preload purge Excessive use of 
Coe on ground if valve failed to 
shuttle to G 
0 
e position 
.... Valveposition discrete - booster 
Orbiter: 
A(4) 
B(C) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(0) 
C(4) 
I 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
1.1.7.l-2a & 4.1.7.1-2a 
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer 
Inlet Purge check Valve 
NAMEDRAWING 
NUMBER 
FAILURE MODE 
FUNCTION OF 
FUNCTIONO OFURRNCCOMPONENT PRIMARY 
Prevent backflow of oxid from Fails to open during pre-
reaching purge shutoff valve, and start purge.
from reaching fuel preburner check 
valve Must flow through during 
purging. 
REDUNDANT 
c, 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Fails to close after pre-
start purge. 
Low 
Fails to open at postfire 
purge. 
Low 
Fails to close after post-fire purge. Low 
1.1.7.1-2b & 4.1.7.1-2b Fuel 
Preburner Oxidizer Inlet 
Purge Check Valve 
Prevent backflow of oxidizer from 
reaching purge solenoid valve, 
Must flow-through during purge 
Failure to open at start of 
purge before FS-l 
Low 
Failure to close at end of 
prestart purge. 
Medium 
Failure to open at shut-
down purge after FS-2. 
Low 
Failure to close at shut- Low
 
down purge.
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SUBSYSTEM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOIIEIDATIONS FOR 
DETECTIONMETIOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS 
MISSION 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
PossIble foration of ice in in-
jector, low perfornes, engine 
say fail to scat 
ooster Possible loss of 
redundancy 
Orbiter No effect 
Io effect Valve position discrete, functional 
chocks at enint cycle with On 
No known check valves 
don indicators 
.ade with pos- Boaster A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(A 
Possible cross flow of oxidizer to 
fuel preburnor circuit, with nix-
cure ratio control probles Loss 
of shutoff redundancy 
No effect No effect Look chock at caint cycle Cross-flow depends upon opening &P in 
check valve design 
toaster 
Orbiter: 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
Possible injector 
turbine danago 
face burning and No effect No effect Volvo position discrete 
clbear pressure 
preburnor Effect is on subsequent flight 
(potentially). 
Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter- A(4) 
U(4) 
C(4) 
No effect Ia effect No affect .. Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
0(4) 
Orbiter- A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
Possible failure Io start due to 
ice forction, engine fails to 
cone to NPL Engine cutoff poss -
bie hard start 
rooster 
Orbiter 
Laes 
Loss 
of redundancy 
of one engine 
boster 
Orbiter 
No effect 
rosible asion loss 
Valve position discrete Interlock with start sequence Bater-
Orbiter 
A(4) 
B(2B) 
(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
No effect Lox/gox trappedin 
line to solenoid valve untilshut-
dow Loss of shutoff redundancy 
in bockflow wade. 
Io effect No effect 
-. 
-- Booster-
Orbiter-
A(4) 
B(4)
0(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Possible 
dcage 
preburner or turbine No effect No effect Valvo position discrete f 
to. at sainc cycle 
nelional ay.- Affects no.e flishc, potentially. Boostor A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
c(4) 
NO offect No effect NO effect Booster A(4) 
Orbiter-
B(4)
C(4) 
A(4) 
______________________________C(4) B(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.1 7.1 2c & 4.1.7.1-2c Main 
TCA Fuel Inlet Purge Check 
Valve 
Prevent backflow of H2 from reach- 
ing solenoid valve. Must flow-
through during purge. Redundant 
backflow shutoff. 
Fails to open at pre-FSj 
purge. 
Low 
Fails to close at end of 
pre-FS1 purge 
Medium 
Fails to open at shutdown 
purge (FS2) 
Low 
Fails to close at end of 
post FS2 purge 
Low 
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FAILUREEFFECTON MISSION 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTER MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
Booste. Booter Ias of redundancy Boostor No effect Volve position diseret. Intorlock with start sequence Booater A(4) 
B(21) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
_ _ _C(4) 
U12 reaches shutoff solenoid valve 
Coss of shctoff redundancy 
No effect No effect Valve position discrete, look chock at 
paint cycle 
-- Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
Orbiter 
0(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Possible M R problem resulting in 
Injector doamge No effect No effect Valve positon discraet, chock at saine cycle 
functional -- Booster A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
No effect Ne effect No effect Leak check at saint cycle Could effect net flight, if 
valve failed to closetight 
fealere ) 
shutoff 
(Secendary 
Booster: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
0 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
1.1,7 l.-2d & 4.1.7.1-2d 
Main TCA Oxidizer Purge 
Check Valve 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FAILURE MODEFUNCTIONITYOF 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
Prevent liquid oxadizer from Fails to open at pre-FS 
reaching solenoid valve. Must purge. 
flow through during purge, 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Fails to close at end of 
pre-FSl purge. 
Medium 
Fails to open at shutdown 
purge (FSa). 
Low 
Fails to close after FS2 
purge, 
Medium 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY 1.1.7& 4.1.7 
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FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR MISSIO OPERATINS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION MEM'OD OTHER RECOCENDATIONS CATEGORY 
° Possible less of chamber 
performosce. 
Burnout with premature shutdown. 
Booster 
Orbiter 
Loss of redundancy 
No effect 
(altituda start) 
Rooster 
Orbiter' 
No effect 
No effect 
Valve position discrete. Interlock with start sequence Booster: A(4) 
B(2B) 
0(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
c(4) 
Loss of shutoff redundancy -
lo reachesshutoff solenoid 
valve. 
NO effect. Ao effect. Valve position discrete; 
at maintenance cycle. 
leak check .- Boostes- A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
c(4) 
Probable injector d ge. No effect. Ho effect. Valve position discrete Dosage affect next flight - Doostr A(4) 
inspect injector. B(4)0(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
No effect. No effect. Ho effect. Leak check at maintenance cycle Could affect next flight if solesoid 
valve had excessive leakagein 
reverse direction. 
Booster: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
.(4)
G(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
FUNCTIONITYOF FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
DRAWING FUNCTION PR MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
l.1.7.1.-2e & 4.1 7.1-2e Provide redundant backflow shutoff Fails to open prior to Low 
High Pressure O.T.P.A. Seal to prevent oxidizer or fuel from loading of propellants. 
Cavity Purge Check Valve reaching purge distribution 
system. (See purge solenoid 
valve 1.1.7.1-1d.) 
Must flow through during purge 
(preloading through engine
shutdown). Failure to close at Medium 
Note: Not redundant in truest shutdown of purge. 
sense, since solenoid valve is 
fail-open. 
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FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIOR 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOIMIEDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMIENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS 
M 
CRITICALIT 
CATEGORY 
Possible detonation at start, 
sea recommendations. 
.. possible launch delay. Valve position discrte, 
pressure, 
meal cavity Interlock aea.rec.nt with loadin, 
ready squo. co pure systm chemks 
at a.intenases cycle should catch 
Boaster: A(4) 
H(2.) 
C(4) 
malfunctioning check valve. Orbiter: A(4) 
B(23) 
C(4) 
Any residual propelleata nay 
reachshut-off valve. Would be 
very low inpressure, and probably 
would not reach the purga system 
in event of solenoid valve 
No effect. No effect. a-oostert A(4) 
B(4)
0(4)Orbiter: A(4) 
r(4) 
failure(open). B(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME NAMENUNER 
FUNCTION OF 
DAWINGMALFUNCTION 
COMPONENT 
I 1.7.1-2f & 4.,1.7.1-2f Fuel 
Suction Line Purge Cheek Valve 
Provide redundant shutoff to 
prevent back flow of fuel into 
purge system,'and possibly into 
oxidizer system. (Depends upon 
design of 1.1.7.1-1e.) Must flow 
through during purge. 
1.1.7.1-2g & 4.1.7.1-2g 
Oxidizer Suction Line Purge 
Cheek Valve 
Provide redundant shutoff to 
prevent back flow of oxidizer 
into purge system, and possibly 
into fuel system (depends upon 
design of l.l.7.1-le). 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
OCCURRENCE 
Fails to open during 
purge prior to propellant 
loading. 
Low 
Fails to close at end of 
purge prior to propellant 
loading. 
Low 
Fails to open during 
purge prior to propellant 
loading. 
Low 
Fails to close at end of 
purge prior to propellant 
loading. 
Low 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM ASSEMBLY1.1.7 & 4.1.7 
SUBSYSTE1 1.1 & 4.1 SHEET 3 of 3 
FAILUREFFECT ON 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
MISSBOa 
OPERATIOHS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Loss of purge - probable foriation Possible launch delay Valve position discrete, Interlock with propellant loading ready Booster. A(4) 
of ice in fuel system, engine purgecheck at maintenance cycle, signal. Depending upon designof engine B(2B) 
fail. to start 
(.ee rceseondaeiae). 
purgeselect valve,thischeck valve 
may rto be ness.ary. For bsebkloj to 
occur, purge pressure would have to 
Orbiter 
C(4) 
A(4)
B(2B) 
dropbelow either line pressure. C(4) 
Loss of backflow shutoff No effect. No effect Valve position discrete, Booster A(4) 
redundancy, leakchecks at maintenance cycle. B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
los of purge - probable formation 
of ice in oxidizer System. 
-- Possible launch delay Valve position discrete, 
purge check at maintenance cycle. 
Interlok with propellant loading ready 
signal Depending upon design of engine 
Booster A(4) 
B(2B) 
Possible engine failure ce to 
NPL. possible tumbopop damage 
purge select volvo, this check valve 
may not be necessary, For backslw to Orbiter 
C(4)
A(4) 
due to plugged passage occur, purge pressure wsuld have to B(2B) 
(see reccommendatians)° drop belo either linepressure. C(4) 
Loss of backflov shutoff No effect. N, effect. Valve position discrete, -- Booster A(4) 
redundancy leakchecksat sainenaace cycle B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
0(4) 
B-76 
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FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RECOMMEI:DATIONSFOR OPEEATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Loss of performance with pro-
raturo shutdwn 
Los. of one engine, probable 
thrust-vector control problea 
Possible mission loss Guidance package detection of loss of 
&V and/or thrust vector problem. 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
O(2A) 
Engine shudo. Loss.f fne es ia., Mission loss Volve poL.on discee. Proiity Orbiters A(4) 
type switch B(4) 
C(2A) 
No effect,or, if long enough, 
seae as failure to open 
Same as above Some as above Same as above Orbiter A(4) 
9(4) 
C(2A) 
Engine shecdo Sameas above Same as above Same as above Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
Very soasi increase in shutdown No effect Provalve shutoff No effect Same as above Orbiter A(4) 
impulse provides redundancy Minor 
corrective maneuver may be 
requ.ied 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Possible fire hazard at launch Possible firehazard or launch Possible launch abort Vehicle ccmprcent Gilasensors Orbiter A(4) 
Leak check as part of scheduled B(2B) 
saYntlenene eye C(2At 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
DANGFUNCTION OF FAILURE MODE 
___________ PROBABILITY OF 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
4.1.8 3 Extendible Nozzle 
Deployment Kit (Orbiter Only)* 
Extends and retracts nozzle in re-
sponse to power commands Exten-
Primary system fails to ex-
tend or retract nozzle or 
Low 
sion required. Prior to shutdown stopping at intermedzate 
in booster, and after orbiter.shut position 
down. Double redundancy drive 
mechanism, lock/seal drive mecha- Secondary system fails to Low 
nism extend nozzle or stopping 
at intermediate position, 
slow extension, 
Distortion of guide struc- Low 
ture on landing 
Failure of primary lock 
drive mechanism at locking. 
Medium 
Failure of secondary lock Low 
drive mechanism at locking. 
Secondary nozzle extension Low 
drive mechanism or lock 
drive mech. fails at re­
traction 
Critical components
 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM4 0 ASSEMBLY4 1 8 
SUBSYSTEM4 1 SHEET 2 of 2 
S.ISYSE'l 
FAILUREFFECT ON 
SYSTEM IISSION RECOMMEI.DATIONSFORDETECTIONIETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS 
MISSION 
OPERATIONS CATEGORY 
Loss oz driveredundancy No effect No effect Vozzle position discrete (fully es= Orbiter A(4) 
tended,fullyretracted) 
current 
Motor B(2B)
C(4) 
Loperformanee her gas leak, Loss of one engine toss Nsssionozzle et.enion discrete (fuy11, c- Test both primary and edundant drive Orbiter A(4) 
possible engine damage tended, 
current 
fully retracted) Moter athenioms s ntenarc cycle B(2B) 
C(2A) 
No effect Ho effect No effect kunctional test at Lant cycle Effect could be inability 
nozzle on nov flight 
to extend Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
Loss of redundancy NoEne None Lock position discrete ootor current -- Orbiter AC4) 
B(4) 
teduced flm coolant flewlisido 
nozzle, possible nozzle damcge,Possible engine loss 
Pessible loss of one engine Possible ission lees Lock position discrete motor current Orbiter A(4) 
B(2)C(2A) 
less of nozzle on een.try Lossof nozzle Reentry iscard Lock position discrete nozzle 
discrete Motor curant 
position -- Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
c(1S) 
0 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.2 1 1 Oxidizer Feed Line - L-TA L-6A L-4B Supplies Lba to AJ-400 main 1) Minor leakage Low 
(Vacuum Jacketed) L-2A L-7A L-5B engines. 
L-3A L-1B L-6B 
L-4A L-2B 
L-SA L-3B 
4 2 1 1 Oxidizer Feed Lines L-4A L-4B 
2) Major leakage Low 
(Vacuum Jacketed) L-13A L-13B 
3) Loss of vacuum in line Medium 
1 2 1 2 Oxidizer Prevalve V-77A V-82A V-80B Safety valve ­ isolates engine I) Fail open. Low 
V-78A V-83A V-81B from oxidizer source 
V-79A V-77B V-82B 
V-BOA V-78B V-83B 
V-81A V-79B 2) Fail closed Low 
4.2 1 2 Oxidizer Isolation V-lA V-lB 
Valve V-2A V-2B 
3) Fail to relieve at Low 
specified back 
pressure 
4) Valve leaks past seat. Medium 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM1 0 and 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 2 1 and 
4 2 1 
SUBSYSTEM 1 2 and 4 2 SHEET I of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMENDATIONSFOR MISSION OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
1) Ne.,liibls - ceate osddissr I) Nona I) None I) narordous gas detector 1) Engine compartment relief and purge 1) A(4) 
rich atmosphere in vicinity of 
leak Subsystem volume capable 
B(3) 
C(4) 
of absorbingminor leakage 
2) Degraded performance asoc- 2) Total performance grossly 2) Probable mtssion termination 2) Engin inlet pressure measurement 2) Same as above 2) A(4) 
aced main ..gie excessive reduced B(2B) 
ox~itc os 0a.(1 
3) Coss of ability to maintain 3) Las of engine 3) No effect on mission if only 3) Engine inlettemperature meosurement3) Burst discshould be installed tO 3) A(4) 
engine inlet conditiors one booster engine is shutdown preventimplosion of the pressure B(2B) 
carrierin the event of S high C(2A) 
pressure conditionin the annulus 
1) No direct effect due to 
required normally opes condi-
1) wo direct effect .. ondar 
engine shut off capability 
) No effecton mission 
performance 
) Volv po.ition indicator 1) None 1) LA4) 
B(4) 
tdonfor operational oe impaired C(4) 
2) Shutdown of affected engine 2) No performance degradation 2) No degradation to mission 2) Valve position indicator 2) None 2) A(4) 
Remaining engines sequenced B(2B) 
to emergency power level C(3) 
3) Ns effect - valve openedby 
commandor lossof power 
3) Go affect - cdunisot 
function 
relief 3) Nhofafset 3) ?r are. mesurement 
valve 
dowastream of 3) Noe 3) A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
4) No effect- engle valve used 4) No effect -oecoedary shutoff 4) No effect 4) Pressure measurementdownstream of 4) None 4) A(4) 
as shutoffmechanism systencapability valve B(4) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1 2 2.2 Oxidizer Isolation 
Valve 
V-lA 
V-2A 
V-lB 
V-2B 
Emergency LO2 isolation at main 
tank (normally open). 
1) Failed open. 
2) Failed closed. 
3) Fails to relieve at 
specified backpressure. 
4) Leakage past valve 
seat 
5) Major flange leakage 
1) Failed open. 
2) Failed clsed.tow 
3) Fails to relieve at 
specified back-
pressure 
4) Leakage past valve 
seat. 
5) Major flange 
leakage 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
FAILUREMODEN EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM1 0 ASSEMBLY1 2.2 
SUBSYSTEM1 2 SHEET_1 of I 
FAILUREFFECTO NISSION 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMEINDATIONSFORDETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOM4ENDATIONS OPERATIONS CRITICALITYCATEGORY 
No effect - reqired to be open 
for operation 
Postfiring 
possible 
tank isolation not No effect 
Probable mission tormination 
Valve position indicator 
Valve position indicator. 
pelete compoest 
Valve 
requrcemsnt for mtr t) A(4) 
E(4) 
Terminates approximately one half System partially operative main 
of the main Los flow. enines starved of oxidizer 
No effect - vo lvo is opened No effect - r edundant relief 
eletriall-d .. o.oleetricolly7 ode forfor system 
None 
N 
robbl misioProbable mission t-l-rmntrnntlen 
Pressure downstreon of 
valve 
re u s.n e nt dowa treothof 
Pressure measurement downesream ofvalve 
daurementdistribution lin  would fiasnoto f 
need for i th component 
durS meas a oveC(
So.. as above 
hs 2) 
3) 
A(4) 
A(3,2 ) 
2A)
CU 
A(4)3(4) 
No effect No functional effect emergency Guncotton. pressure .... remen. C(4) 
Loes of transferrable propellant isolation of main tasnk propellantis coevromlsed. 4) A(4) B() 
System partially eparativ main 
en8ne starved of oxidizer 5) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
C(2M) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF
 
DAIGFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
NAME DRAWING COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT
 
___________NAME _______NUMBER _____________ 
1 2 4.2 Oxidizer Fill Valve V-7A V-7B Provides positive shutoff for I) Fails open, minor Low ­ medium 
1 2 9.3 Fuel Fill Valve V-19A V-19B propellant full and drain internal leakage, major Low 
4.2.3.2 
(Booster) 
Oxidizer Fill Valve 
(Orbiter) 
V-7 
Valve incorporates internal relief 
feature. Precluding overpressure 
condition between valve and fill 
coupling 
internal leakage. 
2) Fails closed 
3) Major external leakage 
(upstream flange). 
4) Major external leakage 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
(downstream flange). 
5) Fails to relieve at 
designed back pressure. 
1.2 4.3 Oxidizer Fill Coupling C-lA C-lB Provides coupling for GSE fill 1) Fails closed or minor Low ­ medium 
1 2.8.2 Fuel Fill Coupling C-SA C-SB line. Provides low level internal leakage. Low 
4 2.3.3 
(Booster) 
Oxidizer Till Coupling 
(Orbiter) 
C-1 
propellant loss capability during 
disconnection 
2) Major leakage, internal 
or external, fails open 
1.2 3.2 Oxidizer Vent Valve V-3A V-16A V-SB Provide safety/prepressure control 1) Fails open or internal Low 
1 2 8.3 Fuel Vent Valve V-4A V-17A V-6B and automatic venting capability leakage. 
(Booster) V-5A V-IA V-15A for the main propellant tank. 
V-6A V-3B V-16A 
V-15A y-4t V-17A Fails open, internal Very low 
V-18A leakage, or major 
leakage upstream of 
4 2.2.2 Oxidizer Vent Valve V3, V4, V5, V6 valve package 
4 2 7 3 Fuel Vent Valve VIO, Vll, V12, V13 
(Orbiter) 2) Fails closed Low 
Fails closed Very low 
1.2.8.2 Fuel Tank Vent Coupling C-3A C-3B Provides rapid connection and Structural failure only. Low 
- (Booster) 
4 2.7 2 Fuel Tank Vent Coupling C-3 
disconnection between stage and 
ground vent system. 
(Orbiter 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSAN(ALYSIS SYSTEM: 1 0 & 4 0 SUBSYSTEM1 2 & 4.2 ASSEMBLY 
1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.8, 1.29 
SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON rISSIOa 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMEUDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
No effect - checking mechanism 
of fill coupling maintains 
look integrity 
No effect - valve is normally 
closed during flight 
Noeffect - upsceam line 
inactive during flight
Subsysten operation tepoird 
No effect - coupling relief 
mechanism opens under 
overpresaure 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
No effect due to shutoff 
redundancy of coupling check/ 
shutoff mechanism 
No effect 
No effect 
Degraded perhomnc dsi so 
aJor loss of oxidirer 
No effect 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
Mission flight 
No effect 
termination 
1) Valve position indicator 
2) Valve position indicator 
3) Valve position indicator 
4) Presste measurement dowatres 
valve 
5) Pressure osesre- -eedounotre 
valve 
of 
of 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
None 
None. 
None 
None 
Coupling design require 
melif 
safety 
1) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
2) A(4) 
130) 
c(4) 
3) A(4)
R(3) 
C(4) 
4) A(4)
B(3) 
5) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
I) 
2) 
No effect - co primary 
function i, flighst 
No effect - fill valve 
provides positive propellant 
shutoff 
1) No effect 
2) NO effect 
1) 
2) 
No effect 
No effect - relatively seall 
quantity of propellants look 
external to spacecraft 
1) 
2) 
Position indicator 
Position indicator for po.itlive 
disconnect verification and coupling 
status 
1) 
2) 
None 
gene 
1) 
2) 
A(4) 
R(3) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
No effect due 
redundancy 
to series No effect No effect. Position indicator None 1) A(4) 
I(3) 
C(4) 
Loss of tasnk pressure System operation impaired System Mission termination Position indicator, propellant tank None A(3) 
unable to maintain required 
propellant pressure Main engine 
becomes inoperative 
Pressure meesurement. B(NI) 
0(1 
No effect due to parallel 
valve redundancy 
aoeffect. No effect Position Indicator None 2) A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Minimum operational effect Possible 
tasks 
hazard to propellant Possible mission termination rack pressure measureat None. A(4)3(23) 
C(U) 
No effect Noeffect o effect Position indicator for uncoupling None A(4) 
verification 8(3) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
1.2 5 1 Main Booster Oxidizer T-1A 7-1B Contain and store propellant for 1) Minor external leakage. Low-medium 
Tank main engine utilization. 2) Major external leakage Low 
1 2 10 1 Main Booster Fuel Tank T-2A T-2B Also the booster oxidizer tank 
4.2.4,1 Main Orbiter Oxidizer T1 and T2 contains residual gas for the 
Tank APS usage. 
4 2 9 1 Main Orbiter Fuel Tank T3 
1 2.5 and 4.2. 
FAILURE MODE ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTE:1.0 and 4 0 ASSEMBLY:1 2.1 and 4 2.6 
1 .2:10 and 4 2.9 
SUBSYSTEM1.2 sad 4.2 SHEET I of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 0115l10 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR ORIATI OII 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Noneo­ subsystem volume capable 
of absorbing minor leakage
Subsystem operation impaired 
No effect, leakage too alight to 
cause fire haoard 
Fire hazard potential high Occur-
No effect 
Immediate miasion flight toroa-
rion Rezard monitoring system 
Hazardous ga analyzer 
compartment 
Hmzardous gas anelyrar 
in tank 
in tank 
None 
Multi-gas analyzers 
A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
rence coulddrastically affect 
system op'ration 
ICtingency supply of APS O gafl(1 
equired to operate compartm.t andtank pressure and 
quarnity measure cents 
A(4) 
E(I
) 
ia depleted J 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1.2 6.2 Helium Coupling C2 Provide connection for ground sup- 1) Fails open. 
plied helium. The helium is circu­
lated into the main oxidizer dis­
tribution line to initiate lox 
recirculation and geyser suppres-
si n. 
Fails open. 
Low 
Low 
2) Fails closed Low 
4 2.5.2 Helium coupling 
4.2.5 3 Helium coupling 
* 
C-2 
C-8 
Provide coupling for ground 
supplied helium line The helium 
is ingested into the main oxidizer 
distribution line to initiate L02 
recirculation and geysering I 
suppression 
I) Fails open or major 
internal leakage 
Fails open or major 
internal leakage 
Low 
Very low 
2) Fails closed Low 
3) Internal leakage 
(major or minor) 
Medium 
Internal leakage minor, Low 
FAILURENODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM1 0 and 4 0 SUBSYSTEM 1 2 and 4 2 
ASS£WLY: 1.2.6 and 4 2.5 
SHEET 1 of 
FAILUREEFFECTON HISSI0 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMEN:DATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
OERATCITICALIT 
CATEGORY 
No effect 
maintains 
-secondary checkvalve 
subsystem integrity 
No effect No ffect Presur. osc.... sent 
ground test 
between Ctfor None A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Rapid loss of propellant through 
the coupling with possible stage 
fire 
No effect - normally closed 
during fligbt 
System inoperable 
P02 
No effect 
due to loss of Mission termination 
No streot 
Line pressure measurement 
sasurement downstream of 
au bow 
hB(4) 
and temporature Nose 
coupling 
ntsns 
A(3) 
B(3) 
C(Z&) 
A(4) 
C(4) 
No effect ­ secondary check valve 
maintains subsystem integrity 
No effect NO effect Pressure transducer 
for ground test 
between chock .elves Nuns A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
Rapid loos of propellant through Systee degradation dsoe to 
coupling with possible setago fire propellant loss 
Mision Position indicator 
poppers 
for both valve None A(3) 
B(3)
C(2A) 
No effect - normally 
flight 
closed during No effect No effect Sas as above None A(4) 
B(4)
C(4) 
No ffect - scries 
checking feature 
redundnt No eftrct No effet Presaur..tte 
for ground checkout 
wtbetwen peppe's None A(4) 
B(4)
c(4) 
No effect - subsystem volume 
capable of absorbing anoear leakage 
but po.sible stage fire could 
exist if leakage was not stopped 
No effect No effect 
Min leokage 
spacecraft 
e sterclto 
Sae as abuve None A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 

DRAWING 

NAME 	 NUMBER 

1.2.7.1 Fuel Feedline - L-ISA L-18A L-16B 

(Booster) 	 L-14A L-19A L-17B
 
L-15A L-13B L-18B
 
L-16A L-14B L-19B
 
L-17A L-15B 

4 2.6 1 Fuel Feedline (Orbiter) L-8 and L-9 
1 2 7.2 	 Fuel Isolation Valve V-BA V-13A V-llB 

(Booster) 	 V-9A V-14A V-12B 

V-10A V-8B V-13B
 
V-11A V-9B V-14B
 
V-12A V-10B 

4.2.6.2 	Fuel Isolation Valve V-8 and V-9
 
(Orbiter)
 
FUNCTION OF 

COMPONENT 

Supplies fuel to main engine. 

Fuel safety valve - isolates 

propellant from main engine.
 
FAILURE MODE 

PRIMARY 

1) Minor leakage. 

2) 	Major leakage. 

1) 	Fails open 

2) 	Fails closed. 

3) 	Fails to relieve at 

specified backpressure.
 
4) 	Valve internal leakage 
past seat. 
REDUNDANT
 
PROBABILITY OF
 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
 
Medium
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Medium
 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM1 0 and 4 0 
ASSEMBLY 1 2.7 & 4 2 7 
SUBSYSTEM1 2 and 4 2 SHEET I of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIO S 
RCCOIMCDATONSFOROPEMATIDNS - - CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
1) No effect- subsystem capable 
of abserbing minor lookge 
1) None- .system proteced by 
inert atmosphere in engine 
compartment 
1) No effect 1) Hazardous g.. detector Provide engine compartment reliefand 
purge 
A(4) 
D(3) 
C(4) 
2) Impaired subsystesm performane 
Fuel starvation to adjacent 
main e.gine 
2) Degraded system porformance 
due to escessive lossof fuel 
2) Probable mission termination 
I 
2) Pressure measurement and 
compartment hazardous gas detector 
2) Sam as above A(4) 
B(2B) 
0(i 
1) No direct effect due to 
required open condition for 
operational code 
3) No direct effect Secondary 
engine shutoff capability 
impaired 
3) No effect 3) Valve position indicate 3) None A(4) 
C(3) 
0(4) 
2) Engine controller senses 
Ioss, initating engine 
shutdon 
112 4) No perforance degradation 
Remaining engines sequenced 
to .. r.....p.er level 
4) No mission impact 4) Valve position indicator 4) None A(4) 
B(2B) 
0(4) 
3) No effect during subsysten 
operation 
5) No effect during system 
operation After thrust 
termnatien, the isolation 
5) No effect 5) Pressure messuremnent 
valve 
downstream of 5) None A(4) 
B(4) 
0(4) 
valve is opened on command 
to relieve overpressure lockup 
4) No effect­ engine valve acts 
as secondaryshutoff 
6) No effect 
Primary shutoff capability is 
afforded by in engine valve 
6) No effect 
I 
6) Pressure measurement 
of valve 
downstream 6) None (4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
NAENUMBER 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
________________________ 
1 3.1 3 Oxidizer Pressure V-20A V-20B Provides a step regulation of I) Fails open. Low 
Control Valve (Booster) V-21A V-21B autogenous hydrogen and oxygen 2) Fails closed Low 
4 3.1.2 Oxidizer Pressure 
Control Valve (Orbiter) 
V-19 
V-20 
gas for tank pressurization 3) Leaks internally 
1) Fails open 
Low 
Low 
1.3.1 7 Fuel Pressure 
Control Valve (Booster) 
V-22A 
V-23A 
V-22B 
V-23B 
2) Leaks past seat Low 
4.3.1.6 Fuel Pressure V-21 
Control Valve (Orbiter) V-22 
1.3.1 4 Oxidizer Pressurant 
Filter (Booster) 
F-IA F-IB Provides filtering of autogenous 
pressurant gas to preclude 
1) Filter clogs. 
2) Filter ruptures. 
Low 
Low 
4.3.1.4 Oxidizer Pressurant 
Filter (Orbiter) 
F-2 contamination of downstream control 3) External leakage. 
orifice (minor) 
Low 
1.3 1.8 Fuel Pressurant F-2A F-2B 
Filter (Booster) 
4.3.1 8 Fuel Pressurant F-3 
Filter (Orbiter) 
1 3.2.2 Helium Coupling -
Oxidizer (Booster) 
C-6A C-6B Connects GSE Helium supply for 
tankage pre-pressurization. 
1) Fails closed 
2) Fails open or major 
Low 
Low 
4 3.2.2 Helium Coupling ­ C-6 internal leakage 
1 3 2.4 
Oxidizer'(Orbiter) 
Helium Coupling - C-4A C-4B 
Fuel (Booster) 
4.3 2 4 Helium Coupling -
Fuel (Orbiter) 
C-4 
I) Fails open or major Very low 
internal leakage 
(cheek valves). 
1 3 l and 1 3.2 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM1 0 and 4 0 ASSEMBLY 4 3 1 and 4 3.2 
SUBSYSTEM 1 3 and 4 3 SHEET 1 of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
MISSIO1S 
OPERATIONS C-RITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
No effect - series redundant No effect 
valves System operates at lower end of 
Subsystem pressure operates at tankpressure band 
low end of pressure supply limits Propellant tank is at upper end 
(This condition occurs at end of of pressure operating lImit Vent 
powered flight), valve operation to relieve tank if 
Subsystem operates at upper end of required 
pressurization band 
No effect 
No effect. 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
Valve position indicator 
Valve position indicator 
ullege pressure 
and tank 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
1) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
2) A(4) 
T(4) 
C(4) 
3) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Decrease in tank pressure 
Contamination of downstream 
System forced to operate out-of-
limits 
Probable loss of mission I 
Probable terminati 
o 
n of mission 
AP transducer across filter 
61Ptransducer across filter 
Filter shouldbe designed to blowout 
under high AFconditiens 
1) A(4) 
B(4) 
canpentrs 
Us effect 
Tank pressure lose 
Potential fire hazard 
If leakage is high enough - mission 
could be aborted 
Gas detector 
filter 
in area or bay containing None 
2) 
C(2A) 
A(4) 
3) 
S(4) 
C(A) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(i ) 
I) No flight effect but enable 
to load helium if ground 
failure occurs 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
Position indicator 
Poattion fndica.r 
Provide ground pressure masueent 
between chest valve aselees 
Provide ground pressure measurement 
1) A(4) 
E(3) 
C(4) 
2) No effect due to series 
redundant check valve 
between cheekvalve sections 2) A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
Ecessive loss of pressurent gas System failure 
Pressureloss 
due to tank Probable termination of mission Pressure transducer 
dowstream 
in autegenous line , None A(4) 
B(4)C(U) 
,6 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAMEDRAING FUNCTIONOF PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME _______________________NUMBER 
4.4.1.1 Oxidizer Distribution L-17 Ducting for transmittal of liquid Structural (fatigue Low 
Line L-18 oxygen, causing leakage) 
4 4 1 2 Oxidizer Isolation V-23 Controls liquid oxygen fill and 1) Fail open. Low 
Valve drain for the on-orbit LO2 tank. 2) Fail closed. Low 
3) Fail to relieve at Medium 
specific back Low 
pressure Low 
4) Internal leakage 5) External leakage 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 4 0 SUBSYSTEM 4 4 
ASSEMBLY4 4 1 
SHEET--. of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RECOHIENDATIONSF R OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER ECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
L-17 no effectafter loading 
L-18 loss of tank pressure 
L-17 no effeet 
.1 decrease in pressurean i 
Decrease in performance of APS 
system 
Monietr linepressure None A(l 
C(B) 
Iflowrae supplied topropellantl 
condicioning system 
(I ) 
i) No effect­ propellant 1) Ne effect I) No effect 1) Monitor valve position 1) None 1) A(4) 
stopped at main engine 
valve 
2) NO effect 
3) No effect - pressure can be 
relieved through main We0 
tank isolation valve 
4) No effect - propeltant 
vcaved t main engine
valve 
Se) Loss of tankpressure
5b) Possible fire hazard if 
fuel is present in 
cspartent 
2) Automatic shutdown of main 
engine if on-orbit tank is 
being used as supply 
3) No effect 
4) No effect 
S) Deca in pressure end 
ecase 
fluet suplie)tpropellant conditioning 
system 
No effect - Compartment purge 
capableof handling limited 
leak.sa 
2) Mission would be terminated 
3) No effect 
4) No effect 
5) Decrease in APS performance 
No effect 
2) Monitor valve position 
3) Pressure measurement downstream 
of volvo 
4) None 
5a) Monitor on-orbit cankpressure 
5b)Hazordous gas detector in c.losed 
comprtment 
2) None 
3) None 
4) None 
Sa) None 
5b) None 
B(3) 
C(4) 
2) A(i 
B(2B) 
C(I 
3) A(4) 
B(3)
0(4) 
4) A(4) 
B(3)
c(4) 
5o) A(I 
B(2D) 
C0L ) 
S5) A(4)BSO) 
C(3) 
D-] Effect en external subsyatesa. 
re 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
4.4 2 2 Oxidizer Vent Meat 
Exchanger 
H-I Provide cooling of tank suction 
line during vent to compensate 
for heat leak into tank 
1) Major external leakage 
2) Restricts flow of gas 
during vent, 
Low 
Low 
4.4 2.1 
Valve* 
Oxidizer Tank Vent V-24 
V-25 
Permit overboard vent of propel-
lant tank ullage gas. 
Isolate airborne system from 
ground system. 
1) Volvo foils closed. 
2) Valve fatlA open or 
leaks internally 
ZR) Valve fails open 
or leaks internally 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
*Critical component.
 
FAILUREHODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM4 0SUBSYSTEM4 4 ASSEMBLY 4.4 2SHEET i of i 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSI 00 
RECOMMIEIATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
I) Contamination of subsystem I) No effect I) No effect on crew safety or 1) Mesure subsystem compartment I) None 1) A(3) 
compartment with GOR 2) Propellant tank pressure primary mission objective pressure 2) None B(4) 
2) Vent rate capability reduced relief ratereduced 2) No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
2) Monitor tank vent racte or measure 
pressure loss acrossbeat exchanger 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
I) Vent assembly rendered useless 
for propellant tank pressure 
relief 
1) Potential for over-proessuriza-
tion of en-orbit propellant 
task exists 
1) 
2) 
Major effect on crew safety and I) Valve 
pzisary mission objective I 2) Valve 
Nc effect on crew safety os 2R) Valve 
position switch 
position switch 
position switch 
1) Redesign valve system to parallel-
series configuration 
2), 2R) Provide pressre measuresent 
I) A(2A,l
B(3) 
C(2Al 
2) Ho effect 
2R) Overboard loss of pressurize-
nion as subsystem cannot 
2) No affect 
2R) Impossible to presssriza 
orbit propellant tank 
on-
pzimar y mssio objective 
2R) j or effect on primary atusion 
objective - no effect on crew 
between series redundent 
valves for single point failure 
detection 
2) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
be isolated, safety 2R) A(2A) 
B(3)
c(2A) 
co 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
MN 
NAMEDRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
4.4 3 1 Oxidizer Tank 
4.4.6 1 Fuel Tank 
T-4 
T-5 
T-6 
1) Contain and store propellants 
for main engine contingency 
supply 
2) Contain and store propellants 
for APS on-orbit usage and 
A/B-S reentry landing engines. 
Minor external leakage. 
Major external leakage 
(oxidizer tank). 
Lcw-medium 
Very low. 
Major external leakage(fuel tank). Very low 
FAILURE MODE ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM.4 0 	 ASSEMBLY:4.4.3 and 4 4 6 
SUBSYSTEM4.4 	 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 	 EIGONOS 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITIALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMLENDATIONS CATEGORY 
None - Subsystem volume capable of Fire hazard possible No effect Ha.ardous gas analyzer in tonk Provido compartment purge for all 	 A(4)
absorbing minor leakage comprtment closed compartments 	 B(4) 
C(4) 
Subsystem operation impaired, Occurrence could drastically tmediate mission ormminarion HIlacrdos gas analyzer in tank Sam as above 	 A(2A)
fire hazard potential high 	 affect system operation compartment requires propellant tank B(2B)
ResuppIy for ACPS on accmulators pressure and quantity measurements. C(1 12A) 
is terina ted 
Same as above se a bove Immediato mission tereination. Same as above goese as abov 	 A(ZA) 
Resupply for ACPS Is accumulators B(2B)
terminated il 2 supply for ADS C(1 2A)
engines is nor available 
Effect on extenal subsystem 
w 
0 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODEOF 
REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
4 4 4 2 Fuel Isolation Valve* V-26 
V-27 
Isolate contingency fuel supply 
from main engines 
1) Valve falls open during 
main engine operation 
2) Fail to relieve at 
specific back pressure
3) Internal leakage.
4) External leakage. 
5) Fails closed 
6) Valve fails open after 
main engine burn. 
1) Very low 
2) Low 
3) Medium 
4) Low 
5) Low 
6) Low 
* Critical component.
 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS m NTE SYSTEM4 0 ASSELY: 
SUBSYSTEMSUBSYSTEM4 4 SHEETi of I 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
REC4MMEMDATIONSFDA 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMIENDATIONS 
rISSOOPERATIONS 
M 
TYCATEGORY 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Propellant would be exhausted 
No Efect 
Possible loss of contingency 
fuel supply 
Loss of tank pressure Fire 
hazard in tank compartment 
Loss of fuel supply 
capability 
Somalose of fuel 
i 
2) 
3 
4) 
5) 
6) 
A/B propellant would be do-
pleced if msin engine burn 
is continued, 
No effect - pressure would be 
relieved into main fuel tonk 
Posless of sae Al 
Decrease in pressure oand 
flowrote supplied to propel-
lantconditioning system 
Fire hazard 
Loss of contingency 
fuelsupply
LH2 would be Introduced into 
the matn propulsion system 
propellant line. 
i) Mission is terminated 
2) No ffct 
3) rossible lo.s or mission 
objectives 
4) Decrease in APSperformeo 
None unle.s oxidizer leakage 
Ipresent Coemartment is 
pured 
5) Primary mission objectives 
jeepardised 
6) Possible reduction of misscn 
objectives 
I) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Valve potition indicator 
Line pressure s receot 
On-orbit tonk pressure measureont 
and line temperature dewostresa of 
valve 
Monitor on-orbit tank pressure 
Iazardous oasdetector 
Pooltion indicator 
Temperature sensor in line down-
stre.. fi valve 
1) Redesign system such that ..­ obit 
tendt ore isolated from aI 
tonkaos 
Alternative - Place on-orbit tanks 
In aerie with mi fuel tank 
2) None 
3) None 
4) Provide pure capability for sl 
closed compartments 
5) None 
6) None 
1) A(3)
B(2) 
G(2A) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
3) A(3) 
R(2Z) 
C(3) 
4) A(3) 
(3) 
C(3) 
5) A(4) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
6) A(4) 
(3) 
c(3) 
4.4.5.2 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
Fuel Tank Vent Valve* V-28 
V-29 
V-30 
V-31 
DRAWINGNUMBER FUNCTION OFCOMPONENT 
Provides controlled venting and 
automatic overpressure relief 
for the on orbit main propellant
fuel tank. 
PRIMARY 
Fails open. 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
Fails open. 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Very low. 
Fails closed. Low 
Fails closed Very low. 
4.4,5.4 Fuel Vent Line Coupling C-11 Provides ground coupling capabil-
ity for fuel tank vent. 
Leaks externally. Low 
*critical component.
 
AND EFFECTS 4.4.5 
SUBSYSTEM4.4 SHEET I of 
FAILUREMODE ANALYSIS SYSTEM 4 0 ASSEMBLY-
FAILUREFFECT ON 
 MISSIONPECOMMEhDATIONS OPETIU-S -- CRTALITYF R 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHERECOIOENDATIONS CPTEIORYCATEGORY 
No ffect due to series redun- No affect No offect PoIton Indicator None A(4)
dancy. IWO 
c(4)
 
Loss of tank pressurization caps- Degraded system operation mission termination Valve position Indicators propellant None A(2A)bSiity, Resupply for ACPSHo accumulators took pressure and q-ntiy seua.- 3(2B) 
hampered.IMI supply to ABS n- mets 0(2A,IS) 
8Einos is termilnated. 
No effect duo to parallel redun- No effect No offect PostionIndicator Non. A(')dancy B(3) 
C(4)
 
Norml tank venting capacity In- Automatic relief of propellant Immediate termination of fLight Position Indicator ad Cnk pressure None A(1u)
paired tank . lost %.okup sthod of m.anBont B(2B)
relieving tank prossure could be C(2M) 
employed by opening propellant 
isolation valves and venting then 
.ai tank 
go effect-coupling does not have No effect No effect. Position indicator for proper decoupling N*one A(4) 
a poppet Coupling is normaly verification B(3) 
open in flight C(4) 
ta 
C 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
4.5.1.2 
4.5.1.6 
Oxidizer Tank Pressuri-
zation Line Filter 
Fuel Tank Pressuriza-
tion Line Filter 
F-4 Remove particles and/or contami-
nants before gas reaches the regu-
lator package. 
Filter becomes clogged, re-
sulting in filter rupture. 
Very low. 
4.5.1.3 
4.5.1.7 
Oxidizer Tank Fressuri-
zation Regulator* 
Fuel Tank Presuriza­
4on Regulator 
R-5 thru R-8 
R-9 thru R-12 
Reduces supply pressure to regu-
lated tank pressure, 
Fails open or fails to 
regulate. 
Fails open or fails to 
regulate. 
Medium 
Low 
Fails closed. Low 
Fails closed. Low 
4.5.1.4 
4.5.1.8 
Oxidizer Tank Pressuri-
zation Valve 
Fuel Tank Pressuriza-
tion Valve 
V-32 
V-33 
V-34 
V-35 
Provides positive isolation of high 
pressure gas from low-pressure sub-
system. 
Fails open or leaks in-
ternally. 
Fails closed. 
Low to medium. 
Low 
Fails closed. Very Low 
)critical component.
 
ASSBIMLY 4.5.1 & 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYST 4.0 4.5 2 
SUBSYSTEM 4.5 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT O 
RECOMEIDATIONS FOR HI15O1OEATiOs CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHIERECOVI(IDATIONS CAEGORY 
Possible reduction in pressume Possible reduction of c-orbit Could cuse mission tersniatin Dontrem pressure .e..ur.eat Design features should include faltr A(2A) 
fowtre and contamination of tank pressure. blosout proviel.on= Into oe bank of B(4) 
downstream regulators. controllin regulators. C(2a) 
No effect due to regulator series 
redundancy 
No effect No effect. Operating pressure In 
detection 
selected for Non A(4) 
D(3) 
1 C(4) 
Overpressur condition downstream Tanta presse at uppe lmits . Flight trmination I Dowenuream pressure mesuresnt Soan A(2A) 
of regulators. teak vent relieves.I B(2C(l ) .2A) 
No effect due to parallel redn- Na effect No effect. Operating pressure band selection None A(4) 
dancy I(3) 
C(4) 
Pressurization to on-orbit propel- Sytte ability to supply propel- | eediate flight terintion Teak pre.sure seasureo t. A(I .2A) 
lant took, terminated lant to APS and A/D impaired.e B(2n) 
c(1 ,2A) 
Pressure roeuletors oper.to to No offset. No affect Valve position indicators. it A(4) 
enint.ain required pressure. B(3) 
C(4) 
No effect due to valve (prallel) No effect. No effect Valve position indicor rme A(4) 
redundnsy R(2)
C(4) 
Pressurization to on-orbit propel- y!rabilitytoupplypropel- Iinediate flight termination Propellant tank pressure Heasuresent.Sone A(1 ZQA 
lat cank - terminated. lantso APS ad A fBaired B(2B) 
0(1 .2h) 
Er Effect On External Subeysta 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
FUNCTIONITYOF 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PR03ABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Propellant Inlet Manifold None. Distribute fuel and oxidizer 
to the coaxial injector, 
Cracking due to thermal 
fatigue or vibration. 
Low 
Coaxial Injector None. Inject fuel and oxidizer into the 
thrust chamber in such a manner 
as to achieve complete mixing for 
combustion. 
Cracking due to thermal 
fatigue or vibration. 
Low 
Clogging of injectors due 
to propellant 
contaminants. 
Low 
Thrust Chamber TC-l 
TC-2 
TC-3 
TC-4 
TO-S 
TC-6 
TC-7 
TC-8 
TC-9 
TC-1O 
TC-11 
TC-12 
TC-13 
TC-14 
TC-15 
TC-16 
TC-17 
TC-18 
TC-19 
TC-20 
TC-21 
TC-22 
TC-23 
TC-24 
TC-25 
TC-26 
TC-27 
TC-28 
TC-29 
TO-3o 
TC-31 
TC-32 
TC-33 
TC-34 
TO-35 
TC-36 
TC-37 
TC-38 
Contain combustion gas and 
accelerate the gas through a 
converging-diverging nozzle 
to produce thrust. 
Crackig due to thermal 
fatigue or vibration. 
Low 
2.1.1, 2.5.1, 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 2.0, 5.0 ASSEMBLY5.1.1, 5.4.1 
SUBSYSTEM2.1, 2.5, 5.1, 5.4 SHEET 1 of t 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSIOr 
RECOMMEhDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALI 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Possible pro-mixltng of propellants No effect. Possible effect on crew safety Measure ignitor chamber pressure, Periorm scheduled visual inspection Booster A(4) 
with resulting fire or explosion or primary mission objoLv. visual inspotion. durin maintenance. B(ca) 
hazard. Failed thruster must be C(3) 
isolated.Possible toss of one orbiter A(4) 
level of redundancy B(4)C3) 
Improper mixing of propellants No effect No effect on crew safety or Measure ignitorchamber pressore, Performsscheduled visual Inspection BooFters: A(4) 
with resulting coebustion primary mission objective, visual inspection, during maintenance. B(4) 
instability or thrust chember C(4) 
burnthrcuh. Patled thruster Orbitmr A(4) 
muta be isolated Possible loss B(4) 
of one levelof redundancy. C(4)
 
Improper mixing of propellants No affect Me effect on crew safety ar Measnre igniter chamber presture, Perform scheduled visual inspection Booster: A (4) 
with resulting combustion primary mission objective visual inspection. during maintenance. B(4) 
instability or thrust chamber C(4)
 
burnthrough. Failed thruster Orbiter- A(4)
 
must be isolated PosIble loss B(4)
 
of one level of redundancy. G(4)
 
Possible hot gas external leak NOeffect No effecton crew safety or Measure igniterchamber pressure, Perform scheduled visual inspection 1oostor: A(4) 
and/or burnhrough Possible primary mission objecfive vistal inspection during maintenance. B(4) 
lo. of perforanso C (4) 
Failed thruster must be isolated. Orbitor: A(4) 
Possiblelos of one levelof B(4)
 
redundancy C(4)
 
c, 
C 
o 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
Igniter Fuel Valve None 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
Provide fuel to igniter chamber 
in response to 28 vdc command, 
Fail closed on loss of power. 
FAILURE MODE 
PRIMARY 
Valve fails to open or 
close prematurely. 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
Low 
Valve opens slowly. Low 
Valve fails to close or 
closes slowly. Low 
Igniter Oxidizer Valve None Provide oxidizer to igniter 
chamber in response to 28 vdc 
command. 
Fail closed on loss of power. 
Valve fails to open or 
closes prematurely 
Low 
Valve opens slowly. Low 
Valve fails to close or 
closes slowly. 
Low 
Spark Plug None Provide controlled spark gap 
for high voltage discharge to 
ignite propellants. 
Short to ground or wear 
causing excessive gap. 
Medium 
SUBSYSTEM 
Failure to achieve thrustwith 

seleaced thruster. Failed 

thruster nuat be isolated 

Possible lossof one levelof 
redundancy. 

Failure to achieve thrut with 
selected thruster. oasible 
ignition chamber burnout. Failed 
thrster must be Isolated 
Fo..sAble lras of one level or 
redundancy. 

Overboard 	 loss of propellant.
Failed thruster must be Isolated, 
Possible loss of one levelof 
redundancy. 

Failure to achieve thrust with 
selected thruster Failed 

thruster custbe lolated, 

Possiblelossof one lavelof 

redundancy. 

Failure to achieve thrust with 
selected thruster Failed 
thrustermustbe isolated. 
Possible loss of one levelof 
redundancy 
Possible ignition chamber 
burnout and/or averbuaed Ioss of 
propellant. Failed thruster 

must be isolated. Possible loss 

of one levelof redundancy 

Failure to achieve thrust with 
selected thruster. Possible 

overbard loss o propellnts. 

Failed thruster oustbe isolated. 

Possible Ioss of one levelof 

redundancy. 

FAILUREEFFECTON 
SYSTEM 
No effect 

No effect 
No effect. 
No effect. 
No effect. 
No affect. 
No effect. 

FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
RECOMNODATIONSF R 
MISSION 	 DETECTIONMETHOD 
No effect on crewsafety or treasure igniterchamber pressure
primary mission objective. 

No effect oncrewsafety aure igniter chamber Ro.surea or 
Priery missioo objective. 
No effect on crew safety or Measure igniter chamber pressure.
primary mission objective. 
No effect on crew safety or Massureigniter chamberpressure 
primary mission objective 

No effect on crew safety or Measure igniter chamber pressure. 
primary mission abjectivc. 

No effoct on crew safety or Measure igniter chamber pressure
primary objective. 
No effecton crewsafety or Measure igniter chamber pressure
primary objective 
SYSTEM 2.0, 5 0 	 ASSEMBLY2.1.2, 2.5.2, 
SUBSYSTEM 2.1, 2,5. 5.1,5.4 	 5.1.2. 5.4.2
ShEET I Of 2 
MISSION 
OPERATIONS CRITIALTYOTHERRECOMIENDATIONS _/ CATEGORY 
None Booster 	 A(4)
 
B(4)
 
0(4)
Orbiter: 	 A(4) 
s(4)
 
C(4) 
None Booster 	 A(4)
 
B(4)
 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4)
 
None Booster. 	 A(4)
B(4) 
C(4)
 
Orbirer 	A(4) 
B(4) 
G(4) 
None. Booster; 	 A(4) 
B(4)
 
c(4)
Orbiter 	 A(4) 
B(4)C(4) 
Gone ooster 	 A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter: A(4) 
B(4)C(4) 
None., Booster 	 A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4 
Orbiter. 	A(4)
 
B(4)
 
C(4) 
None Boaster: 	 A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4)
 
Orbiter 	 A(4)
 
B(4)
 
C(4)
 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
FUNCTIONN 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OFPROALT0 OCCRECOCUROFC 
Spark Cable None Conduct high voltage pulses from 
exciter to spark plug. 
Short to open circuit. Low 
Exciter None Convert 28 vdc input to 30,000 
volts at 250 pps output for 
spark ignition, 
Fails to produce pulses 
or produces low level 
pulses only. 
Low 
FAILURE AODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 2.0, 5.0SUBSYSTEM2.1, 2.5, 5.1, 54 tSSD LY: 2.1.2. 5.1.2. 2.5.2,oAf 
SHU2 of" Z 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILUREEFFECTON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOLDIELOATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOMMENDATIONS 
1SS1.1 
WERTION 
/ca/ 
Failure to achieve thrust with 
selected thr ¢tr Posible 
.erboard loss or propellant. 
Failed thruster must be isolated 
Possible loss ot one level of 
- offect. No effect on crew sara t or 
primary mission objective. 
5s..rau intor chmber pressure. Nona 3oostrne 
Orbliea: 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(4) 
redundanc% C(4) 
Failure to achieve thrust with 
selected thruscar. Possible 
overboard loss of-propellantes 
Failed thruster must be isolated. 
Possiblelossof one level of 
rcdandanc . 
No effect No effact o crew safety or 
priaary mi.ion objective. 
Moasura i1 niter chamber pressure. Noo Booster 
Ocbiter: 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4)
A(4) 
3(4) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 

NAME 

Bi-Propellant Main Thrust Chamber 	FV-i 
Valve 	 FV-2 

FV-3 

FV-4 

FV-5 

FV-6 
FV-7 

FV-8 
FV-9 
FV-10 

FV-Il 
FV-12 

FV-13 

FV-14 

FV-15 

FV-16 

FV-17 

FV-18 

FV-19 

FV-20 
FV-21 
FV-22 

FV-23 
FV-24 

FV-25 
FV-26 

FV-27 

FV-28 

FV-29 

Fl-3O 

FV-31 

FV-32 

EV-33 

FV-34 

FV-35 

EV-36 

FV-37 

FV-38 

FAILURE MODE PROBABIL OF 
NUMBER COMPONENT 
FUNCTIONN 
PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
OCUROFC 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
OV-I Provide on-off control of oxid Fails to open. Low 
OV-2 and fuel to thrust chamber in 
OV-3 
0V-4 
response to 28 vdc input command. 
Fail closed on loss of power. 
0V-5 
07-6 
OV-7 
OF-8 Opens too slowly. Low 
OV-9 
OV-10 
0V-l 
OV-12 
0V-13 
0V-14 
0V-15 Fails to close or Low 
0V-16 
0V-17 
closes too slowly. 
0V-18 
0V-19 
OV-20 
OV-21 
0V-22 Closes prematurely, Low 
OV-23 
0V-24 
0V-25 
0V-26 
OV-27 
0V-28 
0V-29 Oxid or fuel valve fails Low 
OV-30 to open (linkage failure). 
OV-31 
0V-32 
0V-33 
0V-34 
0V-35 
0V-36 Oxid valve fails to Low 
0V-37 close on shutdown. 
0V-38 
Fuel valve fails to Low 
close on shutdown. 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSNALYSIS SYSTEM z.0, 5.0 SUBSYSTEM2.1, 2.5, 5.1. 5A 
ASSEBLY: 2.1.3, 1.53. 
5.1.3, 1. ofSHEET I of 2 
FAILUREEFFECT ON ISSI!O 
RECOMVE,.DATIONSF R oPrTICA--If 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOIMENDATIONS CATEGM 
Failure to achieve thrust with 
selected thruster. Foiled 
thruster must be isolated 
Possible loss of one level of 
redundancy 
No effect, No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective. 
easure igniter chamber preassure. game. Demnr: 
Orbitler 
A(4) 
3(4) 
C(4) 
A(4)
) 
C(4) 
Depending upon delay, subsyst 
may isolate slected thruster 
Possible loss of one level of 
redundancy 
No effect. No effect en ce. afe.ty or 
prieary mission objective. 
M-ur Innitr chamber presure. Nose. oosr: 
Orbiter. 
A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
A(4)
3(4) 
C(4) 
Extended burn possible. Loss of 
shutoff redundancy. Failed 
thrustermust be isolated. 
Possible corrective commandfrom 
uidonce and navLgation0 
No effect on crew safety or 
prmary missieon objective 
Hasure ignter chamber pressure No*ne. ostr.ct A(4) 
30) 
C(4) 
0rbirme A(4) 
B(4) 
.(4) 
Premature loss of threat. 
Failed thruster must be isolated 
Possible corrective commandfrom 
guidance and navigation, 
No effect on crewr afety or 
primary mission objective. 
Measure Igniter chamber pressure* None. gooster: 
Otsiter: 
A(4) 
3(4)
C(4)A (4) 
B(4) 
Fails to achieve thrust with 
selected thruster. Failed 
thruster must be isolated with 
possibto loss e one lovel of 
redundancy. 
No effect. No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective, 
Measure igniter chmaber pressure. None Booner: 
abiter: 
A(4) 
3(4)
C(4) 
a(4) 
3(4) 
C(4) 
Slightly econded burn nic. Possible injector burnout. 
Failed thruster must be isolated 
No effect. No effec on ¢ .fca ety or primary mission objective. Masre igniter chaber pressure ane. osers A (4)3 (4)
C (4) 
with possible loss of one level 
of rcddaney Orbitmr: A (4) a. (4) 
c (4) 
StiLhrly at.nredd burn timo. N effect. No effect emcrew safety or asre igiter chamber pressure. None. rsuse ; A(4) 
Failed thruster must be isolated 
with possible loss of anelevel
of redundancy. 
primary mission objective. 
Orbiter: 
B(4)
C(4)
A(4) 
.(4) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 	 FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF
DRAWING ~~FUNCTION 	 MLUCINOCRECOF 
REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCENUMBER COMPONENT 	 PRIMARY
NAME 

Bi-Propellant Isolation Valve 	 FV-i OV-l Provide positive shutoff of Failure to open prior Low
 
TV-2 OV-2 propellant to individual to thruster use,
 
FV-3 OV-3 thrusters. Provide on-off
 
FV-4 OV-4 control of propellants to
 
FV-5 OV-5 igniter valves and bi-propellant
 
FV-6 OV-6 control valve.
 
rV-7 OV-7 Fail closed on loss of power.

FV-8 OV-8 Failure to close after Low
 
FV-9 OV-9 thruster usage.
 
FV-Ic OV-10
 
FV-Il OV-ll
 
FV-12 OV-12
 
FV-13 OV-13
 
FV-14 OV-14
 
FV-1 OV-15 Valve opens slowly. Low
 
FV-16 OV-16
 
FV-I? OV-17
 
FV-18 OV-18
 
FV-19 OV-19
 
FV-20 OV-20
 
FV-21 OV-21
 
FV-22 OV-22 Valve closes slowly. Low
 
FV-23 OV-23
 
FV-24 OV-24
 
FV-25 OV-25
 
FV-26 OV-26
 
FV-27 OV-27
 
FV-28 OV-28
 
FV-29 OV-29 Valve closes prematurely. Low
 
FV-3O OV-30
 
FV-31 OV-31
 
FV-32 OV-32
 
FV-33 OV-33
 
FV-34 OV-34
 
FV-35 OV-35
 
FV-36 OV-36 One valve fails to open Low
 
FV-37 OV-37 (either oxid or fuel).
 
FV-38 OV-38 Structural failure.
 
One valve closes 	 Low
 
prematurely
A. Before operation.
 
B. During operation.
 
SUBSYSTEM 
Selected thrueasr rendered 
inoperatve. Failed threster 
must be isolated with possible 
lossof one levelof redundancy. 
Thbrustercasnotbe isolaedd* 
No effect. 
f fect. 
Loss o threat in ole red 
thrusTer. Failed thrustermust 
be isolated with poasibleloss 
of one level of redundancy 
Beleeted thrusterrendered in-
operstive.Thruster cannot be 
Isolated* 

A. Failure to achieve thrust. 

5. If fuelvalve, loseof thrust, 
probablehigh M.R. and 

thruetr damego 
If acid valve, las. of thrust, 
failed thruster must be 
isolated with possible less of 
one level of redundancy. 
FAILUREEFFECT ON 

SYSTEM 
No effect. 
Vo effect. 

O effect, 
1it, tout 
NOe'fcct. 
no effect. 
No effect 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS 
RECOIWDATIONSFOR 
MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD 
Wo effect on crew safety or Hes..reigniterchamber pressure or 
primarymission oojcctive volve position. 
No ffsa ..on cnw sfety or Mcasue Volvoposition. 
primerymission objective. 

No effet on crew oafety or Madotar olvo position.
primary mission objective 
No ettect on crew sofetyor Measurevalve opositiv

primarymission objective. 

No effect on crew safety or Measurevalve position. 
primary mission objective. 
Noeffect on crew safety or Measuro igniter chamber pressure. 
pricsd mission objective. 
No effect en crew safety or Measure igniter chamberpressure. 
priostry mission objeetive. 
SYSTEM 2.0 5.0 ASSEIBLY 2.1,3, 2.5.3, 
SUBSYSTEM 2.1,2.5. 5.1.5.4 S I h .,43 
IIISSION 
OPE.ATI0IJS-CRITICALITY 
OT1ERRECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
None Booster A(4) 
B(3) 
0(4) 
Orbiter A(4)
so) 
0(4) 
Bleed ot syitem at 
prior to reentry. 
aing Or ge.t.o - (4) 
B(4) 
Orbiter 
C(4) 
A(4> 
3(4)
0 (4) 
None,. Booster. A(4)
B(4)
C(4) 
Orbiter. A(4) 
0(4) 
"oe* Booster. 
Orbiter 
'(4)
B(4)
0(4)
A(4) 
5(4)C(4) 
Me. Booster A(4) 
3(4) 
0(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
None ostor A(4) 
B(3) 
Orbiter 
0(4) 
A(4) 
'(3) 
G(4) 
This mode of failureis rather remote. Reoster A(4) 
R(4) 
C(4) 
Orbiter A(4) 
B4) 
0(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
2.2.1.1 & 5 2 1.1 
Tankage 
Accumulator T-4 
T-5 
T-6 
Receive GOz and 011.propellants for 
storage at approximately 1500 psia 
and 5000P to minimize conditioning 
1) Major external leakage 
2) Minor external leakage 
1) Low 
2) Low 
T-7 equipment restarts. 
T-8 
T-9 
T-1O 
T-Il 
2 2 1 2 & 5.2.1.2 Filter F-4 
F-S 
F-6 
Remove particulate contaminants 
from gaseous propellants upon ex-
pulsion from accumulators 
I) Flow path through 
filter element ob-
structed 
i) Low 
2) Low 
3) Medium 
F-7 2) Major external leakage. 
F-B 3) Minor external leakage 
F-9 
F-10 
F-Il 
2.2 1.3 & 5 2 1.3 
Regulator 
Pressure R-5 
R-6 
R-18 
R-19 
R-31 
R-32 
Reduce accumulator supply pressure 
from 1500 psia to pressure levels 
1) Fails open or fails to 
to regulate. 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
R-7 
R-8 
R-20 
R-21 
R-33 
R-34 
commensurate with flow rate require 
ments for APS thrusters 
2) Fails closed. 
R-9 R-22 R-35 
R-10 R-23 R-36 
R-11 R-24 
R-12 R-25 1) Fails open or fails 1) Low 
R-13 R-26 to regulate 2) Low 
R-14 
R-15 
R-27 
R-28 
2) Fails closed. 
R-16 R-29 
R-17 R-30 
2 2 1.4 & 5.2.1.4 
Valve 
Solenoid V-29 
V-30 
V-42 
V-43 
Admit regulated propellants to 
propellant feed assembly. 
1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close or 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
V-31 V-44 leaks internally. 
V-32 
V-33 
V-34 
V-35 
V-36 
1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
V-38 or leaks 
internally. 
V-39 
V-40 
V-41 
2 2 1ASSEMBLYFAILURE ANALYSIS
MODEAND EFFECTS SYSTEM2.0& 5 0 
521 
SUBSYSTEM 2 2 & 5 2 SIEET I of I 
FAILURE
EFFECT ON 
 MISSIOH
 
RECO)IEIDATIONS FOR 
 OPERATIONSSUBSYSTEM SYSTEM ISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ' CATEGORY 
1) Contamlnation of sebeystav I) Performance degradation or 1) Major effecten crewsafety Measure accumulator pressure and subys- Include accumulator isolation valves 1) A(2A)compertant Pressure loseof complete system operability and primary mission objective tem comaortsent pressure and bypass lines to permitisolation B(2B)affected assembly and all in- lose 2) Sam as above of fmilad asmssovEster and maintain C(2A)terconnootod assemblies with 2) Sane as above completosystem operation or establish 2) A(2A)time 

safety factorgreaterthan thatrequired B(2B)
2) S... aa bove for normal oper ring nqs.ip..t C(2A) 
1) Propellant delivery capability 
to afected engine subsystems 
reduced 
2) Contamination of sbsyates am-
partnent Pressure lose of af 
fertedassembly and all inter-
connected assemblieswith time 
3) Same as above 
1) Performance degradation at 
affected engine subsystems 
2) Performance degradation or 
complete system operability 
loss(3) 
3) Same as 2) above 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Major effoctcn ore safety i) Measure pressure drop acrossfilter 
and primary mission objective2) Perform periodic leakchecks 
Sameas 1) abeve 3) Seie as 2) above 
same as 1) above 
None 1) A(2A) 
B(3) 
C(2A) 
2) A(2A) 
B(2A) 
3) A) 
B(4) 
I) No effect 
2) No effect 
1) No effect 
2) No effecr 
1) No effect on crew safety or 
primary miasionobjective 
2) No offset en crews.faty er 
primary mission objetive 
1) Monitor pressure regulator band 
width 
2) Heasro downstream presure 
None 
C(3) 
i) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
1) 
2) 
Possible overpressurization of 
affected ACS thrusters 
Assembly reedored useless for 
delivery of propellants to af-
fected thrusters 
1) ACS thruster performance 
degraded Possible thruster 
lossdue to aplouion or fire 
2) Complete loss of affected 
thruster modules 
t) 
2) 
Major offecr an cresw safary 
ad primarymissionobjecive 
Major effecton crew safety 
amd primary mission objective 
1) inaftor pressure regulator bad 
width 
2) Measure downstream pressure 
None 1) A(24) 
B(3) 
C(2A) 
2) AC(2A) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
1) Neeffect 
2) Assembly cannotbe isolated 
1) Mo effect 
2) No effect 
1) No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objentive 
Valve position swdtch,Measure pressure
downstream of valve 
Perform valve cycle and leak test. 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
2) Sameas 1) above 0(3) 
2) A(s) 
0(4) 
1) Assembly rendereduselessfor 
delivery of propellants to 
affected trhter. 
Assembly cannot be isolated 
I) Complete lossof affected 
thruster modules 
2) No effect 
1) Major effect on crew safety 
or primary mission objective
2) No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Sameas I) above I) A(ZA) 
D(3) 
C(2A) 
2) A(3) 
B(4) 
0(3) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 

NAME 

2 2.2.1 & 5.2.2 1 Quick C-B 
Disconnect Coupling C-9 

C-10 

2.2 2 2 & 5 2 2 2 Solenoid V-79 
Valve V-80 
V-44 
V-70 
2.2 2.3 & 5.2.2.3 Relief Valve V-25 
V-27 
V-45 
V-71 
2.2.2.4 & 5 2.2.4 Manual Valve V-26 
V-28 
V-67 
V-68 
DRAWING 

NUMBER 

FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
Allow connection of ground lines 

for loading and unloading GO2 and 

OH2 propellants. 

Admit GO2 and GIL propellants to 

fill lines Isolate airborne sys-

tem from ground loading system, 

Preclude overpressurization of 
auxiliary propulsion system, 
Permit manual relief capability to 

auxiliary propulsion system 

FAILURE MODE 

PRIMARY 
1) Coupling restricts 

propellant inflow and 

outflow. 

2) Major external leakage.
 
3) Minor external leakage.
 
1) Valve fails to open 

2) Valve fails to close 

or leaks internally
 
1) Relieves at too low 

pressure 

2) Relieves at too high 

pressure 

3) Major external leakage.
 
4) Minor external leakage
 
1) Valve fails closed. 

2) Valve fails open or 

leaks internally
 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF
 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
 
1) Low 
2) Medium
 
3) Medium
 
1) Low
 
2) Medium
 
1) Low
 
2) Low
 
3) Low
 
4) Medium
 
1) Low
 
2) Low
 
FAILURE MODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 2 0 & 5 0 SUBSYSTEM2.2 & 5 2 
ASSEMBLY 2.2.25 2.2 SHEET I of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RIECOMyE.OATIONSFOR DPERATIOHS / CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OThER RECOIIEIDATIONS CATEGORY 
1) Propellant loading and un- 1) No effect 1) No effect on crew safety or Measure pressure drop across coupling None 1) A(4) 
loading rates 
2) No effect 
3) No effect 
reduced 2) No effect 
3) No affect 2) 
3) 
primary 
Same as 
Same as 
nission objective 
abov * 
above 
Perform leak checks U(4) 
0(4)
2) A(4) 
2(4)C3(4) 
3) A(4) 
C(4) 
1) Propellants cannot be loaded 1) System rendered inoperable 1) Major effect on primar alssion 1) Valve position switch 1) None I) A(2) 
or unloaded 2) No effect ebjective, no effect on crw 2) Valve position switch provide pros- 2) Perform valve cycle and leak test B(4) 
2) No effect 
2) safetyTo effsct on crew safety or sure tap between series redundant valves for single point failure do- 2) C(2)A(3) 
primary mission objective tection R(4) 
D(3) 
1) Accumulator pressures below 
oporating requirements 
1) Performance degraded due to 
low ...uulato prsures 
I) Possible effoct on crew safety
end primary misslon objective 
1) 
2) 
None 
None 
1) A(3)
B4) 
2) Accumulator pressures above 2) Safety margin reduced Poten- 2) lajor effect on crew safety 3) Perform look test C(3) 
operating requirements C1ol for rupture or leek of and primary mission objective 4) Perform look test 2) A(2AIS) 
3) Accumulator pressure decay components increased 3) Same as 2) above B(IS) 
4) 
with rise 
Accumulator prescore decay 
3) Overboard propellant loss re-
sulting in eventual lass of 
4) Same as 2) above 
3) 
C(2AIS) 
A(ZA,1S) 
with tire 
4) 
system-
overboard propellant loss to-
B(4) 
C(2A,1S) 
sulting in eventual lose of 4) A(3) 
system B(4)0(3) 
I) Accumulator pressure cannot 1) No affect 1) No effect o primary mission 1) Perform valve cycle test 1) A(3) 
be relieved manually 2) Overboard propellant Ios to- objective or crew sofety 2) Perform leak test and valve cycle R(4) 
2) Accumulator pressure decay sufting in eventual loss of 2) Major effoct on crew amfety test C(3) 
with time systm operability and primary mission objective 2) AMA) 
B(3)
C(1 ) 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME NUMBER 
FUNCTIONMALFUNCTION 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
OCCURRENCE 
2.3.1.1 Turbine* U-I 
U-2 
U-3 
Convert gas generator thrust to 
rotating power and transmit to 
power train 
1) Turbine fails to ro-
tate at required RPM. 
2) Turbine fails t6 ro­
tate 
1) Low 
2) Low 
2 3,1.2 Power Train PT-I 
PT-2 
PT-3 
Transmit turbine power to pump. Power linkage fails. Low 
2 3 1 3 Pump* P-I 
P-2 
P-3 
Receive liquid hydrogen at 20 psia,
boost to accumulator pressure or 
A/B engine system pressure, and 
deliver to heat exchangers or A/B 
propellant distribution lines 
1) Major external leakage
due to seal failure. 
2) Impeller fails to ro-
tate at required RPM. 
3) Impeller fails to ro­
tate. 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
3) Low 
2 3.1.4 Solenoid Valve V-90 
V-91 
V-92 
V-93 
V-94 
V-63 
Admit liquid hydrogen into suction 
side of pump 
1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally. 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
1) Valve fails to open. 1) Medium 
2) Valve fails to close 2) Low 
or leaks internally 
2.3.1 5 Check Valve V-64 
V-65 
V-66 
V-67 
V-68 
V-69 
Insure unidirectional flow of 
liquid hydrogen from discharge 
side of pump. Preclude reverse 
flow of gaseous and/or liquid hy­
drogen in system during A/B engine 
start 
1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally 
1) Low 
2) Low 
1) Valve fails to open. 1) Low 
2) Valve fails to close 2) Medium 
or leaks internally. 
* Critical component 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 2 0 	 ASSEMBLY:2 3.1 
SUBSYSTEM 2 3 	 SHEET I of 2 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 	 MISSI
 
FOR 	 OPERATORS ---- TIC RECOMErDATIONS CAEGORYOTHERRECO@MENDATIONS --SYSTEM 	 MISSION DETECTIONMETHODSUBSYSTEII 
1) 	 Insufficient power delivered 1) Accumulator repreasuriation| I) No effect en crewsafety or Measure turbine speed None. 1) A(3) 
to pumpresulting In perform- rats capability ard LHe flow primry mission objective B(3) 
ante degradation rate to A/B engine system to- 2) Same o 1) above C(3) 
2) Na power deliveredto pump ducad 	 2) A(3)R(3) 
2) Same am 1) above C(3) 
No power delivered to puep 	 Accumulator repressurization rate No effect on crw safety or pri- Measure turbine speed and pump speed or Perform scheduled inspection and sain- I) A(3) 
capability and LIla flewrate to mary mission objective gearbox temperature tenans of lubrication system B(3) 
IA/a cogine system reduced C(3) 
1) 	 Contamination of subsystem 1) Accumulator reprosmuriation 1) No effet on crewsefet or 1) Measure pump discharge pressure or None 1) A(3)1 11 
compartmat 	 rate capability and a flow- primary mission objective. compartment temperature B(4) 
2) 	Unable to deliver LHa to beat rat to A/B engine system re 2) Same as 1) above 2) Measure pump speed C(3) 
exchanger and A/B angine sys- duced 3) Sam am 1) aboe 3) Measure pump speed 2) A(3) 
tom at proper flowate 2) Same as I) above B(4) 
3) 	Som as 2) above 3) Same as 1) above S(3)
3) So a 1 aboe 3)A(3) 
B(4)
__________________________________c(3) 
1) Turbopump rendered useless to 1) Accuularbto ropresurizatlone 1 ) No affect on crow safety or Use valve positions switch and measure Perform valve cycle and leak teat 1) A(3)
 
subsyatem rate cap ility and Lsl flow-i primary isas objective pump suctio ssure B(4)
 
2) Assembly cannot be isolated rute to A/B engine system re-I 2) No effect on crow safety or C(3)
 
dused j primary mission objective 2) A(4)

D(4)

) 	 possible effect on pumps in C(4) 
airbreathing engines due to 
the delivery of high pressure I 
hi-phase hydrogen 
1) 	 Turbopump rendered useless to I) Same as 1) above ) No aeffect on Crow safety or 1) A(3) 
subsystem 2) Same 2) aboveJ ca B(4)prmry mission objective. 
2) Asembly cannot be isolated 2) Major effect on crew safety or C(3)
 
primary mission objective 2) A(3)
 
B(4)
 
C(2A) 
I) Assembly rendered useless for 1) LH o capability dc- I1) No effect on crew safety or esure pump discharge pressure or line I) Perform check valve functional test. 1) A(3) 
delivery of Los to A/a engine I ruded primary mission objective ressure downstream of valve ) Perform check valve functional test. B(4) 
system A/B engine propellant No effort 2) No effect C(3) 
delivery line cannot be purged 2) A(4) 
2) 	ao effect B(4)C(4)
 
1) Sass as I) above t) Same or 1) above 1) Same as 1) above. ovid. pressure top beween aeriesre- edundancy may nor be required 1) A(3) 
Z) Reverse flow of LHmpossible 2) No effet 2) No effect hundant valves for single point failure B(4) 
Intection 	 G(3)
 
2) 	 A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
w
 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
2.3.1.6.1 Heat Exchanger H-1 
H-2 
H-3 
Convert liquid hydrogen to gaseous 
form using hot exhaust gases from 
gas generator and deliver to hy-
drogen gas accumulators at approx-
imately 1500 psia. 
1) Partial blockage of 
coil by contaminants 
inLH2 
2) Coil major leakage. 
3) Coil minor leakage 
I) Low 
2) Low 
3) Medium 
2.3 1.6 2 Solenoid Valve V-45 
V-46 
V-47 
V-48 
V-49 
V-so 
Direct flow of liquid hydrogen 
from discharge side of pump to A/B 
engine system or heat exchanger as 
required by system demand 
1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally. 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
1) 
2) 
Valve fails to open. 
Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally. 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM2 0 ASSEMBLY2 3.1 
SUBSYSTEM2 3 SHEET2 of 2 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMEWATIONS FOR MISSIOdOPERATONS CR--L-
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMENATIONS CATEGORY 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Reduced capability to recharge 
aeu.mulatmrs 
Turbine ov.apeed potential 
exists 
Reduced capability to recharge 
accumultors 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Accumulator reprossuritation 
rats capability reducod 
Accumulator averpressurization 
possible 
Accumulator repressuri.a.io. 
ratecapability reduced 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Ro effect .s crew safety or 
primary sion bjomtive.
Same as 1) above 
Same as 1) above. 
easure heat exchaner outlet pressure 
If pressure falla below lower limit. 
pumpsuction valves muset be closed to 
isolatoe system 
None 1) A(3) 
D(3) 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
BF3) 
C(3) 
3) Ain) 
B)A(3)C(3) 
1) Assembly rendered useless for 
accuulator repr surizat.on 
Gan 8e.atet .. not be purge 
2) No affect 
I) 
2) 
Accumulator repressurizati.on 
rate capability reduced, 
o effect 
1) 
Z) 
Na effect on crew safety or 
primry mesion objective 
Us effect 
Use valve position switch, measure pump 
discharge pressure or as gonerator in-
ect pressure 
N..a 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
B(4)
C(3) 
1) 
2) 
Same as 1) above 
Lou flow to heat exehanger 
cannot be controlled 
1) S- as 1) above ) 
P(3) 
of Begaccumulators Capabi-
ity to doliver LIIa to air-
breathig 
1) 
2) 
Sa.me.. 1) above rse valve position switch. moasso pomp
Possible effect on crew safety discharge pressure oras generatar in-
or primary ission objective lt pressure 
perform valve aycle ad loek ehook 1) 
2) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
A(2A) 
Bpaired) 
C(ZA) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
2 3 2 1 Gas Generator G-1 
G-2 
G-3 
Provide turbine drive gases for 
the turbopump assembly and a high 
temperature heat source for the 
heat exchangers, 
1) Major hot gas external 
leakage. 
2) Blockage of propellant 
injectors 
1) Low 
2) Low 
2 3 2 2 Heat Exchanger H-4 
H-5 
H-6 
Assure delivery of gaseous hydro-
gen at the proper conditions to 
the hydrogen accumulators and gas 
generator bootstrap system 
1) Partial blockage of 
coil by contaminants 
in LH2 . 
2) Coil major leakage 3) Coil minor leakage. 
1) Low 
2) Low 
3) Medium 
2 3.2.3, 2.3 2 4 Solenoid Valve GOV-l 
GOV-2 
GOV-3 
GFV-l 
GFV-2 
GFV-3 
Admit GO2 and G2 propellants to 
the gas generator 
1) Valve fails to open 
2) Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally. 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
1) Valve fails to open 
2) Valve fails to los 
or leaks internally 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
2 3 2 5 Check Valves V-51 
V-52
V-53 
V-95 
V-96
V-97 
Allow unidirectional flow of GH2 
to the accumulators Precludetoteacmltr rcueorbackflow of high pressure gas 
through the heat exchanger 
1) 
2) 
Valve fails to open 
Valve fails to close leaks internally 
1) Low 
2) Low 
1) Valve fails to open 
2) Valve fails to closc 
or leaks internally, 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM 2 0 ASSEMBLY2 3 2 
SUBSYSTEMZ 3 SHEET I of 
FAILUREEFFECTON MISSION 
SIJBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOID4ECATIOIISFOR 
DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECO!IMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
1) 
2) 
Lose of subsystem 
Possible performance 
degradation of turbine 
1) 
2) 
Compartment fire could result 
Decrease in turbire output 
could offect repressurization 
capability and also affect L16 
flower to A/B engines 
1) 
2) 
Catastrophic loss of stage. 
Loss of hydrogen conditioning 
subsste could affect mission 
termination 
Masure gas generator chamber pressure one 1) 
2) 
A(ID 
B(3) 
C(1 
A(2A) 
B(3) 
C(A) 
I) 
2) 
3) 
Reduced capability to recharge I) 
accumulators 
Turbine overspeed potential 2) 
exists 
Reduced capability to 3) 
recharge accumulators 
Accumulator repressurization 
rate capability reduced 
Accumulator overpressurization 
possible 
Accurculatorrepresuriestion 
rate capability reduced 
1) 
2) 
3) 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective I 
Same as 1) above 
Same as 1) above 
Measure heat exchanger outlet pressure 
If pressure falls below lower limit, 
pup suetien valve. csae be alesd to 
isolatesystem 
None 1) A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
1(3) 
C(3) 
3) A(3) 
3(3) 
C(3) 
1) 
2) 
Turbopumprendered 
No effect 
useless 1) 
2) 
Possible performance 
degradation due tc loss of 
turbopup assembly 
No effect 
1) 
2) 
No effect on crew safty or 
primary mission objective 
No effect on crew safety or 
Primary mission objective 
Use valve 
generator 
position switch, messure gas 
chamber pressure 
None 1) 
2) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
A(3)
B(4) 
C(3) 
1) 
2) 
Turbopump rendered useless 
Overboard loss of propellants 
Assebly cynnt be isolted 
1) 
2) 
Possible performance 
degredation due to leas of 
teubopum asssbly 
Accumula-or pressure loss with 
ncreasing time resulting 
in sysem lose 
1) 
2) 
No effect on crew safety of 
primary misio objective, 
Hjec offs..n raw safety 
cn primary tession objective 
Use 
gas 
valve position switch, measure 
generator chamber pressure 
Perform valve cycle and leek test I) 
2) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
A(A) 
B(3) 
C(2A) 
1) Eminent turbopurp failure due 
to deadhead pumping Sub-
assembly rendered useless for 
accumulator recharge 
2) No effect 
1) 
2) 
Accumulator repressurization 
rate capability reduced 
o effect 
1) 
2) 
No effect on Crew safety or 
ptimaery mission objective 
See. as above 
1) 
2) 
Measureheat ech.ngeroutlet pros-
mere 
Provide pressure tap between series 
redundant valves for single point 
failuredetection 
1) 
2) 
None 
Perform check valve functional test 
1) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
1) Sameas 1) above. 1) Same am 1) above 1) SameaS 1) above Provide pressure tap between series Perform check valve functional Cost 1) A(3) 
2) No effect 2) No effect 2) No effect redundant valves for single point 
failuredetection 
B(4) 
0(3) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
an 
,o 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME NUMBER 
DRAWING ~~FUNCTIONOF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MLUCINOCREC 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
2 4.1.1 Turbine* U-4 
U-5 
U-6 
Convert gas generator thrust to ro 
tating power and transmit to power 
train 
1) 
2) 
Turbine fails to 
rotate at required RPM 
Turbine fails to 
rotate. 
1) 
2) 
Low 
Low 
2 4 1 2 Power Train* PT-4 
PT-5 
PT-6 
Transmit turbine power to 
compressor. 
Power linkage fails Low 
2 4 1 3 Compressor* CV-I 
CV-2 
CV-3 
Remove ullage gas from main 102 
tank at 35 to 40 psa and compress 
to 1500 psia for delivery to GO 
accumulators 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Major external leakage 
due to seal failure 
Compressor blade fails. 
Compressor bearing 
fails. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Medium 
Low 
Medium 
2 4 1 4 Check Valve V-54 
V-55 
V-56 
V-85 
V-86 
V-87 
Insure uni-directional flow of 
1500 psxa G02 into accumulators 
Preclude reverse flow of high 
pressure GOZ into compressor. 
1) 
2) 
Valve fails to open 
Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally 
1) 
2) 
Low 
Medium 
1) 
2) 
Valve fails to 
open 
Valve fails to 
close or leaks 
internally. 
1) 
2) 
Low 
Medium 
2 4 1 5 Solenoid Valve V-57 
V-58 
V-59 
V-60 
V-61 
V-62 
Admit low pressure (35 - 40 psia) 
G02 to compressor. 
1) 
2) 
Valve fails to open. 
Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally 
1) 
2) 
Medium 
Medium 
I) 
2) 
Valve fails to open 
Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally 
1) 
2) 
Medium 
Medium 
* m Critical component 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM2 0 ASSEMBLY 2 4 1 
SUBSYSTEM 2 4 SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON IISEIOO 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS CRITICLITY 
NCATEGORY 
I) Insufficient power delivered 
to compressor resulting in 
reduced output of high 
ptress.e COg 
2) No power delivered to 
compressor resulting in 
1) 
2) 
Accumulator represeurization 
rate capability reduced 
Bameas above 
1) 
2) 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Sane as above 
Measure turbine speed 1oneI) A(3) 
BI3) 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
reduced output of high 
pressure We 
No power delivered to compressor Accumulator reproeourization rate No effect on crew safety or Measure turbine speed and compressor Perform scheduled inspection and A(3) 
capability reduced primary mission objective speed or gearbox temperature mainrenance of lubrication system B(3) 
C(3) 
I) 
2) 
Contamination of subsystem 
compartment by GO2Reduced output of high 
1) 
2) 
No effect 
Accumulator repressurization 
rate capability reduced 
I) 
2) 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Same as above 
1) 
2) 
Measure compressor discharge 
pressure or compartment pressure 
Inspection 
1) 
2) 
None 
Perform scheduled inspection 
postflight proceduroes 
per 
1) A(3) 
9(3) 
C(3) 
3) 
pressure COe 
Same as 2) above 
3) Same as 2) above 3) Same as above 3) Measure compressor speed and/or 
bearing temperature 
3) None 2) A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
3) A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
l) Assembly rendered tees 
to subsystem for accumulator 
repressurization subsystem 
I) 
2) 
Accumulator reprensurizarion 
rate capability reduced 
No effeot 
1) 
2) 
N aeffect en crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Sane as above 
Measure copreseo discharge pressure 
Provide pressure tap btweenseries 
redundant valves for single point 
Perform cheek valve functional east 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
CI3) 
2) 
performance degraded 
No effect 
failuredetection 2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
I) 
2) 
Sass as I) above 1) 
Possible reverse flowof high 2) 
pressere GOP into 
compressor 
Sane as I) above 
Potential eists for over-
pressurization of main 
Ie tanks 
I) 
2) 
Same as i) above 
Possible effect on crew 
safetyand primary mission 
objective 
Measure compressor discharge presser a 
Provide pressure tap between series 
redundant valves for single point 
failure detection 
Perform check valve functional test 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(2A) 
C(2A) 
1) Assembly rendered useless 
to subsystem for accumulator 
repree..eastion 
2) No effect 
1) 
2) 
Accumulator repressurization 
?ate capability reduced 
No effect 
1) 
2) 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Same as 1) above 
Use valve position switch, 
compressor inlet pressure 
measure Perform valve cycle and leak check I) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
I) Same as 1) above 
2) Assembly cannot be isolated 
I) 
2) 
Sam as I) 
No effect 
ebove I) 
2) 
Sane as 
Same an 
1) 
1) 
abase 
above 
Use valve position switch, 
compressor inlet pressure 
measure Perform valve cycle and look check I) A(3) 
B(4) 
2) C(3)A(3) 
B(4)
0(3) 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF
 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY- REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
2 4.2 1 Gas Generator G-4 
G-5 
G-6 
Provide turbine drive gases for 
the turbocompressor assembly, 
1) Major hot gas 
external leakage 
2) Blockage of propellant 
injectors 
1) Low 
2) Low 
2 4 2 2 Solenoid Valve GOV-4 
GOV-5 
GOV-6 
Admit GOa propellants to 
generator. 
the gas 1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally 
1) Medium 
2) Medium 
1) Valve fails to 
open. 
2) Valve fails to 
close or leaks 
internally. 
1) 
2) 
Medium 
Medium 
2 4 2 3 Solenoid Valve GFV-4 
GFV-5 
GFV-6 
Admit G1e propellants to 
generator. 
the gas 1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
or leaks internally. 
I) Medium 
2) Medium 
1) Valve fails to 
open. 
2) Valve fails to 
close or leaks 
internally 
1) Medium 
2) Medium 
242 
FAILURE lODE AND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 2 0 ASSEMBLY 
SUBSYSTEM2 4 SHEET._ of _,,__ 
FAILURE EFFECT ON "ISSiOa 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CR AILITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS - CATEGORY 
1) Contamination of subsystem 1) Accumulator repressuriration I) No effect on crew safety or Measure gas geerator chamber pressure Noe 1) A(3) 
2) 
compartment 
Possible performance 
rate capability reduced 
2) Sameas above 
primary 
2) Se.e as 
misalon 
above 
objective R(3) 
C(3) 
degradation of turbine 2) A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
1) Turbocormpressor assembly 1) Accumulator repressurtzation 1) No effect on crew safety or Use valve position switch, measure gas Perform valve cycle and leak test 1) A(3) 
rendered useless to subsystem 
for accumulator recharge 
Assembly cannot be purged 
rate capability reduced 
2) No effect 2) 
primary mission objective 
Sane as above 
generator inlet pressure H(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(4) 
2) No effect H(4) 
0(4) 
1) Same as 1) above 
2) Overboard lossof propellants-
1) Same as 1) above 
2) Accumulator pressure loss 
1) 
2) 
Same as 1) above 
Major eftect on crew safety 
Use valve position switch1 
generator inletpressure 
measuregas Perform valve cycleand leak test 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
assembly cannot be isolated with time resulting in andprimary mission objective 0(3) 
eventual system loss 2) A(2A) 
B(S3) 
C(2A) 
1) Turboo.pressor asembly 
rendered useless to subsystem 
1) Accumulator repressurization 
rate capability reduced 
I) No effect on crew safety or 
primry mission objective 
Use valve position switch, 
generator inlet pressure 
measure gas Perform valve cycle and leak teat 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
for accumulator recharge - 2) No effect 2) Sameas above C(3) 
assembly cannot be purged 2) A(4) 
2) No effect B(4) 
c(4) 
1) Sameas 1) above 1) Sameam 1) above 1) Sameas 1) above I Use valve pesition switch, measure gas Perform valve cycle ad leak test 1) A(3) 
2) Overboard loss of propellants 
Assembly cannrot be isolated 
2) Accumulator pressure losswith 
time resulting in eventual 
2) Major effect oncrew safety 
and primary mission objective 
generator inletpressure B(4) 
C(3) 
system los 2) A(2A) 
B(3) 
C(2A) 
as
 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
 FAILURE MODE
 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF PROBABILITY OF
 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
 
2.6.1 1 Gas Generator 	 G-7 Provide turbine drive gases for 
 I) Hot gas external 1) Low
 
C-8 the turbine leakage (major) 
 2) 	Low
 
G-9 
 2) 	Blockage of propellant
 
injectors.
 
2 6.1.2 
Turbine* X-1 Convert gas generator thrust to 1) Turbine fails to 1) low
 
X-2 rotating power and transmit to rotate at required RPM 2) low
 
X-3 power train. 2) Turbine falls to
 
rotate.
 
2.6.1 3 Power Trar 	 PT-7 Transmit turbine power to Power linkage fails 
 Low
 
PT-8 booster power converter
 
PT-9
 
2 6 1 4 0Hs Solenoid Valve 	 CFV-7 Admit GH2 propellants to the gas 1) Valve fails to open 1) Medium
 
GPV-8 generator. 
 2) 	Valve fails to close 2) Medium
 
GFV-9 
 or leaks internally.
 
1) 	Valve fails to 1) Medium
 
open. 2) Medium
 
2) 	Valve fails to
 
close or leaks
 
internally.
 
2 6.1.5 GO Solenoid Valve GOV-7 Admit G02 propellants to the gas 1) Valve fails to open 1) Medium
 
GOV-8 generator. 2) Valve fails to close 
 2) 	Medium
 
(4V-9 
 or leaks internally.
 
1) 	Valve fails to 1) Medium
 
open 2) Medium
 
2) Valve fails to
 
close or leaks
 
internally
 
* * 	 Critical component 
H Effect am etel delsye FAILURE M)DEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 2 0 SUBSYSTEM2 6 ASSEMBLy: 2.6.1 SHET I Of 1I 
FAILUREFFECTON HISSIO'I 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFORDETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOWN4EMDATIONS OPERATIONS- CRITIEMIIY 
1) 
2) 
Contamination of subsystem 
compartment 
Possible performance 
degradation of turbine 
1) aximumpower output
capability to boosr 
I overters reduced 
12) Sameas aboveB(4) 
power 
1) 
2) 
No effect on crew safety or 
priory misaus objective 
Same as above 
Masure gas generator chamber 
I 
pressure None 1) A(3)
B(4) 
c(3) 
2) A(3) 
C(3) 
1) Insufficient power delivered 
to power converter 
2) No power delivered to power 
convertor 
1) aximumpower output 
capability to booster power 
converters reduced 
12) Sameas above 
1) No effet on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
2) Same as above 
Measure turbine speed None 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
E4)C(3) 
No power delivered to power 
converter 
xmumower output capability 
to booster power converters 
reduced 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Measure turbine speedand poter 
converter output or gearbox temperature 
Perform scheduled inspection and 
maintenance of lubrication system 
A(3) 
E(4) 
C(3) 
1) Turbine drive assembly rendere 
useless to subsystem for power 
supply to power converters 
Assembly canne be purged 
2) No effect 
1) Haximm power output 
espability to booster power 
manvectors reduced 
2) No effect 
1) No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
2) Same as above 
Use valve position switch, measure 
gas generator inlet pressure 
Perform valve cycle and leak test. 1) A(3) 
R(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
1) 
2) 
Sao as I) above 
Overboard loss of propellants 
Assembly cannot be isolated 
1) 
2) 
Sameas 1) above 
Accumulator pressure los with 
time resulting in eventual 
lossof system 
I) 
2) 
SaBe a 1) above 
Major effect on crew safety 
end primary mission objective 
Use valve pesition switch, 
generator inlet pressure 
easure gas Perform valve cycle and leak teat 1) A(3) 
(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(26)
s(3) 
C(WA 
I) Turbine drive assembly 
rendered uselasa to s bsystem 
for power upply powerfor su l too  
converters Assembly cannot 
be purged 
2) No effect 
I) 
'2) 
rius power output
capability to booster 
po.er tonvertes red.cedower ucedt 
No ffect 
J 
1) 
2 ) 
No effect on crew safety or 
Primey missin objective 
aea )aoeC3S meas 1  above 
Use valve position switch, 
...ertuorinlet pressure 
measure gas Perform valve cycle aud leak test. 1) 
2) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
A(4) 
R(4) 
C(4) 
1) 
2) 
Sm as 1) bove 
Overboard loss of propellants 
Assembly annot be isolated 
1) 
2) 
Sme as 1) aov1) 
Accumulator pressure loss with 
time resulting in eventual 
loss of system 
2) 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Major effect on crew cfeaty 
and primary mission objective 
Use valve position switch, 
generator islet pressure 
measure gas Perform valve cycle and leak test 1) 
2) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
A(2A) 
B(3)
C(2A) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
5 3 1.1 Gas Generator G-1 
G-2 
G-3 
Provide turbine drive gases for 
the turbopump assembly and a high 
temperature heat source for the 
1) Major hot gas e'ternal 
leakage. 
2) Blockage of propellant 
1) Low 
2) Low 
heat exchanger, injectors. 
5 3 1 2 Heat Exchanger H-4 Assure delivery of gaseous hydro- 1) Partial blockage of 1) Low 
H-5 
H-6 
H-7 
gen and oxygen at the proper 
conditions to the hydrogen and 
oxygen accumulators, respectively, 2) 
coil by contaminants 
in L02 or LH2 
Coil major leakage 
2) Low 
3) Medium 
H-8 and to the gas generator bootstrap 3) Coil minor leakage. 
H-9 system. 
5 3 1.3 ad 5 3 1.4 
GO and GB Solenoid Valve 
GOV-l 
GOV-2 
Admit 60% and GH propellants to 
the gas generator 
1) Valve fails to open. 
2) Valve fails to close 
1) Medium 
2) Low 
GOV-3 or leaks internally 
GFV-I 
GFV-2 
GFV-3 
1) Valve fails to open. 1) Medium 
2) Valve fails to 
close or leaks 
2) Medium 
internally 
5 3 1.5 ard 5 3,1 6 
GO and GE Check Valve 
V-46 
V-47 
Allow unidirectional flow of G112 
or GO to the accumulators, 
1) Valve fails to open 
2) Valve fails to close 
I) Low 
2) Low 
V-48 Preclude backflow of high or leaks internally 
V-49 pressure gas through the heat 
V-5O 
V-51 
exchanger 
V-g0 
V-81 
V-BB 1) Valve fails to open. 1) Low 
V-3 2) Valve fails to close 2) Medium 
V-84 or leaks internally 
V-85 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 5 0 ASSEMBLY:5.3.1 
SUBSYSTEM5 3 sSIM 1 of 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS 
MIBS11 
OPERATIONS 
-CAIESOR CATESOODY 
1) 
2 
Contamination of subsystem 
compartment 
Possible performance 
degradation of turbine 
I) Accumulatr repr..sa riraton 
rate capabli'ty snd I2 flew-
racetO A/B eogine system 
reduced 
1) 
2) 
No affect on crew eafty or 
prieary mission objective 
Same as above. 
Measuregas generator chamber pressure Nono 1) A(3) 
R(3) 
C(3) 
2) A(3) 
12) Sam asabove B(3) 
l) Reduced cspabiity to 
recharge accumulators 
2) Turbine overspeed potential 
exists. 
3) Reduced capability to 
recharge accumlatores 
1) Accumulator repressurisation 
rate capability reduced 
2) Accumulator overpreosurization 
possible
3) Accumulator represaurition 
rae capability redued' 
1) 
2) 
3) 
No effecton crew safety or 
primary mission objective I 
Same as above 
Same as above 
Measure heatech.ger outlet pressure 
If pressure falls below lover limit, 
pumpsuction valves =at be closed to 
isolate system 
None 1) A(3) 
S(3) 
C(3) 
2) A(3)
B(3) 
C(3) 
3) A(3) 
B(3)C(3) 
1) Turbopup rendered 
2) No affect 
useless 1) Possible performance 
degradation due to loss 
turbopuep assembly 
2) No effect 
of 
1) No effecton crew safoty or 
primary ieon objective 
2) Same as 1) above 
Use valve position switch, seasure 
generator charber pressure 
gee None 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(S) 
2) A(3) 
E(4)
C(3) 
1) Turbopump rendered useless 
2) Overboard loss of propellant, 
Assembly cannot be isolated 
1) 
2) 
Sameas i) above 
Accumulator pressure le 
with rise reultiig in 
eventual system loss 
1) 
2) 
Same em 1) ebove Use valveposition switch, measure Bs 
Major effect on crew safety gesrator chamber pressure
and primry missin objecetive 
1) 
2) 
Mone 
Perform valve 
check 
cycle test an4 leak 
1) A(3) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
2) A(ZA) 
B(3) 
RISE) 
1) Eminen turbopuep failureduo 
to deadhead pumping Sub-
assembly rendered useless for 
accumulator rachrge 
2) No effect 
1) Accumulator reprossurisorn 
rate capability reduced 
2) No effect 
1) Na effaer on Crew safety or 
mission objective 
2) Saee as I) above 
1) Meaor heat esclss crutle 
pressure 
2) Provide pressure tap between series 
redundant valves for single point 
failuredetermination. 
) 
2) 
None 
Perform check valve functional test. 1) A(3) 
3(4) 
C() 
2) A(4) 
B(4)C(4) 
1) Same as 1) above 
2) No effect 
1) Some .. 1) aoe 
2) No effect 
1) Sam as 
2) Same as 
1) 
1) 
above 
above 
1) Sane 
2) Sae 
as 
as 
1) abovo1) 
2) above 2) 
None 
Perform check valve functional test. 1) A(3) 
B(4)
C(3) 
2) A(4) 
B(4) 
DEffect on External.Subsystem 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
5 3 2 1 Turbine* U1-1 
U-2 
U-3 
5 3 2 2 Power Trairt PT-I 
PT-2 
PT-3 
5.3.2.3 Pumrt P-i 
P-2 
P-3 
P-4 
P-5 
P-6 
5.3 2 4 and 5 3 2.5 
L02 and LB2 Solenoid Valve 
V-52 
V-53 
V-54 
V-55 
V-56 
V-57 
FUNCTION OF 

COMPONENT 

Convert gas generator thrust to 

rotating power and transmit to 

power train, 

Transmit turbine power to pump 

and power converters
 
Receive liquid hydrogen at 20 psia 
boost to accumulator pressure or 

A/B engine system pressure, and 

deliver to heat exchangers or A/B 

propellant delivery system. 

Admit liquid hydrogen or LO2 

into suction side of pump 

FAILURE MODE 

PRIMARY 	 REDUNDANT
 
1) Turbine fails to rotate 

at required RPM. 

2) 	Turbine fails to rotate
 
Power linkage fails. 

1) 	Major external leakage 

due to seal fracture 

2) 	Impeller fails to 

rotate at required RPM.
 
3) 	Impeller fails to
 
rotate.
 
1) 	Valve falls to open. 

2) 	Valve fails to close 

or leaks internally
 
1) 	Valve fails to 

open

2) 	Valve fails to close
 
or leaks internally.
 
PROBABILITY OF
 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
 
1) Low 
2) Low 
Low
 
1) 	 Medium 
2) 	 Low 
3) 	Low
 
1) Medium
 
2) Los
 
1) Medium
 
2) Low
 
*Critical component.
 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM o0 ASSEMBLY5 3 2 
SUBSYSTEM5 3 SHEETI of 
FAILUREEFFECTON HISSIR 
RECQIEIDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRIT 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETIIOD OTHER RECOVMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
1) Insufficient powerdelivered 
to pumpand orbiter power 
)Accus 
ce 
lator pressurization 
a.pbility and N 1 flow-
1) No effecton crew safety or 
primat'y mission objective. 
Measure turbine speed None 1) A(3) 
B(3) 
onaverlets resulting in 
performance degradation 
rate to A/B engi 
reduced 
2) le above 
2) 
C(3) 
A(3) 
2) No power delivered to pump and 
orbiter power converters [2) Sameas above 
B(3) 
C(3) 
No power delivered co pump and 
orbiter power converters 
Jcularor rpreu1z.o rote 
capability and leCemf rate to 
engine system reduced 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
Measure turbine speed and pump speed 
a .gearbo. temperature 
Perform scheduled inspection and 
naiaatenaace of lubriceation system 
A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
Power output to orbiter power 
converters reduced 
1) Contamination of subsystem )Accumulator reprsurtzionsste 1) No effect en crew safety or 1) Measure pumpdischarge pressure or None 1) A(3) 
campertaen t 
2) . Usable to deliver Ils ad/er 
l3b to bleat exchanger and 2 
to A/B engine system at proper a) 
rate capability and Bi flw-
rate to A/B engine sytem 
reduced 
Some as 1) bove 
2) 
3) 
primary mission objective 
No effect on crew safety or 
primary mission objective 
No effect on crew safety or 
2) 
3) 
compartment temperature 
Measure pump speed 
Measure pumpspeed 2) 
B(4) 
C(3) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
3) coeW 2 a 3) Sameas 1) oe primaty mission objective 3) 
C(3) 
A(3) 
~C(3) B(4) 
1) Turbopum rendered useless to ) Accumulator, repressurizaton ) No effect on crew safety or Use valve positioncycle and look rest 1) A(3) 
subsyst em 
2) No effect 
rate capability and Hesflow-
rate to A/B engine subsystem 2) 
primar 
Same as 
mission 
above 
objective pump,suction pressure B(4) 
C(3) 
rduced 2) A(4) 
- B(4) 
1) 
2) 
Sam as 
Samea. 
1) 
2) 
above 
above 
1) 
2) 
8B. am 1) above 
Uncontrolled flow of LH or 
I) 
2) 
Sameas 1) above 
Major effect on crew safety 
Use valve position switch, 
pumpsuction pressure 
.asure Perfor. valve cycle eod leak test. 1) A(3) 
B(4) 
'lTOjthrough pump,beat 
exchanger, ad into accumula-
Cars Assembly cannotbe 
isolated 
or primary mission objective 
2) 
C(3) 
A(3) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
ao 
Z£fecte m cmi a rs 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUABER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
3 1 1 1 and 6 1.1.1 Fan* Not available 1) Supplies inlet air to Failure to deliver inlet None Low 
compressor, air to low pressure 
2) Contributes to thrust through compressor. 
bypass. 
3 1.1.2 and 6.1 1.2 Not available Compresses fan inlet air to higher Failure to raise pressure None Low 
Low-Pressure Compressor* pressure and temperature and temperature of air 
supplied to high pressure
comlpressor. 
3 1 1.3 and 6 1 1.3 
High-Pressure Compressor* 
Not available Accepts air from low pressure 
compressor and conditions air 
Inadequate pressure and 
temperature of air supplied 
None Low 
for inlet to burner, to burner inlet 
3 1 1 4 and 6 1 1.4 Not available Mixes air and fuel, ignites 1) Fuel Manifold wear None Low 
Burner mixture and expels the combustion 2) Fuel injection can 
products wear or burn-out 
3) Combustion chamber 
wear or burn-out 
3 1 1 5 and 6 1,1 5 Not available Drives the high pressure Loss of speed and failure None Low 
High-Pressure Turbine* compressor to rotate high pressure 
compressor 
3.1.1 6 and 6.1 1 6 
Low-Pressure Turbine* 
Not available Drives the low pressure 
compressor 
Loss of speed and failure 
to rotate low pressure 
None Low 
compressor. 
*Critical component.
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RECOMMENDATIONSFOR SPEM-TION- CRITICALI 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Decrease in power assembly Loss of thrust from one engine Booster vehicle loss with more 1) In-place ground visual inspection None A(2A)

efficiency and loss of thrust requires additional thrust output than two engines out with broscope or pyrometer B(4)

froe the remaning eperating Orbiter vehicle loam vith sor 2) Monstor vibration level C(2M)
 
engines 	 than one engine out except when 3) Monitor sound level
 
nonpowerod landing is possible 4) Monitor total specific fuel 
consumption (TSFC) 
Decrease in power assembly 	 Lose of thrust from one engine Booster vehicle loss with more I) In-place ground visual inspection None A(2A, 
efficiency and loss of thrust 	 requires additional thrust output than two engines out with broscope or pyrometer B(4)
 
iron the remaining operating Orbiter vehicle loss with ore 2) Monitor vibration level C(2A)
 
engines thanone engine out except when 3) Monitor sound level
 
nonpowered landing is possible 4) Monitor total specific fuel 
consumption 
5) Monitor engine pressure ratio 
Docrease in power asmeebly 	 Loss of thrust from one engine Boostor vehicle loss with more 1) In-place ground visual inspection None A(2A) 
efficiency and loss of thrust 	 requires additional thrust output than two enginesout with broscope or pyrometer B(4) 
from the remaining operating Orbiter vehicle loss with sore 2) Mnitor vibration level C(2A) 
engines than one engine out except when 3) Monitor sound level 
non.owered landing is possible 	 4) MonitorTSFC 
5) Monitor speed 
Bum. through of outer engine 	 loss of thrust fro. one engine Vehicle loss from fire or I) Flamo-eut detection signal Provide a combustion chamber design A(I 
casing wic loss of thrust 	 requires additional thrust ontpsit explosion 2) Engine compartment fire signal which utilizes sin different ground B(2B)
from the remaining operating 3) In-place ground visual Inspection renousable chambers and injection cans C(I 
engines of fuel injection can and combustion 
chamber 
Decrease i. power .ssmbly 	 Loss of thrust from ensngina Bo eter vse la Ios wish seoe 1) In-plaro ground visual inspection Nne A(2A,
efficiency and loss of thrust 	 requires additional thrust output thsn two engines out with haroscope or pyrometer B(4) 
from the remining operating Orbiter vehicle loss with core 2) Monitor vibration level C(2A)
engines than one ongine nut eXCept when 3) Monitor moundlevel 
nonpowered landing is possible 	 4) Monitor TSFC 
Decrease in power assembly LOSSof thusot from one ongise Booster vehicle loss with mae 1) In-place ground visual inspection None A(2A) 
efficiency and loss of Chrust requires additional thrust output than two enines out with barosope or pyrometer B(4) 
from the remaining operating Orbiter vehicle lose with core 2) Monitor vibration level C(2A;
engines than one engine except when 3) Monitor sound level 
nonpowered landing is possible 4) Monitor TSFC 
5) Monitor speed 
se 
Ca 
Ca 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FUNCIONOF FAILURE MODE __________________ PROBABILITY OF 
NAME DRAWINGNUMBER FUNCTION 
OF
COMPONENT PRI1ARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
3 1 2 1 and 6 1 2 1 
Inlet Shutoff Valve 
Not available Allows the supply of LH2 to the 
variable displacement pump from 
the Propellant Management 
Subsystem 
1) Wear on seals 
2) Electrical fatigue 
3) Wear and yield on 
closure mechanism. 
None Medium 
3 1.2 2 and 6 1.2.2 
Variable Displacement Valve Pump 
Not available 1) Accepts LN from the Propel-
lant Management Subsystem. 
2) Delivers L12 through the fuel 
control system to the fuel 
heater 
I) Wear on seals. 
2) Wear and fatigue on 
blades 
3) Wear and fatigue on 
shafts 
None Low 
3.1.2.3 and 6.1.2.3 
Cooldown and Pressure Relief 
Valve 
Not available Conditions LH2 for entrance to 
the fuel heater. 
1) Electrical fatigue. 
2) Wear and fatigue on 
closure mechanism. 
3) Wear on seals. 
None Medium 
3 1 2 4 and 6 1.2.4 
Fuel Heater 
Not available Accepts LH2 and 
vapor 
emits hydrogen 1) Electrical fatigue 
2) Wear on seals. 
None Low 
3.1.2.5 and 6.1.2 5 
Flowmeter 
Not available Measures the H2 vapor flowrate 
from the fuel heater to the 
combustion chamber. 
1) Electrical fatigue 
2) Wear on seals. None Medium 
3 1 2.6 and 6.1.2.6 
Shutoff and Dump Valve 
Not available 1) Controls flow of H2 vapor from 
fuel heater to engine burner 
2) After stopping flow to the 
engine the valve dumps excess 
propellant overboard 
1) Electrical fatigue 
2) Wear on seals. 
3) Wear and fatigue on 
closure mechanism 
4) Wear and fatigue on 
dump mechanism 
None Medium 
3.1 2.7 and 6.1.2.7 
Electronic Controller 
Not available 1) Accepts inputs from gas path 
analysis, power level angle 
and flowmeter 
2) Controls speed of variable 
displacement vane pump 
1) Electrical fatigue. 
2) Wear, fatigue, and 
yield on mechanical 
control mechanism 
None Medium 
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SUBSYSTEM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSIONSUBSYSTECATEGORY 
RECOMMENOATIOMSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIOMS 
NISSIO 
OPERTIOS 
O 
CRICAL 
Failure to attain engine start Engine would not function Booster vehicle lose with more 
than two engines oat 
Orbiter vehicle loss with mre 
than one engine out 
1) 
2) 
Monitor valve open/close/interediat 
status when system is in operation
Perform around frnction and Olectri-
cot checks 
Provide valves in series-parallel. A(A) 
B(4)
C(2A) 
iase.npoeer assembly 
efficiency and loss of thrust 
Loas of thrust from one engine 
requires additional thrust output 
from the remaining operating 
engines 
Booster vehicle loss with the Leak checks during 
equivalent of more titan two engines system components 
out IC() 
Orbiter vehicle loss with the i 
equivalent of more then one engine 
out 
leak checks of other None A(2A) 
B(4) 
Decreaso in power assembly 
efficiency and toss of thrust 
Less of thruset from one engine 
requires additional thrust output 
from the remaining operating 
engines 
Booster vehicle loss with the Perform ground function 
equivalent of more than two engines checks 
out 
Orbiter vehicle losswith the 
equivalent of more thanone engine 
out 
and electrical Provide valves in parallel A(A) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
Decrease in combustion efficiency 
resulting in less of th.us 
Loss of thrust from one engine tO-
quies additional thrust output 
from the remaining operatig 
engines 
Booster vehicle loss with the 
equivalent of more than two enines 
out 
Orbiter vehicle losswith the 
equivalent of note than one engine 
out 
Perform ground electrical 
pressure de-y leak .. a 
checks and None A(2A) 
H(4) 
C(ZM) 
Decrease in combustion efficiency 
resulting in los of thrust 
Loss of thrust from one engine 
requires additional thrust output 
from the remaining operating 
engines 
Booster vehicle loss with the Perform ground electrical 
equivalent of more than two engines functional test 
out 
Orbiter vehicle loss with the 
equivalent of more than one engine 
out 
checks and Provide floamoters in parallel A(A) 
B(4) 
C(:ZA) 
Failure to attain engine start or 
possible decrease in power 
assembly efricisucy and less of 
thrust 
Engine would not function and loss 
of thrust fre one engine requires 
additnal thrust ouu fras tie 
remaining operating engines 
Booster vehicle loss wi th the 
equivalent of more than two engines 
out 
Orbiter vehicle loss wit the 
equivalent of more than one engine 
out 
1) 
2) 
Monitor valve position when system 
is in operation 
Perfora around electrical and 
funetional tests 
Provide valves in parallel A(A) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
Failure to attain engine start or 
possible decrease power 
assembly efficiency and loss of 
thrust 
Engine would not function and loss 
of thrust from one engine requires 
additional thruset output from the 
remaining operating esgines 
Booster vehicle loss with the 1) 
equivalent of more than two engines 
out 2) 
Orbiter vehicle loss with rise 
Monitor functioning status of 
controllor during system operation 
Perform ground electrical and 
functiosnal tests 
None A(2A) 
B(4) 
CEA) 
equivalent of more thanone engine 
out 
C 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAEDRAWING 
NAME NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
FUNCTIONN 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
OCUROFC 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
3.1.3.1 and 6 1.3 1 Scavenge Not available Transfer oil from bearings to 1) Wear and fatigue on None Low 
Pump* storage tank. seals. 
2) Wear and yield on drive 
mechanism 
3) Wear and yield on gears. 
4) Leakage. 
3.1.3.2 and,6.1.3.2 Oil Boost 
Pump and Main Oil Pressure 
Not available Supplies oil pressure for 
direction of oil to various 
1) Wear and fatigue on 
seals. 
None Low 
Pump* bearings, gearboxes etc. 2) Wear and yield on drive 
mechanism. 
3) Wear and yield on 
gears
4) Leakage. 
3 1.3 3 and 6 1.3.3 Oil 
Strainer 
Not available Removes particles that may be 
detrimental to bearing operation 
1) Clogging of screen. 
2) Leakage 
None Medium 
3 1.3 4 and 6.1.3.4 Boost Pump Not available Controls oil boost pump discharge 1) Wear and fatigue on None Low 
Relief 
Valve 
pressure by relieving excess seals. 
pressure caused by vehicle altitud( 2) Wear on sensing 
changes element. 
3) Wear and yield on 
closure mechanism 
4) Leakage. 
3.1 3.5 and 6.1 3.5 Boost Pump Not available Supplements oil boost pump 1) Wear and fatigue on None Low 
Regulating Valve discharge pressure. seals. 
2) Wear on sensing 
element. 
3) Wear and yield on 
closure mechanism. 
4) Leakage. 
3.1.3.6 and 6 1.3.6 Main 
Pressure Regulating Valve 
Not available Supplements oil pressure pump 
discharge pressure, 
1) Wear and fatigue on 
seals 
None Low 
2) Wear on sensing 
element. 
3) Wear and yield on 
closure mechanism 
4) Leakage. 
6.1.3.7 Zero-G Pressure Supply Not available Prevents oil evaporation during 1) Wear and fatigue on None Low 
System zero-G environment. seals. 
2) Wear on sensing 
element. 
3) Leakage. 
*Critical components.
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RECOMEI,DATIONSFOR OPERAT1Oz CRTCLY 
SUBSYSTE4 SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OIHER REC)raDAIET OS /CAT EGRRY 
0i1 hiding"with prolonged 
engine use would cause bearing 
basting and eventual loss of 
engine power assembly efficiency 
Loss of thrust from one engine 
requiros additional thrust output 
frm che reovin operain 
engine. 
oostor vehile. loss with moe 
than two engines out. 
Orbiter vehicle loss with core 
than one engine out exceptwhere 
unpevered landing is possible. 
Monitor oil level in storage tank 
Mntor oil woeratere at storage ton. 
inlet mnitor oil pressure 
hove ACZA 
3(4) 
0(2) 
low oil pressure results in See 
improper bearing lubrication, 
tearing heating and eventual loss 
of engine power assembly 
above See above. Monitor oil pressure pump discharge 
flowrate nd presure 
Maoior oil boost pumpdischarge 
flootate and prssrel 
None A(2A) 
B(4) 
(2A) 
efficiency 
See above See above See above Mniator oil 
pressure 
Mnior oil 
pressure pump discharge 
level in stose cook 
Nae A() 
3(4) 
(2A) 
See above See above Sae above Noior oil level in storage took 
Monral l1 beor pump diAag 
flearate and pressure. 
omne A(2A) 
(4) 
C(zi) 
See above See above See above moni or ox level in store tank, None A(2A) 
Monitor oil booest pumpdischarge 3(4) 
Closeat.and prcieC(2A) 
See obsve See shove See abve- ntm ilt level in storge cosk. 
Mator oi pressure pup discharge 
npres.ure. 
Nnn A(U) 
Z(4)
C(25) 
See above. See above See stove Montor oi lvel. in stoprag tank. ona A(2A) 
Mnitor system temperature and pressure. 3(4) 
C(2A) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAMEDRAWING FUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
3.1.4.1 and 6 1.4.1 Solid-Start Not available 1) Provide engine start in event 1) Electrical signal None Low 
Cartridge of failure of primary start failure. 
technique. 2) Squib failure due to 
2) Supply energy for rotating seal loss or shorted 
high pressure turbine until bridgewire. 
engine start is attained. 
FAILURE40O ANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 3 0 and 6 0SUBSYSTEH3 1 and 6 1 ASSEMBLY3 1 4SHEET I of I 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILUREEFFECTON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOI4YIDATIONS FOR 
DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
MISSION 
OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
Failure to attain engine start Engine would not function Booster vehicle loss with =oto tha 
two onginos out 
Orbiter vohiele loss with ore 
than o.e engine out escapt whon 
.on..eaed landing is possible 
Failure to start engine as evaluated 
hgh pressure turbine speed 
by None A(2A) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
3.1 5 1 and 6 1.5 1 Not available Provide fuel ignition. Electrical short circuit None Low 
Igniter Plug 
3 1.5.2 and 6.1.5 2 Not available Provide high voltage for Electrical short-open None Low 
Ignition Compositor igniter plug circuit. 
3.1 5 3 and 6 1.5.3 Not available Converts input voltage to 1) Input filter short- None Low 
Ignition Exciter ignition pulses. open 
2) Motor brushes 
3) Transformer short­
open. 
4) Selenium rectifier 
short. 
5) Wear and fatigue on 
cams 
6) Wear and fatigue on 
switches, 
7) Wear and fatigue on 
drive mechanism 
FAILURE MODEAND EFFECTS ANLSES SYSTEM 3 Oand 6O 
SUBSYSTEM3 1 asd 6 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHERRECOCIIENDATIONS 
Failure to achieve fuel ignition Engine would not function Booster vehicle loss with core 
than two engines out 
Monicor voltge output of ignition 
exciter 
Nose 
Orbiter vehicle loss with sore 
than one engine out exceptwhen 
nonposered landing is possible 
Failure to achieve fuel Ignition Engine would not function Sea above Monitor voltage output of ignition 
exciter 
None 
Failure to achieve fuel ignition Engine would not function See above mniator voltage output of ignition
exciter 
Nend 
Monitor input voltage and current of 
ignition exciter 
ASSEMBLY: 61.56 1 5 
SHEET I of 
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OPERATIOS CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY
 
A(2A) 
B(4) 
C(2A) 
A(2A) 
B(4)
 
C(2A) 
AIM ­
B(4)

C(A) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE - PROBABILITY OF 
DRAWING FUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
NAME NUMBER COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
3 2.1 1 Inlet Pressurization Not available Provide uniform distribution of Structural (fatigue None Low 
Diffuser gas into ullage area failure). 
3.2.1.2 Hemisphere Segments Not available Welded segments provide storage Structural (leakage due to None Low 
vessel for LH2. fatigue failure). 
3.2.1 3 Outlet Line Not available Provides LH2 transfer to turbofan Structural (leakage due to None Low 
engines fatigue failure). 
3 2.1.4 Vent Line Not available Provides gas transfer for Structural (leakage due to None Low 
relieving tank gas pressure1 fatigue failure) 
3.2 1 5 Mounting Brackets Not available Maintain position of tank assembly Structural (fatigue None Low 
inside the main LH2 propulsion failure). 
isystem storage vessel. 
FAILUREMODE AND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 3 0 ASSEMBLY 3 2 1
 
SUBSYSTEM3 2 SHEET_ of i 
MISSId
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FORRECORIMEIDATIONS OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOIIENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Tpraper cnk pressure and loss Hyrogn conditining syston pu Vehicle logs wish an equivalent Failure would be detected by subsystem None A(3) 
of adequate rank outflow dagedoe to artl injection of two engines out performance B(2B) 
chrcteristics Loss of engine thrust C(2_) 
Improper rank pressure and loss Loss of angi.n thrust Vehicle loss with on equivalent 1) Visual periodic inspection Lone A(3) 
of adequate tank outflow of two engines out 2) Periodic tankpressure decoy check B(2B)
chsrsaeristics O(2A) 
Loss of adequate L1I2 tank outflow Loss of engine thrust Vehicle loss withsuoquivant Visual periodic insp.ction lNo.. A(3) 
rare of two engines out B(2B) 
C(2A) 
Loss of tank pressure and Loss of engine thrust Vehicle loss wits an equivalent Visual periodic inspecrcion None A(3) 
adequate tankoutflow of two engines out B(2B) 
cberaeristics C(2A) 
None I
2 
to ai.n propulsion syet. rankse B(ZB)
 
Loss of LH supply Los of engne thrust and damage Vehicle loss Visual periodic Gspoao A(l 
DEffoets on external subsystoe 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
3 2 2.1 Storage Vessel Transfer 
Line (4-in -dia Line) 
None Transfers LB2 from cruise tanks to 
hydrogen conditioning system 
Structural (fatigue 
failure) 
None Low 
3.2.2.2 Solenoid Valve Package 
(4-in valve) 
V-54 
V-55 
V-56 
V-84 
Controls LH2 outflow from cruise 
tank to hydrogen conditioning 
system. 
1) Fail to open 
2) Fail to close 
3) Major leakage, 
One valve in each 
parallel leg fails to 
open. 
1) Low 
2) Low 
3) Low 
FAILUREMODE AND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 3 0 SUBSYSTEM 3 2 
ASSEMBLY3 22 
SHEET i of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
RECOME:DATIONS FOR 
MISSION 
CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Less o£ cruise tank pressure 
adequate tankoutflow 
characteristics 
aend Loss of cnginc thrust vehiele loss with an equivalent 
of tso enginesout 
Ound Visual Inpection None A(I ) 
B(3) 
0(1 ) 
1) One valve failure in each 
parallelleg would stopLH2 
flowto Hydrogen Conditioning 
syatem 
2) None 
3) Los of ysat.pRensure 
1) Turbofan engines would lone 
threat 
2) None 
3) Turbofan engineswould lone 
thrust 
1) Vehicle losswith an 
equivalent of two engines out 
2) None 
3) Vehicle loss with an 
equivalent of two enginesout 
1) Monitor position of each valve 
2) Monitor position of each valve 
3) Monitor system pressure 
1) None 
2) None 
3) None 
1) A(I 
B(3) 
C(I) 
2) A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
3) Al)
B(3) 
0(I 
o 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION FUNCTON FAILURE MODEOFPROBABILITY OF 
NAME DRAWING NUMBER FUNCTION 
OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
3., 3 1 and 6 2 1 2 L-3 booster none Butting for Transfer of T/F fuel Structural kfatigue None Low 
Transfer Line orbicer (LH) from APS Hydrogen Condition- failure). 
B - 4-in -dia Line ing Subsystem (Booster) and 
0 - 2 5-in -dia Line Turbopump Assembly (Orbiter) to 
the Turbofan Engine Valve Package 
3 2 3 2 and 6 2 1 1 EFV-l thru EFV-28 To supply LHe from the Propellant 1) Failure to open One valve fails to open 1) Low 
Solenoid-Valve Package (Booster) Management Subsystem to the T/F 2) Failure to close in each parallel leg 2) None 
k3 Packages on the Orbiter). EFV-l thru EFV-12 engines. 3) Major leakage 3) Low 
k7 Packages on the Booster). (Orbiter) 
k12-in Valves) 
3.2 3 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM3 0 and 6 0 ASSEMBLY6 2 1 
SUBSYSTEM 3 Z and62 SHEET of 
FAILURE EFFECT ON ISSIO N 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMIENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS 
OPERATIONS
-ATEGRY CRITICALITY 
Loss of adequate 
characteristics 
flow Loss of engine thrust Booster vehicle loss with an Ground 
eqivalent of two enginas our 
Orbiter vehicle lose with on equi-
alentof one engine out exceptwhen 
visual inspection None A(I 
B(3) 
C(1 
nonpowered landing is possible 
1) One valve failure in each 
parallel cngould stop ramn 
flow 
2) None 
3) Loss of system pressure 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Turbofan 
thrust 
None 
Turbofan 
thrust 
engine would lose 
engines would lose 
1) Booster vehicle lose with en 
equivalent of two engines out 
Orbiter vehicle loss with an 
equivalent of ore engine out 
ecept when non. owered landing 
is possible 
2) None 
3) Vehicle losswith an 
equivalent of to engines out 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Honitor position of each valve 
Honitor position of each valve 
HonLior system pressure 
1) 
2) 
3) 
None 
None 
None 
1) 
2) 
3) 
AIL 
B(3) 
C(1,) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
A(l) 
11(3) 
CI 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
FUNCTIONITYOF 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
3.2.4 1 Transfer Line 
(6-in. line) 
L-31 Ducting for rapid transfer of 
fuel tank gas to atmosphere 
Structural (fatigue 
failure causing leakage). 
None Low 
3.2 4.2 Valve Package 
(6-in valves) 
V-70 
V-71 
V-72 
V-73 
Controls rapid overboard dumping 
of fuel tank gas. 
1) Failure to open. 
2) Failure to close 
3) Major leakage 
One valve in each 
parallel leg fails 
open 
to 
Low 
Low 
Low 
3.2.4.3 Quick Disconnect 
Coupling (6-in.
coupling) 
C-10 Allows ground control for 
venting of fuel tank gas. 
Structural (fatigue 
failure). 
None Low 
FAILUREMODEAID EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM3 0SUBSYSTEM 3 2 ASSEBLY 3 2.4SHEET__ of I 
FAILUREFFECT ON MISSIOr 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSOIO 
RECOMPEMATIONSF R 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS OPERATIONS CARTEGOY 
Fuel tank sa would be vented 
vehicle internal conpartments 
to Themojdynantc onditions xtn. .al 
to components would change 
None - line 
valves 
is isolated by vent Oround via.l l..peetiun None A(4) 
B(2B) 
1) 
2) 
3) 
One valve failurein each 
parallel leg oould prevent 
tank vnting 
Fuel tank pressure could not 
be m.ntained 
Fuel tank pressure could not 
be raintained 
1) 
2) 
3) 
None -eystem could be vented 
through the functioning system 
in the other bodyof the body 
vehicle 
Loss of engine thrust 
Loss of engine thrust 
1) 
2) 
3) 
None 1)
Vehicle loss with an equivalent 2)
of two engines out. 3) 
Vehicle losswith an equivalent 
of two engines out 
Nenitoc 
Moattor 
Menitor 
fuel tank pressure 
volve position 
fuel tank pressure 
None 
None 
None 
IB2B) 
1) A(4) 
C(4) 
2) A(l) 
B(2B) 
C(I I 
3) A~l ) 
11(2C0) 
Fuel tank gas would be vented 
in vehicle main engine comport-
mene 
Noes None - coupling 
valves 
isolated by vent Sre..d visu 1Ispeetion None A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
MNE DNAEINGNUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT 
3 2 5 1 Quick Disconnect 
Coupling 
0-5 Provides coupling for GSE fill 
line Provides low level 
propellant loss capability during 
connection 
3 2 5 2 Transfer Line L-21 Ducting for transfer of 
propellant from quick disconnect 
coupling to fili valve. 
3.2.5.3 Fill Valve (Solenoid 
Operated with Integral 
Relief Provisions) 
V-74 Provides positive shutoff for 
propellant fill and drain 
PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
1) Fails closed or 
minor internal leakage 
2) Major leakage internal 
or external. 
None Low 
Structural (fatigue 
failure causing leakage). 
None Low 
1) Fails open, minor 
internal leakage, 
major internal 
leakage. 
2) Fails closed. 
3) Major external leakage 
(upstream flange). 
4) Major external leakage 
(downstream flange) 
5) Fails to relieve at 
designed back pressure 
None I) Low 
2) Low 
3) Medium 
4) Low 
5) Low 
FAILUREMCDEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 3 0SUBSYSTEM3 2 ASSEMBLY3.2 5 SHEET I of 1 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RECOIMENIDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTHERRECOIMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
No effect - fil1 valve provides Mono None round visual inspetion None A(4) 
position propellant isolation U(3) 
C(4) 
puel leakage into vehicle 
coepartesn. during leading 
None None Ground visual inspection None A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
1) No effect-checking aechani.. 
at fill coupling minrain 
1) No effect due 
redundancy of 
to shutoff 
coupling check/ 
1) 
2) 
Nona 
Nono 
1) 
2) 
Monitor 
Monitor 
valve position, 
valve position. 
1) 
2) 
None 
None 
1) A(4) 
B(4) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
leak integrity
No offect-valve is nereally 
closed during flight 
No ffact-upsrrra line in-
active during flight 
Loss of fuel tenk pressure 
No eff.ct-couplisn relief 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
shutoff echonis 
lone 
None 
Loss of turbofan 
Hone 
engine thrust 
3) Non. 
4) Vhlile tua ith an 
equivalent of two engines out 
except whore unpowored landing 
is possible 
5) None 
3) 
4) 
5) 
Monitor tankpressure
Monitor tunk preuco 
Mnitor tank pressure 
3) None 
4) Mono 
5) Coupling design requires safety 
relief 
2) 
3) 
C(4)
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
mechanism opensunder 4) A(4) 
overpressure H(3) 
C(2A) 
5) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
____________ 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 

NAME 

3.3.1.1 Transfer Line from 
Regulator Package to 
Ut2 tank (2-in line) 
L-33A 
3 3.1.2 Series - Parallel R-37A 
Regulator Package 
(2-in. regulator) 
R-38A 
R-39A 
R-40A 
3 3 1.3 Parallel Solenoid V-75A 

Valve Package V-76A 

(2-in, valve) 

3.3 	1 4 Filter F-12 

(2-in. filter) 

DANGFUNCTION OF 

DRAWING FCONN 

NUMBER 	 COMPONENT 

Ducts GH2 to pressurize the LE2 

A/B propellant supply tank for 

T/F engines.
 
Controls the pressure level and 

reduces the accumulator pressure 

from 1500 psia to Lu2 tank 

pressure of 20 psia. 

Allows release of GH2 from the 

accumulators to pressurize the 

LH2 T/F supply tanks 

Removes particles or 

contaminants from GOH before 

gas reaches the pressure 

regulators
 
FAILURE MODE
 
P 

PRIMARY 	 REDUNDANT
 
'Structural (fatigue None 

failure causing leakage)
 
I) Internal leakage. None 

2) External leakage 

(upstream side). 

3) Wear, failed closed
 
1) Failure to open. 1) Both valves fail 

2) Failure to close, to open. 

3) Major leakage (extend). 2) Both valves fail 

to close.
 
1) Clogging. None 

2) Leakage. 

3) Rupture. 

PROBABILITY OF
 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE
 
Low
 
I) Low
 
2) Low
 
3) Medium
 
1) Low
 
2) Low
 
3) Low 
1) Low
 
2) Low
 
3) Low 
FAILUREMODEAND EFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM 3 0 ASSEMBLY3.3.1 
SUBSYSTEM 3 3 SHEET I of I 
FAILURE EFFECT ON MISSION 
RECMOEEDATIONSFOR OPERATIONS CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM MISSION DETECTION METHOD OTHERECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY 
Paolgao leakage in vehicle Majo leakage would cause loen Vehi.cle le wth an equivalent Monitor tank gas p.essure Mon A(t 
coapart~eet in tank gas pressure and decrease 
in turbofan engine thrust. 
of two engines out B(3)
o(lI 
1) No effect due to relief valve 
built into regulator. 
2) None 
3) lass of tank pr u... 
1) None 
. 
2) 
ahI gs 
cmm 'fT 
u ply ....... 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Noon 
Decrease Ps sInn 
carpabIlity
Vehtl.e I.o with an 
1) Ground teat 
2% Mmnitor uflsupply ta n vole 
I' ed H upy ok. 
3) noitoregulatos pesition 
1) None 
2) Noe 
3) None 
1) A(4) 
B(3) 
C(4) 
2) A(3) 
3) Decrease in tutbofan egine equi.valent of toe engines out B(3) 
thrust. CC) 
3) At)SB)Y 
C(S)ca1 ) 
i) Loss of tank pressure if 1) Decrease in turbofan engine 1) Vehicle les with as i) Mouitor valve position 1) Valve should be eade to fail 1) A(l I 
both valves fail thrust equivalent of two enginesout 2) None because failure ha no effact normally open S() 
2) No oeffae 2) No effect 2) No effect on system, subsystm or mission 2) Nose C(I 
3) None 
o3)r4neasedrs qupran1 3) Dcoreasea in misnian3capability
I 
3, Monitr 'in supplt oe )A4B()
c(4) 
3) A(3) 
B(3) 
C(3) 
1) Decrease in tank pressure
2) No.. 
3) Nose 
1) Decrease in turbofan 
P 
Increased rqurents3 o s tl suppy 
thrust 
for 
1) Vehicle loan with an 
equivalent of two engine, out 
2) Decreasnois srensnnaS 
ceapability 
1) 
3> 
onitor tank gas pressure and 
periodic raplc.e.t
's supply tank prosrur 
1)
2)
3) 
Provide series-parallel filters 
None 
PIrovidc slros-parallal filters.. a 
1) 
2' 
A()
B(3)
1A(3) 
3) Eventual damage of regulators 3) toss of regulators anEdground leak cests B(3) 
3) Measure AP across filter C(3) 
3) A(3) 
Bs) 
C(3) 
DEffects en exteral subsystems 
0, 
to 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FUNCTION OF 
COMPONENT PRIMARY 
FAILURE MODE 
REDUNDANT 
PROBABILITY OF 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
6 2.2 1 Pump* P-7 
P-8 
P-9 
Transmits LU2 from storage vessel 
to turbofan subsystem. 
1) Major external leakage. None 
2) Impeller fails to 
rotate at required RPM. 
3) Impeller fails to ro­
tate 
Low 
6 2 2.2 Solenoid-Operated 
Valve Package 
V-58 
V-59 
V-60 
V-61 
V-62 
V-63 
Admits liquid H2 into suction side 
of pump. 
1) Fails to open 
2) Fails to close 
3) Major external leakage. 
None Low 
6.2 2 3 Turbine* V-4 
V-5 
V-6 
Converts gas generator thrust to 
rotating power and transmits power 
to pump. 
1) Turbine fails to rotate None 
at required RPM. 
2) Turbine fails to rotate 
3) Power leakage fails. 
Low 
6.2 2.4 Check Valve V-64 
V-65 
V-66 
Insure one directional flow from 
discharge side of pump. 
1) Falls to open 
2) Fails to close 
3) Internal leakage. 
4) External leakage. 
None Medium 
*Critical component
 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM6 0SUBSYSTEM6.2 ASSEMOLY:6.2.25 1 of 1 
- 'T--lLURE-EFFECTO. 
RECOMMECDATIONSFOR MISS""i -ITICIIY 
SUBSYSTEM SYSTEMI MISSION DETECTIONMETHOD OTIIERECOMMENDATIONS -ATMO 
Loss is upstresa flowate Decrease i turbofan engine Vehicle loss with the equivalent easrers pumpdiacharge pressure, None 1) A(I 
thrust of one engine out except when 
nenposered landing is possible 
suction pressure and vibration level B(2M) 
C(1 ) 
2) (IS) 
C(I ) 
3) A(I) 
B(2a) 
C(13 
1) Turbopump will fail to supply 
LH2 
2) Turbopump eannor be isolated 
3) Deceos. in pua suction 
pressure 
Decrease in i11c floerat to 
turbofon engines 
No effect 
Decease in Islow's tot 
torbofan engines 
Vehicle loss with the equivalent 
of one engin our except when 
nonpowored landing is possible 
No effect I 
Vehicle loss with the equivalent 
oensure valve position and pump suction 
pressure 
Neasure volvo position 
Neasore volve p.sitioausd pump suction 
pressure 
None 1) 
2) 
A(1 I 
B(2B) 
C(I I 
AE4) 
D(3) 
of en. engine out except whoa 
nonpewerad landing is possible 3) 
C(4) 
A(I) 
C(1 ) 
Loss in upstream flowrote Decrease in 112 flowrete to turbo- Vehicle loss with the equivalent Measure turbine speed and vibration None A(I 
frn engines of one engine out except when 
nonpowered landing is possible. 
level. B(2n) 
0(l I 
I) 
2) 
Loss in upstream ftlowret 
Causes possible back flow to 
turbpoepu 
1) 
2) 
Decrease 
turbofen 
Decreane 
in LH flowerate 
engines 
in Lis fleesrare 
to 
t 
Vehicle lose with the equivalent 
of one engine out except when 
nonpwered landing is possible 
Noanure pump dischargo presure and 
provide pressure tap bemweon series 
redusd.t vlve1s foar single point 
None 1), 2), & 4) A(I I 
s(2n) 
0(E I 
3) 
4) 
Allows pressurization of 
upstream liner 
LOSS in upstream pressur 
3) 
4) 
turbofan engines 
No affect 
Decrease in Le flowert to 
detection. 
None 
3) A(4) 
B(4) 
C(4) 
turbof n engines 
o 
COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION RAIGFUNCTION OF FAILURE MODE 
____________ PROBABILITY OF 
NAME 
DRAWING 
NUMBER 
FCON 
COMPONENT 
P R 
PRIMARY REDUNDANT 
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE 
6.2.3 1 Gas Generator G-4 Provide turbine drive for the 1) Major hot gas external None Low 
G-5 turbopump assembly, leakage 
G-6 2) Blockage of propellant 
injectors 
6.2.3.2 H2 Series Solenoid-
Operated Valve Package 
GFV-4 
GFV-5 
Admit GH2 to the gas generator 1) Fails 
2) Fails 
to open. 
to close. 
1) Both fail to open 
2) Both fail to close 
Low 
GFV-6 3) Major external leakage 
6 2.3.3 02 Series Solenoid-
Operated Valve Package 
GOV-4 
GOV-5 
Admit GO to the gas generator 1) Fails 
2) Fails 
to open 
to close. 
1) Both fail to open 
2) Both fail to close 
Low 
GOV-6 3) Major external leakage 
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS SYSTEM6 0 ASSEMBLY 6 2 3 
SUBSYSTEM 6 2 SHEET I of I 
SUBSYSTEM 
FAILUREEFFECT ON 
SYSTEM MISSION 
RECOMMEIDATIONSF R 
DETECTIONMETHOD OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
MISSION 
OPERATIONS 
/ 
CRITICALITY 
CATEGORY 
1) 
2) 
Loss of subsystem 
Decrease in combustion 
efficiency and hence decrease 
in turbine RPM 
1) 
2) 
Compartment fire could result 
Decrease in turbofan engine 
thrust 
1) Catastrophic loss of stage 
2) Vehicle losswith an 
equivalent of one engine out 
exceptwhere unpored landing 
is possible 
Meaure chamber pressure Compartment in vicinity of Gas Generators 
should have flamedetectors 
I) A(1 ) 
B(2B) 
C(i 
2) All) 
B(2B)
C_() 
I) Combustion process will be 
incomplete 
2) ] 1 gas fllood.combustion 
chaeber 
3) Decrease in combustio 
efficiency 
I) Decrease in turbofan engine Vehicle losswith an equivalent of 
thrust one engine out e'cept where 
2) Pooel aturated ...btion unpaosred lendinsis possible 
causing decrease in turboprmp 
efficiency and turbofan engine 
thrust 
3) Decrease in turbofar engine 
thrust 
Monitor valve position 
Monitor gas generator chamber pressure 
None A(lI 
B(2B) 
C(1 
1) Combustion processwill be 
incomplete 
2) 02 gas floodscombustion 
chamber 
3) Deerease in combustion 
efficiency 
I) Decrease in turbofan engine Vehicle losswith an equivalent of 
thrust one engine out ecePt where 
2) 02 saturated combustion uspewered landingis possible 
causing decrease in turbopuep 
efficiency and turbofan engine 
thrust 
3) Decrease in turbofan engine 
thrust 
Monitor valve position 
Monitor gas generator chamber pressure 
None A(l 
B(2D) 
C(1 

SYSTEM1.0 & 4.0 ASSEIBLY: I..L & 4.1.1 
FNEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.4 CWMPfORIT: 1.1.1-1 & 4.1.1.1 
I SHEETj of . 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOFMENDATIOISF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECCOREOATION1 
Ball Bearings Take out shaft axial/radial 
loads, transmit to housing, pro-
vide saft/impeller/turb me 
position control within housing 
to prevent rub, and clearance 
variations. 
Ball and race wear, 
brinnelling 
pallIn, Increased torque requiremeats, 
increased shaft vibration, di-
placement, labyrinth meal and 
impeller, turbine rub; loading 
to erratic start characteris­
ties, 1ev output. 
Vibration, Inlet presere; 
discharge pressure, pep rpm; 
torque chock at maint. cycle. 
Cracked ball - disintegrating. Abrupt reduction in flow/ Pump rpm; discharge press 
pressure output. vibratioa/displaceaent; 
torque check. 
Ctacked race. Accelerated wear of balls.Same as first line entry. Same as above. 
Cracked retainer. Same as above. Same as above 
Worn retainer Sae as above. Same as above 
Impeller Provide pressure rise. Vane breakage structural 
fatigue 
Reduced pressure/flow output 
Inctreaed vibration. Poe.-bility of Joumcing,with complete 
Pump rpm, vibration, discharge 
pressux 
loss of output 
Shft Support turbine and impeller, 
transmit loads to bearing. 
Breakage. Structural fatigue. Abrupt loss of output. 
overcpeod end severea 
internal components 
Turbine 
ga to 
Pump discharge pressure; pIp 
ri. (xrely apid sequence
of events - detection and re­
action tine usually Insufficient 
to avoid damage.) 
Turbine Noarles Control flow of drive fluid to 
turbine blades (passive)., 
Spallin, cracking pitting. Reduction in turbine efficiency 
reduced output. 
. Pump rpm; discharge pressure; 
inlet .assure. 
Turbine Blades Convert drive fluid energy to 
shaft rotational onergy. 
Distortion Reduction in turbine efficiency Pump rpm; discharge presre;
nlet pressure. 
Loss of blade(s) 
fatigue. 
structural Reduced turbine efficiency. 
Proaressive damage to turbine 
with very low output. Increased 
Vibration; pp rpm; discharge 
& Inlet pressure. 
vibration. 
Labyrinth Seals Provide controlled leak seals at 
impeller inlet and outlet, and 
bearing coolant inlet passage 
Secondary wear as a result of 
excessive shaft radial die-
placement (This is a function 
Reduced output. Bearing detection syate 
provide primary data. 
bould 
of design point clearances). 
SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY 1.1 1 & 4 1 1 
FMEAON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4.1 COMPONENT 1 1 1 2 & 4 1.1.2 
SHEET I of 2 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMMENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOIHMENDATION 
Ball Bearings (2 rows in pumping 
area, 2 rows in turbine). 
baintain impeller/turbine to 
housing clearances, take out 
axial and radial loads. 
Ball and race wear, spalling, 
brinnelling 
Increased torque required, im-
creased shaft vibrations, dis-
placements, reduced efficiency,
possible impeller/turbine rub/ 
Vibration, inlet pressure, pump 
rpm, discharge pressure. 
shaft rub, Lowoutput. 
Cracked bell disintegrating. Abrupt reduction in flow/pressure Same as above 
output 
Cracked race. Accelerated wear of balls, same Sate as above. 
as first line entry. 
Cracked/worn retainer Same as above. Same as above. 
Drive Shaft tansmit turbine drive energy 
to impellers, distribute loads 
to bearings, thrust balancer. 
Breaoks Abrupt loss of pump output 
Probable turbine overspeed with 
sever. internal damage. 
Pump speed to provide as rapid 
a shutdown as possible 
Inducer/Impeller Blades Provide pump pressure rise. Crack with loss of blade piece. Reduced output, increased vibra- Vibration, inlet pressure, 
tion, possible janing of piece outlet press=re, pump speed 
with progressive damage to TPA. 
Hay pass through to praburners, 
nozale, with subsequent damage. 
Piston Ring Seals Provide interstage assembly 
pressure seals 
Loss of spring tension, crack. Reduced pumping efficiency Inlet pressure, discharge pres­
sure, pump speed, preburner 
power valve position 
2 
PART NAME 

Liftoff Seal 

Thrust Balances 
Hot Gas Turbine 

Turbine Nstles 

Ceek Valve, Outlet of 3rd 

Stage, Inlet to First Stage. 

FUNCTION 

Provide static seal between 3rd 
stage and turbine prior to 
operation, provide controlled 
flow oeal dynamically. 
Ltsit axial loads en bearng, . 
Convert hot gas stream energy 
to rotational energy. 

Control flow of hot gas to 
turbine blades
 
Prevent excessive fuel leakage 

to chamber/outside of eagine 
prior to start. Spiing tension 
set to relieve somewhat above 
head/prepressure settings, 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
FAILURE 	 FAILURE EFFECT ON 

MECHANISM 	 COMPONENT 

Pace wear, loss of retaining 	 Increased static leakage to 
force 	 turbine and engine. 
I 
Pace wear (bear.ig or other 	 Reduced output, increased 
abnoraal displacement is cause) 	 vibration, 
Distortion of blade. 	 Reduced effeciency tip rub low 
octut. 
Los of blades(s). 	 increased vibration, reduced 

efficiency, possible progressive
 
damse with loss of output.
 
Disc distortion Rub, with reduced efficaency;
vibration increase. 
Fitting, distortion 	 Loss of efficiency, low output. 
Fails to open at set pressure. 	 No effect on fuel TPA. Loss of 

coolant to OIFA turbine bearings 

Fails to close at shutdown, No effect on fuel TPA Small 
fails to seat adequately at fuel leak through engine after 
shutdown shutdown, until prevalve isclosed
 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 0 
SUBSYSTEIM 1.1 4 1 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 

DETECTION METHOD 

Leak check at maint. cycle. 
Pump speed, vibration, inlet
 
pressure, outlet pressure;

preburner pressure/tmp. 
Psup speed, vibration preburna 
chamber pressure, teaperature 
inlet pressure; dischargepressure 
Vibration, purp speed.
 
Vibration3 prebuee chamber
 press./tmp., pumpsped, 
inlet pressure, outlet pressure. 
Sane as above. 
Valve position discrete;
 
coolant outIst teperature.
 
Leak checks at saint. yle
valve position discrete. 
ASSEMBLY:1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
COPONENT- 1.1 1.2 & 4.1.1.2SHEET2 of 
OTHER
 
RECOMtENDATION 
SYSTEM 1 0 &4 0 ASSEMBLY I 1 1 &4 1 1 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1 1 & 4 1 COMPONENT 1 1 1 3 & 4 1,1 3 
PARTNAME 
Ball Bearings 

Impeller 

Shaft 
Turbine Nozzles 

Turbine Blades 
Labyrinth Seals 
FUNCTION 
Take our shaft axial/radial 
loads, transmit to housing, 

provide shaft/inpaller/turbine
position control within housing

to prevent rub and clearance 
variations. 

Provide pressure rise 

Support turbine and impeller, 
transmit loads to bearings. 

Control flow of drive fluid to 
turbine blades (passive) 
Convert drive fluid energy 
to shaft rotational energy.
 
Provide controlled leak seals at 
inpeller inlet and outle, and 
bearing coolant passage. 

FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
Ball and race wear, spelling, 
brinnelling 

Cracked ball, disintegrating. 

Cracked race. 

Worn/cracked retainer 

Vane breakage Structural 

fatigue, 

Breakage (structural fatigue) 
Spelling, cracking, pittiug. 
Distortion. 
LOe of blade(s), structural 
fatigue. 
Secondary wear as a result of 

xes.ivl haft radial displace-
ment (this is a function of 
design point clearances). 
FAILURE EFFECTON 
COMPONENT 
Increased torque requirements, 
increased shaft vibration, dis-

placement, reduced efficincy, 
Labyrinth seal, impeller turbine 
rub due to excessive wear
 
Possible detonation with pump
 
rupture, fLire.
 
Abrupt reduction in flow/pressure 

output.
 
Accelerated wear of balls. Same 

as first line entry above
 
Same as above. 

Reduced pressure/flow output, 
increased vibration. Possibility 
of jamming, with complete loss 
of output Possibility of 
detonation with pump rupture, 
fire 
Abrupt loss of output Rub, 
possible detonations with 

pump rupture, fire. 

Reduction in turbine efficiency, 
reduced output, 
Reduction in turbine efficiency. 
Reduced efficiency, progressive 
damage to turbine is probable, 
increased vibration; possible

detonation with pump rupture,
fire. 
Reduced output. 

RECOIMMENDATIONSF R 
DETECTIONMETHOD 
Vibratton, inlet pressure, 
discharge pressure, pump rpm.,
 
trque check at main, cycle. 
Same as above. 
Same as above.
 
Same as above 
Same as above
 
Pump rpm vibration discharge
 
Pressure
 
Pump discharge pressure, pump 
rpm (extremely rapid sequence 
of events). 
Pump rpm, inlet pressure, dis­
charge pressure
 
Same as above. 
Vibration, pump rpm. inlet 
pressure, discharge pressure. 
Bearing detection system should 
provide primary data. 
SHEET I of 1 
OTHER 
RECOMhENOATION 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEILY: 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
FfIEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4.1 COMPONENT 1.1.1.4 & 4.1.1.4 
SHEET4 of 4 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMIEDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION IECHANISH COIIPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Labyrinth Seal, at Turbline 
Hydrostatic Seal 
Provide gross back-flow protce-
ton for hydrostatic seal and 
running ring from, turbine gases. 
Secondary wear as a 
bearing wear. 
Structural failure. 
result of No effect - bearing failure would 
precede any =ajor effect. 
Distortion of hydrostatic and 
lift-off running ring Excessive 
fuel bypass from preburners -
--
Leak checks at eajat. cycle 
Eagine performance parameters. 
minor reduction in engine per­feormanc. 
Thrust balancer Provide major portion of axial 
thrust takeout, tolimit bearing 
loads 
No primary mode of failure. 
Ecas axial shaft rotice due to 
worn bearings could cause face 
wear, and accelerate the bearing 
Reduced flow/pressure output. Vibration, displacsect; thrsat 
balance cavity pressure. 
vear. (See bearings) 
Lift-off Seal Provide static seal between 
turbine roller bearing coolant 
and turbine area, 
Wear, loss of seal tension 
(bellows or spring) cracked 
bellows, 
Excess static overboard leakage 
of fuel (sacondery failure), 
(Requires failure of II.P.F T P A. 
check valves) 
Leak checks 
cycle 
at maintenance 
Hydrostatic 
Seals 
Face and Journal Provide controlled flow seals 
between 2nd stage output and 
seal cavity, also between turbine 
roller bearing and seal cavity 
No primary failure mode. Wear 
would result from excessive 
bearing wear (see bearings) 
Reduced pump output (See beartngs) 
Filter Provides filtered flow for bear-
ings, hydrostatic seals, 
labyrinth, thrust blancer, 
preburner injectors. Self 
Channel to plate separation 
opening the equiv orifice size. 
Possible plugging of passages 
Accelerated bearing wear, 
possible seal wear with loss of 
pep performance. 
(See bearings) 
cleaning design. 
________________________________________ 
_______________________________________ex 
to 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY I I I & 4 1.1 
FHEAONCRITICAL COIIPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4.1 COMPONENT 1.1.1 4 & 4 1 1 4 
SHEET 1 of 4 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECOIMIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHAIIISII COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMIENDATION 
Roller Bearing (turbine area) Transmit radial shaft loads to 
ho.sing, maintain clearances. 
Roller/race 
brinalling 
wear, Spalling, 
End and rolling 
Increased vibration, increased 
shaft displacement, slightly 
Vibration, shaft displacement 
surface (minor wear). reduced performance 
Same as above, except major wear Turbine blade rub, labyrinth 
rub, increased vibration 
Reduced performance. 
seal Vibration, shaft displacement 
pump rpm inlet pressure, dis­
charge pressure, preburner 
chamber pressure, temp. 
Cracked roller, disintegrating Abrupt reduction in flow/pressure Vibration, pump rpm inlet pres­
output, increased vibration, sure discharge pressure 
severe labyrinth seal rub, 
Journal ceal rub, possible 
detonation 
Cracked race Accelerated wear of balls, Vibration, shaft displacement. 
some as first line entry above. 
Worn/cracked retainer. Sameas above. Same as above 
Ball Bearings (Zrows) and 
Roller Bearing (between first and 
Transmit axial and radial shaft 
loads to housing Maintain 
Ball/race wear, roller/race 
wear (minor). 
Same as Line 1 entry above. Same as above 
second stage pump impellers) clearances 
Same as above except major wear Increased vibration, displace- 
ment, possible labyrinth/hydro-
sEi.'c seal rub, possible 
Pump rpm, vibration, displace­
ment, inlet pressure discharge 
pressure 
impeller rub, with possible 
detonation, rupture of pump 
and fire 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY:1. 1 & 4.1.1 
FtlEAON CRITICAL CCIIPONENTS SUBSYSTEM1 1 & 4 1 COMPONENT1 1.1 4 & 4.1.1.4 
SHEET2 of 4 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECO)4EDRIATION 
Ball/Roller Bearings (cent) Continued Cracked ball or roller, with 
disintegration 
Abrupt reduction in pump output, 
increased vibration, impeller 
Vibration, shaft displacement, 
pump speed, discharge pressure 
rub, scal rub, probable detona- inlet pressure 
tion with rupture of pump, fire 
Cracked race Accelerated wear of rollers/ Vibration, pump rpm displacement, 
I balls Sa as Line I entry inlet pressue., outlet pressure. 
Worn/cracked retainemr Same as above Same as above 
Inducer Boost 
stage 
inlet pressure for first LOss of vane or piece Increased vibration, reduced 
output, possible Jammsingof 
Vibration, pump rpm inlet pros­
sure, first and second stage 
piece in inducer, first stage 
or second stage, piece may go
through to main TCA Possible 
outlet pressure 
detonation, rupture of pump, fire 
First/Second Stage Impellers Provide required head riae Loss of Vane or Piece Sam as abeve Same as above 
Turbine Convert hot gas flow energy 
rotational energy 
to Blade distortion, 
tion. 
disc distor- Turbine rub, reduced 
increased vibration 
output, Vibration, pump rpm, p.eburner 
chamber pressure, temp., inlet 
pressure (io), discharge 
preesure. 
FIIEA ON CRITICAL COIIPONERTS SYSTEM t 0 & 4 0 SUBSYSTEM1 I 4.1 
ASSEMBLY 1 1.1 & 4 1 1 
COMPONENT1.1.1 4 & 4 1 1 4
SHEET 3 of 4 
PART NAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
IIECHANISM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
COMPONENT 
RECOMUIENDATIONSF R 
DETECTION METHOD 
OTHER 
RECOMmENDATION 
Turbine (cont) Continued Loss of blade Increased vibration, probable Vibration, pump rpm discharge 
progressive turbine damage, 
loss of pump output. 
pressure inlet pressure. 
Turbine No..les Control flow of hot gas to 
turbine (passive). 
Distortion, spelling, crack. Reduced turbine efficiency 
low pump output 
- Pump rpm, preburnar chamber pres­
sure/temp. inlet pressure, 
discharge pressure 
Diaeeter Seal (upstream) Provide an assembly seal between Loss of spring tension/cracked Reduced output (minor) of pump. Same as above 
first stage and inducer, ring (depends upon design) 
Diameter Seals Provide assembly seals in inter-
propellant seal cavity, between 
second stage and oxid vent cavity 
also between turbine cavity and 
Loss of spring tension/cracked
ring (depends upon design). 
Reduced output (minor) of pump. Seal cavity oxid vent pressure,
fuel vent pressure, plus param­
eters directly above. 
fuel vent cavity. 
Labyrinth Seals - Inducer/
Impeller Area 
Provides controlled flow seal 
at inducer outlet, first stage 
outlet flow to bearings, 
Secondary wear 
bearing wear. 
aaa result of (See bearings) Reduced pumping
efficiency. Possible detonation 
depending upon materials, degree 
(See bearings) 
second stage inlet. of rubbing. 
Labyrinth Seals, Seal Cavity Provides controlled helium purge 
seal flow to aid. and fuel vent 
Same as above. (See bearings) Excessive purge 
gas requirement 
(See bearings) 
pressure. 
Seal cavity 
cavities. 
SYSTEM1 0 ASSEMLY- 1.1 
FMEAON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1 1 COMPONENTI 11.8 
SHEET 1 of 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECONMIENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MIECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECORIENDATION 
Motor Actuator and Gear Train Provide driving force to open/ Open winding, short to ground Valve fails to open at start, or Valve position. 
close valve via a gear train slow to close at shutdown 
Shorted turns Valve may open slowly Valve position 
Bearings wear, gall, or Jam. Slow open/close, failure to open, 
failure to close 
Gear breakage (structural fatigue) Valve nay fail to open, or it may 
possible Jaming fail to close Valve position 
Linkags Translate rotary gear output to Cracked (structural fatigue) Valve fails to open or closes Valve position 
linear valve tisn slowly 
Spring Provide added closure force for 
sbaling with no head pressure 
Breakage (structural failure or 
loss of spring tension) 
Fails to seal at 
shutdown. 
bleed-in and Leak check at naint cycle 
Shaft Bearings Transmit shaft radial loads to Wear, galling of shaft. Erratic valve opening/closing Valve position trace 
valve housing 
Poppet Seal Provide positive shutoff Wear, particle in seal (secondary Excessive leak during chill-down, Leak checks at maint cycle 
failure) postfiring 
Filters, Flow-Through Sysrem Prevent plugging of pressure 
balance orifices (0 05 to 0 1 in ) 
Plugging due to accrued conte 
(secondary effect) or, structural 
failure of either filter 
Closes earlier in shutdown tail-
off of pressure, valve fails to 
omn at sturt possible premature 
Valve position 
closure 
Static Seals Prevent external leakage Creep None - external fire hazard Leak checks at mint cycle 
PARTNAME 
Motor Actuator and Gear Train 
Linkage, Shaft 

Sprin' 
Shaft Bearings 

Poppet Seal 

Pilot Valve (passive) 

Static Seala 

FUNCTION 
Provide driving force to open/ 

close valve via a gear train. 
Translate rotary gear output to 

linear valve motion. 

Provide added closure for. for 
sealing with no head pressure. 
Trensamitshaft radial loads to 

valve bousing. 
Provide positive shutoff 
Provides pressure balance for 

opening 

Prevent external leakage. 

FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON 
MECHANISM COMPONENT 
Open winding, short to ground Valve fails to open at start, 
slow to close at shutdown 
Shorted turns. Valve may open/close slowly 
Gear breakage (structural Failure to open/close 
fatigue), possible Jamming. 
Bearings wear, gall or jam Slow to open/close, failure to 
open/close. 
Cracked (structural fatigue) Valve fails to open, closes 
I slowly. 
Breaka.e, lose of cession. Fails to seal at chill-down or 
shut down, slow to close 
Wear, galling of shaft. Erratic valve opening/closing 
Wear, particle imbedded in seal Excessive internal leak at chill 
(secondary failure) down, post firing 
Fails to open (structural fail- Fails to open 

ure).
 
Fails to close (seal wear, Small leak at shutdown 

conas..)
 
Creep. None - external safety hazard 
Valve 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4 1 
RECOIIIEi4DATIONS FOR 
DETECTIDNIETHOD 
position, 
ASSEMBLY 1 1 1 & 4,1.1 
COMPONENT 1 1.1 9 & 4 1 1 9 
SHEET 1 of 1 
OTHER 
RECOMMENDATION 
Valve position 
Valve position 
Valve position 
Valve position. 
Volve position. Plus leak check 
at maint cycle 
Valve position. 
Leak checks at maint cycle 
Valve position. 
Leak checks at maint cycle, 
Leak checks at maint. cycle. 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT 
Motor/Gear Train Drive Provide valve positioning force. Open windlng, short to ground Failure to open, fails to close, 
fails static, not reap, to 
commands. 
Shorted turns. Slow response, 
Gear failure (structural fatigue). Failure to open, remains open at 
shutdown. Fails static with no 
response to commands. 
Motor bearings gall, 
possibly Jce. 
Failure to open, slow to open/ 
close, failure to close. 
Shaft Transmits power from gear train Breakage (structural failure). Failure to open, failure to close 
to valve piston, at shutdown, fails static - no 
rasponse to com.ands 
Shaft Bushings Take out shaft radial loads & 
provide guide, 
Wear, galling. Failure to open, failure to close, 
erratic operation of valve. 
Shaft Seal (Primary) Provide pressure seal between Wear. Possible slight effect on valve 
valve cavity and secondary seal. response. 
Shaft Seal (Secondary) Provide seal between primary seal Wear, No effect. Secondary flilure 
and motor cavity, causing external leak. 
Piston Ring (Upper) Part of valve CV determination. Wear. loss of spring force Slight change in valve CV. 
Change in position for given 
power demand. 
Piston Ring (lower) Provide a pressure balance seal. Wear, less of spring force. Increased opening time, 
decreased closing time, 
Static Seals Prevent external leakage. Creep. None - external safety hazard 
SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 
SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 
RECOIMIENDATIONSF R 
DETECTIONMETHOD 
Valve position. 
ASSEMBLY: 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 
COMPONENT:1.1.1.10 &4.1.1.1O 
SHEETI of 
OTHER 
RECOMMEhDATIOJ 
Valve position. 
Valve position. 
Valve position. 
Valve position. 
Valve position. 
Leak check at maint. cycle. 
Leak checks. 
Valve position Preburner chamber 
pressure. 
Valve position. Preurner chamber 
pressure 
Leak checks at maint. cycle. 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 1.1 & 4 1 1 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM1 1 & 4.1 COMPONENT1.1.1.11 & 4 1.1 11 
SHEET1 of 1 
PART NAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
IIECHANISM 
FAILURE FFECTON 
COMPONENT 
RECOMIENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTION METHOD 
OTHER 
RECOMMENDATION 
Motor/Gear Train Drive Provides valve opening/position- Open winding, short to grond. Failure to opea, or premature Valve position 
ing force. closure 
Shorted turns. Slow response. Valve position 
Gear failure (structural 
fatigue) possible jaming 
Failure to open, premature 
closure, failure to close. 
Valve position 
Motor bearings gall and jam. Failure to open, slow opening/ Valve position 
closing, failure to close. 
Shaft Transmits power from gear train Breakage (structural failure) Failure to open, premature Valve position 
to valve piston. closure. 
Shaft Bushings Take our shaft radial loads, 
provide guide 
and Wear, galling. Failure to open, failure to 
elses, erratic operation of 
Valve position 
valve 
Shaft Seal (primary) Provide pressere seal between 
valve cavity and secondary seal. 
Wear Slight 
time. 
effect o valve response Leak check, valve position 
Shaft Seal (secondary) Provide seal between primary Wear Secondary failure resulting in Leak check 
seal and engine exterior. external leak 
Piston Ring (upper) Provide restricted flow path dur-
ing start to NFL. 
Wear, loss of spring force. Valve not controlling start and 
shutdown transient properly -
Valve position, preburer chamber 
pressure, temperature. 
slight change inposition for 
given power demand 
Piston Ring (lower) Provide a pressure bal. seal. Wear, loss of spring force. Increased opening time, de- Same as above. 
creased closing time (very small 
effect) 
Shutoff Seal Provide positive shutoff. Wear, contaminate particle In Excessive internal leakage of Leak checks at saint, cycle. 
seal (secondary). oid. 
Static Seals Prevent external leak. Creep None ­ external safety hazard Leak checks at maintenance 
cycle 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 1 3& 4 1 3 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1 1 & 4 1 COMPONENT 1 1 3 1 & 4 1 3 1 
SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMMENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION HECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOIMIENDATION 
Oxidizer Valve, Solenoid 28 vdc Provide on-off control of oxidizer Fails to open Fails to ignite. Valve position discrete 
flow to igniter in response to 
command 28 vdc valve is a fail- Opens slowly Fails to ignite Valve position discrete, preburner 
close on loss of power chamber pressure 
Premature closure Fails to ignite. Sa.a as above 
Fails to close due to sticking at 
closure signal 
Burnout of igniter chamber, with 
possible burn-through tohot gas 
Valve position discrete, main C C 
pressure 
manifold high ter discharge gas 
Seat leakage beyond spec limits Hard start, possible 
damage 
igniter tube Leak check at maintenance cycle 
Main C C pressure Physical
check of igniter plug. 
tLciter (Redundant) Comvert 28 vdc to30,000 volt NO output or low output Feila toignite igniter current 
50 pps energy to plug 
Cable from Exciter to Plug (Each 
Eyiter to Plug) 
Conduct high-voltage pulses from 
exciter to spark plug 
Open circuit Fails to ignite Igniter current 
Short circuit, or spark gap to 
ground not allowing spark todis-
Fails to ignite Ignition detector 
charge atplug 
Spark Plug (Redundant) Provide controlled spark gap Short toground Fails to ignite Ignition detector 
SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.oSUBSYSTEM1.1 &4.1 ASSEMBLY. 1.1.1 & 4.1.1 COMPONENT1.1.1.12 6 4.1.1.12 
SHEET 1 of I 
PART NAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
FAILURE EFFECTON 
COMPONENT 
RECOIENDATIONS FOR 
DETECTION METHOD 
OTHER 
RECONVIENDATION 
Motor/Gear Train Drive Provide valve opening/positioning 
force* 
Open winding, short to ground Failure to open, 
premature closing. 
Valve position. 
Shorted turns. Slow response. Valve position 
Motor bearings gall and jam. Failure to open, slow to open/
close, failure to close 
Valve position. 
Gear failure (structural fatigue), 
possible Jaucing. 
Failure 
failure 
o open, presmture closure 
to close. 
Valve position. 
Shaft Transmits power from gear train 
to valve positton. 
Breakage (structural failure). Failure to open, premature 
closure. 
Valve position, 
Shaft Bushings Take out shaft radial loads and 
provide guide. 
Wear, galling. Failure to open, failure to 
close, erratic operation of 
Valve position. 
valve. 
Shaft Seal (Primary) Provide pressure seal between 
valve cavity and secondary seal 
Wear. Slight effect on valve response, 
depending upon severity, 
tak checks, 
position. 
possibly valve 
Shaft Seal (Secondary) Provide seal between primary seal 
and engine exterior. 
Wear. go effect Requires double 
failure - then external leak 
Leak checks. 
would be evidenced. 
Piston Ring (Upper) Provide restricted flow 
during start to MPL. 
path Wear. Slight increase of oid flow to 
preburner during start and 
shutdown. Valve not controlling
flow properly. 
Preburner chamber 
temperature. 
pressure, 
Piston Ring (Lower) Provide a pressure balance seal Wear. Slightly increased opening time, 
decreased closing time, 
Valve position, preburner 
chamber pressure 
Shutoff Seal Provide positive shutoff. Wear/particle imbedding Excessive internal leakage Leak checks at reg. maint. cycle. 
of orid. 
Static Seals Prevent external leakage Creep. one ­ external safety hazard Leak checks at r~g maint, cycle. 
wel
 
SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY1 1.3 & 4.1.3 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1.1 & 4 1 COMPONENT 1 1.3.1 & 4 1 3 1 
SHEET I of 1 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOMIENDATION 
Oxidizer 
28 vdc 
Volvo, Solenoid, Provide on-off control of 
oxidizer flow to igniter in 
response to command 28 vdc. 
Valve is a fail-close on loss of 
Pails to open. 
Opens slowly. 
Fails to ignite. 
Fails to ignite. 
Valve position discrete. 
Valve position discrete, pro­
burner chabcr pro.... 
power. 
Preoature closure. Fails to ignite, premasture loss Sane as above. 
of ignition 
Fails to close due to sticking, Reduction inlife expectancy of Valve position discrete. 
at signal to close igniter easy, burnout of igniter
chamber, metal contamination of 
Check at oaintenance cycle(functional and leak). 
proturner injector. 
Seat leakage beyond spec liits.* Pressure spike in igniter Leak check at sainteance cycle 
cheober 
damage. 
Possible igniter Conduct physical check of 
igniter plug 
Exciter (redundant) Convert 28 vdc input signal to 
30,000 volt SOpps energy to 
No output or low output Fails to ignite. Igniter current. 
plug 
Cable from Exciter to Plug 
(each s'citer to plug) 
Conduct high-voltage pulses 
exciter to spark plug. 
from Open circuit. 
Short circuit or spark gap to 
ground, not aLlowing spark to 
discharge at plus 
Fails to ignite. 
Fails to ignite. 
Igniter current. 
Ignition detector 
Spark Plug (redundant) Provide controlled spark gap. Short to ground. Pails to ignite. Ignition detector 
PART NAME 

Oxidizer Valve, Solenoid, 28 
vdc 
Exciter (redundant) 
Cable from Exciter to Plug 
(each exciter to plug) 

Spark Plug (redundant) 

FUNCTION 

Provide on-off control of 

oxidizer flow to igniter in 
response to command 28 vdc. 
Valve is a fail-lose on loss 
of power. 
Convert 28 vdc input signal to 
30,000 volt 50 pps energy to plug
 
Conduct high-voltage pulses 
frn exciter to spark plug 
Provide controlled spark gap. 

FAILURE 
MECHANISI 
Fails to open. 
Opens slowly. 
Premature closure 
Pails to close due to sticking, 
at closure signal 
Seat leakage beyond spec 
limits, 
No output or low output. 
Open circuit 
Short circuit, or spark gap to 

ground not allowing spark to
 
discharge at plug.
 
Short to ground. 
FAILURE EFFECTON 
COMPONENT 

Fails to ignite 

Fails to ignite. 
Fails to ignite. 
Reduction in life expectancy of 

igniter assy, burnout of 
igniter chamber, metal con-
tamination of praburner injector 
Excessive pressure spike, 
possible igniter damage, 

Fails to ignite. 
'sils to ignite. 
Fails to ignite. 

Pails to ignite. 

SYSTE, 1 0 & 4.0 
SUBSYSTEMI I & 4 1 
RECOMIEDATIONS FOR 
DETECTION METHOD 

Valve position discrete 
Valve position discrete, pre­
burner chamber pressure.
 
Same as above 
Valve position discrete, check
 
at maintenance cycle; functional 
and leak check. 
Leak check at maintenance cycle, 
check igniter plug condition
 
igniter current. 
Igniter current. 
Ignition detector
 
Ignition detector
 
Os
 
ASSEMBLY 1.1 3 &4 1 3 
COMPONENT1.1 3 2 & 4 1 3 2 
SHEET 1 of 
OTHER 
RECOISIENOATION 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 
SUBSYSTEMI I & 4 t 
ASSEHBLY1 1.4 & 4 1 4Gimbal ActuatorCOMPONENT-& Power Pack 
SHEET of 2 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMHENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Hydraulic Power Pack Provide hydraulic fluid at 3000 
prig nominal to the TVCgimbal 
actuators 
Minor fluid leakage (not at suf- 
ficient rate to deplete reserve 
fluid durin. missien. 
Fault isolation and repair or re-
placement required prior to next 
flight 
Reservoir fluid level measurement 
(piston position transducer) 
MaJor fluid leakage (at rate suf-
ficient to deplete reserve fluid 
Impending loss of pressure to 
gimbal actuators, resulting in 
Same as above Lock actuators in null position
when this failure mode is de­
and eventually starve pump inlet) . actuator slow response while ac-
umulator discharges and then Inherdover actuators 
tocted 
Turbine-driven 
deliver flow 
pump failure to Rapid loss of pressure to gimbal 
actuators as accumulator dis-
charges (2 to 12 seconds, depend-
ing on actuator activity) ,result-
Supply pressure measurement Operate motor-driver pump and 
lock actuators in null position 
when this failure mode is do­
tected 
ing in actuator slow response forbrief period and then in hardover 
actuators 
Motor-driven pump failure to de- Inability tocheckout or service Supply pressure measurement. 
liver flow gimbal actuator and power packLoss of backup to turbine driven 
pump for actuator null lock opera­
tion 
Loss of accumulator gas charge Neglible effect if turbine-driven 
pump is oL, However, if this can-
dition exists, a sudden failure of 
the turbine-driven pump to deliver 
flow iS likely to disable capabil-
Accumulator gas pressure measure-
ment 
Possibly operate motor-driven 
pump whenever turbine-driven pump 
is operatirg (set pressure compen­
sator on motor-driven pump to 
lower pressure so that it normally 
icy tolock actuators in null operates at no load) 
position (becausea too rapid 
loss of pressure to actuators be­fore motor-driven pump can come up 
to speed). 
Excessive particulate contarine- Clogging of filters at actustor Periodic sampling of hydraulic Flush and refill component with 
tion in hydraulic fluid (due to 
pump wear, erosion of fluid pas-
sages, etc) 
inlets, reducing filter effective-
mess and allowing contamination to 
reach actuator servovolves May 
fluid for analysis (ground 
nence operation) 
mlnte- clean fluid when indicated by no­
saIts of fluid sample analysis 
Replace actuator filters whenever 
result in servovalve failure to extreme fluid contamination bas 
function occurred 
Gimbal Actuator Position the rocket engine 
TVC 
for Minor internal leakage (sorvovalve 
able to deliver flow at load re-
Slow response of gimbal actuator Actuator 
mand. 
position measurement cos­
quird to hald actuator at 
manded position). 
em­
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 1 4 &4 1 4RIEA~~~~~~~ ONCIIA OIOET bal ActuatorVlA ONCRITICAL CCIIPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 1 1 & 4.1 COMPONENT&Power Pack 
PART NAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
Gimbal Actuator 
(aentnied) 
Major internal leakage (inexcess 
of sevovalve ability to deliver 
flow at pressure required to hold 
actuator at commanded position) 
Primary servovalve fails to re-
spend to electrical input signal 
Secondary servovalve fails tore-
spond to electrical input signal 
(after disabling of primary serve-
valve), 
Actuator does not lock in null 
when required by other failure
modes being detected or engine 
shutdown (Failure of solenoid 
valve, centering valve, selector 
valve, null lock, or feedback 
mcbasis. ) 
Null lock inadvertently arms 
(sal..id valve or disarm piston 
seal fails) 
Feedback aechanism backlash (due 
to wear or partial failure). 
Feedback mechanism failure 
Extremely high fluid temperature 
due toexcessive internal leakage 
from orifice wear 
Dynamic load damper failure 
(sticking piston, clogged orifice, 
or broken spring) 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 

COMPONENT 

Actuator goestoward hardover 

position. Detection of error 
causes actuator to return tonull
 
and look (as if both primary and
 
secondary servovalves had failed
 
as below)
 
No response rf actuator to com-

mend. Detection by syternral
sys­
tem, which compares the input sig­
nal to the actuator output pos­
tion results in disabling of the
 
primary srevalve and enabling of
 
the secondary servovalve The
 
actuator will then function nor­
mally
 
No response rf actuator to com-

mnd Detection (as for primary
 
servovalve failure) disables the
 
secondary setvovalve, arms the
 
null lock, ard allows the center­
ing valve to drive the actuator to
 
null positior
 
Actuator goes hardover and remains 

there
 
Actuator locks innull position 

Excessive null shift, loss of 

position accuracy, and possible
 
unstable actuator position (oscil­
lation)
 
Unrodulated actuator position 

(full extend or full retract posi-

tions only) 

Ecessive null shift 

Unstable actuator position (oscil-

lation) 

SHEET of 2 
RECOMMENDATIONS OTHERF R 
DETECTION METHOD RECOMIIENOATION
 
Actuator position measurement 
compared to om..nd. 
Same as above
 
Same as above
 
Actuator null position switch.
 
Actuator position measurement cm­
pared to command.
 
Sam as above
 
Same as above Arm actuator null lock to lock in
 
position if actuator passes
 
through null.
 
Same as above
 
Actuator position measurement Lock actuator in null position

analyzed for oscillation when this condition isdetected
 
FIIEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM 1.0 & 4.0 SUBSYSTEM1.1 & 4.1 
ASSEMBLY.1.1.5 & 4.1.5 
COMPONENT: 1.1.5.4 & 4.1.5.4 
SHEET 2 of 2 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECOMENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Power Modules for Valves, 
Ignition, Solenoid Locks, 
Motor Drives 
Provide outputs to on-off, modu-
lating valves, gimbal actuator 
servose,igniters, extendible 
Driver fails to deliver power 
on command 
Loss of redundancy Current sensors indriver 
circuits 
nozzle drivers and looking
.chanisms, gimbal actoutor 
null locks. 
Power Modules for instrument.-
tion 
Provide regulated power as 
required for transducers 
Pailure to regulate 
Loss of power 
Loss ot redundancy 
Loss of redundancy 
rttmary/sconl.arY cosartssI. 
Prieary/seondsry comparison 
-BITE" Modules Perform tests on processor, 
power modules, 
Logic failure, lossof check 
capability 
Loss of redundancy Failure mode give. "switch" 
signal to CCU,or CPUto 
switch bite 
Channel Control Unit Select functional modules based 
on bite signals for operable 
Failure of select switches, 
logic, 
Loss of select capability None - fails neutral Shut­
down module still available 
flow path This unit is fail 
neutral - a failure in the CU 
results in continuation of the 
last structure An additional 
failuro in the controller re­
suits in a safe engine shut­
down via the shutdown module 
Emergency Shutdown 
Module 
Shuts down engine on fixed se-
quence, selected in event of 
failure of the shutdown capa-
Failure of logic switch Loss of third level redundant 
shutdown capability 
None 
bility associated with other 
two channels 
re 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY 1 1.5 & 4 1.5 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COHPONENTS SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT1 I & 4.1 1.1.5.4 & 4 1.5.4 
SHEET I of 2 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECOMENDATIONS FOR
 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD 
 OTHER RECOIMENDATIONS
 
DCAmplifier Analog Multiplexer 	 Amplify low level signals from Amplifier zero drift loss of redundant data channel. Computation comparison 
transducers, to a level suitable 
for multiplexing, multiplex 16 Noisy channel.
 
channels into one output.
 
Loss of signal. 
Clamped full stale signal. 
Gain change 
Corstant output from one channel Loss ot 16 channel redundancy Computation comparison. 
(MX switch fails to reopen) 
Node Analog Switches 	 Provide selection of any of the Loss of signal Loss of all redundancy in one Computation comparison. 
16 channel amplif/lNX modules input subsystem (analog inputs). 
into one of two or both analog- Constant output - from one 
to-digital converters module (MDXswitch fails to 
reopen). 
Analog-to-Digital Converter. Convert high level analog signals Ref. supply drift. Sane as above. Computation comparison. 
fro node switches to binary BITE 
digits. "Hanging" digits or dropping 
digits. 
ef.resistor open, with
 
digitizing error
 
Digital Pro.ssr/Meory Perform calculations, tests., ailura in core, logic failure, oss of on complete channel. Computation comparison. 
sequencing, self checks, clock failure, power supply 
failure. 
Counter Input Module 	 Convert periodic input signals Improper counting, logic failure. Same as above Computation coaparison.
 
(rpm flow) tobinary digits.
 
Digital Interface 	 Provide logic interface between Logic element failure. Sane as above. Diagnostic routine from vehicle
 
vehicle data/cosmeand bus and comp/interface.
 
controller.
 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4 0 ASSEMBLY1 1.5 & 4.1.5 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM1 1 & 4 1 COMPONENTIgnition Control Harness 
SHEET i of a 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMM!IENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIENDATION 
Cable, from Controller to Exciter Conduct 28 vde on command from Open circuit at connectors loss of continuity Igniter current 
(TWo Exciters, TWo Cables) Fuel 
Prehurner, Oxid Preburner, Main 
controller power bus to spark ex­
cter unit Short circuit to ground in cable Lose of poeretransmission to Isiter current (breaker should 
Combustion Chamber or connector exciter blow, showing loss of current) 
Open circuit in cable Loss of continuity Igniter current 
High rosistrn connection High resistance to current flow Igocer current 
Cables from Controller to Conduct do or ac from controller All modes result in loss or ex- The valves will fail to open, or N/A 
Individual Valves, Including Con- power bus to valves. treme degradation of conduction will fail to prescribed condition, 
sectors as specified The individual 
valve failure eodes and effects 
include this mcde 
,m
re
PARTNAME 	 FUNCTION 
Motor Drive Unit for Extending Provides power to drive the 
Retracting Nozzle extenrion assembly. (Redundant motor mechanisms).
Operates from system electrical 
power. 

Cable Drive 	 Transmit output force of motor 
drive unit to nozzle (redundant 
cable drives). 
LOck Drive Mechanism 	 Provide driving force for nozzle 
locking/sealing at extended 
position. (Redundant motor 
mechanisms.) 
Operates from system electrical 
power
 
FMEAON CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
FAILURE 	 FAILURE EFFECT ON 

14ECHANISII COMPONENT 
Open circuit Failure to extend or retract, 
Short i..uit stopping at intermediate position 
Shorted turns 	 Slow operating, with potential 

for incomplete extension prior 

cO separation/ignition
 
Gear breakage, bearing galling Slow operationt failure to 

jamming (or circuit mech. slip- extend/retract, stopping at
 
page). intermediate position
 
Breakage 	 Failure to extend/retrart, 
stopping at intermediate posi­
tion 
Open circuit. Failure to lock, failure to un-

Short circuit lock, partial unlock/lock 

Shorted turns 	 Slow operation - ultimate motor 

burnout
 
Gear breakage, gears wear, Failure to lock/unlock, partial 

jamming unlocking/locking 

SYSTEM 4.0 ASSEMBLY4 1 8 
SUBSYSTEM4 1 	 4.1.8.3COMPONENTSHEET 1 of 1 
RECOIMIENDATIONS OTHERF R 

METHODDETECTION 	 RECOKRIENDATION 
Nozzle position
 
Motor currant 
Nozzle position
 
Motor current
 
Same as above
 
Same as above
 
lock position 
Motor current 
Motor current
 
Motor current
 
Lock position
 
SYSTEM 1 0 & 4.0 ASSEMBLY.1.1 5 & 4.1 5 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM1 1 & 4.1 COMPONENT:1.1.s.4 
SHEET1 of 1 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECONIENDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMM4ENDATION 
Fuel Temperature, Fuel Preburner Provide temperature data for mix- Shift of resistance vs temperature Change sensitivity Compare redundant data 
Inlet turn ratio control loop, sensitivity 
Fuel Temp, Oxid Preburner Inlet Open circuit Loss of signal Compare redundant data 
Oxid Tamp, Oxidizer Flowetor, Low impadance short across signal Change (reduction) of sensitivity Compare redundant data 
Prebur leads 
Oxid Temp, Main Cbmbustion Cham­
ber Fleneter 
Oxid Flow, Prebvrners Provide oxid flow rate (volumetric) Open circuit in pickoff coil Loss of signal, one coil Compare redundant data - (second 
Data for mixture ratio control coil) 
Oxid Flow, 
Chamber 
Main Combustion loop. 
Low impedance short circuit across Reduced output voltage one coil Compare redundant data - (second 
signal lned, coil) (effect may be a 
below system threshold) 
signal 
Bearing wear or contamination Erratic output, change in calibra- Compare redundant data. 
tion factor, loss of signal in 
both pickeff coils, due to rotor 
locking 
Pressure, Main Combustion Chamber Provide pressure feedback data for Open circuit in power or signal LOSSof signal Shunt calibrate or compare 
control loops (Thrust and six- leads redundant data 
turn ratio ) 
Fuel Pressure, 
Inlet 
Fuel Preburner Low impedance shrt 
or signal leads 
across power Reduction of sensitivity Same as above 
Zero off-set Saoe as above. 
Fuel f..uue, OC id Pcburne 
Inlet Open circuit in shunt calibration Failure to provide step output Same as above 
leg(s) on one or both steps 
Oxid Pressure, Oxid Floweeter 
Shift of shunt calibration re- Nonlinear output of shunt calibra- Same as above 
Oxid Pressure, Main Combustion sistance valve tion 
Chamber Flowwater 
Low impedance from shunt calibra- Zero off-set Same as above 
Pressure, Fuel Ireburner, Combus- tion leg to any other 
tion Chamber Nonlinear shunt caiibracion steps Sam as above 
Pressure, Oxid Preburner Combus- Shift of shunt-to-force sensitiv- Change of output sensitivity with Compare Redundant Data 
tion Chamber ity bonding slip or change in pressure 
mechanical properties 
4P, Inlet to Chmbcr, Fuel 
Preburner Open circuit in ore leg Zero off-sot (large) Shunt calibration or compare 
redundant data 
AP, Inlet to Chamber, Oxid 
Proburear Open circuit in two logs Zero off-set or loss of signal Same as above 
Osid pressure, Ist Stage Disch, Open circuit in three legs. LOSe of signal Same as above 
Oxid Pressure, 2nd Stage DisBc,HPOTPA _ _ 
t, 
FICA ONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM 4.0 
SUBSYSTEM4.4 ASSEMBLY 4.4.2COMPONENT4 4.2 1 Oxidizer TankVent Valve 
SHEET I of I 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMIENOATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANIS COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOHMENDATION 
Primary Pilot Valve Provides force to open main valve 1) Fails open No effect Volvo position indicator Method should be devised to 
2) Fails closed. No effect Valve position indicator checkout pilot valve 
Secondary Pilot Valve Backup to primary pilot valve 1) Fails open Valve could not operate as a Valve position indicator Sao. as above 
2) Fails closed normally closed valve, Valve position indicator 
Valve could not operate in the 
open sodo 
SYSTEM 4 0 ASSEMBLY4.4.4 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 4 4 COMPONEIf: 4.4.4.2 Feel hoatioom 
Vale. 
SHEET I of 1 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Relief Valve Prevents the overpressurization Fails closod. Feed lines dosostream would Valvo position indicator Devise method for valve checkout. 
of feed lines downstream of the 
shutoff valve in the event all 
Fails open burst 
External lesaoe 
Valve position indicator 
valves ar. closed and lines 
are filled with fuel 
Actuator Provides actuation for valve. Fails to operate Valve fails open or closed Valve position indicator. 
to 
SYSTEI 4 0 ASSEMBLY 4 4 5 to 
FEMEAONCRITICAL COIPONENTS SUBSYSTEI4 4 COIPONENT 4 4 5 2 Fuel Tank Vent Valve 
SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMHIENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIVIENDATION 
Primary Pilot Valve Provides force to open main valve Fails open. No effect -secondary pilot would Valve position indicating switch. Method should be devised to c/o 
Fails closed, operate valve Valve position indicating switch, pilot valve 
No effect ­ secondary pilot would 
operate valve 
Secondary Pilot Valve Backup to primary pilot valve Fails open. 
Fails closed 
Valve could notoperate as a 
normally closed valve 
Valve could not operate in the 
Valve position indicating switch. 
Valve p6sition indicating switch, 
ethod should be devised toc/o 
pilot valve 
open mode 
SYSTEM 4 0 ASSEIMBLY4 5 1 & 4.5 2 
FHEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTF3I4 5 COMPONENT 
4.5.1.3 & 4.5.1.7 
Regulator
SHEET 1 of 1 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTOff RECOMiENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIVIENDATION 
Relief Valve Prevents the over-pressurization
of the doanstream on-orbit tank-
Fails closed. 
Fails open 
Component would not operate as a 
relief valve 
Tank pressure measurement. 
Tank pressue . .acr 
age Major leak path through regulator. 
an 
SYSTEM2 0 ASSEMBLY2 3 1 1,2.4 1 1,2 6 1 2 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM2 3, 2 4, 2 6 COMPONENTTurbine 
SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMlIENDATIOilSFOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION IIECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIIMENDATION 
Turbine Case Locate and support vanes and blade Cracking due tohigh loads and Possible loss of vane or seal Visual inspection, measure tur- None 
tip seals Support turbine ex-
baust duting 
thermal stress support bine speed 
Rotor Shaft Support turbine disks Transmit 1) Shaft deplection due to high 1) Possible rubbing of turbine 1) Measure turbine vibration, None 
torque from disks to power train 
and provide spacing for rotor 
parts 
load or excessive tempera-
tures 
2) Fatigue cracking due to vibra-
blades against case Reduced 
bearing life 
2) Reduced pact life, possible 
visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection
3) Measure turbine rotor speed, 
tion shaft separation visual inspection 
3) Shaft separation (secondary 3) Complete loss of turbine 
failure) 
Turbine Disks Support blade seals and spacers 1) Radial growth due toover- I) Limited growth will result in i) Measure turbine vibration, None 
Provide axial spacing for rotor 
parts Transmit driving torque 
from blades to rotor 
speed or overheating 
2) Galling or wear of blade at-
taechmentslots due tovibra-
blade tip or seal rubbing and 
snap growth, which could r. 
suit in rotor shaft unbalance 
visual 
2) Visal 
inspection 
inspection 
tion or gas load 2) Reduced part life 
Turbine Blades Transmit energy from gas stream 
to disks 
1) Airfoil cracking due to 
vibration and cnntrifugal 
1) Reduced part life Possible 
lossof blade resulting in 
I) Measure turbine vibration, 
visual inspection 
None 
loads rotor unbalance and possible 2) Visual inspection 
2) Blade tip rub due tomaterial 
creep or e'trem gas generator 
condition 
damage todownstream parts 
2) Blade tip and case wear 
Possible vibration 
Seals Form flow path at blade tips. 1) West due to rubbing 
2) Distortion due togas loads 
and thermal growth 
1) Loss of efficency due to 
leakage 
2) Inctesed oal clearence re­
suiting in gas leakage and 
1) Visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection 
None 
performance loss 
Vanes Direct gas generator combustion 1) Bending of vanes due togas 1) Loss of efficiency due to I) Visual inspection, measure None 
products to turbine blades loads or overtemperature flow distortion gas temperature 
2) Cracking due to blade wake- 2) Roducd part life Possible 2) Visual inspection 
exeLed vibration total or partial vane loss 3) Visual inspection 
3) Erosion due to hot gas resulting indownstream dam­
impingement age and/or loss of efficiency 
3) Reduced part life 
SYSTEM 2 0 ASSEMBLY 2 3,1 3 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 2 3 COMPONENT Pusw 
SHEET 1 of 1
 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMMIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION IIECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOM4ENDATION 
Main Housing 	 Contain LE 2 propellant Locate 1) Cracking of housing at sount- 1) External leakage of LHa and 1) Visual inspection None 
and support bearings and seals in, pads due to high loads and possible bearing misalignment 2) Visual inspection 
Provide compartments for location stress concentrations with reduced part life 3) Visual inspection 
and mounting of impeller and bear- 2) Cracking of impeller support 2) Reduced mount strength, possi­
ings Provide mounting pads for lugs due to high loads ble impeller misalignment with 
gearbox housing and structural mon- 3) Loosesing of studs or bolts due reduced part life
 
be. to thermal expansion or high 3) External leakage of Lit2 and
 
loads possible bearing alignmnrt
 
with reduced part life
 
Seals Prevent leakage between impeller 1) Wear caused by time in opera- 1) External leakage of 11a with I) Visual inspection, measure None 
shaft and housing tion or impeller unbalance reduced part life pump discharge pressure 
2) Distortion caused by excess 2) External leakage of Lla with 2) Visual inspectionL measure 
pump pressure reduced part life pump discharge pressure 
Impeller Transmit LH propellant at a spet- 1) Blade damage caused by pitting 1) Change in pump efficiency and 1) Measure pump vibration, visual None 
ified inlet pressure to a higher due to particle ingestion and/ increase in vibration inspection 
pressure at the pump outlet or local cavitation 2) Impeller rub against mai hous. 2) Measure pump speed, visual im­
2) Impeller misalignment due to ing Reduced part life with spertion 
bearing wear or improper as- loss In pump efficiency 
seaMbly
 
Bearings 	 Locate and support impeller within Wear of bearings de to high loads Reduced part life with possible Bearing tesperature measurement, None 
the main housing or overheating bearing failure resulting in loss visual inspection 
of impeller support Possible 
impeller rub against housing 
we 
FEEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM2 a 
SUBSYSTEM 2 4 
ASSEMBLY2 4 1 
COMPONENT Compressor 
SHEET 1 of I 
PARTNAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
COMPONENT 
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD 
OTHER 
RECOMMENDATION 
Compressor Housing Locate and support bearings and 
seals Provide compartment for 
location and mounting of shafts 
and bearings Contain high-pres-
sure gaseous oxygen Provide 
mounting pads for gearbox housing 
and structural members 
i) 
2) 
3) 
Cracking of housing at mount-
ing pads duo to high leads and 
stress concentrations 
Cracking of shaft support lugs
duoto high loads 
Loosening of studs or bolts 
due to thermal expansion or 
1) External leakage of high-
prossure gaseous oxygen and 
possible bearing misalignment 
with reduced part life 
2) Reduced mount strength, pos­
sible shaft misalignment 
with reduced part life 
1) Visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection3) Visual inspection 
None 
high loads 3) External leakage of high­
pressure gaseous oxygen and 
possible bearing misalignment 
with reduced part life 
Rotor Shaft Support compressor dieks. Trans-
mit driving torque todisks and 
provide spacing for rotor parts 
1) Shaft deflection due tohigh 1) Possible rubbing of compressor 
load or ecessive temperatures. blades against housing Re-
2) Fatigue cracking due tovibra- duced bearing life 
1) Measure compressor vibration, 
visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection 
None. 
tion 
3) Shaft separation (secondary 
failure) 
2) Reduced part life, possible 
shaft separation 
3) Complete loss of compressor 
3) Measure compressor rotor speed 
compressor outlet pressure, 
visual inspection 
Compressor Blades Increase pressure of gaseous oxygen 1) Airfoil cracking due tovibra-
to 1500 psia for oygen accumulator tion and centrifugal loads 
resupply 2) Blade tip rub due to material 
I) Reduced part life Loss of 
blade resulting in rotor un-
balance and possible damage 
1) Measure compressor 
visual inspection
2) Visual inspection 
vibration, None 
creep or extreme gas generator 
condition 
to downstream parts 
2) Blade tip and housing wear 
Possible vibration 
Compressor Disks Support blade seals and spacers 
Provide axial spacing for rotor 
parts Transmit driving torque to 
blades 
1) Radial growth due to overspend 
or overheating 
2) Galling or wear of blade at-
tachment slots due to vibra-
1) Limited growth will result in 
blade tip or seal rubbing and 
snap growth, which could re-
suit in rotor shaft unbalance 
1) Measure compressor vibration, 
visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection 
None 
tin or gas load 2) Reduced part life 
High-Pressure Compressor Seals LiniitInterstage gas recirculation Seal distortion due to gas loads Increased seal clearance resulting Visual inspection None 
and thermal growth in greater interstage gas leakage 
and performance loss. 
Compe.... r Van..ad Statre Direct gas from one rotor stage to 1) Bonding of vanes due togas 
the next loads or overtemperature 
2> Airfoil cracking due toblade 
wake-eacited vibration. -
1) Loss of efficiency due to flow 
distortion 
2) Reduced part life Possible 
total or partial vane loss ro­
1) Visual inspection Measure 
stage gas temperature 
2) Visual inspection 
None 
sulting in downstream damage 
and/or loss of efficiency 
Rotor Shaft Bearings Locate and support %otor shaft 
within the compressor housing 
Wear of bearings due to high loads 
or overheating 
Reduced part life with possible 
bearing failure resulting in loss 
Bearing temperature 
visual inspection 
measurement, None 
of shaft support Possible blade 
tip rub against housing 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM 2 
SUBSYSTEM 
0 
2 3, 2 4, 2.6 
ASSEMBLY: 2 3.1, 2.4.1, 
COMPONENT Pe.r Train 
2.6.1 
SHEET 1 of I 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOIIMENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIPEDATION 
Gearbox Housing Locate and support bearings and 
seals Provide compartment for 
location and mounting of gears, 
shafts, besrings Provide munt-
1) 
2) 
Cracking of housing at mount-
ing pads due to high lends and 
stress concentrations 
Cracking of gearbox support 
1) 
2) 
Oil leakage and possible bear-
ing misalignment with reduced 
part life 
Reduced mount strength, possi-
1) 
2) 
3) 
Visual inspection 
Visual inspection, oil pressure 
measurement 
Visual inspection 
None 
ing pads for turbine, pump, oil 
pumps, and structural members 3) 
lugs due to high loads 
Loosening of studs or belts due 
ble driveshaft misalignment 
with reduced part life 
to thermal expanson or high 3) Oil leakage and poosible gear 
leads misalignment, reduced part 
life 
Gear Shafts Support and position gears within 
the gearbox Transmit torque from 
1) Wear of splines due to part 
movemenc 
1) 
2) 
Reduced part life 
Less of torque transmlssion 
1)
2) 
Visual inspection 
Visual inspection, oil pressurr 
None 
gear to gear 2) Shear of apline due to over- and support to gears Posaibl measurement 
load loss of oil pump or power 
transmission capability 
Bearings Locate and support gear shafts Wear of bearings due to high loads Reduced part life with possible Oil pressure measurement, oil None 
within the gearbox or overheating bearing failure resulting in loss 
of shaft support and loss of force 
temperature measurement 
transmission to components 
Gears rransfer torque between shafts 1) Gear wear due to high loading 1) Reduced part life 1) Visual inspection None 
within gearbox or oil contamination 2) Reduced part life with possi- 2) Visual inspection 
2) Web cracking due to vibratory ble shear failure resulting in 
loading, loss of power transmission to 
components 
Seals Contain oil and air pressure 
component mounting pads 
at Wear or cracking due to misalign-
cent or high load 
Reduced part life, possible oil 
leakage 
Measure oil level, visual inspec-
tion 
None 
as 
SYSTEM5 0 ASSEMBLY5 3.2 
FiEA ONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 5 3 COMPONENT Power Train 
SHEET 1 of 2 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMMENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Gearbox Housing Locate and support bearings and 
seals Provide compartment for 
location and mounting of ears, 
shafts, bearings. Provide count-
ing pads for clutch, pumps, oil 
pumps, heat exchangers and struc-
tural members 
I) Cracking oi housing at mount-
ing pads due to high loads and 
stress concentrations 
2) Cracking of gearbox support 
lugs due to high loads 
3) Loosening of studs or bolts 
due to thermal e pansion or 
high loads, 
1) Oil leakage and possible bear-
ing misalignment with reduced 
part life 
2) Reduced mount strength, pos-
sible driveshaft misalignment
with reduced part life 
3) Oil leakage and possible gear 
misalignment, reduced part 
1) Visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection, oil pros­
sure sesuresment 
3) Visual inspection 
None 
life 
Gear Shafts Support and position gears within 
the gearbox Transmit torque from 
gear to gear 
I) Wear of splines due to part 
movement 
2) Shear of spline due toover-
1) 
2) 
Reduced part life 
Loss of torque transmission 
and support to gears Possi-
I) 
2) 
Visual inspection 
Visual inspection, oil 
pressure measurement. 
None 
load ble loss of oil pump or power 
transmission capability 
Gear Shaft Bearings Locate and support 
within the gearo. 
gear shafts Wear of bearings due tohigh loads 
or overheating 
Reduced part life with possible 
bearing failure resulting in loss 
of shaft support and loss of force 
Oil pressure measurement, oil 
temperature measurement 
None 
transmission to components 
Gears Transfer torque between shafts 
within gearbox 
1) Gear wear due to high loading 
or oil contamination 
2) Web cracking due to vibratory 
loading 
1) Reduced part life 
2) Reduced part life with possi-
ble shear failure resulting 
in loss of power transmission 
1) Visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection 
None 
to components 
Seals Contain oil and air pressure at 
component countlng pads 
Wear or cracklng due to misalign-
mant or high load 
Reduced part life, possible oil 
leakage 
Measure oil level, visual inspec-
tion 
Hone 
Clutch Housing Locate and support bearings and 
seals Provide compartment for 
location and mounting of clutch, 
power shaft, hearings Provide 
1) Cracking of housing at mount-
inspads due to high loads and 
stress concentrations 
2) Cracking of clutch support 
1) 
2) 
Possible bearing misalignment 
with reduced part life 
Reduced mount strength, pa-
sible power shaft misaliga-
I) Visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection 
3) Visual inspection 
None 
counting pads for turbine, gearbox 
and structural members 
lugs due to high loads 
3) Loosening of studs or bolts 
due to thermal expansion or 
ment with reduced part life 
3) Possible bearing misalignment,
reduced part life 
high loads 
Power Shaft Transmit power from turbine to 
gearbox through clutch plates 
Support clutch plates 
I) Shaft deflection duo to high 
load or ocesive temperatur. 
2) Fatigue cracking due to vibra-
tion. 
3) Shaft separation (secondary 
1) Clutch misalignment resulting 
in p.ssibla coal or clutch 
plate rubbing, reduced bearing 
life 
2) Reduced part life, possible 
1) Measure clutch vibration, 
visual inspection 
2) Visual inspection 
3) Masure turbine speed, gear­
box output, visual inspection 
None 
failure) . shaft separation 
3) Axial shift of power shaft 
resulting in clutch plate 
rubbing, loss of power trans­
mission capability 
FUEAONCRITICAL CCIPONENTS 
SYSTEM 5 0 
SUBSYSTEM,5 3 
ASSEMLY 5 3.2 
COMPONENT:Power mraiz 
SHEET 2 of 2 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOIiIENDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION IETHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Power Shaft Beatings Locate and support the power shaft Wear of bearings due to high loads Reduced part life with possible Bearing temperature measurement, None 
within the clutch housing or overheating bearing failure resulting In loss visual inspection 
of shaft support and loss of force 
transmission to components 
Seals Preclude contamination of clutch 
hous.In by external con.tai.ant s 
Wear or cracking due to misalign-
es or high load 
Reduced part life, possible clutch 
housing contamination 
Visual inspection. None 
Clutch Plates Control power transmission from I) Cracking of plates due to high 1) Reduced part life, possible 1) Visual inspection None 
turbine to gearbox loads and stress concentra- plate separation 2) Measure clutch vibration, 
2) 
tions 
Separation of clutch 
(secondary failure), 
plate 
2) LOSS of power transmission 
control to gearbox, possible 
loss of clutch housing 
visual inspectio. 
Clutch Plate Control Solenoid Control engagement of clutch 1) Failure to engage plates 1) loss of power transmission i) Heasure turbine ard gearbox None 
plates 2) Failure to disengage plates capability to gearbox, outputs (speed) 
2) Possible overload of turbine 2) Measure turbine speed 
SYSTEM 3 0 &6 0 ASSEMBLY 3 1 1 & 6 1 1 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 3.1 & 6 1 COMPONENT 3 1.1 1 6.1.1 1 
SHEET1 of 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMMENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION M1ECHANISM1 COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOMIENDATION 
Blades Increase pressure of engine air 
to low-pressure compressor 
1) Foreign object damage 
2) Blade tip rub due to .mterial 
1) Decrease in performance 
proportional to the ecenc of 
1) GOroundinspection, 
vibration 
increased None 
creep or extreme engine 
conditions 
3) Cracking of airfoil or 
damage 
2) Blade and seal damage 
3) Possible loss of part of 
2) Ground Inspection 
3) Inspection at overhaul, 
increased vibration 
dovetail due toblade flutter blade with downsatreadamage 
and high vibration 
Fan Disks/Hubs Support blades, blade locks, 1) Radial growth due to overspeec 
seals, ad rim spaces Transmit or overheating 
driving torque to blades Provide2) Cracks inrim lugs or web 
axial spacing for rotor parts due to cycle loading. 
3) Galling or wearlof blade 
1) Blade tip or seal rubbing 
resulting in rotor shift 
and unbalance. 
2) Tensile yield or burst which 
results in severe engine 
1) Overhaul inspection mad 
engine vibration 
2) Overhaul inspection, engine 
vibration, loud noise 
3) Overhaul inspection 
None 
attachment slots due to gas damage 
loads and vibration 3) Reduced part life 
Stator Vanes Direct air from one rotor stage 
to the next. 
1) Foreign object damage 
2) Surface damage due toblade 
contact 
3) Cracking due tovibration 
4) Wear of surface due to 
1) Decrease in performance 
2) Decrease in performance 
3) Possible part failure with 
downstream damage 
4) Reduced part life 
1) Overhaul inspection, increased 
Total Specific Fuel 
Consumption (TSFC) 
2) Overhaul inspection, increased 
TSFC 
None 
damage 
5) Loose fasteners 
5) Downstream blade end vane 
damage 
3) Overhaul inspection, reduced 
engine pressure ratio 
4) Overhaul inspection 
5) Overhaul inspection 
Bearings Provide radial support 
fan rotor 
tofront I) Skid or wear due to low load 
2) Wear or seizure due to 
1) Reduced part life possible 
premature failure 
1) Overhaul inspection or engine 
vibration 
None 
overheating 2) Same as above. 2) Same as above 
SYSTEM 3.0 & 6 0 ASSEMBLY'3 1.1 & 6.1.1FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM3 1 & 6 1 COMONENT3.1.1 2 & 6.1.1.2 
SHEET I of 1 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECOPIENDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTICN MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIMEIIDATION 
Blades Increase pressure of engine 
to high-pressure compressor 
air I) Wear of shroud contact faces 
due to vibration 
2) Foreign object damage 
3) Blade tip rub due tomaterial 
creep or extreme engine 
1) 
2) 
Loose blades reduced 
vibration damping 
Decrease in performance 
proportional to extent of 
damage 
1) Inspection at overhaul, 
noisy rundown, increased 
vibra.ion 
2 Ground inspection, increased 
vibration 
None 
condition 
4) Craoking of airfoil or dovetai 
due to blade flutter 
3) Blade and seal damage 
4) Posoible loe of part of 
blade with downstream damage 
3) Ground inspection 
4) Inspecion at overhaul. 
increased vibration 
and high vibration 
Disks/Hubs Support blades, blade locks, 
seals endrim spacers 
Transmit driving torque to 
blades 
Provide axial spacing for rotor 
1) Radial growth due to ovarspeed 
or overheating 
2) Cracks in rim lugs or web duo 
to cyclic loading 
3) Galling or wear of blade 
1) Blade tip or seal rubbing 
resulting in rotor shift and 
unbalance 
2) Tensile yield or burst which 
results in severe engine 
1) Overhaul inspection and 
engine vibration 
2) Overhaul inspection, engine 
vibration, loud noise. 
3) Overhaul inspection. 
None 
parts attachment slotsldo to gas damage. 
loads and vibration 3) Reduced part life 
Air Seals Limit interstage air 
recirculation 
Wear or cracking duo to rubbing Increased seal clearance resulting 
in higher interstage air leakage 
and performance loss 
Overhaul inspection and increase 
inTSFC 
None 
Stator Vanes Direct 
to che 
air from 
next 
one rotor stage 1) 
2) 
Foreign object damage 
Surface damage due to blade 
1) 
2) 
Decrease 
Decrease 
in performance 
in performance 
1) Overhaul inspection, 
increased TSFC, 
None 
contact. 
3) Cracking due tovibraticn. 
4) Wear of surfaces due to 
damage 
5) Loose fasteners 
3) Possible part failure with 
downstream damage. 
4) Reduced part life 
5) Downstream blade and vane 
dosage 
2) Same asabove 
3) Overhaul inspection, reduced 
engine pressure ratio 
4) Overhaul inspection 
5) Overhaul inspection 
Bearings Provide radial support 
fan rotor 
to front 1) Skid or wear due to low load 
2) Wear or seizure due to 
overheating 
1) Reduced part life, possible 
premature failure 
2) Sameas above 
1) Overhaul inspection or 
engine vibration 
2) Sacs am above 
None 
SYSTEM 3 0 & 6.0 ASSEMBLY3 1 1 & 6 1.1 
FIEA ONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 3.1 & 6.1 COMPONENT 3.1.1 3 & 6 1 1 3 
SHLEII Of 3 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOIUIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION NECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIIENDATION 
Blades Increase pressure of engine air 1) 
2) 
3) 
Airfoil cracking due to 
vibrating and centrifugal 
loads 
Wear of atcsehment lugs 
Blade tip rub due to ma erial 
1) 
2) 
Reduce part life because of 
possible loss of blade airfoil 
resulting in rotor unbelance 
and damage to downstream parts 
Reduce part life replacement 
1) Engine vibration, increased 
TSFC overhaul inspection 
2) Overhaul inspection
3) Overhaul inspection, increased 
TSFC 
None 
creep or extreme engine at overhaul 
condition 3) Blade tip and seal wear, 
possible vibration reduced 
aurge margin Possible IFS 
and PER for parts replacement 
High-Compressor Disks/Rubs Support blade seals andrim seals 1) Radial growth (yield or creep) 1) Limited growth will reulmt in I) Overhaul inspection and None 
Provide spacing for rotor parts(integral spacers) 
Transmit driving torques to 
blades 
due tooverspeed or over- 
heating. 
2) Fatigue cracks in rim, lugs, 
bolt holes, or web due to 
blade tip or seal rubbing and 
snap growth which could result 
in rotor shift and unbalanced 
engine shutdown & PER. 
engine vibration 
2) Overhaul inspection, engine 
vibration and loud noise 
3) Overhaul inspection 
cyclic loading 
3) Galling or wear of blade 
2) Cracks weaken disks andlead 
to tensile yield or burst 
attachent slots due to 
vibration and gas load 
which results in severe engine 
damage and engine shutdown 
3) Reduced part life Removal 
at overhaul. 
Seals Liclt interstage air recirculation Knife edge wear or cracking due to Increased seal clearance resulting Overhaul inspection and increased None 
rubbing, seal land distortion due 
to gas loads and thermal growth 
ingreater interstage air leakage
and performance loam 
TSFC 
and surface wear due toblade rub Alteration of internal thrust 
balance could cause reduced life 
of thrust bearing 
SYSTEM 3 0 & 6 0 ASSEMBLY3.1.1 & 6.1.1 
flEA ONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM3 1 & 6 1 COMPONENT:3.1.1 3 & 6.1.1.3 
SHEET2 of 3 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECCOIIENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIENDlATION 
High-Pressure Compressor 
Variable Vanes 
Direct engine air from one rotor 
stage to the next 
1) Cracking of vane due to 
combined bending and vibrating 
1) Loss of 
loss of 
vanes resulting in 
efficiency damage to 
1) Increased Total Specific 
Fuel Consumption (TSFC), 
None 
loads. downstream parts and probable angina vibration, overhaul 
2) Bending of blades due to gas engine shutdown inspection 
loads or over-temperature 2) Loss of efficiency and 2) Increased TSFC, overhaul 
3) Wear of vase pivot due to vane possible restriction of vane inspection 
movement. ovement 3) Overhaul inspecon 
4) Cracking of carbon support 3) Red6ced part life Loosened 4) Overhaul inspection 
bearings due to shock loadings fit of pivots with possible 5) Overhaul inspection 
5) Linkage disconnect or fracture vane tilt and inner shroud 
due to vibration or high load axial shift 
4) Same as above 
5) Free stage would open Co no' 
+ position causing engina 
surge resulting in inflight 
shutdown 
Bearings Provide radial support to rear of 1) Skidding of rollers due to 1) Reduced part life resulting 1) Overhaul inspection, vibration None 
high pressure rotor, low radial load. in replacement at overhaul 2) Same as above 
2) Fretting or spinning of Possible premature failure 3) Same as above 
inner race on hub due to loss resulting in engine shutdown 4) Same as above 
o restraint 2) Some as above 
3) Bearing wear or seizure due to 3) Same as above. 
overheating 4) Some as above. 
4) Roller r rrace wer due to 
high load or rotor vibration 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEh 
SUBSYSTEM 
3 0 & 6.0 
3 1 & 6 1 
ASSEMBLY3 1 1 & 6 1 1 
COMPONENT3 1 1.3 & 6 1 1.3 
SHEET 3 of 3 
PARTNAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
COMPONENT 
RECCIVIENOATIONSFOR 
DETECTION METHOD 
OTHER 
RECOMMENDATION 
Bearings (tont) Sam as above. 5) Cage wear or separation. 5) a) Contamination of oil 
resulting from wear 
b)Bear.in failure results 
from separation leading to 
radial shift of rotor with 
probable blade and vane 
contact and engine shut­
down 
5) a) Overhaul inspectcon 
b) Engine vibration, RPM 
decrease 
SYSTEM3 0 & 6 0 ASSEMBLY3 1 1 & 6 1 1 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS­
fHO PRESSURE TURBINE SUBSYSTEM3.1 & 6.1 COMPONENT 3 1.1 5 & 6 1 1.5 SHEET 1 of 3 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECONIENDATIOIS FOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Turbine Blades Transfer enfrgy from gas stream 1) Cracking of airfoil or Possible blade loss resulting in Inspect at overhaul Part replacement at overhaul. 
to high-pressure disks, attachment due to cyclic reduced efficiency, high rotor Measure vibration None 
loading and vibration unbalance, and impact damage to Inspect at overhaul 
2) Corrosion or erosion of adjacent and downstream parts 
blades Reduced efficiency of turbine 
Blade pitting could lead to 
cracking 
Turbine Disks Supports blades, seals and spacers 
Transmit. terque to shaft 
1) Disk burst due to oversped 
2) Radial growth due to overspeed. 
3) Crack in rim, bolt holes, or 
Severe pngina damage. Probable 
case penetration with possible 
stage da. ge 
Severe vibration, loud noise. 
Overhaul inspaction, engine 
vibration 
None 
web due to cyclic loading Limited growth will result in Overhaul inspection 
blade tip or seal rubbing 
Cracks weaken disk and lead to 
tensile yield and burst 
an 
C 
SYSTEM3 0 &6 0 ASSEMBLY3 1 1 &6 1 1 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM3 1 & 6 1 COMPONENT3 1 1 5 & 6 1 15 
SHEET 2 of 3 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECO14ENDATIONSFOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMENDATION 
Turbine Rim Sp.er Supports labyrinth seals 
disk run axial deflections. 
Limits I) Radial growth due 
speed or overtemp 
to over- Seal rub and wear, loss of 
efficiency due to interstaege air
Increased Total Specific Fuel 
Consumption (ISVC) 
None 
Damen disk ria vibration 2) Cracking due to cyclic recirculation Overhaul inspection 
loading Part replacement at overhaul. Overhaul inspection 
Turbine Blade Yip Seals Forms flow path at blade tips I) Wear due toblade rubbing Air leakage past blade tips Increased TSFC None 
2) Distortion due tooverheating resulting in reduced turbine Overhaul inspection 
efficiency
Seal daeege and blade damage 
Same as above 
Same as above 
resulting in loss of turbine 
efficiency. 
Turbine Case Supports vanes and blade tip 
seats 
Cracking due tohigh load and 
temperature 
Possible loss of vane or seal 
support with vane deflection 
Overhaul inspection Part removal at overhaul 
and possible rotor rub, 
ASSEMBLY 1 
FMEA COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 3.1 & 6 1 COMPONENT 3 1 1 5 & 6 1.1.5 
SYSTEM3 0 & 6 0 	 3 1 & 6 1.1 
ONCRITICAL 
SHEET_3 of 3 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOMMENDATIONSF R OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT METHODDETECTION 	 RECOMMENDATION 
Turbine Vanes D~rents the cobaistioas gases to 1) Bowing of vanes due to high Turbine gas flow distortion Increased Total Specific Fuel None 
turbine blades temperature resulting in reduced efficiency Consumption (TSC) Replace at overhaul 
2) Cracking of airfoils due to Reduced part life overhaul inspection None 
severe thermal gradients Possible blade-vane rubbing Overhaul inspection 
3) 	 Cracking of vane feet due to Increased TSFC 
cyclic loading Overhaul inspection 
Turbine Interstage Labyrinth Knife edge wear or cracking due 	 Increased seal clearance resulting Increased TSFC None 
Seals torubbing 	 in greater interstage air leakage Overhaul inspection

and performance loss.
 
as 
LOW CRESSIETURBINE SYSTEM 3 0 & 6 0 SUBSYSTEM3 1 & 6 1 
ASSEMBLY 3.1 1 & 6.1.1 
COMPONENT3 1 1 6 and 6 1 1 6 
SHEET 1 of 3 
PARTNAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
COMPONENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
DETECTIONMETHOD 
OTHER 
RECOMIENDATION 
Turbine Blades Transfer energy from gas stream 
to low pressure turbine disks 
1) Cracking of airfoil or 
atachment due to cyclic 
Possible blade loss resulting in 
reduced efficiency, low rotor 
Inspect at overhaul 
Inspect at overhaul, 
Part replacement at overhaul 
None 
loading and vibration unbalance and impact damage to 
2) Corrosion or erosion of 
blades 
adjacent and downstream parts 
Reduced efficiency of turbine 
Blade pitting could lead to 
cracking 
Turbine Disks Supports blades, seals, and I) Disk burst due to overspeed Severe engine damage Probable Severe vibration None 
spacers 2) Radial growth due to case penetration with possible Loud noise None 
Transmits torque to shaft 
3) 
overapeed 
Crack in rim, bolt holes, 
stage damage. 
Limited growth will result in 
overhaul inspection 
Engine vibration. 
None 
or web due to cyclic loading blade tip or seal rubbing Overhaul inspection 
Cracks weaken disk and lead to 
tensile yield and burst 
FREA ON CRITICAL CCHIPORENTSA N 
SYSTEM 3.0 & 6.0 
SUBSYSTEM3.1 & 6.1 
ASSEMBLY3.1.1 & 6.1.1 
COMPONENT3.1.1.6 & 6.1.1.6 
SHEET 2 of 3 
PART NAME FUNCTION 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
COMPONENT 
RECOMINDATIONS FOR 
DETECTION METHOD 
OTHER 
RECOMIENDATION 
Turbine Rim Spacer Supports labyrinth seal. Limits 
disk run axial deflections 
Dampen disk rim vibrations. 
1) Radial growth duo to orspe d Sarnoas UIPT 
or overtempraturc Some as IMT. 
2) Cracking due to cyclic loadieng 
Increased Total Specific Fuel 
Consumption (TSFC) 
Overhaul inspection 
Overhaul inspection. 
None 
None 
Turbine Blade Tip Seals Forms flow path at blade tips 1) 
2) 
Wear due to blade robbing. 
Distortion due to overheating 
Air leakage past blade tip re-
sulting in reduced turbine 
efficiency 
Seat and blade damage resulting 
in alt leakage past blades and 
cooling air leakage. 
Increased TSFC 
Overhaul inspection 
Increased TSFC. 
Overhaul inspection. 
None 
Nane 
Turbine Vanes Directs the combustion gases to the 1) Centering pin wear due to 
turbine blades thermal go.th and vibration 
2) Deflection of vane platforms 
due to thermal gradients 
3) Deflection of airfoil due to 
high temperature 
4) Airfoil cracking at leading 
or trailing edge 
Part replacement at overhaul 
Air leakage between platforms with 
reduced cooling and possible blade 
bowing 
Loss of efficiency 
Possible airfoil deflection 
Overhaul inspection 
Increased TSFO 
Overhaul inspection 
Increased TSFC 
Overhaul inspection 
None 
,0 
o 
SYSTEM 3.0 & 6.0 ASSEMBLY3.1.1 & 6.1.1 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 3.1& 6.1 COMPONENT 3.1.1.6 & 6..1.6 
SHEET 3 of 3
 
FORFAILURE 	 FAILURE EFFECTON RECOWIENDATIONS OTHER 
MECHANISM COMPONENT 	 DETECTION METHOD RECOMIMENDATION
PART NAME 	 FUNCTION 

Turbine Intarstage Labyrinth Knife edge wear or cracking due Increased seal clearance resulting Increased Total Specific Fuel None
 
Seal torubbing in greater interstage ar leakage Consumption (TSFC)

and performance loss Overhaul inspection
 
Turbine Bearings 	 Provide radial support to roar end 1) Roller skid or wear due to Possible premature failure result- Engine vibration
 
of low-pressure turbine rotor, low load lg in engine shutdown, Engine vibration.
 
2) Roller or race wear due to Scae as above Ensinc vibration
 
high load Same as above RPM increase
 
3) Bearing wear or seizure due Contamination of oil results in Engine vibration
 
to overheating bearing failure and engine 
4) Cage wear or separation shutdown 
5) Fretting or spinning of outer Same as above 
race on hub due to loss of
 
restraint
 
ASSEMBLY 3 1.3, 6 1 3 
SYSTEM 3 0, 6 0 COMPONENT 3 1 3 1 Scavenge 
FlEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 3 1, 6.1 6 1 3 1 Prs, 
SHEET1 of 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECOMM1ENDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PART NAME FUNCTION MECHANIS COMPONENT DETECTION METHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Scavenge Pump Remove oil from gearbox cempart- 1) Compartment flooding due to 1) Increased oil temperature. 1) High oil temperature, low oil None 
Cntsfor return to oil tank. engine attitude, or pump Pesibte oil leakage reduced pressure and level, eagine 
cavitation. part life Poseible engine smoking, ground inspection. 
2) Gear wear due to high loading shutdown. 2) Low oil level, engine smoking, 
or misalignment
3) Pump Jamming due to eonta.i-
2) Reduced part life Possible 
gear failure with pump failure 
overhaul inspection. 
3) See 2) above 
4) 
nents. 
Gear journal wear due to high 
and compartment flooding (see 
above). 
4) Overhaul inspection 
loading. 3) Compartment flooding (see 
above). 
4) Reduced pump life and effi­
ciency replacemeat at overhaul. 
re 
ASSEMBLY 3 1 3, 6 1 3 
FMEAONCRITICAL COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM 3 0, 6 0 
SUBSYSTE3.1, 6.1 
COMPONENT 3.1 3 2 
6.1 3 2 
011 Pressure 
Pump 
SHEET I of I 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECTON RECOIIIENDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PARTHAE FUNCTION HECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOIVIENDATION 
Main Oil Pressure Pump Supply pressurized oil to engine 
for lubrLeat.oa and cooling, 
1) Input shaft or pump housing 
damage due to high backpres-
1) Reduced lubricant flow or pos-
sible loss of flow resulting 
1) 
2) 
Low oil pressure. 
Low oil pressure 
None 
2> 
sure., 
Pump Jamming due to contasi-
in reduced bearing and seal 
life or engine shutdown. 
3) 
4) 
Low oil pressure. 
Loss of oil pressure. 
uents. 2) Loss of oil pressure and flow 
3) Gear journal wear due to high resulting in engine shutdown. 
loading. 3) Reduced oil pressure, part 
4) Gear Wear due to high loading replacement 
or misalignment. 4) Reduced part life, possible 
gear fatigue with pump failure 
and engine shutdown. 
SYSTEM 6.0 ASSEMBLY6 2 2 
FMEA ON CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM 6 2 COMPONENT 6.2 2 I Pump 
SHEET 1 of 
FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OTHER 
PARTNAME FUNCTION MECHANISM COMPONENT DETECTIONMETHOD RECOMMENDATION 
Main Housing Contains U! 2 propellant and, 
through proper sizing, controls 
1) Inlet pitting 
tation and/or 
caused by cavi-
particle in-
1) 
2) 
Change 
Change 
in 
in 
pump 
pump 
efficiency 
efficiency, 
1) Evaluation of head 
across pump 
rise Evaluation can be accomplished 
with coputation of head rise 
suction and discharge propellant jestion 3) Change in impeller tip 2) Evaluation of head rise and suction specific speed based 
velocity. 2) Outlet pitting caused by cavi- clearance and loss of pump across pump en the following measurements: 
tatien end/or particle in- efficiency 3) Evaluation of head rise a> Pump speed, 
3) 
jestion 
Overpressure caused by ex-
across pump b) Suction pressure, 
c) Discharge pressure 
case suction pressure 
Seals Prevent leakage between impeller 
shaft and housing 
1) Wear caused by time in opera-
tion 
I) External leakage causing 
change in loss of dischare 
1) Limit usege based on time 
ensitivity 
Noe 
2) Overpressure caused by ex- pressure 2) Measure discharge pressure 
cs suction pressure 2) External leakage causing loss 3) Measure discharge pressure 
3) Fatigue caused by impeller in discharge pressure. and vibration level 
unbalance, 3) External leakage causing lass 
in discharge pressure 
Impeller Transmita Ua propellant at a Blade damage caused by Pitting Change in pump efficiency and in- Evaluation of head rise across None 
specified inler pressure to 
higher pxessure at the pump 
a 
out-
from particle ingestion and/or 
local cavitation, 
crease in vibration level, the pump, 
level 
and measure vibration 
let. 
C 
SYSTEM 6.0 ASSEMBLY 6 2 2ONCRITICALMEMA COMPONENTS SUBSYSTEM6 2 COMPONENT6 2 2 3 Turbine 
PART NAME 

Rotor Blades 

Disks 

Shaft 

Seals 

Turbine Case 

Vanes 

FUNCTION 

Transmits energy from gas stream 

to disks 

Support blades seals and spacers 

and transmits torque to shafts 

Transmits torque pump impeller 

rotation. 

Form flow path at blade tips 

Support vanes and blade tip seals. 

Support turbine exhaust case 

Direct cmbustion products to 

rotor blades. 

FAILURE 

IIECHANISM 
1) Cracking due to cyclic load-
ing and vibration. 
2) Corrosion or erosion of 
blades, 
1) Disk burst due to overspend 

2) Creep due to overspeed. 

3) Cracks due to cyclic load-

ing 

1) Deflection due to load 

2) Cracking due tovibration, 

1) Wear due torubbing 

2) Distortion due to thermal 

gradients 

Cracking due to load and tempera-

ture. 

1) Bowing due to temperature 

2) Cracking due to thermal 

gradients 

3) Erosion duo to hot gas im- 

pingement 
4) Cracking duo to cyclic leading 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 

COMPONENT 

1) Blade loEs resulting in re-
duced efficIency, 
2) Pitting which could lead to 
cracking. 
1) Probable case penetration. 

2) Seal rubbing and shaft an-

balance. 

3) Tensile yield and disk rup­
ture
 
1) Seal rubbing and rotor us-

balance 

2) Reduced life
 
1) loss of efficiency due to 

leakage. 

2) Reduced efficiency.
 
Possible loss of vane or seal 

support.
 
1) Flow distortion and reduced 

efficiency.
 
2) Reduced part life 
3) Reduced part life.
 
4) Possible blade vane rubbing
 
RECOMIENDATIONSFOR 
DETECTION METHOD 

Periodic visual inspection and None 
vibration monitoring. 
1) Measure turbine speed None
 
2) Measure vibration level
 
3) Measure turbine speed.
 
1) Measure vibration. None
 
2) Measure turbine speed
 
I) MIeasure Mone
turbine speed

2) Measure turbine speed
 
Measure turbine speed None
 
Measure turbine speed None
 
SHEET 1 of I 
OTHER
 
RECOIErnNDATIDN 
APPENDIX C - LRU MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
 
C-I
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES 
FOR THE LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS 
This appendix is comprised of the summary maintenance procedures 
that were developed for the propulsion systems' Line Replaceable
 
Units (LRUs). These procedures were prepared in the course of
 
deriving the checkout functions to be performed as a part of LRU
 
removal, replacement and retest.
 
The maintenance procedures for the booster and orbiter main
 
propulsion systems are presented first. The auxiliary propulsion
 
LRU maintenance procedures start on page C-57, and the airbreathing
 
LRUs start on Page C-99.
 
C-2
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU nl LO_ Tank Vent Package
 
LRU 0 LH2 Tank Vent Package
 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY- Tank Vent
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Vent Subsystem to Ambient Pressure
 
PROCEDURE
 
i, REMOVAL
 
a, Remove access panels to forward region.
 
b. 	Install contamination protection equipment around valve.
 
c. 	Install valve removal equipment.
 
d, 	Disconnect electrical cables; sensors, valve flange retaining
 
bolts to vent line; valve flange bolts to LOX and LH2 tank.
 
e. 	Remove valve, and all seals.
 
f. 	Take swab samples per contamination procedure.
 
g. 	Cap all line openings and valve openings.
 
2. 	 REPLACEMENT 
a. 	Remove all protective caps.
 
b. 	Take swab samples.
 
c. Install valve seals; valves and bolt-up both ducts.
 
d, Connect electrical cables and sensors.
 
e. 	Remove all GSE.
 
f. 	Install safety wire and perform visual inspection of area.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Perform electrical checks.
 
b. 	Perform valve leak check,
 
c. 	Perform valve functional check through main system computer.
 
d. 	Checkout of sensors.
 
C-3
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU ) LO2 Tank Isolation Valve 
LRU ) LH2 Tank Isolation Valve 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM 
- Main Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - Distribution and Feed
 
COMPONENT - 1.2,2.2 and 1.2.7.2
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS -
Insure system is purged and vent to ambient.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1, 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove ----- s doors.
 
b. 	Install contamination protection equipment around valve.
 
c. 
Install valve removal GSE and duct supporting fixture.
 
d. 	Disconnect electrical cables, sensors, valve flange

retaining bolts to LOX engine distribution duct; valve
 
flange bolts to tank sump.
 
e, Remove valve and all seals.
 
f. 	Take swap samples.
 
g. 	Cap duct opening and sump opening.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove all protective caps.
 
b. Take swap samples.
 
c, Install valve seals; valve and secure both flange ends.
 
d. 	Connect electrical cables and sensors.
 
e. 	Remove all GSE,
 
f. 	Install safety wire and perform visual inspection.
 
3 
 PRETEST
 
a. Perform electrical dfi ckout.
 
b, Perform valve leak check.
 
c, 	Perform valve functional checkout.through main system
 
computer.
 
d. 	Checkout of all sensors.
 
e. 	Checkout of built-in relief valve.
 
C-4
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ) L02 Prevalve 
SYSTEM - Booster Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - Oxidizer Feed
 
COMPONENT - 1,2.1.2
 
TASK TIME - 2 hours
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Insure system is purged and vented.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Remove access panels to rear base region.
 
b. Install contamination protection equipment around valve.
 
c. Install valve removal equipment.
 
d. Disconnect electrical cables; sensors; valve flange
 
retaining bolts to engine suction duct; valve flange
 
balts to oxidizer feed ducting.
 
e. Remove valve, and all seals.
 
f. Take swab samples per contamination procedure.
 
g. Cap all duct openings.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Remove all protective caps.
 
b. Take swab samples.
 
c. Install valve seals; valves and bolt-up both ducts.
 
d. Connect electrical cables and sensors.
 
e. Removal all GSE.
 
f. Install safety wire and perform visual inspection of area.
 
3, RETEST
 
a. Perform electrical checks.
 
b. Perform valve leak check.
 
c. Perform valve functional check through main system computer.
 
d. Checkout of sensors.
 
C-5
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU n (20 Booster/Orbiter LH2 Fill Valve'
 
LRU 18 15 Booster/Orbiter LO Fill Valve 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - Fill and Drain
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TINE - 1 hour 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Insure valve is purged.
 
PROCEDURE
 
I. REMOVAL
 
a. Remove access panels to lower aft region.
 
b. Install contamination protection equipment around valve.
 
c. Install valve removal equipment.
 
d, Disconnect electrical cables; sensors; valve flange
 
retaining bolts to fill and drain lines.
 
e. Remove valve, and all seals.
 
f. Take swab samples per contamination procedure.
 
g. Cap all-line openings and valve openings.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a, Remove all protective caps.
 
b. Take swab samples.
 
c. Install valve seals;' valves and bolt-up both ducts.
 
d, Connect electrical cables and sensors.
 
e. Remove all GSE.
f. Install safety wire and perform visual inspection of area.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Perform electrical checks.
 
b. Perform valve leak check.
 
c. Perform valve function check through main system computer.
 
d. Checkout of sensors.
 
C-6
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU ( . ( Booster/Orbiter Fuel Autogenous Line Filter 
LRU n . ( Booster/Orbiter Oxidizier'Autogenous Line Filter 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Main Pressurization
 
ASSEMBLY- Autogenous Pressurization
 
COMPONENT - 1.3.1.4 and 1.3.1.8
 
TASK TIME - .5 hour
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Insure system is vented to ambient.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove flange bolts, seals.
 
b. 	Remove filter.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Clean flange ends.
 
b; Insert new filter, seals.
 
c. 	Bolt up flange fittings and install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU n% , ( Booster/Orbiter Fuel Pressurant Control Valve Package 
LRU (23 Booster/Orbiter Oxidizer Pressurant Control Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM -Main Pressurization 
ASSEMBLY - Autogenous Pressurization 
COMPONENT - 1.3.1.3 and 1.3.1.7 
TASK TIME - 2 hours 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Insure system has been vented to ambient. 
PROCEDURE 
1. REMOVAL 
a. Remove access doors.
 
b. Install contamination equipment.
 
c. Remove electrical wiring and sensors.
 
d. Cut brazed sleeves at notched sections.
 
e. Remove welded assembly and clean.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation.
 
b. Connect electrical wiring and sensors.
 
c. Remove contamination protection GSE.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Perform leak test.
 
b. Perform electrical test,
 
c. Operate valve with system pressurized with helium.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ( (24 Booster/Orbiter Oxidizer Pressurant Control Orifice
 
LRU Q Q@ Booster/Orbiter Fuel Pressurant Control Orifice
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM -Main Pressurization
 
ASSEMBLY- Autogenous Pressurization
 
COMPONENT - 1.3.12 and 1.3.1.6
 
TASK TIME - .5 hour
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Insure system is vented to ambient.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Remove access panels.
 
b. Remove lock-wire, flange bolts, and seals.
 
c. Remove orifice.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Clean flange ends.
 
b. Insert new orifice, record serial number.
 
c. Insert new seals.
 
d. Bolt up flange ends and install lock wire.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Leak check around flange.
 
C-9
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU (13 Booster Fuel Fill Line Coupling 
LRU ( Orbiter Fuel Fill Coupling 
LRU Q Orbiter Oxidizer Fill Coupling 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - Fuel Fill and Drain 
COMPONENT - 1.2.9.2 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove bolts from flanges.
 
b. 	Remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove structural tounts.
 
d. 	Remove coupling half.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install sealing devices after cleaning sealing surfaces.
 
b. 	Make structural attachments.
 
c. 	Install bolts and torque per specified value-and sequence.
 
d. 	Perform retest procedure specified below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test bolted flange connection by:
 
1) Attaching GSE to newly installed coupling,
 
2) Close tank vent valves,
 
3) Pressurize through GSE with 20 psia helium,
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ( Fuel Tank Vent Coupling
 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY- Fuel Vent Assembly 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove bolts from flanges.
 
b. 	Remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove structural mounts.
 
d. 	Remove coupling half.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install sealing devices after cleaning sealing surfaces.
 
b. 	Make structural attachments.
 
c. 	Installbolts and torque per specified value and sequence.
 
d. 	Perform retest procedure specified below.
 
e. Return system to secured state.
 
3., RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test bolted flange connection by:
 
1) 	Attaching GSE to newly installed coupling,
 
2) Close tank vent valves,
 
3) Pressurize through GSE with 20 psia He,
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU @ , ( Booster/Orbiter Fuel Tank Prepressurization Coupling 
LRU . (13)Booster/Orbiter LO2 Tank Prepressurization Coupling 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Pressurization
 
-ASSEMBLY - Helium Pressurization
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure
 
a. 	Remove bolts'from flanges.
 
b. 	Remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove structural mounts,
 
d. 	Remove coupling half.
 
2. 	 REPLACEMENT 
a. 	Install sealing devices after cleaning sealing surfaces.
 
b. 	Make structural attachments.
 
c. 	Install bolts and torque per specified value and sequencer
 
d. 	Perform retest procedure specified below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state,
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test bolted flange connection by:
 
1) 	Attaching GSE to newly installed coupling,
 
2) Close tank fill valves,
 
3) Pressurize through GSE with 20 psia He,
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU . 27 Booster/Orbiter LO2 Recirculation Coupling
 
LRU ( Orbiter LH2 Recirculation Coupling
 
SYSTEM - Booster and Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - Geyser Suppression 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - I hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure
 
a. 	Remove bolts from flanges,
 
b. 	Remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove structural mounts.
 
d. 	Remove coupling half.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install sealing devices after cleaning sealing surfaces.
 
b, Make-structural attachments.
 
c. 	Install bolts and torque per specified value and sequence.
 
d. 	Perform retest procedure specified below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test bolted flange connection by:
 
1) Attaching GSE to newly installed coupling,
 
2) Close tank valves,
 
3) Pressurize through GSE with 20 psia He,
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU (1D LO2 Fill Coupling 
SYSTEM - Booster Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY- Oxidizer Fill and Drain 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove bolts from flanges.
 
b. 	Remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove structural mounts.
 
d. 	Remove coupling half.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install sealing devices after cleaning sealing surfaces.
 
b. 	Make structural attachments.
 
c. 	Install bolts and torque per specified value and sequence.
 
d. 	Perform retest procedure specified below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test bolted flange connection by
 
1) 	Attaching GSE to newly installed coupling,
 
2) Close tank valves,
 
3) Pressurize through GSE with 20 psia He,
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q Main Booster Engine
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engines
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 8 hours
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS: Engine GSE is required for this procedure.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect four (4) data cables, 3 power cables; GH3
 
purge line.
 
c. 	Attach engine handling fixture, gimbal support fixture.
 
d. 	Disconnect propellant lines (48 ea-3/8" bolts); 2 gimbal
 
pads; GH2, GOX tank pressurization lines; recirculation lines.
 
e. 	Remove engine, using handling fixture; flange seals.
 
f. 	Take swab samples of LOX/GOX lines.
 
g. 	Install closures on lines and electrical connectors.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Move engine into position.
 
b. 	Remove suction line covers. Move engine into position,
 
install seals, then mate engine to vehicle suction lines,
 
install all bolts, torque, safety wire.
 
c. 	Remove covers from tank pressurization lines - install seals,
 
mate, bolt, safety wire.
 
d. 	Remove covers from all other lines, repeat c.
 
e. 	Connect gimbal pads; remove support fixture.
 
f. 	Remove engine handling gear, contamination protection.
 
Connect all electrical cables.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check, 50 psi GH3, interface joints only.
 
b. 	Perform electrical power, and system electrical verification
 
checks.
 
1) Gimbal power,
 
2) Controller functions,
 
3) Valve functional via controller.
 
c. 	Perform gimbal actuator alignment with optical test equipment.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ( On-Orbit LO2 Vent Package
 
LRU 	n On-Orbit LH2 Vent Package
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - On-Orbit Propellant 
ASSEMBLY- Oxidizer Tank Vent, Fuel Tank Vent 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - I hour 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating line*
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation on
 
sleeves.
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Perform retest described below.
 
d. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize tank with 20 psia He. Monitor tank
 
pressure for decay. (This leak tests the upstream sleeve
 
on the replaced LRU package). Install GSE to vent and close
 
vent valve. Open all valves on the replaced package and
 
monitor tank pressure for decay. (This leak tests the down­
stream sleeve on the replaced LRU package.
 
b. 	Electrical - During leak test verify valve positions and
 
continuity.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU n6 On-Orbit Fuel Tank Pressurant Filters
 
LRU 9 On-Orbit LO, Tank Pressurant Filters
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - On-Orbit Pressurization
 
ASSEMBLY - Fuel Tank Pressurization, Oxidizer Tank Pressurization
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1/2 hour
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Remove flange bolts, seal.
 
b. Remove filter.
 
2. REPLACEMENT 
a. Clean flange ends.
 
b. Install new filters and seals.
 
c. Make bolted flange connections.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test
 
1) Attach GSE to vent coupling,
 
2) Open vent valves,
 
3) Pressurize tanks with 20 psia He.
 
4) Leak check filter connections.
 
5) Vent and secure subsystem.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	n7 On-Orbit Fuel Tank Pressurant Control Regulator Package
 
LRU 0 On-Orbit LO2 Tank Pressurant Control Regulator Package
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM- On-Orbit Pressurization
 
ASSEMBLY - Fuel Tank Pressurization, Oxidizer Tank Pressurization 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with-cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation on
 
sleeves.
 
b. Connect electrical wiring.
 
c, Perform Retest described below.
 
d. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. Leak Test - Load 1500 psia GH2 into APS bottles. Open tank
 
vent valves. Open solenoid valve for the regulator package
 
which was just installed. Perform bubble leak test on regulator
 
connections.
 
b. 	Electrical - Perform continuity check.
 
c. 	Functional - Close solenoid valve for the regulator package
 
which was not replaced. Open solenoid valve for newly installed
 
regulator package. Close tank vents. With 1500 psia in APS
 
bottles verify tank pressure level within specified limits.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q Fuel Tank Pressurant Shutoff Valve
 
LRU aOxidizer Tank Pressurant Shutoff Valve
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - On-Orbit Pressurization 
ASSEMBLY- Fuel Tank Pressurization, Oxidizer Tank Pressurization 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring,
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation
 
on sleeves,
 
b. 	Connection electrical wiring.
 
c. Perform Retest described below.
 
d, Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Load 1500 psia GH2 into APS bottles. Open tank
 
vent valves. Open newly installed solenoid valves. Monitor
 
tank for pressure decay.
 
b. 	Electrical - During leak test verify valve positions and
 
continuity.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU @ Main Orbiter Engine
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM -Main Engine
 
ASSEMBLY- N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 9 hours
 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS - Engine GSE is required for this procedure.
 
The removal, replacepent, and checkout of some
 
components on the orbiter engine will require
 
extension of the nozzle to full aft position,
 
and the use of a nozzle protective and support
 
fixture. This will, in general, add approximately
 
one half hour to the corresponding booster time.
 
PROCEDURE
 
This procedure will be exactly like'that of the booster engine
 
except for special precautions that must be taken with the
 
extendible nozzle.
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LRUs MAIN ENGINE SUBSYSTEM
 
This section of Appendix C presents the maintenance procedures
 
for the Main Engine Subsystem. Many of these LRUs are shown in the
 
exploded view of the main engine in Figure C-1.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	CT Low Pressure Turbopump
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump
 
TASK TINE - 8 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect hydraulic lines, cap.
 
c. 	Remove sensors, cap lines and connectors.
 
d. 	Connect handling equipment to L.P.T.P.A.
 
e. 	Remove turbine drivelines; L.P. discharge line; seals,
 
cap lines, and exposed joints.
 
f. 	Disconnect suction line to L.P.T.P.A. (24 ea. - 3/811 bolts).
 
g. 	Remove TPS support brackets.
 
h. 	Move L.P.T.P.A. aft to clear suction spool.
 
j. 	Disconnect upper suction spool (24 ea. - 3/8" bolts).
 
Remove spool.
 
k. 	Remove L.P.T.P.A. forward and out; seals. cap lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Move L.P.T.P.A. into position - aft of normal.
 
b. 	Remove cap and install seal L.P. suction line.
 
c. 	Install L.P. suction spool; seal to L.P.T.P.A.
 
e. 	Connect L.P.T.P.A. support bracket.
 
f. 	Install L.P.T.P.A. turbine driveline; L.P.T.P.A. dis­
charge line including seals. Remove handling equipment.
 
g. 	Connect hydraulic lines.
 
h. 	Install sensors. Mate connectors.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check, 50 psig GHe.
 
b. 	Sensors elect, ok via controller.
 
----
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 02 High Pressure Turbopump
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
 
TASK TIME - 8 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Remove sensors; L.P.T.P.A. discharge lines; seals,
 
cap lines and connectors.
 
c. 	Disconnect L.P.T.P.A. turbine driveline; LH 2 recirc.
 
line; main fuel valve; H cooling lines; purge lines.
 
d. 	Install tooling on H.P.T.P.A. discharge line to clear
 
joing to fuel valve.
 
e. 	Remove H.P.T.P.A.; seals, cap openings.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove protective caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; H.P.T.P.A. release discharge line and
 
connect to H.P.T.P.A. (or valve).
 
C. 	Install seals; L.P.T.P.A. discharge line.
 
d. 	Connect L.P.T.P.A. turbine driveline; LH recirculation
 
line (after installing new seals); H2 cooling; purge
 
lines.
 
e. 	Remove handling equipment.
 
f. 	Install sensors; connect cables.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check GH , interface seals (includes sensors).
 
b. 	Sensors check: VIA controller, at combined systems
 
test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	0) Low Pressure Turbopump
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
 
TASK TIME - 8 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Remove sensors, cap lines, connectors.
 
c. 	Connect handling equipment to TPA.
 
d. 	Remove turbine driveline; L.P. discharge line; seals,
 
cap lines, and exposed joints.
 
e. 	Disconnect suction line to L.P.T.P.A. (24 - 3/8" bolts).
 
f. 	Remove TPA support brackets; L.P. OPTA; seals.
 
g. 	Take swab sample.
 
h. 	Install closure on suction spool.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Move L.P.O.T.A. into position with handling equipment
 
b. 	Remove suction line closure.
 
c. 	Install seal on suction line; L.P.O.T.P.A.; seals;
 
turbine drive line; L.P.O.T.P.A. discharge line;
 
O.T.P.A. support brackets.
 
d. 	Remove handling equipment.
 
e. 	 Install sensors; connect cables, safety wire. 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check GH0 50 psig.
 
b. 	Sensors: VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 4 High Pressure Turbopump
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump 
TASK TIME - 8 hours 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Remove sensors; disconnect cables; cap lines and
 
onnectors.
 
c. 	Remove L.P.O.T.P.A. discharge line; line to preburner
 
shutoff valve; discharge line to main TCA valve; seals;
 
H coolant lines. Install closures. 
d. Aitach handling equipment. 
e. Remove H.P.O.T.P.A. (36 - 1/2" bolts); seals. Install 
closure. 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove closure.
 
b. 	Install seal; H.P.O.T.P.A., fasten to hot gas manifold
 
(36 - 1/2" bolts).
 
c. 	Remove handling equipment.
 
d. 	Install seals; discharge line; line to preburner;
 
L.P.O.T.P.A. discharge line; H coolant lines.
 
e. 	Install sensors. Connect cables, safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check: GH, 50 psig.
 
b. 	Sensors: VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 5) Fuel Preburner 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power
 
COMPONENT - Fuel Preburner
 
TASK TIME - 2.5 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Remove sensors. Cap lines and connectors.
 
c. 	Disconnect LOX inlet line; fuel inlet line,
 
igniter lines; spark cable; igniter valve electrical
 
line; oxygen valve control cable.
 
d. 	Attach handling equipment.
 
e. 	Remove preburner (36 bolts); seals. Cap all lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Move preburner into place, using handling equipment.
 
h. 	Remove caps, closures.
 
c. Install seals; preburner to hot gas manifold (36 bolts).
 
.d. Remove handling equipment.
 
e. 	Connect LOX inlet line; fuel inlet line; igniter lines;
 
electrical cables.
 
f. 	Install sensors. Connect cables. Safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check: 50 psig GH
 
b. 	Electrical: Perform igniter, valve, and sensor electrical
 
checks VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU @ Oxidizer Preburner
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Oxidizer Preburner 
TASK TIME - 3 hours 
PROCEDURE 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. Remove sensors. Cap lines and connectors.
 
C. Disconnect preburner oxidizer shutoff valve; fuel inlet
 
line; igniter lines; oxidizer line to fuel preburner;
 
igniter valve electrical line; control cables to LOX
 
and LH control valves. 
d. Attach2handling equipment. 
e. Remove preburner (36 bolts); seals. Cap all lines. 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Move preburner into place, using handling equipment.
 
b. 	Remove caps, closures.
 
c. 	Install seals; preburner to hot gas manifold (36 bolts).
 
d. 	Remove handling equipment.
 
e. 	Connect preburner oxidizer shutoff valve; fuel inlet
 
line; igniter lines; oxidizer line to fuel preburner;
 
igniter valve electrical line; control cables to LOX
 
and LH control valves.
 
f. 	Instali sensors. Connect cables. Install safety wires.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check: 50 psig GH
 
b. 	Electrical: Spark, control valves igniter valves, sensors
 
at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU 	G) Main Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Fuel Main Valve 
TASK TIME - 4 hours 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical cables; sensors; valve body
 
retaining bolts from pump discharge and orifice housings;
 
regenerate nozzle cooling line; chamber coolant line;
 
nozzle coolant outlet line; fuel line to fuel preburner.
 
b. 	Remove fuel line assembly (all lines itemized above);
 
valve; seals.
 
c. 	Cap all lines, openings.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; valve; fuel line assembly.
 
c. 	Connect electrical cables; sensors. Install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	 Leak check: Upstream of valve - 50 psig GH . Downstream 
of valve - TBD. 
b. 	Valve functional: VIA controller at combined systems test.
 
c. 	Sensors: VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	C Main Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Oxiaizer Main Valve
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical cables; sensors; valve body
 
retaining bolts to pump discharge line; oxidizer
 
'turbine driveline from discharge line.
 
c. 	Remove pump discharge line to valve; valve; seals.
 
Take swab samples.
 
d. 	Cap all lines and openings; electrical connectors.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove protective caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; valve; pump discharge line.
 
c. 	Connect oxidizer turbine driveline; electrical cables;
 
sensors. Install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check upstream of valve - 50 psig GH . Downstream-TBD. 
b eb. 	Valve functional VIA controller at combined systems test.
 
c. 	Sensors VIA controller at combined systems test.
 
C-30
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU 6) Fuel Control Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Fuel control valve, oxidizer preburner 
TASK TINE - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical cables; fuel line to valve.
 
b. 	Remove valve; seals.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install seals, valve.
 
b. 	Connect fuel line; electrical cables.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check upstream of valve - 50 psig GHe .
 
Downstream of valve - TBD.
 
b. 	Valve functional VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU @ Oxidizer Control Valve
 
-SYSTEM 
 - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Oxidizer Control Valve, Oxidizer Preburner
 
TASK TIME - I hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Disconnect electrical cables; valve body from oxidizer
 
distribution line downstream of shutoff valve; valve
 
body from preburner.
 
b. Remove valve; seals.
 
c. Take swab sample.
 
d. Cap lines; openings.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Remove caps.
 
b. Install seals; valve.
 
c. Connect electrical cables.
 
d. Install safety wires.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. 
Leak check upstream of valve - 50 psig GH . Downstream 
of valve - TBD. 8 
b. Valve functional VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 0 Oxidizer Control Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine power 
COMPONENT - Oxidizer Control Valve, Fuel Preburner
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical cables; oxidizer line to valve body.
 
b. 	Remove valve; seals.
 
c. 	Take swab sample.
 
d. 	Install caps.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; valve.
 
c. 	Connect oxidizer line.
 
d. 	Connect electrical cables.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check upstream of valve - 50 psig GH . Downstream 
of valve - TBD. e 
b. 	Valve functional VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENAINCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q Propellant Lines
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Interconnect Articulating Lines, Consisting of:
 
(1) L.P.F.T.P.A. Discharge Line 97 lb
 
(2) L.P.O.T.P.A. Discharge Line 66 lb
 
(3) L.P.F.T.P.A. Turbine Drive Line 10 lb
 
(4) L.P.O.T.P.A. Turbine Drive Line 10 lb
 
TASK TINE - N/A 
GENERAL - All four lines require disconnects at both ends and new
 
seals. The discharge lines require handling equipment
 
due to the weight. Each line requires a vacuum check
 
with portable test equipment. Approximate time per
 
line: 1 hour.
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Disconnect sensors; bolts at line ends.
 
b. Remove line; seals.
 
c. Install caps on openings.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Remove caps.
 
b. Install seals; lines; sensors. Safety wire.
 
c. Connect cables to sensors.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Leak check 50 psig GHe
 
b. Vacuum check - use shop equipment.
 
c. Sensors VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU (13 Interconnect Lines
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Interconnect Lines, Consisting of:
 
(1) Fuel Suction
 
(2) Fuel Main Valve Outlet
 
(3) Fuel Inlet, Fuel Preburner
 
(4) Fuel Inlet, Oxidizer Preburner
 
(5) Oxidizer Suction
 
(6) Oxidizer Valve Outlet
 
(7) Oxidizer Inlet, Fuel Preburner
 
(8) Oxidizer Inlet, Oxidizer Preburner
 
(9) Fuel Coolant, Gas Manifold
 
GENERAL - The removal, replacement, and checkout procedures are
 
essentially unique. Some grouping is possible. Details
 
are given within each group. None of the line sections
 
is expected to exceed 30 lbs weight.
 
A. 	SUCTION LINES (Engine to vehicle interface).
 
Elapsed Time - 2 hours per line
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment, bellows
 
compressor.
 
b. 	Remove 38 - 3/8" bolts (24 ea. end).
 
c. 	Compress bellows.
 
d. 	Remove suction line; seals.
 
e. 	Install closures on line/opening.
 
2. 	INSTALLATION
 
a. 	Install bellows compressor.
 
b. 	Remove caps, closures.
 
c, 	Install seals; suction line; release compresser; bolts;
 
safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check 50 psig GH e
 e
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B. 	FUEL MAIN VALVE OUTLET
 
Elapsed Time - 3 hours
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove flange bolts at fuel main valve outlet; chamber
 
coolant valve inlet; nozzle coolant manifold outlet;
 
main fuel line at fuel preburner inlet; sensors.
 
b. 	Separate lines and remove outlet line, seals.
 
c. 	Cap lines and connectors.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install seals; line; bolts; sensors; safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check 50 psig GH •
 
b. 	Electrical VIA controhler at combined systems test.
 
C. 	FUEL INLET, FUEL PREBURNER
 
Elapsed Time - 3 hours
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove bolts at orifice flange; bolts at nozzle coolant
 
manifold outlet; bolts at fuel preburner inlet; sensors.
 
b. 	Disconnect fuel line to oxidizer preburner, at fuel
 
preburner.
 
c. 	Remove fuel inlet line, seals.
 
d. 	Cap all openings, lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install seals; fuel inlet line.
 
b. 	Connect fuel line to oxidizer preburner; nozzle coolant
 
manifold outlet.
 
c. 	Install sensors; safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check 50 psig GH
 
b. 	Electrical: sensors eVIA controller at combined systems
 
test.
 
D. 	FUEL INLET, OXIDIZER PREBURNER
 
Elapsed Time - 2 hours
 
1. 	 Removal 
a. 	Remove sensors. Cap lines, connectors.
 
b. 	Disconnect flanges at both ends of fuel line.
 
c. 	Remove fuel line; seals.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install seals; fuel line; sensors; safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check 50 psig GH •
 
b. 	Electrical: Sensors eVIA controller at combined
 
systems test.
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E. 	OXIDIZER INLET, FUEL PREBURNER
 
Elapsed Time - 2 hours
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect flanges at both ends of line.
 
b. 	Remove line, seals.
 
c. 	Cap openings.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install seals; line; safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check 50 psig GH •
 
e 
F. 	OXIDIZER VALVE OUTLET; OXIDIZER INLET,'OXIDIZER PREBURNER;
 
FUEL COOLANT, GAS MANIFOLD.
 
Elapsed Time - Each - 3 hours
 
GENERALIZED PROCEDURE
 
These lines are short sections, requiring disconnect at both 
ends, and seal removal. The configurations of the lines are
 
TBD. Replacement and checkout involves seals, reconnection
 
of flanges, and pressure check.
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TAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
,RU ( Select Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Oxidizer Recirculation Select Valve
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical cables. Cap connectors.
 
c. 	Disconnect oxidizer recirculation line from valve to
 
interface, at valve; oxidizer recirculation line from
 
HPOTPA to valve at valve; valve from LPOTPA turbine.
 
Remove valve, seals.
 
d. 	Inspect for particles, contamination.
 
e. 	Cap all lines, openings.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals, valve.
 
c. 	Connect electrical cables.
 
d. 	Install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check: GN2, 50 spi, with valve in "tank" and
 
"turbine" positions.
 
b. 	Electrical check: Functional valve with leak check,
 
via controller.
 
I 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ) Select Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Fuel Recirculation Select Valve
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical cables; cap connectors.
 
c. 	Disconnect fuel recirculation line from valve to inter­
face, at valve; fuel recirculation line from HPFTPA to
 
valve at valve; valve from LPFTPA turbine. Remove valve,
 
seals.
 
d. 	Inspect for particles, contamination.
 
e. 	Cap all lines, openings.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals, valve.
 
c. 	Connect electrical cables.
 
d. 	Install safety wire.
 
e. RETEST 
a. 
b. 
Leak check: 
positions. 
Electrical: 
GHe, 50 psi, with valve in "tank" and "turbine" 
Functional valve with leak check, via controller. 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU (16 Control Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power 
COMPONENT - Fuel Recirculation Control Valve
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical cables. Cap connectors.
 
c. 	Disconnect fuel recirculation line from valve to regulator
 
at valve; valve from HPFTPA. Remove valve, seals.
 
d. 	Inspect for particles, contamination.
 
e. 	Cap line, openings.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals, valve.
 
c. 	Connect electrical cables.
 
d. 	Install safety,wire.
 
3. RETEST 
a. Leak check: 50 psi GHe, with select valve to turbine. 
b. Electrical: Open and close valve via controller. 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LR (17Q Recirculation Regulator -

SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Power
 
COMPONENT - Fuel Recirculation Regulator
 
TASK TIME - 2 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect line from regulator to select valve, at
 
regulator; line from regulator to control valve at
 
regulator. Remove regulator, seals.
 
c. 	Inspect for particles, contamination.
 
d. 	Cap lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	 Remove caps. 
b. 	Install seals, valve, safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Check: 50 psi GHe with recirculation select
 
valve to turbine.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
hU (@ Booster Nozzle 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Thrust Chamber 
COMPONENT - Booster Nozzle 
TASK TIME - 8 hours 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment; nozzle support
 
equipment; gimbal actuator support equipment. 
b. Disconnect gimbal rod ends; coolant inlet line; coolant 
outlet line. 
c. Disconnect nozzle (48 ea - 1/2" bolts). 
d. Remove nozzle; seals. 
e. Install protective covers. 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Remove protective covers.
 
b. 	Move nozzle into position, using handling equipment.
 
c. 	Install seals.
 
d. 	Connect nozzle (48 ea - 1/2" bolts); coolant lines;
 
gimbal actuator rod ends.
 
e. 	Install safety wire.
 
f. 	Remove nozzle and gimbal support equipment.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check: 50 psig GH e
e 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRTU @ Coolant Control Valve
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Thrust Chamber 
COMPONENT - Chamber Coolant Control Valve
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect valve electrical connectors; chamber coolant
 
valve (16 ea - 1/4" bolts).
 
b. 	Disconnect coolant valve from fuel discharge line
 
"Spider" (8 ea - 1/4" bolts). 
c. 	Remove coolant valve; seals.
 
d. 	Install caps on line, opening.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; valve; chamber coolant line.
 
c. 	Connect electrical connectors.
 
d. 	Install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check: Upstream of valve - 50 psig GH
 
- 50 psig GH . e
Downstream of valve 

b. 	Electrical: Valve functional atecombined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 0 Interconnect Lines 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Thrust Chamber 
COMPONENT - Interconnect Lines, Consisting of:
 
(1) Main Chamber Coolant Inlet (TBD)
 
(2) Nozzle Coolant Inlet (TED)
 
(3) Main Injector Inlet.
 
TASK TINE - N/A
 
PROCEDURE
 
GENERAL - The main injector inlet'line is definable at this time.
 
The line runs from the oxidizer pump 2nd stage outlet
 
to the main oxidizer valve inlet. The other lines are
 
TBD, but in general are short small diameter lines.
 
This procedure covers only the main injector inlet
 
(oxidizer) line.
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
Elapsed Time - 2 hours
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Remove sensors. Cap lines, connectors.
 
c. 	Disconnect oxidizer line to LPFTPA; ignitor oxidizer
 
line; main injector line at both ends.
 
d. 	Remove main injector line; seals.
 
e. 	Cap lines, openings.
 
2. ,REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps, closures.
 
b. 	Install seals; main injector line.
 
c. 	Connect oxidizer line to LPFTPA; ignitor oxidizer line.
 
d. 	Install sensors; safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check - 50 psig GH
 
b. 	Electrical - Sensors VI controller at combined systems test, 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU R TCA Igniters 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Ignition
 
COMPONENT - Preburner and Main TCA Igniters
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. Disconnect high voltage spark cables; igniter val e
 
cables; propellant lines; sensors. Cap all lines,
 
connectors.
 
b. 	Remove igniter bolts; igniter assembly.
 
c. 	Install protective cover.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove protective covers.
 
b. 	Install igniter assembly.
 
c. 	Connect propellant lines; spark cable; valve cables;
 
sensors. Install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check - downstream of igniter valves, 50 psig GHe. 
Upstream of igniter valves, 50 psig GHe . 
b. 	Valve functional - VIA controller at combined systems test.
 
c. 	Sensors - VIA controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 22 Interconnect Lines
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY- Ignition 
COMPONENT- Interconnect lines, consisting of preburner and 
main TCA igniter propellant inlet lines. 
TASK TIME - Each 2 hours 
PROCEDURE - (ALL) 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Disconnect flanges at both ends of line.
 
b. Remove support clamps; line; seals.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install seals; line; support clamps.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Leak check - 50 psig GH •
 
b. Electrical - None. e
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU (23 Gimbal Actuators
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Thrust Vector Control 
COMPONENT - Gimbal Actuators and Power Pack
 
TASK TIME - N/A 
PROCEDURE
 
GENERAL - The actuators (2) weigh approximately 100 ib, each,
 
attached by clevis/spherical rod ends. The main pump
 
weighs approximately 15 lb and the electrical auxiliary
 
pump weighs approximately 20 lb. The major replacement
 
effort centers around the actuator, and is the main
 
subject of this procedure.
 
Task Time - 8 hours.
 
A. 	ACTUATORS
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical cables; hydraulic lines.
 
Cap all lines,,connectors.
 
c. 	Attach nozzle positioning equipment; actuator
 
handling equipment.,
 
d. 	Remove clevis pins actuator.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Position actuator, using handling equipment.
 
b. 	Attach rod ends to upper and lower clevis.
 
c. 	Connect hydraulic lines; electrical cables.
 
d. 	Install safety wire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Adjust nozzle zero position.
 
b. 	Bleed-in hydraulic lines.
 
c. 	Leak check - high pressure system operating
 
auxiliary pump from shop power.
 
d. 	Electrical - test actuator and servo system at
 
combined systems test VIA controller.
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B. 	MAIN PUMP Estimated time - 3 hours
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect hydraulic lines. Cap all openings,
 
lines.
 
c. 	Remove main pump (TBD bolts); seal.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install seal; main pump; safety wire.
 
b. 	Connect hydraulic lines.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Bleed-in system.
 
b. 	Leak check - operate auxiliary pump to 0btain
 
full system pressure at flanges.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
S(24) Engine Controller
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Control
 
COMPONENT - Engine Controller
 
TASK TIME - 60 minutes
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Attach handling fixture.
 
b. Disconnect interconnects cables
 
c. Remove attachment bolts.
 
d. Remove controller.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Position controller.
 
b. Install attachments bolt .
 
c. Connect interconnect cables.
 
d. Safety wire.
 
e. Remove handling fixture.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Connect test GSE (may be via vehicle).
 
b. Load diagnostic program.
 
c. Operate controller, perform internal tests.
 
d. Reload operational program.
 
e. Perform internal tests.
 
f. Perform engine functional check including all programs.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU (25 Wire Harness
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Control 
COMPONENT - Ignition and Valve Control Harness
 
TASK TIME - I hour per subassembly
 
PROCEDURE
 
GENERAL - The harness configuration will probably consist of two
 
to four subassembly harnesses, with multi-pin connectors
 
at the controller, and fanning out to individual valves
 
by area grouping. The ignition harness (low voltage) may
 
be integral with the control cables. The high voltage
 
conductors are considered part of the ignitor component.
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Remove safety wires; support clamps.
 
b. Disconnect connectors, both ends. Cap.
 
c. Remove harness.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Position harness­
b. Connect cable connectors.
 
c. Install cable clamps; safety wires.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Electrical - Via controller at combined systems test.
 
b. Valve functional - Via controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU 26 Instrumentation Harness 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Control 
COMPONENT - Instrumentation Harness
 
TASK TIME - 2 hours per subassembly
 
GENERAL - The probable configuration is a set of six to ten sub­
assemblies, serving perhaps ten transducers, with one 
multi-pin connector at the controller end. This 
discussion deals with each subassembly. 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 'REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect connectors at transducer and controller ends.
 
Cap connectors.
 
b. 	Remove cable clamps; harness.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Place harness in position.
 
b. 	Connect connectors, both ends.
 
c. 	Install cable clamps, safety wires.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. Electrical - Via controller at combined systems test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU (2 Check Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Tank Pressurant 
COMPONENT - Fuel Tank Pressurization Check Valve
 
TASK TIME - I hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect valve flanges.
 
b. 	Remove valve, seals.
 
c. 	Cap lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a., Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; valve.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check - Upstream and downstream requires simultaneous
 
application of 25 psig GH .
e 
C-52
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
1 (@ Check Valve 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Tank Pressurant
 
COMPONENT - Oxidizer Tank Pressurization Check Valve
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect valve flanges.
 
b. 	Remove valve; seals.
 
c. 	Take swab sample.
 
d. 	Cap lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; valve.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check - upstream and downstream requires simultaneous 
application of 25 psig GHe . 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU (29 Heat Exchanger 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine 
ASSEMBLY - Tank Pressurant 
COMPONENT - Oxidizer Heat Exchanger
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
I. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Install contamination protection equipment.
 
b. 	Disconnect hot gas inlet line; hot gas outlet line;
 
oxidizer inlet line; oxidizer outlet line.
 
c. 	Remove heat exchanger mounting bracket; heat exchanger;
 
seals.
 
d. 	Install caps on lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Remove caps.
 
b. 	Install seals; heat exchanger; bracket.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test - oxidizer lines, TBD. Hot gas lines ­
50 psig, GH 
.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
IRU (30 Purge Valves
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine
 
ASSEMBLY - Engine Purge
 
COMPONENT - Purge Valves
 
TASK TIME - Each component, 30 minutes.
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
a. Disconnect electrical connector.
 
b. Remove flange bolts; valve; seals.
 
c. Cap lines; openings.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Remove caps, closures.
 
b. Install seals; valve.
 
c. Connect electrical connector.
 
d. Install safety wire.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Leak check - TBD
 
b. Electrkcal check - operate valve.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 3 Extendable Nozzle
 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine, Orbiter Only 
ASSEMBLY - Extendable Nozzle 
COMPONENT - Extendable Nozzle 
TASK TIME - 16 hours 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Attach nozzle handling equipment, with nozzle in
 
90% aft position.
 
b. 	Remove seal ring.
 
c. 	Disconnect drive cable clamps; position sensor cables.
 
d. 	Remove nozzle.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Move nozzle into position, using handling equipment
 
nozzle to be at 90% aft position - match position index
 
marks.
 
b. 	Attach drive cable clamps.
 
c. 	Install seal ring.
 
d. 	Connect position sensor cables.
 
e. 	Install safety wires.
 
f. 	Remove handling equipment.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Mechanical - Using shop power, operate nozzle to fully
 
stowed, full aft, and fully stowed.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ( Nozzle Deployment Kit 
SYSTEM - Main Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Main Engine, Orbiter Only. 
ASSEMBLY - Extendable Nozzle 
COMPONENT - Extendable Nozzle Deployment Kit
 
TASK TIME - 8 hours (one guide rail, cable, drive assembly kit).
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
a. 	Install nozzle support equipment nozzle extended.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical cables. Cap connectors.
 
c. 	Remove cable; drive unit.
 
d. 	Disconnect guide column supports.
 
e. 	Remove guide column.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install guide column; cable and drive unit.
 
b. 	Connect electrical cables; safety wire.
 
c. 	Remove nozzle support equipment.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Operational - Using shop power, return nozzle to stowed
 
position, and cycle to full extension/fully stowed.
 
C-57 
LRUs Auxiliary Propulsion System
 
This section of Appendix C contains the maintenance
 
procedures for the Booster and Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
Systems.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	nl Engine Package. Booster - ROS/Separation
 
LRU 	n Engine Package. Orbiter - RCS/OMS
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- RCS, OMS, Separation Engine
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3 hours 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-2)
 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
a. 	Assemble engine package removal fixture.
 
b. 	Disconnect mounting bolts; lockwire.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts.
 
d. 	Remove engine package
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Attach mounting fixture to engine package.
 
b. 	Orient package to mounting index-guide pins.
 
c. 	Install seals; engine package-to-vehicle-mounting-pad
 
seals on thruster assembly.
 
d. 	Orient engine package to mounting pad indexing pins and
 
slide toward the mounting pad until contact is made.
 
e. 	Install engine package mounting bolts through mounting
 
pads to threaded holes in vehicle mounting pad.
 
f. 	Install lockwire.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak check ­
1) Apply nitrogen or helium pressure to the oxidizer and
 
fuel lines with the bipropellant isolation valves in a
 
closed position.
 
2) Monitor leak detection ports for interface seal integrity.
 
b. 	Electrical ­
1) Actuate the igniter valve similar to that for thruster
 
operation.
 
2) Energize the igniter spark plug and visually monitor spark
 
through the thrust chamber exit with appropriate tooling.
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Fuel
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9	Electrcal harness includes igniter power, instrumentation,
 
and valve actuation circuit.
 
*Each propellant delivery interface has leak check annulus
 
and port.
 
*Vehicle Mounting Pad is hard-mounted to vehicle.
 
*All engine control valves included in engine package.
 
Fig C-2RCS/OMS/Separation Engine Package Removal
 
and Replacement
 
C-60 -
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU . 3 Booster GO2 GH2 Filter 
LRU Q) Q Orbiter GO. GHO Filter 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove filter and clean propellant distribution lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement filter and braze sleeves to propellant
 
distribution lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected
 
subsystem (02 or H2).
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to appropriate quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
c. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
d. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay.
 
e. 	If pressure decay noted, perform bubble leak test on replaced
 
filter to verify.
 
f. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
g. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	 n4 . n) Booster GH.2 G02 Solenoid Valve 
LRU 	n4 . n) Booster GH2J.GO 2 Solenoid Valve
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove solenoid valve and clean propellant feed lines.'
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement solenoid valve and braze sleeves to
 
propellant feed lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to solenoid valve
 
and verify response with position indicator instrumentation.
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to appropriate quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
c. 	Close solenoid valve.
 
d. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
e. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay (internal leakage).
 
f. 	 Perform bubble leak test (external leakage). 
g. 	Open solenoid valve and monitor feed line pressure,
 
h. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
i. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
C-62
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q6 Booster/Orbiter GH2 Check Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Hydrogen Conditioning 
Orbiter Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove check valve package and clean propellant lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement check valve package, verify installation
 
in proper direction, braze sleeves to propellant lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected subsystem.
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to GH2 quick-disconnect
 
coupling. 
c. Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia. 
d. Monitor accumulator pressure for decay. (Downstream leak 
check, internal leak check). 
e. Pressurize upstream side to 1500 psia. (Upstream leak 
check, internal leak check). 
f. 	Reduce pressure in accumulators and verify check valve
 
, operation.
 
g. 	Perform external bubble leak check if required.
 
h. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
i. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ) Booster/Orbiter Gas Generator GH, Propellant Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Booster Hydrogen Conditioning, Booster Oxygen Conditioning,
 
Booster APU, Orbiter Propellant Conditioning
 
ASSEMBLY- N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIKE - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove gas generator GH2 propellant valve package and
 
clean propellant lines.
 
2, 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve package and braze sleeves to
 
propellant lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to each solenoid
 
valve and verify response with position indicator instrumenta­
tion.
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to GH2 quick-disconnect
 
coupling. 
c. Close both solenoid valves. 
d. Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia. 
e. Monitor accumulator pressure for decay with: 
i) Main GH2 valve closed, isolation valve open,
 
2) Main GH2 valve open, isolation valve closed, (internal leakage)
 
f, 	Perform bubble leak test on upstream brazed joint with both
 
valves closed (external leakage).
 
g. 	Close turbine overboard dump valve.*
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and turbine
 
for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM.
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h. 	Open main GH and isolation valves and pressurize gas
 
generator ani turbine0
 
i. 	Perform bubble leak test on downstream brazed joint
 
(external leakage).
 
J. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
k. 	Close main GH2 and isolation valves and open overboard
 
dump valve.
 
1. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	Q Booster/Orbiter Gas Generator GO, Propellant Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Hydrogen Condition, Booster Oxygen Conditioning, 
Booster APU, Orbiter Propellant Conditioning
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove gas generator GO2 propellant valve package and
 
clean propellant lines.
 
2. 	 REPLACEMENT 
a. 	Install replacement valve package and braze sleeves to
 
propellant lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to each solenoid
 
valve and verify response with position indicator instrumentation.
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to G02 quick-disconnect couplin
 
c. 	Close both solenoid valves.
 
d. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
e. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay with:
 
1) Main GO2 valve closed, isolation valve open.
 
2) Main G0 valve open, isolation valve closed. (internal
 
leakagej.
 
f. 	Perform bubble leak test on upstream brazed Joint with both
 
valves closed (external leakage).
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g. 	Close turbine overboard dump valve.*
 
h. 	Open main GO and isolation valves and pressurize gas
 
generator an turbine.
 
i. 	Perform bubble leak test on downstream brazed joint
 
(external leakage).
 
j, Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
k. 	Close main G02 and isolation valves and open overboard
 
dump valve.
 
1. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and
 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRUn Booster LH2 Check Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Booster Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Hydrogen Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY- N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove check valve package and clean propellant lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement check valve package, verify installation
 
in proper direction, braze sleeves to propellant lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Pressurize airborne cruise tank and propellant distribution
 
line to 25 psia.
 
b. 	Open LH2 pump isolation and suction valves.
 
c. 	Monitor system pressure for decay and, if required perform
 
bubble leak check for external leakage.
 
d. 	Reduce cruise tank and propellant distribution line pressure
 
to ambient.
 
e. 	Close cruise tank propellant distribution valves and monitor
 
propellant distribution line pressure (internal leakage).
 
f. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
g. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
C-68
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q Booster Turbopumps
 
SYSTEM - Booster Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Hydrogen Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 6 hours
 
PROCEDURES (Refer to Figures C-5 and 0-6)
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Drain gearbox lubrication system.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves on pump suction and discharge lines
 
with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Attach turbopump removal fixture.
 
e, 	Remove mounting bolts from gas generator and mounting
 
flanges on pump and turbine.
 
f. 	Remove turbopump.
 
g. 	Remove gas generator/turbine seals and clean.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install gas generator/turbine seals.
 
b.- Attach mounting fixture to turbopump.
 
c. 	Install replacement turbopump.
 
d. 	Install mounting bolts in gas generator and mounting flanges.
 
e. 	Remove mounting fixture.
 
f. 	Braze pump suction and discharge lines.
 
g. Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
he Connect electrical instrumentation.
 
J. 	Replace gearbox lubrication oil.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify gearbox lubrication oil level.
 
b. 	Pressurize APS hydrogen accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
c. 	Open pump isolation and suction valves.
 
d. 	Perform bubble leak check on pump suction and discharge
 
line brazed connections.
 
e, Close turbine overboard dump valve.*
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and
 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM.
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ft 	 Open gas generator main GH2 and isolation valves and
 
pressurize gas generator and turbine.
 
g. 	Perform bubble leak test on gas generator/turbine seals
 
(external leakage).
 
h. Reduce accumulator pressure to 15 psia.
 
is. Connect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
J. 	Open turbine overboard dump valve.
 
k. 	Activate cold gas turbine drive gas.
 
1. 	Verify turbine speed instrumentation, and lubrication
 
system operation.
 
m. 	Perform visual inspection for gearbox/pump seal leakage.
 
n. 	Deactivate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
o. 	Disconnect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
p. 	Pressurize accumulator to 19 psia.
 
q. 	Close pump isolation and suction valves and gas generator 
main G12 and isolation valves. 
r. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 1 Booster Turbopump Suction Valve Package 
LRU Q Orbiter LH2 Pump Suction Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Hydrogen Condition, Orbiter Propellant Conditioning, 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURES
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove valve package and clean suction lines.
 
2a 	 REPLACEENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve package and braze sleeves to
 
suction lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to each solenoid
 
valve and verify response with position indicator instru­
mentation.
 
b. 	Close both solenoid valves.
 
c. 	Connect helium pressurization line and pressurize appropriate
 
tank (cruise tank or on-orbit LH2 tank) to 30 psia.
 
d. 	Monitor tank pressure for decay with:
 
1) Suction valve closed, isolation valve open.
 
2) Suction valve open, isolation valve closed. (internal leakage).
 
e., 	Perform bubble leak test on brazed joints with both valves
 
open (external leakage).
 
f. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
g. 	Close pump suction and isolation valves.
 
h. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Booster Gas Generator/Heat Exchanger Package
 
SYSTEM - Booster Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Hydrogen Conditioning Subsystem
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 4 hours
 
PROCEDURES (Refer to Figure C-3 ) 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation and control.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from turbine inlet duct and structural
 
mounting pads.
 
d. 	Remove gas generator/heat exchanger package and clean lines.
 
e. 	Remove turbine inlet duct seal.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Installreplacement turbine inlet duct seal.
 
b. 	Install replacement gas generator/heat exchanger.
 
c. 	Install mounting bolts in turbine inlet duct and
 
structural mounting pads.
 
d. 	Braze-heat exchanger inlet and outlet lines and gds
 
generator propellant lines.
 
e. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
f. 	Connect electrical instrumentation and control.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Pressurize APS hydrogen accumulators and LH2 cruise tanks
 
to 30 psia.
 
b. 	Open LH2 pump isolation and suction valves and accumulator
 
resupply and isolation valves.
 
c. 	Perform bubble leak check on heat exchanger inlet and outlet
 
brazed connections (external leakage).
 
d. 	Close accumulator resupply and isolation valves.
 
a. 	Close turbine overboard dump valve.*
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and
 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRI.
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f. 	Increase APS hydrogen accumulator pressure to 1500 psia.
 
g. 	Open gas generator main GH and isolation valves and
 
pressurize gas generator, iurbine, and heat exchanger to
 
1500 psia.
 
h. 	Monitor heat exchanger outlet pressure (internal leakage)
 
and perform bubble leak check on turbine inlet duct seal
 
(external leakage). 
i. 	 Reduce accumulator pressure and cruise tank pressure to 19 
psia. 
j. 	Close gas generator main GH2 and isolation valves and open
 
overboard dump valve.
 
k. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
G02 L02 
tI Mounting Flanges 
Gas 
GH2 Ignter Turbine inlet 
IgniterDuct 
GO2 

I Mounting
 
Instrumentation
 
Harness
 
Fig. 0-3 Booster Gas Generator/Heat Exchanger Package Removal and Replacement
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU (a Booster LH2 Solenoid Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Booster Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Hydrogen Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURES
 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
a. Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b, Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove LH2 solenoid valve package and clean lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve package and braze sleeves
 
to lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connection electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to each solenoid
 
valve and verify response with position indicator instru­
mentation.
 
b. Close both solenoid valves.
 
c, Open LH2 pump suction and isolation valves.
 
d. 	Pressurize APS hydrogen accumulators to 30 psia and on-orbit
 
LH2 tanks to 15 psia.
 
e. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay with:
 
1) Resupply valve closed, isolation valve open,
 
2) Resupply valve open, isolation valve closed (internal leakage).
 
f. 	Open both solenoid valves and pressurize LH2 tank to 30 psia.
 
g. 	Perform bubble leak test on brazed joints with solenoid valves
 
open (external leakage).
 
h. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
i. 	Close accumulator resupply and isolation valves.
 
J. 	Close LH2 pump suction and isolation valves.
 
k. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	P Booster/Orbiter Gas Generator
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Hydrogen Conditioning, Booster Oxygen Conditioning,
 
Booster APU, Orbiter Propellant Conditioning
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-4)
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation and control.
 
V. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from turbine inlet duct and
 
structural mounting pads.
 
d. 	Remove gas generator and clean propellant lines.
 
e. 	Remove turbine inlet duct seal.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement turbine inlet duct seal.
 
b. 	Install replacement gas generator.
 
c. 	Install mounting bolts in turbine inlet duct and
 
structural mounting pads.
 
d. 	Braze propellant inlet lines.
 
e. 
Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
f. 	Connect electrical instrumentation and control.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Close turbine overboard dump valve*.
 
b. 	Open gas generator main propellant and isolation valves.
 
c. 	Pressurize appropriate accumulators to 1500 psia.

d. 	Perform bubble leak check on turbine inlet duct seal
 
(external leakage).
 
e. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
f. 	Close gas generator main propellant and isolation valves
 
and open overboard dump valve.
 
g. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
h. 	If required, a hot firing test may be performed by loading APS
 
propellants and cycling gas generator through a start and shut­
down sequence. This test must be followed by a system purge
 
and 	safing procedure.
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and turbine
 
for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM.
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Fig. 0-4 Gas Generator Removal and Replacement 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ) Booster Compressor GO2 Inlet Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Booster Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Oxygen Conditioning
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disc onnect electrical control and instrumentation
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove compressor GO2 inlet valve package and clean
 
propellant lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve package and braze sleeves to
 
propellant lines.
 
b, Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28-vdc electrical actuation signal to each solenoid
 
valve and verify response with position indicator instru­
mentation.
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to main LO2 quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
c. 	Close both solenoid valves.
 
d. 	Pressurize system to 30 psia.
 
e. 	Monitor main LO2 tank pressure for decay with:
 
1. 	GO2 propellant valve closed, isolation valve open.
 
2. 	G02 propellant valve open, isolation valve closed
 
(internal leakage).
 
f. 	Perform bubble leak test on brazed joints with both valves
 
open (external leakage).
 
g. 	Reduce main LO2 tank pressure to 19 psia.
 
h. 	Close G02 propellant and isolation valves.
 
i. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
L)RU Booster Turbocompressor
 
SYSTEM - Booster Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Oxygen Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 5 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
b. 	Remove mounting bolts from GO2 outlet and overboard
 
ducting flanges.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from compressor inlet and turbine
 
inlet flanges.
 
d, Attach turbocompressor removal fixture.
 
e. 	Remove mounting bolts from mounting pads.
 
f. 	Remove turbocompressor.
 
g. 	Remove flange seals and clean flanges.
 
2, 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Attach mounting-fixture to replacement turbocompressor.
 
b. 	Install replacement flange seals.
 
c. 	Install replacement turbocompressor and install mounting
 
bolts in mounting pads.
 
d. 	Install mounting bolts in compressor inlet and turbine
 
inlet flanges.
 
e. 	Install mounting bolts in GO2 outlet and overboard ducting
 
flanges.
 
f. 	Remove turbocompressor mounting fixture.
 
g. 	Connect electrical instrumentation and perform visual
 
inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. Close turbine overboard dump valve.*
 
b, Open gas generator main propellant and isolation valves.
 
c. 	Pressurize appropriate accumulators to 1500 psia.,
 
d. 	Perform bubble leak check on turbine inlet and outlet
 
duct seals (external leakage).
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and
 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM.
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e. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.

f. 	Close gas generator main propellant-and isolation valves
 
and open overboard dump valve.
 
g. 	Connect helium pressurization line to main L02 quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
h. 	Open GO, propellant and isolation valves.
 
i. 	Pressurize system to 30 psia,

j. 	 Perform bubble leak test on G0 outlet and overboard 
ducting flanges of compressor [external leakage).

k, Reduce main LO2 tank pressure to 19 psia.
 
l. 	Close GO2 propellant and isolation valves.
 
m. 	Disconnect pressurization systems.
 
n. 
Connect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment,
 
o. 	Activate cold gas turbine drive gas.
 
p. 	Verify turbocompressor speed instrumentation.
 
q. 	Deactive cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
r. 	Disconnect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU ( Booster GO Check Valve Package 
LRU Q Orbiter GO, Check Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Oxygen Conditioning, Orbiter Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY- N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
b. 	 Remove check valve package and clean propellant lines. 
2, 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement check valve package, verify installation
 
in proper direction, braze sleeves to propellant lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected
 
subsystem.
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to Go2 quick-disconnect
 
coupling.
 
c. 	Verify compressor GO2 propellant and isolation valves (booster)
 
or LO2 pump suction and isolation valves (orbiter) closed.
 
d. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
a. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay. (Downstrelm leak
 
check, internal leak check).
 
f. 	Pressurize upstream side to 1500 psia. (Upstream leak
 
check, internal leak check).
 
g. 	Reduce pressure in accumulators and verify check valve operation.
 
h. 	Perform external bubble leak check if required.
 
i. Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
j, Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU d Booster Turbine 
LRU Orbiter Turbine
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster Hydrogen Conditioning, Booster Oxygen Conditioning, 
Booster APU, Orbiter Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 4 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-5)
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
b. 	Remove mounting bolts from gas generator and overboard
 
ducting flanges.
 
c. 	Disconnect rotor shaft coupling.
 
d. 	Remove mounting bolts from mounting pads and remove turbine.
 
e. 	Remove inlet and outlet duct seals and clean.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement inlet and outlet duct seals.
 
b. 	Install replacement turbine.
 
c. 	Install mounting bolts in mounting pads and inlet and
 
outlet flanges.
 
d. 	Connect rotor shaft coupling.
 
e. 	Connect electrical instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a, 	Close turbine overboard dump valve.*
 
b. 	Open gas generator main propellant and isolation valves.
 
c. 	Pressurize appropriate accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
d. 	Perform bubble leak check on turbine inlet and outlet
 
duct seals (external leakage).
 
e. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
f. 	Close gas generator main propellant and isolation valves
 
and open overboard dump valve.
 
g. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
*This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and
 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRMr.
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h. 	Connect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
i. 	Activate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
j. 	Verify turbine speed instrumentation and proper operation
 
of turbine-driven equipment.
 
k. 	Deactivate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
1. 	Disconnect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
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Fig. C-5 Turbine Removal and Replacement 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU . Orbiter/Booster GH2 Manual Valve 
LRU 6 ) Orbiter/Booster Go2 Manual Valve 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Booster/Orbiter Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove valve and clean propellant fill lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve and braze sleeves to propellant
 
fill lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected
 
subsystem (02 or H2).
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to appropriate quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
c. 	Verify manual valve closed.
 
d. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
e. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay.
 
f. 	If pressure decay noted, perform bubble leak test on
 
replaced valve to verify.
 
g. 	Cycle valve open and closed to verify operation.
 
h. Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
i. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 9 (23) Orbiter/Booster CH2 Relief Valve
 
LRU , Orbiter/Booster GO, Relief Valve 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
le 	 REMOVAL
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove valve and clean propellant fill lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a., 	Install replacement valve and braze sleeves to propellant
 
fill lines,
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected
 
subsystem (02 or H2).
 
b. 	Connect helium pressurization line to appropriate quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
c. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
d. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for delay.
 
e. 	If pressure decay noted, perform bubble leak test on
 
replaced valve to verify.
 
f. 	Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
g. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 24 Orbiter/Booster GH2 Quick-Disconnect/Solenoid Valve Package
 
LRU- . 6R Orbiter/Booster GO2 Quick-Disconnect/Solenoid Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY- N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from vehicle structure mounting
 
flange on coupling.
 
d. 	Remove valve package and clean propellant fill lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve package.
 
b. 	Install mounting bolts in vehicle structure mounting flange
 
on coupling.
 
c. 	Braze sleeves to propellant fill lines.
 
d. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
e. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to solenoid valve and
 
verify response with position indicator instrumentation.
 
b. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected sub­
system (02 or H2).
 
c. 	Connect helium pressurization line to appropriate quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
d. 	Open solenoid valve and pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
e. 	Close solenoid valve and remove pressurization line.
 
f. 	Monitor accumulator pressure for decay (internal leakage).
 
g. 	Perform bubble leak test on brazed sleeve (external leakage).
 
h. 	Open solenoid valve and perform bubble leak test on
 
quick-disconnect coupling.
 
i. 	Close solenoid valve and connect pressurization line.
 
J. 	Open solenoid valve and reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia.
 
k. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 6 Booster/Orbiter GO2 Regulator Package 
LRU Booster/Orbiter CH2 Regulat6r Package
 
SYSTEM - Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from vehicle structure mounting pads.
 
d. 	Remove regulator package and clean propellant distribution
 
lines.
 
2. 	 REPLACEMENT 
a, Install replacement regulator package.
 
b, Install mounting bolts in vehicle structure mounting pads.
 
c. 	Braze-sleeves to propellant distribution lines.
 
d. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
e. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Apply 28 vdc electrical actuation signal to each regulator
 
and verify response.
 
b. 	Verify accumulator isolation valves closed in affected sub­
system (0 2 or H2). 
c. 	Connect helium pressurization line to appropriate quick­
disconnect coupling.
 
d. 	Close accumulator isolation valve in parallel regulator package.
 
e. 	Pressurize accumulators to 1500 psia.
 
f. 	Perform bubble leak check on brazed sleeves (external leakage).
 
g. 	Verify proper pressure in propellant feed lines.
 
h. 	Reduce system pressure (accumulators and feed lines to 19 psia.)
 
i. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	 C) Orbiter LU2 Pump 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM -APS Propellant Conditioning
 
ASSEMBLY- N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 4 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-6)
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Drain gearbox lubration system.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves on pump suction and discharge lines
 
with cutting tool.
 
d, Remove mounting bolts from gearbox and mounting flanges.
 
e. 	Remove LH2 pump and clean lines,
 
f. 	Remove gearbox/pump seals.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement gearbox/pump seals.
 
b. 	Install replacement pump.
 
c. 	Install mounting bolts in gearbox and mounting flanges.
 
d. 	Braze pump suction and discharge lines.
 
e. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
f. 	Connect electrical instrumentation.
 
g. 	Replace gearbox lubrication oil.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify gearbox lubrication oil level.
 
b. 	Pressurize APS hydrogen accumulators and on-orbit LH2
 
tanks to 30 psia.
 
c. 	Open pump isolation and suction valves.
 
d. 	Perform bubble leak check on pump suction and discharge
 
line brazed connections.
 
e. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
f. 	Close pump suction and isolation valve.
 
g. Disconnect pressurization system.
 
h, Connect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
i. 	Activate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
J, 	Verify pump speed instrumentation and lubrication system
 
operation.
 
k. 	Perform visual inspection for gearbox/pump seal leakage.
 
1. 	Deactivate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
m. 	Disconnect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
IRU (10 Orbiter L02 Pump
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Conditioning
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 4 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-6)
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Drain gearbox lubrication system.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves on pump suction and discharge lines
 
with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove mounting bolts from gearbox and mounting flanges.
 
6. 	Remove LO2 pump and clean lines.
 
f. 	Remove gearbox/pump seals.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement gearbox/pump seals.
 
b. 	Install replacement pump.
 
c. 	Install mounting bolts in gearbox and mounting flanges.
 
d. 	Braze-pump suction and discharge lines.
 
e. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
f. 	Connect electrical instrumentation.
 
g. 	Replace gearbox lubrication oil.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify gearbox lubrication oil level.
 
b. 	Pressure APS oxygen accumulators and on-orbit LO2 tanks to 30 psia.
 
c. 	Open pump isolation and suction valves.2
 
d. 	Perform bubble leak check on pump suction and discharge line
 
brazed connections.
 
e. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
f. 	Close pump suction and isolation valves.
 
g. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
 
h. 	Connect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
i. 	Actuate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
j. 	Verify pump speed instrumentation and lubrication system operation.
 
k. 	Perform visual inspection for gearbox pump seal leakage.
 
1. 	Deactivate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
m. 	Disconnect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
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*Electrical harness includes pump speed instrumentation.
 
BPump mounting flanges have removable seals.
 
p'g. c-6 Typical LH7/LO2 Pump Removal and Replacement
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU a Orbiter L0, Heat Exchanger
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 2 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-7) 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from turbine exhaust and overboard
 
ducting flanges.
 
d. 	Remove heat exchanger and clean lines.
 
e. 	Remove seals from ducting flanges.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement ducting seals.
 
b. 	Install replacement heat exchanger.
 
c. ,Install mounting bolts in turbine exhaust and overboard
 
ducting flanges.
 
d. 	Braze heat exchanger inlet and outlet lines.
 
e. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
f. 	Connect electrical instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Pressurize APS oxygen accumulators and on-orbit LO tanks to 30 psia
 
b. 	Open L02 pump isolation and suction valves. 2
 
c. 	Perform bubble leak check on heat exchanger inlet and outlet
 
brazed connections (external leakage).
 
d. 	Close LO2 pump suction and isolation valves.
 
e. Close turbine overboard dump valve*.
 
f, Increase APS oxygen accumulator pressure to 1500 psia.
 
* This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and 
turbine-for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM. 
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g. Open gas generator main GO and isolation valves and 
pressurize gas generator, gurbine, and heat exchanger 
to 1500 psia. 
h. Monitor LO2 pump discharge pressure (internal leakage) 
and perform bubble leak check on turbine exhaust and 
overboard ducting seals (external leakage). 
i. Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia. 
j. Close gas generator main GO2 
open overboard dump valve. 
and isolation valves and 
k. Disconnect pressurization system. 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ( Orbiter LH 2 Heat Exchanger
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME 2 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-7) 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Disconnect electrical instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from turbine exhaust and overboard
 
ducting flanges.
 
d. 	Remove heat exchanger and clean lines.
 
e. 	Remove seals from ducting flanges.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement ducting seals.
 
b. 	Install replacement heat exchanger.
 
c. 	Install mounting bolts in turbine exhaust and overboard
 
ducting flanges.
 
d. 	Braze heat exchanger inlet and outlet lines.
 
e. 
Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
f. 	Connect electrical instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Pressurize APS hydrogen accumulators and on-orbit LH2 tanks
 
to 30 psia.
 
b. 	Open LH2 pump isolation and suction valves.
 
c. 	Perform bubble leak check on heat exchanger inlet and outlet
 
brazed connections (external leakage).
 
d. 	Close LH2 pump suction and isolation valves.
 
e. 	Close turbine overboard dump valve.
 
f. 	Increase APS hydrogen accumulator pressure to 1500 psia
 
g. 	Open gas generator main GH and isolation valves and
2
 
pressurize gas generator, turbine, and heat exchanger
 
to 1500 psia.
 
h. 	Monitor LH pump discharge pressure (internal leakage) and
 
perform buible leak check on turbine exhaust and overboard
 
ducting seals (external leakage).
 
* 	 This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM. 
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i. Reduce accumulator pressure to 19 psia. 
j. Close gas generator main GH2 and isolation valves and 
open overboard dump valve. 
k. Disconnect pressurization system. 
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*Flanges have removable seals.
 
Fig. C-7 	 Typical Orbiter LH2 , LOZ Heat Exchanger
 
Removal and Replacement
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ) Orbiter Power Train Unit
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 6 hours
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure 0-7)
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Drain gearbox lubrication system.
 
b. 	Disconnect electrical harness.
 
c. 	Remove mounting bolts from LH2 and LO2 pump mounting
 
flanges, remove pumps and pump seal.
 
d. 	Disconnect turbine and APU power shafts.
 
e. 	Remove mounting bolts from mounting pads.
 
f. 	Remove power train unit.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement power train unit.
 
b. 	Install mounting bolts in mounting pads.
 
c. 	Connect turbine and APU power shafts.
 
d. 	Replace pump seals.
 
e. 	InstallLO and LH pumps and mounting bolts.
 
f. 	Connect electrical harness.
 
g. 	Replace gearbox lubrication system oil and perform
 
visual inspection.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Verify gearbox lubrication system oil level.
 
b. 	Connect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment
 
c. 	Verify turbine overboard dump valve open*.
 
d. 	Activate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
e. 	Activate gearbox control and verify APU, LH 2 pump, and L02
 
pump operation.
 
f. 	Verify lubrication system instrumentation and operation.
 
g. 	Perform visual inspection for pump seal leakage.
 
h. 	Deactivate cold-gas turbine drive gas.
 
i. 	Disconnect cold-gas turbine drive ground support equipment.
 
* 	 This valve is required to allow pressurization of gas generator and 
turbine for leak checks and has not been identified in the DRM. 
C-97 
ClutchHousing 
Top View 
Electrical Harness
-Connector 
Gearbox
Housing 
APU Power 
Takeoff Shaft 
Turbine 
 Lubrication
 
Power System
 
Shaft
 
Mounting
 
Pad (Typ) Pump Mounting
 
Flange C2)
 
Pump (2)
 
*Electrical harness includes clutch and gearbox control
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*Pump mounting flanges have removable seals.
 
Fig. 0-8 Orbiter Power Train Unit Removal and Replacement
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 7 Orbiter LO2 Pump Suction Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Auxiliary Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - APS Propellant Conditioning 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - I hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
a. 	Disconnect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove valve package and clean suction lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install replacement valve package and braze sleeves to
 
suction lines.
 
b. 	Remove brazing equipment and perform visual inspection.
 
c. 	Connect electrical control and instrumentation.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	 Apply 28 VDC electrical activation signal to each solenoid 
valve and verify response with position indicator instrumentation. 
b. 	Close both solenoid valves.
 
c. 	Connect helium pressurization line and pressurize on-orbit LO2
 
tank to 30 psia.
 
d. 	Monitor tank pressure for decay with:
 
1) Suction valve closed, isolation valve open.
 
2) Suction valve open, isolation valve closed.
 
e. 	Perform bubble leak test on brazed joints with both valves
 
open (external leakage).
 
f. 	Reduce system pressure to 19 psia.
 
g. 	Close pump suction and isolation valves.
 
h. 	Disconnect pressurization system.
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LRUs Airbreathing Propulsion System
 
This section of Appendix C contains the maintenance
 
procedures for the Booster and Orbiter Airbreathing
 
Propulsion Systems. The maintenance procedures for the
 
LRUs within the turbofan engine are also included in
 
this section.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU ) Turbofan Engine 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 6 hours 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. 	New engine has experienced "hot firing" acceptance test.
 
B. 	Electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic connections are minimized.
 
C. 	A ferry mission will occur prior to launch so that engine can be
 
fired after installation.
 
PROCEDURE (Refer to Figure C-9)
 
1, 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove upper wing box panel (see following Figure ). 
b. 	Disconnect electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic connections.
 
c. 	Install engine removal ground support equipment.
 
d. 	Remove engine mounting brackets.
 
e. 	Raise engine from wing compartment with ground support
 
equipment.
 
f. 	Secure electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic connections.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Lower engine into wing compartment with ground support
 
equipment.
 
b. 	Install engine mounting brackets.
 
c. 	Remove ground support equipment.
 
d. Make electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic connections.
 
ef Perform retest procedure below.
 
f. 	Install upper wing box panel.
 
g. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Helium leak test fuel system connections.
 
(Pressure Decay Test through Propellant Management System).
 
b. 	Electrical Continuity.
 
c. 	Perform engine start dry simulation test.
 
PRECEDING PAGIES NOT FILMED 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU n5 Cruise Tank Vent Disconnect Coupling
 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	RE14OVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove bolts from flanges.
 
b. 	Remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove structural mounts,
 
d. 	Remove coupling half.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install sealing devices after cleaning seal surfaces.
 
b. 	Make structural attachments.
 
c. 	Install bolts and torque per specified value and
 
sequence*
 
d. Perform Retest Procedure specified below.
 
e, Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak test bolted flange connections by:
 
1) 	Attaching GSE to newly installed coupling.
 
2) Close tank vent valves
 
3) Pressurize through GSE with 20 psia helium.
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	n6 Cruise Tank Fill Valve
 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY- N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystemto ambient pressure. 
a. 	 Remove electrical connections and secure wiring. 
b. 	Disconnect flange bolts and remove sealing devices.
 
c. 	Remove valve.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Clean sealing surfaces as required.
 
b. 	Install new valve and new sealing devices.
 
c. 	Install flange bolts and torque to specified value and
 
sequence,
 
d. 	Perform retest described below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize Cruise Tank with 20 psia He. Monitor
 
Cruise Tank pressure for decay. (This leak tests the valve
 
flange closest to the cruise tank). Open the Fill Valve and
 
monitor Cruise Tank pressure for decay. (This leak tests
 
the valve flange furthest from the tank).
 
b. 	Electrical - During leak test verify valve positions and
 
continuity.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU Q) Cruise Tank Fill Coupling
 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1, REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
a. Remove bolts from flanges.
 
b. Remove sealing devices.
 
c. Remove structural mounts.
 
d. Remove coupling half,
 
2* REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install sealing devices after cleaning sealing surfaces.
 
b. Make structural attachments.
 
c. Install bolts and torque per specified value and sequence.
 
d. Perform Retest Procedure specified below.
 
e. Return system to secured state.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Leak test bolted flange connections by:
 
1) Attach helium supply to fill coupling,
 
2) Close fill valve.
 
3) Pressurize with 20 psia He.
 
4) Bubble test flanges for leaks.
 
C-108
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	n8 Cruise Tank Pressurization Regulator Package
 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Pressurization 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation on
 
sleeves.
 
b, Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Perform Retest described below.
 
d. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Load 1500 psia GH2 into APS bottles. Open
 
Cruise Tank vent valves. Open solenoid valve for the
 
regulator package which was just installed. Perform
 
bubble leak test on regulator.connections.
 
b. 	Electrical - Perform continuity check.
 
c. 	Functional - Close solenoid valve for the regulator package 
which was not replaced. Open solenoid valve for new installed 
regulator package. Close cruise tank vents. Close Fuel Dis­
tributing Valves. With 1502 psia GH2 in APS bottles, verify 
Cruise Tank pressure at 20 - 2 psia. 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	n9 Cruise Tank Pressurization Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Pressurization 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
I1 REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring,
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
c. 	 Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from 
mating lines. 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation on
 
sleeves.
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Perform Retest described below.
 
d. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Load 1500 psia GH2 into APS bottles. Open
 
Cruise Tank Vent valves. Open newly installed solenoid
 
valves. Monitor Cruise Tank for pressure decay.
 
b. 	Electrical - During leak test verify valve positions and
 
continuity.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU (1hJ Pressurization Filter 
SYSTEM - Booster Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Pressurization 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1 REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install welded assembly and perform brazing operation on
 
sleeve.
 
b. 	Perform Retest described below.
 
c. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Load 1500 psia G012 into APS bottles. Monitor
 
APS bottles for decay. (This test will verify leakage
 
integrity of brazed connections).
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU n3 GH Valve Package 
LRU n5 CO2 Valve Package 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystem to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install new valve package and perform brazing operation 
on sleeves. 
b. Connect electrical wiring. 
c. Perform Retest described below. 
d. Return system to secured state, 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize APS bottles with 1500 psia He. Monitor
 
bottles for pressure decay. (This leak tests the upstream
 
brazed sleeve connection). Open valves and monitor bottles
 
for pressure decay. (This leak tests the downstream brazed
 
sleeve connection).
 
b. 	Electrical - During leak test verify valve positions.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU () Gas Generator Assembly 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 2 hours 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. Disconnect bolts at turbopump inlet duct.
 
c, Cut brazed sleeves at inlet/outlet ports with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove gas generator assembly and clean remainder of brazed
 
sleeve from mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new gas generator assembly and perform brazing
 
operation on sleeves,
 
b. 	Install new seal at turbopumps inlet duct and bolt flanges
 
together using specified torque value and tightening sequence,
 
c. 	Connect electrical wiring,
 
d. Perform Retest described below.
 
e, Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize GO APS bottles with 1500 psia He,
 
Open GO2 valves at inlet ?o gas generator assembly. Monitor
 
for pressure decay at GO2 bottles. (This leak tests the
 
brazed sleeve connection at GO,, valve and the turbopump inlet
 
duct bolted flange). Vent GO "bottles and close GO valve,
 
Perform same procedure using 6H2 bottles and GH2 iniet valves.
 
b. 	Electrical - Apply electrical power and monitor current and
 
voltage at igniter plug. During leak test verify Go2 and GH2
 
valve positions.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	6) LH2 Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated-subsystemto ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
c. 	Remove welded assembly and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new valve package and perform brazing operation
 
on sleeves,
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Perform Retest described below.'
 
d. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize on-orbit LH tanks with 20 psia He.
 
Monitor tank pressure for decay. iThis leak tests the
 
upstream sleeve on the replaced LRU package). Open the
 
solenoid valves on the replaced package and again monitor
 
on-orbit LH2 tanks for pressure decay. (This leak tests
 
the downstream sleeve on the replaced LRU package).
 
b. 	 Electrical - During leak test verify valve positions and 
continuity. 
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU 	 n Turbopump Assembly 
SYSTEM_ - Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY- N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME-+ 2 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	 Remove electrical connections and secure wiring. 
b. 	Disconnect bolts at Gas Generator Assembly outlet duct.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves at suction and discharge sides of the
 
pump with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove turbopump assembly and clean remainder of brazed
 
sleeves from mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new turbopump assembly and perform brazing operation
 
on sleeves.
 
b. 	Install new seal at turbopump inlet duct and bolt flanges
 
together using specified torque value and tightening sequence.
 
c. Connect electrical wiring.
 
d, Perform retest described below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state,
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize GO APS bottles with 1500 psia He.
 
Open GO2 valves at inlet io Gas Generator Assembly. Monitor
 
for pressure decay at Go2 bottles. (This leak tests the seal
 
at the turbopump inlet duct). Vent GO2 APS bottles and close
 
GO2 valves. Pressurize on-orbit LH tanks with 20 psia He.
 
Open LH2 valves at inlet to pump. &onitor LH2 tank pressure
 
for decay. (This leak tests the brazed connections at suction
 
and discharge sides of the pump).
 
b. Electrical - Verify valve positions during leak test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU n Check Valve Package
 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM- Propellant Management 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 3/4 hour 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a, 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
b. 	Remove valve package and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new valve package and perform brazing operation
 
on sleeves.
 
b, Perform Retest described below.
 
c. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a, 	Leak Test - Pressurize on-orbit LH2 tanks with 20 psia He,
 
Open LH2 valves at inlet to turbopump. Monitor LH2 tank
 
pressure for decay. (This technique will simultaneously
 
leak check both the upstream and downstream brazed connections.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	nT Fuel Control Assembly
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections to component modular package.
 
b. 	Remove electrical connections to electronic controller,
 
c. 	Disconnect plumbing connections to component modular
 
package and remove the package.
 
d, Remove electronic controller.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a, 	Install new, preprogrammed, Electronic Controller.
 
b. 	Install component modular package and connect plumbing
 
lines.
 
c. 	Make electrical connections.
 
d. 	Perform Retest described below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize Propellant Management Subsystem
 
with helium; Open valves in Fuel Control Assembly and
 
bubble check plumbing connections.
 
b. 	Electrical - Perform Dry Engine start simulation. Verify
 
valve functions and Electronic Controller performance.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU ) Electronic Controller 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM- Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 2 hours 
PROCEDURE 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent associated subsystems to ambient pressure.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections.
 
b. 	Remove mounting hardware.
 
c. 	Remove electronic controller.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new, preprogrammed, Electronic Controller.
 
b. 	Make-electrical connections.
 
c. 	Perform Retest described below.
 
d. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Electrical - Perform Dry Engine start simulation. Verify
 
Electronic Controller performance.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU ) Scavenge Pump 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURES
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent pressure from Lubrication Assembly.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Drain lube oil from engine.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove modular package and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new modular package and perform brazing operation
 
on sleeves.
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Flush oil system.
 
d. 	Refill oil system.
 
e. 	Perform retest described below.
 
f. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	 RETEST 
a. 	Leak Test - Function Lubrication Assembly and monitor lube
 
oil pressure for decay. Perform visual inspection of con­
'nection for leaks during functional test.
 
b. 	Electrical - Verify electrical connections and functions
 
during leak test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Ooil Boost Pump or
 
LRU 	ng Oil Pressure Pump
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Turbofan Engine
 
ASSEMBLY- N/A
 
COMONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 2 hours
 
PROCEDURES
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent pressure from Lubrication Assembly.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Drain lube oil from engine.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove pump and clean remainder of sleeve from mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new pump and perform brazing operation on sleeves.
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Flush oil system.
 
d. 	Refill oil system.
 
e. 	Perform retest described below.
 
f. Return system to secured state,
 
3, RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Function Lubrication Assembly and monitor lube
 
oil pressure for decay. Perform visual inspection of con­
nections for leaks during functional test.
 
b. 	Electrical - Verify electrical connections and functions
 
during leak test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU 	a) Oil Strainer
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME -1 1/2 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent pressure from Lubrication Assembly.
 
a. 	Drain lube oil from engine.
 
b. 	Disconnect threaded fittings and remove oil strainer.
 
c. 	Visually inspect sealing surfaces for damage (if damaged
 
refinish surface as specified by procedures).
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new oil strainer and torque threaded fittings as
 
specified.
 
b. 	Flush oil system.
 
c. 	Refill oil system.
 
d. 	Perform retest described below.
 
e. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Function Lubrication Assembly and monitor lube
 
oil pressure for decay. Perform visual inspection of
 
connections for leaks during functional tests.
 
b. 	Electrical - Verify electrical connections and functions
 
during leak test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU n Boost Pump Relief Valve or
 
LRU n Boost Pump Regulating Valve or
 
LRU 0 Main Pressure Regulating Valve
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 2 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Vent pressure from Lubrication Assembly.
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections and secure wiring.
 
b. 	Drain lube oil from engine.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove valve and clean remainder of sleeve from mating
 
lines,
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new valve and perform brazing operation on sleeves.
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Flush oil system.
 
d. 	Refill oil system.
 
e. 	Perform retest described below.
 
f. 	Return system to secured state.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Function Lubrication Assembly and monitor lube
 
oil pressure for decay. Perform visual inspection of con­
nections for leaks during functional test.
 
b. 	Electrical - Verify electrical connections and functions
 
during leak test.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU (1t Zero-G LubePressure System 
SYSTEM - Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY- N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 3 hours
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	 REMOVAL 
PRECAUTION - Vent pressure in Lubrication Assembly to ambient.
 
a. 	 Remove electrical connections and secure wiring. 
b. 	Drain lube oil from engine.
 
c. 	Cut brazed sleeves at notched section with cutting tool.
 
d. 	Remove modular package and clean remainder of sleeve from
 
mating lines.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new modular package and perform brazing operation
 
on sleeves,
 
b. 	Connect electrical wiring.
 
c. 	Flush oil system.
 
d. 	Refill oil system.
 
e. 	Perform retest described below.
 
f. 	 Return system to secured state. 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Leak Test - Pressurize gas container in zero-g lube pressure
 
system with gaseous nitrogen. Function the zero-g pressure
 
system and monitor lube oil pressure for decay.
 
b. Electrical - Verify zero-g lube system is functioning.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU (1fIgnition Exciter
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM- Turbofan Engine
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	 Remove electrical connections from ignition compositor
exciter.and-ignition 
b. 	Remove ignition compositor from ignition exciter.
 
c. 	Remove ignition exciter.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new ignition exciter.
 
b. 	Re-install ignition compositor on ignition exciter.
 
c. Install electrical connections.
 
d. 	Perform retest described below.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Electrical - Apply electrical power to ignition exciter.
 
Monitor input voltage and current to exciter; output
 
voltage and current from ignition compositor. Visually
 
evaluate spark at ignition plug.
 
C-124
 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q_ Ignition Compositor
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion
 
SUBSYSTEM - Turbofan Engine
 
ASSEMBLY - N/A
 
COMPONENT - N/A
 
TASK TIME - 1 hour
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	REMOVAL
 
a. 	Remove electrical connections from ignition compositor
 
and ignition exciter.
 
b. 	Remove ignition compositor from ignition exciter.
 
2. 	REPLACEMENT
 
a. 	Install new ignition compositor.
 
b. 	Install electrical connections.
 
c. 	Perform retest described below.
 
3. 	RETEST
 
a. 	Electrical - Apply electrical power to ignition exciter.
 
Monitor input voltage and current to exciter; output voltage
 
and current from ignition compositor. Visually evaluate
 
spark at ignition plug.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
LRU Ignition Plug 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM- Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1, 	 REMOVAL 
a, 	Remove electrical connections.
 
b. 	Remove ignition plug from engine power assembly burner.
 
2. 	 REPLACEMENT 
a. 	Install new ignition plug.
 
b. 	Install electrical connections.
 
c. 	Perform retest described below.
 
3. 	RETEST 
a. 	Electrical - Apply electrical power to ignition exciter.
 
Monitor input voltage and current to exciter; output
 
voltage and current from ignition compositor. Visually
 
evaluate spark at ignition plug.
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MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
 
LRU Q Solid Start Cartridge
 
SYSTEM - Booster/Orbiter Airbreathing Propulsion 
SUBSYSTEM- Turbofan Engine 
ASSEMBLY - N/A 
COMPONENT - N/A 
TASK TIME - 1 hour 
PROCEDURE
 
1. REMOVAL
 
PRECAUTION - Remove Vehicle Electrical Power prior to Start
 
Cartridge Removal.
 
a, Remove electrical connections.
 
b. Remove cartridge.
 
2. REPLACEMENT
 
a. Install new start cartridge.
 
b. Install electrical connections.
 
c. Reconnect vehicle electrical power.
 
d. Perform retest described below.
 
3. RETEST
 
a. Electrical - Apply electrical power to ignition exciter.
 
Monitor input voltage and current to exciter; output voltage
 
and current from ignition compositor. Visually evaluate
 
spark at ignition plug.
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APPENDIX D 
CHECKOUT AMD MONITORING
 
REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
D-1 
This appendix replaces the Checkout and Monitoring Requirements
 
Analysis, Appendix D of MCR-70-274 (Issue 1), and MCR-70-306 (Issue 3).
 
A conversion has been made from a subsystem-by-subsystem analysis of
 
the orbiter stage to a detailed phase-by-phase analysis to improve the
 
continuity of the previous analysis and to include GSE requirements
 
and the detailed measurement requirements. The result is a step-by­
step sequence for a nominal mission, including the values expected for
 
a given measurement at a given time, and justification for the required
 
measurements.
 
This task was accomplished by taking the previous analysis and
 
molding the activities of each subsystem during a given phase into a
 
cohesive phase analysis. This phase analysis was then evaluated against
 
the subsystems requirements documentation. This procedure was followed
 
through each mission phase. Finally, the detailed operations of the
 
tasks that were indicated in the phase-by-phase analysis were added.
 
Glossary of Symbols:
 
ELEMENTS USES
 
V = valve R = readiness
 
L = line S = status
 
E.C. = engine controller X = monitor
 
T.F. = turbofan C = control
 
T.R0 = thruster C/O = checkout
 
T.C. = thrust chamber
 
FCA = fuel control assembly
 
LA = lube assembly
 
G = gas generator
 
PT = power train
 
TP = turbopump
 
FM = flowmeter
 
FH = fuel heater
 
H = heat exchanger
 
C = coupling
 
T = tank 
GOV = L02 valve
 
GFV = LH2 valve
 
EFV = engine fuel valve
 
IGN = ignition
 
U = turbine
 
SG- = start cartridge 
CL = clutch 
P = pump 
FD = flame detector 
COMP = compartment 
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ORBITER
 
I. FERRY PREFLIGHT
 
1. Connect the Ground Power GSE.
 
2. Power up ONMS.
 
3. Perform an OCMS self-check, including eagine controllers.
 
4. Power up all propulsion systems.
 
a) Make the following MPS readiness checks. 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 4 V-i LOIV-l R Closed 
V-2 LOIV-2 
V-3 LOVV-l 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V-5 LOW-3 
V-6 LOW-4 
V-7 LOFV-l 
V-8 LFIV-l 
V-9 LFIV-2 
V-10 LFTVV-l 
V-II LFTVV-2 
V-12 LFTVV-3 
V-13 LFTVV-4 
V-14 LFFV-l 
V-19 LOPCV-l 
V-20 LOPCV-2 
V-21 LFPCV-1 
V-22 LFPCV-2 
V-23 LOIV-3 
V-24 LOTVV-l 
V-25 LOTVV-2 
V-26 LFIV-3 
V-27 LFIV-4 
V-28 LFTVV-5 
V-29 LFTVV-6 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
V-31 LFTVV-8 
V-32 LOPV-l 
V-33 LOPV-2 
V-34 LFPV-1 
V-35 LFPV-2 
C-I LOFC-l 
C-2 LHC-l,2 
C-3 LFTVC-l 
C-4 LHC-3,4 
C-5 LFFC-l 
F.Po 4 C-6 LHC-5,6 1 R Closed 
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FERRY PREFLIGHT (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 4 C-8 LHC-7,8 1 R Closed 
C-Il LFVC-1 Closed 
T-3 PFT-1 19 PSIA 
T-5 PfT-2 
T-6 PfT-3 
T-1 PoT-i 
T-2 PoT-2 
T-4 PoT-3 
L-17 PoL-2 
L-20 PfL-1 
L-21 PfL-4 
C-5/V-14 PfF-1 
C-I/V-7 PoF-I 
L-8 PfS-I 
L-9 PfS-2 
L-3 PoS-1 
L-4 PoS-2 19 PSIA 
T-4 QoT-7 UNC 
T-4 QoT-8 
T-4 QoT-9 
T-5 QfT-4 
T-5 QfT-5 
T-5 QfT-6 
T-6 QfT-7 
T-6 QfT-8 
T-6 QfT-9 UNC 
T-5 TfT-2 AMBIENT 
T-6 TfT-3 
T-4 ToT-3 
L-20 TfL-I 
L-21 TfL-4 
TfL-5 
L-17 ToL-2 
F.P. 4 ToL-4 1 R AMBIENT 
b) Perform main engine readiness checks. (Include Gimbal Locks & Ign.)
 
c) Verify all main engine covers installed.
 
Make the following APS readiness checks.
 
FPo 5 PoL-8 I R 19 PSIA
 
P01-9I * PfL-9
 
PfL-10 19 PSIA 
T.C.-(I-37) LBIV-(l-37) I/valve=37 Closed 
T.C.-(I-37) LMBV-(1-37) f I 
T.C.-(i-37) LIOV-(1-37) .l/vaIve-37 Closed 
F.P. 5 T.C.-(1-37) VII-(l-37) I/T.C.-37 R OV 
F.P 5 T.C,-(1-37) LIFV-(1-37) i/valve"37 Closed
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 5 V-36 LOPV-3 1 R Closed 
V-37 LOPV-4 
V-38 LOPV-5 
V-39 LOPV-6 
V-40 LFPV-3 
V-41 LFPV-4 
V-42 LFPV-5 
V-43 LFPV-6 
C-9 LOFC-2 
C-10 LFFC-2 
V-44 LOFV-2 
V-70 LFFV-2 Ciosed 
T-8 PoT-4 19 PSIA 
T-9 PoT-5 
T-10 PfT-4 
T-11 PfT-5 19 PSIA 
T-8 ToT-4 AMBIENT 
T-9 ToT-5 
T-10 TfT-4 
T-11 TfT-5 AMBIENT 
GOV-1 LG0V-1 Closed 
GOV-1 LGOV-II 
GOV-2 LGOV-2 
GOV-2 LGOV-2I 
GOV-3 LGOV-3 
GOV-3 LGOV-3I 
GFV-I LGFV-I 
GFV-i LGFV-lI 
GFV-2 LGFV-2 
GFV-2 LGFV-21 
GFV-3 LGFV-3 
GFV-3 LGFV-3I 
V-52 LLIV-i 
V-52 LPSV-1 
V-53 LLIV-2 
V-53 LPSV-2 
V-54 LLV-3 
V-54 LPSV-3 
V-55 LFIV-1 
V-55 LPSV-4 
V-56 LFIV-2 
V-56 LPSV-5 
V-57 LFIV-3 
V-57 LPSV-6 Closed 
G-1 VII-38 0V 
G-2 VII-39 OV 
F.P 5 G-3 VII-40 1 R OV 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAM4PLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 	 G-1 LIOV-38 1 R Closed 
G-I LIFV-38
 
G-2 LIOV-39
 
G-2 LIFV-39
 
G-3 	 LIOV-40
 
F.P. 5 G-3 LIFV-40 	 1 R Closed 
Visually verify that all RCS ard OMS protective covers are installed. 
Request vehicle to close all RCS thermal protective doors and confirm.
 
Perform the 	following A/B readiness checks.
 
F.P. 6 GFV-4 LGFV-41 	 1 R Closed 
GFV-4 	 LGFV-4
 
GFV-5 	 LGFV-51
 
GFV-5 	 LGFV-5
 
GFV-6 	 LGFV-61
 
GFV-6 	 LGFV-6
 
Gov-4 	 LGOV-41
 
GOV-4 	 LGOV-4
 
GOV-5 LGOV-51
 
GOV-5 LGOV-5
 
GOV-6 LGOV-61
 
GOV-6 	 LGOV-6
 
V-58 	 LFIV-4
 
V-59 	 LPSV-7
 
V-60 LFIV-5
 
V-61 LPSV-8
 
V-62 	 LFIV-6
 
V-63 	 LPSV-9
 
EFV-1. LEFV-I
 
EFV-2 LEFV-2
 
EFV-3 	 LEFV-3
 
EFV-4 LEFV-4
 
EFV-5 LEFV-5
 
EFV-6 LEFV-6
 
EFV-7 LEFV-7
 
EFV-8 LEFV-8
 
EFV-9 LEFV-9
 
EFV-10 	 LEFV-10
 
EFV-ll 	 LEFV-11
 
EFV-12 	 LEFV-12 Closed
 
PfL-ll 19 PSIA
 
PfL-12 4
 
F.P. 6 	 PfL-13 1 R 19 PSIA 
A/B E.C. - 1.2,3 perform the following readiness checks. 
F.P. 7 FCA-1 LFIVA/B-l 1 R Closed
 
F.P. 7 FCA-l LCPRV-l 	 1 R Closed
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FERRY PREFLIGHT (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT NEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 7 FCA-l LSPV-I 1 R Closed 
IGN-i VITA/B-i OVDC 
FCA-2 LFIVA/B-2 Closed 
FCA-2 LCPRV-2 f 
FCA-2 LSPV-2 Closed 
IGN-2 VIIA/B-2 OVDC 
FCA-3 LFIVA/B-3 Closed 
FCA-3 LCPRV-3 
-
FCA-3 LSPV-3 Closed 
F..P. 7 IGN-3 VIIA/B-3 I R OVDC 
Verify that the turbofan engine cradles are lowered and locked. 
Verify that all turbofan engine covers have been removed.
 
LOAD 
Connect the Propellant Servicing and Pressurization GSE to the appropriate
 
couplings and perform the following status checks:
 
F.P. 	 7 C-I LOFC-l 1 S Open 
C-2 LHC-i 
C-2 LEHC-2
 
C-5 LFFC-l
 
C-8 LHC-7 
C-8 LHC-8 
C-9 LOFC-2 
C-10 LFFC-2 
F.P. 7 	 C-11 LFVC-I 1 S Open 
Open the following valves and verify position.
 
F.P. 	 8 V-7 LOFV-1 1 S Open 
V-3LOIV=3*v-24 LOTVV-I 
FoP. 	 V-25 LOTVV-2 1 S Open 
Command LOX to slow 	transfer mode.
 
Verify operation by 	checking;
 
F.P. 9 	 L-17 ToL-2 I S <200°R 
When
 
F.P. 10 	 T-4 QoT-7 10/Sec C Covered
 
Command LOX helium recirculation on and LOX transfer to fast fill.
 
When
 
F.P. 11 	 T-4 QoT-8 10/Sec C Covered
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command LOX transfer to slow fill, and terminate helium recirculation.
 
When 
FoP. 12 T-4 QoT-9 10/Sec C Covered 
Command LOX transfer to mode hold. 
Verify the following: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
13 
13 
T-4 
L-17 
L-17L-3 
L-4 
L-3 
L-4 
L-7 
ToT-3 
ToL-2 
PoL-2
ToS-I 
ToS-2 
PoS-I 
PoS-2 
PgRL-I 
I 
I 
S 
I 
S 
164+30R 
164+3 0 R 
164+30R 
164+3 0R 
Check for leakage with scan cameras. 
Open V-443 check 
F.P. 14 V-44 LOFV-2 I S Open 
Off-Load the stored helium in T-8 and T-9 
F.P. 
F.P. 
15 
15 
T-8 
T-9 
PoT-4 
POT-5 
I/Sec 
i/Sec 
S 
S 
14.7 PSIA 
14.7 PSIA 
Open V-70; check 
F.P. 16 V-70 LFFV-2 I S Open 
Off-Load the stored helium in T-10 and T-11 
F.P. 
F.P. 
17 
17 
T-10 
T-11 
PfT-4 
PfT-5 
1/Sec 
I/Sec 
S 
S 
14.7 PSIA 
14;7 PSIA 
Load T-8 and T-9 with C02. 
F.P. 
F.r. 
18 
18 
T-8 
T-8 
T-9 
T-9 
PoT-6 
Tol-4I 
Pol-7 
ToT-5 
I/Sec C 
V1500'?SIA 
I/Sec C 
1500 PSIA 
Compute accumulator quantity and send stop signal to the GSE at full load.
 
Close V-44; check
 
F.P 19 V-44 LOFV-2 1 S Closed 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES ,USE VALUE 
Monitor
 
F.P. 	 20 T-8 PoT-6 I/Sec M ,1500 PSIA 
T-8 ToT-4 I 
T-9 PoT-7 	 1500 PSIA
 
F.P. 	 20 T-9 ToT-5 1/Sec M
 
for decay.
 
Load T-10 and T-11 with GH2.
 
FoP. 	 21 T-10 PfT-6 i/Sec C 1500 PSIA 
T-10 TfT-4 
T-11 PfT-7 1500 PSIA4 
F.P. 	 21 T-11 TfT-5 i/Sec C
 
Compute accwmilator quantity and send stop signal to GSE at full load.
 
Close V-70; check
 
F.P. 	 22 V-70 LFFV-2 1 S Closed
 
Monitor,
 
F.P. 23 	 T-10 PfT-6 i/Sec M 1500 PSIA
 
-10 TfT-4II 
.T-. T-11 PfT-7 71 1500 PSIA 
F.P. 	 23 T-11 TfT-5 I/Sec M
 
for decay.
 
Reverify
 
F.P. 24 	 PoL-8 1 S 19 PSIA 
PoL -9
 
PfL-9
 
F.P. 	 24 PfL-10 1 S 19 PSIA
 
Command open; verify
 
F.P. 25 	 V-28 LFTVV-5 1 S Open
V-29 LFTVV-6 I 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
F.P. 	 25 V-31 LFTVV-8 1 S Open
 
Command open; verify
 
F.P. 26 	 V-27 LFIV-4 I S Open
 
f v-14 LFFV-l 	 # #
 
F.P. 26 	 V-26 LFIV-3 I S Open
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FERRY PREFLIGHT 
PHASE STEP 
(Continued) 
ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Commence slow fuel transfer to T-5 and T-6. 
Verify operation by checking; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
27 
1L-21 
27 
L-20 TfL-l 
TfL-4 
TfL-5 
1 
*t 
1 
S 
S 
<50OR 
<500 R 
<50R 
When both 
F.P. 
F.P. 
28 
28 
T-5 
T-6 
QfT-4 
QfT-7 
10/Sec 
10/Sec 
C 
C 
Covered 
Covered 
Command fuel transfer to fast fill 
When 
F.P. 29 T-5 QfT-5 1O/Sec C Covered 
or, 
F.P. 30 T-6 QfT-8 10!Sec C Covered 
Command fuel transfer to slow fill. 
When 
F.P. 31 T-5 QfT-6 10/Sec C Covered 
Or, 
F.P. 32 T-6 QfT-9 10/Sec C Covered 
Command fuel transfer to mode hold when the other one covers, 
or TBD seconds after the first one covers. 
Verify no leakage with compartment detectors. 
Verify safe condition with compartment fire detectors. 
Verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
33 
33 
T-5 
T-6 
L-20 
L-21 
L-8 
L-9 
L-8 
L-9 
TfT-2 
TfT-3 
TfL-l 
TfL-4 
TfS-1 
TfS-2 
PfS-i 
PfS-2 
1 
1 
S 
S 
36-40°R 
36-40OR 
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
Command and verify:
 
F.P. 	 34 V-14 LFFV-1 1 S Closed
 
If
 
F.P. 35 T-4 QoT-9 	 I S Uncovered
 
Command LOX transfer to slow fill.
 
When
 
F.P. 	 36 T-4 QoT-9 10/sec C Covered
 
Command LOX transfer to stop.
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 	 37 V-7 LOFV-l I S Closed
 
If
 
F.P. 	 38 T-5 QfT-6 I S Uncovered
 
and/or
 
F.P. 	 39 T-6 QfT-9 1 S Uncovered
 
Command and verify
 
F.P. 	 40 V-14 LFFV-1 I R Open
 
Command fuel transfer to slow fill.
 
When -
F.P. 	 41 T-5 QfT-6 10/sec C Covered
 
or
 
F.P. 42 T-6 QfT-9 	 10/sec C covered
 
Command fuel transfer to stop when the other covers, or TBD seconds
 
after the first one covers.
 
Command and verify:
 
F.P. 43 V-14 LFFV-l 	 I S Closed
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PHASE STEP 
(Continued) 
ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
PP. 
44 
44 
V-24 
V-25 
V-28 
V-29 
V-30 
V-31 
LOTVV-1 
LOTVV-2 
LFTVV-5 
LFTVV-6 
LFTVV-7 
LFTVV-8 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Pressurization 
Verify 
F.P. 
FtP. 
45 
* 
45 
T-8 
T-9 
T-4 
PoT-6 
PoT-7 
PoT-3 
1 
I 
R 
#4 
R. 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
430 PSIA 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 46 V-33 LOPV-2 I S Open 
Verify 
F.P. 47 T-4 PoT-3 1 S 35-40 PSIA 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 48 V-33 LOPV-2 I S Closed 
Command and verify; 
FoP. 
F.P. 
49 
49 
V-24 
V-25 
LOTWV-I 
LOTVV-2 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Verify; 
F.P. 50 T-4 PoT-3 1 S Ambient 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
51 
51 
V-24 
V-25 
LOTVV-1 
LOTVV-2 
1 
1 
S 
5 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 52 V-32 LOPV-1 1 S Open 
verify; 
F.P. 53 T-4 PoT-3 1 5 35-40 PSIA 
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STEP 
(Continued) 
ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 54 V-32 LOPV-I I S Closed 
Verify; 
F.Po 
F.P. 
55 
55 
T-10 
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-6 
T-11fT-71500 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
I 
S 
S 
1500 PSIA 
PSIA 
<30 PSIA 
<30 PSIA 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 56 V-35 LFPV-2 1 S Open 
Verify: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
57 
57 -
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
35-40 PSIA 
35-40 PSIA 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 58 V-35 LFPV-2 I S Closed 
Command and verify; 
FoP. 
F.P. 
59 
59 
V-28 
V-2-30 
V-31 
LFTVV-5 
LFTVV-6F W -7 
LFTVV-8 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Verify: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
60 
60 
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 61 V-28 
V-30 
LFTVV-5 
LFTVV-7 
I S Closed 
F.P. 61 V-31 LFTVV-8 1 S Closed 
Command & verify; 
F.Po 62 V-34 LFPV-1 1 S Open 
Verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
63 
63 
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
35-40 PSIA 
35-40 PSIA 
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PHASE STEP 
(Continued) 
ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 64 V-34 LFPV-I 1 S Closed 
Monitor: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
4 
65 
4 
65 
T-4 
T-5 
T-6 
PoT-3 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
I/Sec 
+ 
1/Sec 
S 
S 
35-40 PSIA 
35-40 PSIA 
For - minutes for decay 
Command and Verify; 
F.P. 
I 
66 V-32 
V-33
V-34 
LOPV-1 
LOPV-2J
LFPV-I 
1 S Open 
F.P. 66 V-35 LFPV-2 i S Open 
Retract and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
67 
67 
C-I 
C-2 
C-2 
C-5 
C-8 
C-8 
C-9 
C-10 
C-11 
LOFC-1 
LHC-I 
LHC-2 
LFFC-I 
LHC-7 
LC-8 
LOFC-2 
LFFC-2 
LFVC-I 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Commence; 
F.P. 68 T-8 
T-8 
T-9T-9 
PoT-6 
ToT-4 
PoT-7ToT-5 
1/Sec MC 1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
F.P. 68 
T-10 
T-10 
T-11 
T-11 
PfT-6 
TfT-4 
PfT-7 
TfT-5 !/See MC 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
Compute and display quantity on request. 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
FP. 
69 
69 
GOV-I 
COV-2 
GOV-3 
GFV-1 
GFV-2 
GFV-3 
V-52 
LGOV-lI 
LGOV-21 
LGOV-3I 
LGFV-II 
LGFV-2I 
LGFV-31 
LLIV-1 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SANPLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 69 V-53 LLIV-2 	 1 S Open 
V-54 LLIV-3
 
V-55 LFIV-2
 
V-56 LFIV-2
 
F.P. 	 69 V-57 LFIV-3 1 S Open
 
Command the APU shaft clutches to engage on all three sections.
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 	 70 G- VII-38 1 S 28 VDC
 
4 G-2 VII-39 #t
F.P. 	 70 G-3 VII-40 1 S 28 VDC
 
Command & verify;
 
F.P. 	 70 G-1 LIOV-38 1 S Open
 
Initiate igniter spark, verifyj
 
F.P. 	 71 G-1 IIE-38 1 S Pulses
 
F.P. 	 71 G-1 PC-38 1 S
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 	 71 G-1 LIFV-38 1 S Open
 
F.P. 	 71 G-1 PC-38 1 S
 
Command and verify.
 
F.P. 	 72 GOV-I LGOV-1 1 S Open

F.P. 	 72 G-1 PC-38 1 S
 
Command and verify:
 
F.P. 	 73 GFV-I LGFV-l 1 S Open 
F.P. 	 73 G-1 PC-38 1 S
 
Check;
 
F.P. 	 74 G-1 TC-1 I S
 
U-i NT-i 2/Sec C 
PT-i NS-i 1 S 
PT-i QPTL-1 j S 
PT-I PPTL-i S 
FoP. 	 74 PT-i TPTL-l I S
 
When NT-i reaches steady-statelcommand igniter spark off and verify;
 
F.P. 75 G-1 IIE-38 	 1 S 0
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 	 76 G-2 LIOV-39 I S Open
 
Initiate igniter spark, verify
 
F.P. 77 G-2 IIE-39 I S Pulses
 
F.Po 77 G-2 PC-39 I S
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P 78 G-2 LIFV-39 	 1 S Open
 
F.P. 	 78 G-2 PC-39 1 S
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 79 GOV-2 LGOV-2 	 1 S Open 
F.P. 	 79 G-2 PC-39 1 S
 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 80 GFV-2 LGFV-2 	 I S Open 
F.P. 	 80 G-2 PC-39 s
 
Check;
 
F.P. 81 G-2 TC-2 	 1 S 
u-2 NT-2 2/sec C 
PT-2 NS-2 I S 
PT-2 QPTL-2 
PT-2 PPTL-2 
F.P. 	 81 PT-2 TPTL-2 1 S
 
When NT-2 reaches steady-state, command igniter spark off, verify;
 
F.P. 82 G-2 IIE-39 	 1 S 0 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 	 83 G-3 LIOV-40 1 S Open
 
Initiate Igniter Spark, verify;
 
F.P. 84 G-3 IIE-40 	 1 S Pulses
 
F.P. 84 G-3 PC-40 	 I S 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 85 G-3 LIFV-40 	 I S Open
 
F.P. 85 G-3 PC-40 	 1 S 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 86 	 GOV-3 LGOV-3 1 5 Open
 
F.P. 86 	 G-3 PC-40 1 S 
Command and verify;
 
F.P. 87 	 GFV-3 LGFV-3 1 S Open 
F.P. 87 	 G-3 PC-40 1 S 
Check;
 
F.P. 88 	 G-3 TC-3 1 S 
U-3 NT-3 2/Sec C 
PT-3 NS-3 1 S 
PT-3 QPTL-3 I 
PT-3 PPTL-3
F.P. 88 	 PT-3 TPTL-3 1 S 
When NT-3 reaches 	 steady-state, command igniter spark off, verify; 
F.P. 89 	 G-3 IIE-40 1 S 0
 
Commence monitoring:
 
F.P. 	 90 G-1 PC-38 I/Sec M
 
G-1 TC-i 1/Sec
 
U-i NT-I 2/Sec 
PT-I QPTL-I 1/2 sec 
PT-i PPTL-i 1/2 sec 
PT-I TPTL-I 	 1/2 sec
 
PT-i NS-I 1/2 sec
 
G-2 PC-39 I/Sec
 
G-2 TC-2 I/Sec
 
U-2 NT-2 2/Sec
 
PT-2* QPTL-2 1/2 sec
 
PT-2 PPTL-2 1/2 sec
 
PT-2 TPTL-2 1/2 sec
 
PT-2 NS-2 1/2 sec
 
G-3 PC-40 1/Sec
 
G-3 TC-3 I/Sec
 
U-3 NT-3 2/Sec
 
PT-3 QPTL-3 1/2 sec
 
PT-3 PPTL-3 1/2 sec
 
PT-3 TPTL-3 1/2 sec
 
F.P. 90 	 PT-3 NS-3 1/2 sec M
 
91 Connect A/B Ground Start GSE
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FERRY PREFLIGHT 
PHASE STEP 
(Continued) 
ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
92 
92 
V-58 
v-60 
V-62 
V-59 
v-61 
V-63 
LFIV-4 
LFIV-5 
LFIV-6 
LPSV-7 
LPSV-8 
LPSV-9 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 93 G-4 IIE-41 S Pulses 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
94 
94 
GFV-4 
GFV-4 
LGFV-41 
LGFV-4 
1 
i 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
95 
95 
GOV-4 
GOV-4 
LGOV-41 
LGOV-4 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
After TBD seconds, check; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
96 
96 
U-4 
PT-4 
PT-4 
PT-4 
P-7 
NT-4 
PTPL-1 
QTPL-1
TTPL-I 
PPD-7IS 
1 CS 
S 
S.S. 
Terminate spark, verify; 
FoP. 97 G-4 IE-41 1 S 0 
check; 
F.P. 98 P-8 PPD-8 I S <TBD PSIA 
F.P. 98 P-9 PPD-9 1 S <TBD PSIA 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 99 G-5 IIE-42 1 S Pulses 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
100 
100 
GFV-5 
GFV-5 
LGFV-51 
LGFV-5 
1 
I 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify; 
FoP 
F.P. 
101 
101 
GOV-5 
GOV-5 
LGOV-51 
LGOV-5 
I 
I 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
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After TBD seconds, check: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
102 
102 
U-5 
PT-5 
PT-5 
PT-5 
P-8 
NT-5 
PTPL-2 
QTPL-2 
TTPL-2 
PPD-8 
I 
1 
CS 
S 
S 
S.S. 
Terminate spark, verify; 
F.P. 103 G-5 IIE-42 1 S 0 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 104 G-6 IIIE-43 I S Pulses 
Command and verify; 
F.P. 
F.P. 
105 
105 
GFV-6 
GFV-6 
LGFV-61 
LOFV-6 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
106 
106 
GOV-6 
cOV-6 
LGOV-61 
LGOV-6 1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
After TBD seconds, check: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
107 
107 
U-6 
PT-6 
PT-6 
PT-6 
P-9 
NT-6 
PTPL-3 
QTPL-3
TTPL-3 
PPD-9 1 
CS 
S 
S 
S.S. 
Terminate spark, verify; 
F.P. 108 G-6 IIE-43 1 S 0 
Command and verify; 
F.P 109 EFV-l 
EFV-3 
LEFV-1 
LEFV-3 
1 S Open 
FP . 109 EFV-4 LEFV-4 I S Open 
Check: 
F.P. 
FoPo 
110 
110 
PfL-1I 
TfL-6 
1 
1 
SIC 
SC 
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PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Command and verify: 
F.P. il EFV-5 
M-EFV-7 
LEFV-5 
LEYVtF -7 
1 S Open 
F.P. ill EFV-8 LEFV-8 1 S Open 
Check* 
F.P. 
F.P. 
112 
112 
PfL-12 
TfL-7 
1 
1 
SIC 
SIC 
Command and verify; 
F.P 
F.? 
113 EFV-9 LEFV-9 
EFV-10 LEFV-10*EF -11LEFV-11 1 S Open 
F.P. 113 EFV-12 LEFV-12 1 S Open 
Check: 
F.P. 
F.P. 
114 
114 
PfL-13 
TfL-8 
1 
1 
SC 
SC 
Commence monitoring: 
F.P. 
FoP. 
115 
115 
G-4 
G-4 
U-4 
P-7 
G-5 
G-5 
U-5 
P-8 
G-6 
G-6 
U-6 
P-9 
PT-4 
PT-4 
PT-4 
PT-5 
PT-5 
PT-5 
PT-6 
PT-6 
PT-6 
Pc-41 
TC-4 
NT-4 
PPD-7 
Pc-42 
TC-5 
NT-5 
PPD-8 
Pc-43 
TC-6 
NT-6 
PPD-9 
PfL-11 
PfL-12 
PfL-13 
QTPL-1 
PTPL-1 
TTPL-1 
QTPL-2 
PTPL-2 
TTPL-2 
QTPL-3 
PTPL-3 
TTPL-3 
10/Sec 
i/Sec 
5/Sec 
5/Sec 
10/Sec 
1/Sec 
5/Sec 
5/Sec 
10/Sec 
1/Sec 
5/Sec 
5/Sec 
5/Sec 
5/Sec 
5/Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
1/2 Sec 
M 
M 
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP 	 ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command turbofan #1 to start.
 
Activate turbofan 	Ground Start GSE.
 
The engine controller commands 	and verifies:
 
F.P0 116 	 FCA-I LFIVA/B-l I S Open
 
FCA-I NVDVP-l
 
FCA-I PDVDVP-I 
FCA-1 LCPRV-I Open 
FH-i VFH-I 28 VDC 
FH-i IFH-I 
IGN-I VIIA/B-I 28 VDC 
IGN-I III-1 Pulses 
LA-I PLPD-1 
LA-i PSPD-i 
LA-I TSPD-1
 
LA-I QLO-l
 
F.P. 116 	 FM-i FfF-1 1 S
 
When:
 
F.P. 117 	 TF-1 NBPT-1 100/Sec C Nx
 
The engine controller commands 	and verifies:
 
F.P. 118 	 FCA-I LSPV-1 I S Open
 
A/B E.C.-I verifies combustion 	by checking:
 
F.Po 119 	 FD-I FLB-1 A.R. S On 
EoC.-I commences to iuonitor the following for gas path analysis:
 
F.P. 	 120 TF-i PFI-I 100/Sec C
 
TIA-i
 
NF-I
 
NHPT-1
 
FfF-1
 
PHPT-i 
THPT-I 
PED-1 
TED-i
 
TLPTD- I 
TCI-i
 
F.P. 120 	 TF-I PDVDVP-1 100/Sec C 
At steady-state thrust, the engine controller commands and verifies:
 
F.P. 121 	 IGN #1 III-i i S 
 0
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
E.C.-I commenses to monitort
 
F.P. 	 122 LA-i QLO-l 5/Sec
 
LA-I PLPD-1 5/Sec
 
LA-I PSPD-1 5/Sec
 
LA-I TSPD-l 5/Sec
 
LA-1I PG-I 5/Sec
 
FCA-l IFH-1 i/Sec
 
COMP-1 FIC-I 
 1/Sec
 
Command turbofan 2 to start. Activate the turbofan Ground Start GSE
 
B.C. -2 commands and verifies:
 
F.P. 123 	 FCA-2 LFIVA/B-2 1 S Open
 
FCA-2 NVDVP-2
 
FCA-2 PDVDVP-2
 
FCA-2 LCPRV-2 Open
 
FH-2 VFH-2 28 VDC
 
FH-2 IFH-2 
IGN #2 VHIA/B-2 28 VDC
 
IGN #2 111-2 Pulses
 
LA-2 PLPD-2
 
LA-2 PSPD-2
 
LA-2 TSPD-2
 
LA-2 QLO-2
 
F.P. 123 	 FM-2 FfF-2 1 S 
When:
 
F.P. . 124 	 TF-2 NBPT-2 100/Sec C Nx 
The engine controller commands 	and verifies:
 
F.P. 125 	 FCA-2 LSPV-2 1 S Open
 
E.C.-2 verifies combustion by checking:
 
F.P. 126 	 FD-2 FLB-2 A.R. S On 
EoC.-2 commences 	to monitor the following for gas path analysis:
 
F.P. 	 127 TF-2 PFI-2 100/Sec C
 
TIA-2
 
NF-2
 
NHPT-2
 
FfF-2
 
PUPT-2 
THPT-2 
PED-2 
TED-2
 
TLPTD-2
 
TCI-2 
F.P. 127 	 TF-2 PDVDVP-2 100/Sec C
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP 	 ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
At steady-state thrust, E.C.-2 commands and verifies:
 
F.P. 128 	 IGN. #2 111-2 1 S 
 0
 
E.C.-2 Commences to monitor:
 
F.P. 	 129 LA-2 QLO-2 5/Sec M
 
LA-2 PLPD-2
 
LA-2 PSPD-2
LA-2 TSPD-2 
LA-2 PG-2 5/Sec
 
ECA-2 IFH-2 I/Sec
F.P. 19 	 COMP-2 FIC-2 I/Sec M Off 
Command Turbofan 3 to start, activate Ground Start GSE.
 
E.C.-3 commands and verifies:
 
F.P. 	 130 FCA-3 LFIVA/B3 1 S Open
 
FCA-3 NVDVP-3
 
FCA-3 PDVDVP-3 
FCA-3 LCPRV-3 Open 
FH-3 VFH-3 28 VDC 
FH-3 IFH-3 
IGN. #3 VIIA/B-3 	 28 VDC 
IGN. #3 III-3 	 Pulses
 
LA-3 PLPD-3
 
LA-3 PSPD-3
 
LA-3 TSPD-3
 
LA-3 QLO-3
 
F.P. 130 	 FM-3 FfF-3 1 S
 
When:
 
F.P. 131 	 TF-3 NHPT-3 100/Sec C Nx
 
E.C.-3 commands and verifies
 
F.P. 132 	 FCA-2 LSPV-3 1 S Open
 
E.C.-3 verifies combustion by checking:
 
F.P. 133 	 TD-1 FLB-3 A.R. S On 
E.C.-3 commences to monitor the following for gas path analysis:
 
F.P. 134 	 TF-3 PFI-3 100/Sec C
 
TIA-3
 
NF-3
 
NHPT-3
 
FfF-3 
PHPT-3 
THPT-3 
PED-3
 
F.P. 134 	 TF-3 TED-3 100/Sec C 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
F.P. 134 	 TF-3 TLPTD-3 100/Sec C
4 4 	 TCI-344 
Fr. 134 	 TF-3 PDVDVP-3 100/Sec 
 C
 
At steady-state thrust, E.C.#3 commands and verifies:
 
F.P. 135 	 IGN. #3 111-3 1 S 
 0
 
E.C. #3 commences 	to monitor:
 
F.P. 	 136 LA-3 QLO-3 5/Sec M
 
LA-3 PLPD-3
I IA-S PSPD-3 
LA-3 TSPD-3LA-3 PG-3 
FC&-3 IFH-3 I/See 
F.P. 136 	 COMP-3 FIC-3 I/Sec M Off
 
137 St6p and retract Ground Start GSE
 
138 Verify vehicle power buses.
 
Execute power transfer.
 
139 Disconnect Ground Power GSE.
 
D-25
 
FERRY FLIGHT
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Make the following checks while at cruise altitude:
 
F.F. 	 1 V-I LOIV-1 1 S Closed
 
V-2 LOIV-2
 
V-3 LOVV-l
 
v-4 LOVV-2
 
V-5 LOW-3
 
V-6 LOVV-4
 
V-7 LOFV-i
 
V-8 LFIV-1
 
V-9 LFIV-2
 
V-10 LFTVV-l 
V-ll LFTVV-2
 
V-12 LFTVV-3
 
V-13 LFTVV-4
 
V-14 LFFV-l
 
V-19 LOPCV-l
 
V-20 LOPCV-2
 
V-21 LFPCV-l 
V-22 LFPCV-2
 
V-23 LOIV-3
 
V-24 LOTVV-1
 
V-25 LOTVV-2
 
V-26 LFIV-3
 
V-27 LFIV-4
 
V-28 LFTVV-5
 
V-29 LFTVV-6
 
V-30 LFTVV-7 Closed
 
V-31 LFTVV-8 Closed
 
V-32 LOPV-1 Open
 
V-33 LOPV-2
 
V-34 LFPV-l
 
V-35 LFPV-2 Open 
C-i LOFC-1 Closed 
C-2 LHC-I,2
 
C-3 LFTVC-l
 
C-4 LHC-3, 4 
C-5 LFFC-1
 
C-6 LHC-5,6 
C-8 LHC-7,8
 
F 0 F. 1 	 C-1i LFVC-1 1 S Closed 
Monitor:
 
F.F. 	 2 T-1 PoT-i I/min M 19 PSIA 
T-2 PoT-2 I/min 19 PSIA 
T-3 PfT-1 I/min 19 PSIA 
L-17 PoL-2 I/min 
L-20 PfL-I I/min 
L-21 PfL-4 I/min 
L-17 ToL-2 I/min 
F.F. 2 	 L-20 TfL-i I/min M 
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FERRY FLIGHT (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
F.F. 2 L-21 
T-4 
T-5 
TfL-4 
ToT-3 
TfT-2 
I/min. 
1/10 sec. 
1110 sec. 
F.F. 2 
T-6 
T-4 
T-4 
T-4 
T-5 
T-5 
T-5 
T-6 
T-6 
T-6 
TfT-3 
QoT-7 
QoT-8 
QoT-9 
QfT-4 
QfT-5 
QfT-6 
QfT-7 
QfT-8 
QfT-9 
1/10 sec. 
1/sec. 
1/sec. M 
Until Uncovered 
Until Uncovered 
Monitor: 
F.F. 3 T-8 
T-8 
T-9T-9 
PoT-6 
ToT-4 
PoT-7
ToT-5 
I/see MC 
M 
M,CM 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
T-10 
T-10 
PfT-6 
TfT-4 MC M 
1500 PSIA 
F.F. 
T-11 PfT-7 
TfT-5 1T-1I/sec 
MHC 
M 
1500 PSIA 
Compute and display accumulator quantity on request. 
Continue to monitor: 
F.F 0 4 G-1 
G-1 
U-i 
PT-I 
PT-I 
PT-I 
PT-i 
G-2 
G-2 
U-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
G-3 
G-3 
U-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PC-38 
TC-1 
NT-i 
QPTL-I 
PPTL-
TPTL-1 
NS-1 
PC-39 
TC-2 
NT-2 
QPTL-2 
PPTL-2 
TPTL-2 
NS-2 
PC-40 
TC-3 
NT-3 
QPTL-3 
PPTL-3 
I/sec 
1/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/sec 
I/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
12 sec 
1/2 sec 
I/sec 
I/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
172 sec 
M 
F.F. 4 
PT-3 
PT-3 
TPTL-3 
NS-3 
1/2 
1/2 
sec 
sec M 
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FERRY FLIGHT (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
When: 
F.F. 5 T-8 PoT-6 1/sec C 1500-X PSIA 
Or:
 
F.F. 	 6 T-9 PoT-7 I/sec C 1500-X PSIA
 
Verify:
 
F.F. 7 	 V-52 LLIV-1 I S Open
 
FtP.V-53 LLIV-2 	 # 
F:F 	 7 V-54 LLIV-3 1 S Open
 
Command and verify:
 
F.F. 	 8 V-52 LPSV-1 1 S Op;n
 
4 V-53 LPSV-2tt
 
Ft. 8 V-54 LPSV-3 1 S Open
 
Engage the clutches to P-i, P-2, P-3.
 
During G02 resupply monitor the following additional parameters:
 
F.F. 	 9 P-I PPD-I 2/sec M 1500 PSIA 
H-4 THE-I 1/2 sec 
H-4 PHEO-l 1/2 sec 1500 PSIA 
P-2 PPD-2 2/sec 1500 PSIA 
H-5 THE-2 1/2 sec 
11-5 PHEO-2 1/2 sec 1500 PSIA 
P-3 PPD-3 2/sec 1500 PSIA 
1-6 THE-3 1/2 sec 
F.F. 9 	 1-6 PHEO-3 1/2 sec M 1500 PSIA
 
When: 
FF. 10 T-8 PoT-6 1/sec C 1500 PSIA 
F.F. 	 10 T-9 PoT-7 i/sec C 1500 PSIA
 
Disengage clutches to P-1, P-2, and P-3.
 
Discontinue Resupply monitors.
 
Command and verify: 
FoF. 11 V-52 LPSV-I I s Closed 
V-53 LPSV-2 #t1t 
F1?. 11 V-54 LPSV-3 1 S Closed 
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FERRY FLIGHT (Continued) EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAM1PLES USE VALUE 
When:
 
F.F. 12 T-10 PfT-6 1/sec C 1500-Z-PSIA
 
Or: 
F.F. 13 T-I PfT-7 I/sec C 1500-Z-PSIA
 
Verify:
 
Fy 14 V-55 LFIV-1 1 S Open
 
It It V-56 LFIV-2 	 It4 
F.F. 	 14 V-57 LFIV-3 1 Open
 
Command and verify:
 
F.F 15 V-55 LPSV-4 1 	 Open 
It* V-56 LPSV-5 	 I + 
F.F. 	 15 V-57 LPSV-6 1 Open
 
Engage clutches to P-4, P-5, and P-6.
 
During GH2 resupply monitor the following additional parameters:
 
F.F. 16 P-4 PPD-4 2/sec M 1500 PSIA
 
H-7 THE-4 1/2 sec
 
H-7 PHEO-4 -172 sec -1500 PSIA
 
P-5 PPD-5 2/sec 1500 PSIA
 
H-8 THE-5 1/2 sec
 
H-8 PHEO-5 172 sec 	 1500 PSIA 
P-6 PPD-6 2/sec 1500 PSIA
 
I{-9 THE-6 1/2 sec
 
F.F. 16 1-9 PHEO-6 1/2 sec M 1500 PSIA 
When:
 
F.F. 17 T-10 PfT-6 I/sec C 1500 PSIA
 
F.F. 	 17 T-11 PfT-7 i/sec C 1500 PSIA 
Disengage clutches to P-4, P-5, and P-6. 
Discontinue resupply monitors. 
Command and verify: 
F.F. 18 V-55 LPSV-4 	 1 S Closed
 
It V-56 LPSV-5 	 I It
 
F.F. 18 V-57 LPSV-6 	 1 S Closed 
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FERRY FLIGHT (Continued)
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Continue to monitor: 
F.F. 19 G-4 
G-4 
U-4 
P-7 
G-5 
G-5 
U-5 
P-8 
G-6 
G-6 
U-6 
P-9 
PT-4 
PT-4 
PC-41 
TC-4 
NT-4 
PPD-7 
PC-42 
TC-5 
NT-5 
IPD-8 
PC-43 
TC-6 
NT-6 
PPD-9 
PRL-li 
Pft-12 
PfL-13 
QTPL-i 
PTPL-1 
10/sec 
I/see 
5/sec 
5/sec 
10/sec 
1/sec 
5/sec 
5/sec 
1O/sec 
I/see 
5/sec 
5/sec 
5/sec 
5/sec 
5/sec 
1/2 sec 
M 
PT-4 
PT-5 
PT-5 
PT-5 
TTPL-I 
QTPL-2 
PTPL-2 
TTPL-2 
PT-6 
PT-6 
QTPL-3 
PTPL-3 
F.F. 19 PT-6 TTPL-3 1/2 sec M 
E.C. #1 continues to perform gas path analysis: 
F.F. 20 TF-I PFI-I 
TIA-I 
NF-1 
100/sec C 
NBPT-I 
FfF-I 
PHPT-l 
THPT-I 
PED-I 
TED-I 
TLPTD-1 
TC-I 
F.F. 20 TF-I PDVDVP-1 100/sec C 
E.G. #1 continues to monitor: 
F.F. 21 LA-i 
I 
QLO-I 
PLPD-1
PSPD-I 
TSPD-I 
5/sec M 
F.F, 21 
LA-I 
FCA-i 
CO2-1 
PG-I 
IFH-I 
FIC-i 
5/sec 
I/see 
i/sec N OFF 
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FERRY FLIGHT (Continued)
 
EXPECTK
 
PHASE 	 STEP ELEMENT MXASURMNT SANPLES USE VALUE 
E.C. #2 continues to perform gas path analysis:
 
F.F. 	 22 TF-2 PFI-2 100/sec C
 
TIA-2
 
NF-2
 
NHPT-2
 
FfF-2
 
PHPT-2
 
THPT-2
 
PED-2
 
TED-2
 
TLPTD-2
 
TCI-2
 
F.F. 22 TF-2 	 PDVDVP-2 100/sec C
 
E.C. #2 continues to monitor:
 
F.F. 23 LA-2 	 QLO-2 5/sec M 
I IPLPD-2 
PSPD-2
 
TSPD-2
 
LA-2 PG-2 5/sec
 
FCA-2 IFH-2 i/sec
 
F.F. 23 COMP-2 	 FIC-2 1/sec M off
 
E.C. #3 continues to perform gas path analysis:
 
F.F. 24 TF-3 	 FFI-3 100/sec C 
TIA-3 
NF-3
 
NHPT-3
 
FfF-3
 
PHPT-3
 
TBPT-3
 
PED-3
 
TED-3 
TLPTD-3 
TCI-3 
F.Fo 24 TF-3 PDVDVP-3 100/sec C 
E.C. #3 continues to monitor: 
F.F. 	 25 LA-3 QLO-3 5/sec M 
I PLPD -3 
PSPD-3 
TSPD-3
I I 
LA-3 PG-3 5/sec 
FCA-3 IFH-3 1/sec 
F.F. 25 COMP-2 	 FIC-3 i/sec M OFF 
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FERRY APPROACH & LANDING
 
1. Continue to monitor as in steps 2, 3, 4, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25
 
of Ferry Flight.
 
2. After landing, taxi to revetment area.
 
Command & verify:
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
FAL 3 	 V-59 LPSV-7 I S Closed
 
V-58 LFIV-4
 
V-61 LPSV-8
V-60 LFIV-5 
I V-63 LPSV-9 
L V-62 LFIV-6 I S Closed 
Command and verify:
 
FAL 	 4 G-4 VII-41 1 S OVDC 
I G-5 VII-42 4 4 
FAL 4 	 G-6 VII-43 I S OVDC 
Command and verify:
 
PAL 5 	 GOV-4 LGOV-4 1 S Closed
 
GOV-4 LGOV-41
 
GFV-4 LGFV-4
 
GFV-4 LGFV-41
 
GOV-5 LGOV-5
 
GOV-5 LGOV-51
 
GFV-5 LGFV-5
 
GFV-5 LGFV-51
 
GOV-6 LGOV-6
 
GOV-6 LGOV-61
 
GFV-6 LGFV-6 
FAL 5 	 GFV-6 LGFV-61 1 S Closed
 
Discontinue monitoring steps 2, 3, and 19 of Ferry Flight.
 
E.C.-1 commences monitoring.
 
FAL 6 	 FD-I FLB-I 10/sec MC On
 
E.C.-I Checks 
PAL 7 TF-I TTB-1 25/sec M 
For TBD Seconds 
When 
FAL 8 PfL-Il 5/sec C <TBD 
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FERRY APPROACH & LANDING (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
E.C.-I commands and verifies T.F.-l shutdown
 
FAL 9 FCA-l LFIV A/B-i I S Closed 
FCA-I LCPRV-l Closed
 
FH-I VFH-I OVDC
FCA- LSPV-I 1 S Closed 
All engine assemblies are stopped. 
When 
FAL 10 FD-I FLB-1 10/sec C Off 
Command and verify: 
FAL 11 EFV-I LEFV-I 1 S Closed4 EFV-2 LEPV-24
 
MF-3 LEFV-3PAL 11 EFV-4 LEFV-4 1 S Closed
 
E.C.-l discontinues monitoring steps 20 and 21 of Ferry Flight and step 6
 
of Ferry Approach and Landing.
 
E.C.-2 commences monitoring
 
FAL 12 FD-2 FLB-2 10/sec MC On
 
E.O.-2 checks
 
FAL 13 TF-2 TTB-2 25/sec M
 
For TBD seconds.
 
When
 
FAL 14 PfL-12 5/sec C <TBD
 
E.C.-2 commands and verifies T.F.-2 shutdown
 
FAL 15 FCA-2 LFIV A/B-2 1 S Closed

F0A-2 LCPRV-2 I Closed 
FH-2 VFH-2 OVDC 
PAL 15 FCA-2 LSPV-2 I S Closed 
All engine assemblies are stopped. 
When 
JAL 16 FD-2 FLB-2 10/sec C Off 
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FERRY APPROACH & LANDING (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SANPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
FAL 17 	 EFV-5 LEFV-5 I S Closed 
EFV-6 LEPV-6 
F~ 7 EFV-8 LEFV-8 	 1 S Closed 
E.C.-2 discontinues monitoring steps 22 and 23 or Ferry Flight and 12 of 
Ferry Approach and Landing. 
E.C.-3 commences monitoring 
FAL 18 FD-3 FLB-3 10/sec MC On 
E.C.-3 checks 
FAL 19 FT-3 TTB-3 25/sec M 
for TBD siconds 
When 
FAL 20 PfL-13 5/sec C -<TBD 
E.C.-3 commands and verifies T.F.-3 shutdown. 
FAL 21 FCA-3 LFIV A/B-3 1 S Closed4 
 FCA-3 LCPRV-3 Closed 
FH-3 VFH-3 OVDC 
FAL 21 FCA-3 LSPV-3 1 S Closed 
All engine assemblies are stopped.
 
When 
PAL 22 FD-3 FLB-3 10/sec C Off 
Command and verify: 
FAL 23 EFV-9 LEFV-9 I S Closed 
PAL 
4, 
23 
EFV-10 
EPV-11. 
EFV-12 
LEFV-10 
LEFV-11 
LEFV-12 I S 
I 
Closed 
E.C.-3 discontinues monitoring steps 24 and 25 of Ferry Flight and 18 of
 
Ferry Approach and Landing.
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POSTFLIGHT-FERRY
 
1. Tow the Orbiter into revetment. Chock and tie-down.
 
2. Connect Ground Power GSE.
 
3. Execute power transfer to Ground Power GSE.
 
4. Continue to monitor step 4 of Ferry Flight until the APU shutdown
 
command is received.
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMNT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Upon receipt of APU shutdown command
 
Command and verify: 
P-F 5 G-1 VII-38 1 S OVDC 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 6 
 GOV-I LGOV-l 1 S Closed 
P-F 6 G-1 PC-38 1 S 
Command and verify: 
P-F 7 GFV-l LGFV-1 1 S Closed 
P-F 7 G-i PC-38 1 S 
Command and verify: 
P-F 8 G-1 LIOV-38 1 S Closed 
P-F 8 G-1 PC-38 1 S 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 9 G-1 LIFV-38 1 S Closed
 
P-F 9 G-1 PC-38 1 S 
Disengage the clutch to APU-1.
 
Command and verify: 
F-F 10 GOV-1 LGOV-1I I S Closed* GFV-l LGFV-I j 
V-52 LLIV-I
 
P-F 10 V-55 LFIV-I 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 11 G-2 VII-39 1 S OVDC 
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POSTFLIGHT-FERRY 
PHASE STEP 
(Continued) 
ELEMENT EASUREENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
12 
12 
GOV-2 
G-2 
LGOV-2 
PC-39 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
13 
13 
GFV-2 
G-2 
LGFV-2 
PC-39 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
14 
14 
G-2 
G-2 
LIOV-39 
PC-39 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
15 
15 
G-2 
G-2 
LIFV-39 
PC-39 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Disengage the clutch to APU-2.-
Command and verify: 
P-F 16 GOV-2 
PF 4 CGFV-2 
V-53 
P-F 16 V-56 
LGOV-21 
LGFV'-21II 
LLIV-2 
LFIV-2 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 17 G-3 VII-40 1 S OVDC 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
18 
18 
GOV-3 
G-3 
LGOV-3 
PC-40 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
19 
19 
GFV-3' 
G-3 
LGFV-3 
PC-40 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
20 
20 
G-3 
G-3 
LIOV-40 
PC-40 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
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POSTFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELENENT NEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
P-F 21 G-3 LIFV-40 1 S Closed 
P-F 21 G-3 PC-40 1 5 
Disengage the clutch to APU-3. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 22 GOV-3 LGOV-31 1 S Closed 
V-54 LLIV-3 
P-F 22 V-57 LFIV-3 1 S Closed 
23. 	Perform the checks of step la of Ferry Flight.
 
24. Take a status sample of the parameters of step lb of Ferry Flight
 
Check:
 
P-F 25 PoL-8 1 S 19 PSIA 
P-F IPoL-9 
PfL-9 	 9'P-F 25 	 PfL-10 1 S 19 PSIA 
26. 	Remove tape and hard copy, if any.
 
Debrief crew as required.
 
Review in-flight data and fault-isolation output.
 
27. Inspect all subsystems for mechanical disorders.
 
PURGE
 
Connect Drain and Purge GSE and verify status of the following couplings:
 
P-F 	 28 C-1 LOFC-I 1 S Open
 
C-2 LHC-I,2
 
0-3 LFTVC-I 
C-4 LHC-3,4
 
0-5 LFFC-l 
C-6 LHC-5,6 
C-8 LHC-7,8
 
C-9 LOFC-2 
C-10 LYFC-2 
P-F 28 C-li LFVC-l 1 S Open 
Also connect purge GSE to the main oxidizer and on-orbit oxidizer tank
 
vents.
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POSTFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
29 
29 
V-32+V-33 
V-34 
V-35 
LOPV-I 
LOPV-2 
LFPV-l 
LFPV-2 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 30 V-70 LFFV-2 1 S Open 
When GSE indicates P ambient at C-10, repressure with helium thru C-10 until 
P-F 
P-F 
31 
31 
T-10 
T-11 
PfT-6 
PfT-7 
I/sec 
I/sec 
MC 
MC 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
Command GSE to hold. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 31a V-70 LFFV-2 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 32 V-14 LFFV-I 1 S Open 
Pressurize T-3 with helium thru C-4. 
When: 
P-F 33 T-3 PfT-1 I/sec MC 35 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
34 
34 
V-8 
V-9 
V-26 
V-27 
V-34 
V-35 
LFIV-l 
LFIV-2fI 
LFIV-3 
LFIV-4 
LFPV-I 
LFPV-2 
1 
I 
S 
5 
Open 
Open 
After 9 minutes, command GSE to open vent on C-8 for I minute. 
Command purge of L-8,9 through main engines for 3 minutes. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
P-F 
35 
35 
V-28 
V-29 
V-30 
V-31 
LFTVV-5 
LFTVV-6II 
LFTVV-7 
LFTVV-8 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
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POSTFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREDENT AMPLES USE VALUE 
Purge out through C-II for 1 minutes 
Command and verify: 
P-F 36 V-34 LFPV-1 1 S Closed 
P-F 36 V-35 LFPV-2 1 S Closed
 
Stop helium purge from C-3.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 37 V-10 LFTVV-1 1 S -Open 
V-1 LFTVV-2 
P-F 4 V-12 LFTVV-337 V-13 LFTVV-4 1S Open 
Reverse purge from 0-5 out through C-3 and C-li for 10 minutes. During
 
this time configure the main engines and command and verify:
 
P-F 38 V-21 LFPCV-l 1 S Open

P-F 38 V-22 LFPCV-2 1 S Open
 
To purge the H2 autogenous lines out through 0-3.
 
Return the main engines to initial conditions and command and verify:
 
P-F 39 V-21 LFPCV-l 1 S Closed
 
P-F 39 V-22 LFPCV-2 1 S Closed
 
Reduce helium pressure to 20 PSIA and command and verify, in sequence:
 
P-F 40 V-10 LFTVV-l I 5 Closed
 
V-lb LFTVV-2 
V-12 LFTVV-3 
V-13 LFTVV-4 
V-8 LFIV-l 
V-9 LFIV-2 
V-26 LFIV-3
 
V-27 LFIV-4
 
V-14 LFFV-l Closed
 
T-3 PfT-I 
- 20 PSIA 
P-F 40 PfL-2 I S 20 PsIA 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 41 V-44 LOFV-2 1 S Open
 
When GSE at C-9 indicates P = ambient, repressurize the C-9 with helium until
 
P-F 42 T-8 PoT-6 i/sec- M,C 1500 PSIA
 
P-F 42 T-9 PoT-7 I/sec MC 1500 PSIA
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PO STFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PEA SE STEP ELEENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLE S USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
P-F 43 V-44 LOFV-2 I S Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-F 44 V-7 LOFV-l 1 S Open 
Pressurize T-l & T-2 through C-6 with helium, 
When: 
P-F 45 T-i PoT-I _iL9c MC 35 PSA 
P-F 45 T-2 PoT-2 1/sec MC 35 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
P-F 46 V-i LOIV-I 1 S Open 
V-23 LOIV-2 
P-FV-3 LOIV-3 
V-32 LOPV-1
 
PF 46 V-33 LOPV-2 1 S Open 
Purge for 10 minutes. After 5 minutes configure the main engines to 
purge L-3,4 down through the engines for 3 minutes, then return the 
engines to initial conditions. 
After 9 minutes Command and verify: 
P-F 47 V-24 LOTVV-l I S Open 
P-F 47 V-25 LOTVV-2 I S Open 
And open the vent on C-2 for 1 minute. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 48 V-32 LOPV-1 1 S Closed 
P-F 48 V-33 LOPV-2 1 S Closed 
Terminate purge from C-6. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 
I 
49 V-3 
V-4 
LOVV-1 
LOVV-2 
1 
-
S Open 
V-5 LOW-3 
P­ 49 V-6 LOw-4 1 S Open 
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P0 STFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PEASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Reverse purge at 35 PSIA from C-I out through the main oxidizer vent.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 50 V-19 LOPCV-I I S Open
 
P-F 50 V-20 LOPCV-2 I S Open 
And configure the main engines to purge the oxidizer autogenous lines. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 51 V-19 LOPCV-I I S Closed
 
P-F 51 V-20 LOPCV-2 1 S Closed
 
And return the main engines to initial conditions.
 
Reduce the helium pressure to 20 PSIA and command and verify in sequence:
 
P-F 52 V-3 LOVV-I I S Closed 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V-5 LOVV-3 
v-6 LOVV-4 
V-I LOIV-1 
V-2 LOIV-2 
V-23 LOIV-3 
V-7 LOFV-I Closed 
T-1 PoT-I 20 PSIA 
P-F 5 PoL-l 1 S 20 PSIA 
Command GSE to hold. 
Command and verify: 
P-F 53 GOV-I LGOV-II S Open 
GOV-I LGOV-l 
GFV-l LGFV-II 
GFV-l LGFV-I 
G-1 LIOV-38 
G-1 LIFV-38 
COV-2 LGOV-21 
GOV-2 LGOV-2 
GFV-2 LGFV-21 
GFV-2 LGFV-2 
G-2 LIOV-39 
G-2 LIFV-39 
GOV-3 LGOV-31 
GOV-3 LGOV-3 
GFV-3 LGFV-31 
GFV-3 LGFV-3 
G-3 LIOV-40 
P-F 53 G-3 LIFV-40 1 Open 
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PO STFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLE S USE VALUE 
54. After 2 seconds command and verify all the valves of the previous step
 
closed.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 55 GOV-4 LGOV-4I S Open 
GOV-4 LGOV-4 
GFV-4 LGFV-41 
GFV-4 LGFV-4 
GOV-5 LGOV-5I 
GOV-5 LGOV-5 
GFV-5 LGFV-5I 
GFV-5 LGFV-5 
GOV-6 LGOV-61 
GOV-6 LGOV-6 
GFV-6 LGFV-61 
P-F 55 GFV-6 LGFV-6 1 S Open 
56. After 2 seconds command and verify all the valves of the previous step
 
closed.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 57 	 V-70 LFFV-2 1 S Open 
When GSE at C-10 indicates P = ambient,
 
Command and verify-

P-F 58 	 V-55 LFIV-l 1 S Open
V-55 LPSV-4 
V-56 LFIV-2 
V-56 LPSV-5V-57 LFIV-3 
P-F 58 	 V-57 LPSV-6 1 S Open
 
Purge for 2 minutes from C-lI out through C-10.
 
Reduce the purge pressure to 19 PSIA and command and verify in sequence: 
P F 59 	 V-70 LFFV-2 1 S Closed
 
V-55 LFIV-1
 
V-55 LPSV-4
 
V-56 LFIV-2
 
V-56 LPSV-5
 
V-57 LFIV-3
 
V-57 LPSV-6 Closed
 
T-10 PfT-4 19 PSIA
 
P-F 59 T-11 PfT-5 1 S 19 PSIA
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POSTFLIGHT-FERRY (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELENT MEASUREMENT SANPLES USE VALUE 
Increase purge pressure at C-Il to 35 PSIA.
 
Command and verify: 
P-F 60 	 V-58 LFIV-4 S Open 
V-59 LPSV-7 
V-60 LFIV-5 
V-61 LPSV-8
 
V-62 LFIV-6 
V-63 LPSV-9 
EFV-1 LEFV-1
 
EFV-2 LEFV-2
 
EFV-3 LEFV-3 
EFV-4 LEFV-4
 
EFV-5 LEFV-5 
EFV-6 LEFV-6
 
EFV-7 LEFV-7
 
EFV-8 LEFV-8
 
EFV-9 LEFV-9
 
EFV-10 LEFV-10
 
EFV-lO LEFV-I
 
P-P 60 	 EFV-12 LEFV-12 1SOpen
 
The turbofan engine controllers command and verify:
 
P-F 61 FCA-l LFIV A/B-i 1 S Open 
FCA-I LCPRV-l 
FCA-I LSPV-1 
FCA-2 LFIV A/B-2-
FCA-2 LCPRV-2 
FCA-2 LSPV-2 
FCA-3 LFIV A/B-3 
FCA-3 LCPRV-3 
P-F 61 	 FCA-3 LSPV-3 S Open
 
Purge for 5 minutes.
 
Reduce the purge pressure to 19 PSIA.
 
62. 	 The A/B engine controllers command and verify closed the valves of
 
step 61 in reverse order to which they were opened.
 
63. 	 Command and verify the valves of step 60 closed in reverse order to
 
which they were opened.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 64 	 V-28 LFTVV-5 1 S Closed 
V-30 LFTVW-7 
P-F 64 V-31 LFTVV-8 1 S closed 
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POSTFLIGHT-PERRY 	(Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
Terminate purge from C-I.
 
Verify:
 
P-F 65 T-5 PfT-2 S 19 PSIA 
P-F 65 T-6 PfT-3 1 5 19 PSIA 
Attach A/B engine 	covers.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-P 66 	 V-44 LOFV-2 1 Open 
When GSE indicates P - ambient at C-9.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-F 67 V-52 LLIV-1 I S OpenI V-52 LPSV-1 
V-53 LLIV-2 
V-53 LPSV-2
 
V-54 LLIV-3
 
P-F 67 	 V-54 LPSV-3 1 S Open 
Purge for 2 minutes from the on-orbit oxidizer vent out through C-9.
 
Reduce the purge pressure to 19 PSIA.
 
Command and verify in sequence:
 
P-F 68 	 V-44 LOFV-2 1S Cls
 
V-52 LLIV-1
 
V-52 LPSV-1
 
V-53 LLIV-2
 
V-53 LPSV-2
 
V-54 LLIV-3
 
V-54 LPSV-3
 
V-24 LOTVV-I
 
P-F 68 	 V-25 LOTVV-2 I S Closed 
Terminate purge from on-orbit oxidizer vent.
 
Verify:
 
P-F 69 	 T-4 PoT-3 1, S 19 PSTA
 
70. Complete main engine purge. 	 k 
Secure and disconnect the Drain and Purge GSE.
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POSTFLIGHT-PERRY (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLE S USE VALUE 
P-F 71 C-i LOFC-1 I S Closed 
C-2 LHC-1,2 
6-3 LFTVC-l1 
0-4 LHC-3,4 
C-5 LFFC-1 
C-6 LHC-5,6 
C-8 LHC-7,8 
C-9 LOFC-2 
0-10 LFFC-2 
P-F 71 C-If LFVC-l 1 S Closed 
Purge complete.
 
Mechanically lock V-1, 2, 8, 9, 23, 26, 27.
 
Power down the MPS.
 
Verify:
 
P-F 72 V-1 LOIV-l I S Closed
 
V-2 LOIV-2
 
V-8 LFIV-I 
V-9 LFIV-2
 
V-23 LOIV-3
 
V-26 LFIV-3
 
P-F 72 V-27 LFIV-4 I S Closed
 
Input flight data to processing system for trend analysis, performance
 
evaluation, and/or maintenance report.
 
Power down OCMS.
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MAINTENANCE 
1. Tow the orbiter to the maintenance area.
 
2. Perform maintenance as required per maintenance procedures of
 
Appendix C, MCR-70-306, Issue 3.
 
OCMS is powered up, self-checked, and used for retest.
 
Verify; EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
M 3 	 V-i LOIV-I I S Closed 
V-2 LOIV-2 
V-3 LOW-I
 
V-4 LOVV-2
 
V-5 LOVV-3
 
V-6 LOVV-4
 
V-7 LOFV-i
 
V-8 LFIV-1
 
V-9 LFIV-2
 
V-10 LFTVV-i
 
V-I LFTVV-2
 
V-12 LFTVV-3
 
V-13 LFTvv-4
 
V-14 LFFV-1
 
V-19 LOPCV-l
 
V-20 LOPCV-2
 
V-21 LFPCV-l
 
V-22 LFPCV-2
 
V-23 LOIV-3
 
V-24 LOTVV-l
 
V-25 LOTVV-2
 
V-26 LFIV-3
 
V-27 LFIV-4
 
V-28 LFTVV-5
 
V-29 LFTVV-6
 
V-30 LFTVV-1
 
V-31 LFTVV-8
 
V-32 LOPV-1
 
V-33 LOPV-2
 
V-34 LFPV-l
 
V-35 LFPV-2
 
C-I LOFC-l
 
C-2 LHC-I, 2 
C-3 LFTVC-1 
c-4 LHC-3, 4 
C-5 LFFC-1
 
c-6- LHC-5, 6
 
C-8 LHC-7, 8 
C-11 LFVC-I Closed 
T-3 PfT-1 19 PSIA 
T-5 PfT-2 	 + 
M 3 	 T-6 PfT-3 1 S 19 PSIA 
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MAINTENANCE (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
M 3 T- PoT-I 1 S 19 PSIA 
T-2 PoT- 2II 
T-4
L-20L-21 
PoT-3PfL-IPfL-4 I 
H 3 L-17 PoL-2 1 S 19 PSIA 
Verify: 
M 4 PoL-8 
P oL-9III 
1 S 19 PSIA 
PfL-9 
M 4 PfL-1O I S 19 PS 
Verify: 
M 5 V-36 LOPV-3 1S Closed 
V-37 LOPV-4 
V-38 LOPV-5 
V-39 LOPV-6 
V-40 LFPV-3 
V-41 LFPV-4 
V-42 LFPV-5 
V-43 LFPV-6 
V-44 LOFV'-2 
V-70 LFFV-2 
0-9 LOFC-2 
C-10 LFFC-2 Closed 
T-8 PoT-4 19 PSIA 
T-9 PoT-5 
T-10 PfT-4 
M 5 T-11 PfT-5 1 S 19 PSIA 
Verify: 
M 6 GOV-I LGOV-II 1 S Closed 
COY-i LGOV-1 
GOV-2 LGOV-2 
GOV-2 LGOV-21 
GOV-3 LGOV-3 
GOV-3 LGOV-31 
GFV-i LGFV-i 
GFV-I LGFV-lI 
GFV-2 LGFV-2 
GFV-2 LGFV-21 1z 
GFV-3 LGFV-3 
GFV-3 LGFV-31 
V-52 LLIV-i 
M 6 V-52 LPSV-1 I S Closed 
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MAINTENANCE (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
6 V-53 LPSV-2 I- S Closed 
V-53 LLIV-1 
V-54 LLIV-3 
V-54 LPSV-3 
V-55 LFIV-1 
V-55 LPSV-4 
V-56 LFIV-2 
V-56 LPSV-5 
V-57 LFIV-3 
V-57 LPSV-6 
G-I LIOV-38 
G-I LIFV-38 
G-2 LIOV-39 
G-2 LIFV-39 
G-3 LIOV-40 
M 6 G-3 LIFV-40 1 S Closed 
Verify: 
M 7 GFV-4 LGFV-41 1 S Closed 
GFV-4 LGFV-4 
GFV-5 LGFV-51 
GFV-5 LGFV-5 
GFVC6 LGFV-61 
GFV-6 LGFV-6 
GOV-4 LGOV-41 
GOV-4 LGOV-4 
GOV-5 LGOV-5I 
GOV-5 LGOV-5 
GOV-6 LGOV-61 
GOV-6 LGOV-6 
V-58 LFIV-4 
V-59 LPSV-7 
V-60 LFIV-5 
V-61 LPSV-8 
V-62 LFIV-6 
V-63 LPSV-9 
EFV-l LEFV-. 
EFV-2 LEFV-2 
EFV-3 LEFV-3 
EFV-4 LEFV-4 
EFV-5 LEFV-5 
EFV-6 LEFV-6 
EFV-7 LEFV-7 
EFV-8 LEFV-8 
EFVP9 LEFV-9 
EFV-10 LEFV-10 
EFV-11 LEFV-1l 
EFV-12 LEFV-12 Closed 
PfL-1l 19 PSIA 
PfL-12 19 PSIA 
M 7 PfL-13 1 S 19 PSIA 
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MAINTENANCE (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT- MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
The A/B engine controllers shall verify the following: 
M 8 FCA-1 LFIVAB-l 1 S 
FCA-I LCPRV-l 
FCA-l LSFV-I 
FCA-2 LFIVA/B-2 
ECA-2 LCPRV-2 
FCA-2 LSPI-2 
FCA-3 LFIVA/B-3 
FCA-3 LCPRV-3 
M 8 FCA-3 LSPV-3 1 S 
Retract the engine cradles.
 
V.A.B. MATE 
1. Repeat step K-3.
 
2. Verify the following:
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SANPLES USE 
V.A.B. 	 2 T-3 TfT-l S 
T-5 TfT-2 
T-6 TfT-3 
T-1 ToT-I
 
T-2 ToT-2
T-4 TOT-3 
T-3 QfT-1 

T-3 QfT-2 
T-3 QfT-3 
T-5 QfT-4
 
T-5 QfT-5 
T-5 QfT-6
 
T-6 QfT-7
 
T-6 QfT-8
 
T-6 QfT-9
 
T-I QoT-1 
T-1 QoT-2
 
T-1 QoT-3 
T-2 QoT-4 
T-2 QoT-5
 
T-2 QoT-6 
T-4 QoT-7 
T-4 QoT-8 
T-4 QoT-9 

PfL-2 
PfL-3 
L-20 TfL-I 
TfL-2 
VoA 0B. 2 	 TfL-3 1 
EXPECTED 
VALUE
 
Closed
 
Closed
 
EXPECTED
 
VALUE
 
Ambient
 
Ambient 
uncovered
 
Uncovered
 
19 PSIA 
19 PSIA 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
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V.AoB. MATE (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
VoAoB 2 L-21 TfL-4 S Ambient 
TfL-5 Ambient 
PoL-1 19 PSIA 
L-18 PoL-3 19 PSIA 
ToL-1 Ambient 
L-17 ToL-2 
L-18 ToL-3 
ToL-4 Ambient 
L-14 PgF-I 19 PSIA 
0-5 PgF-2 
L-16 PgF-3 
C-5 PfF-I 
L-13 PgO-i 19 PSIA 
0-3 PgO- 2 19 PSIA 
L-15 PgO-3 19 PSIA 
L-14 TgF-I Ambient 
L-14 TgF-2 Ambient 
L-13 TgO-i Ambient 
L-13 TgO-2 Ambient 
L-8 PfS-I 19 PSIA 
L-9 PfS-2 19 PSIA 
L-8 TfS-1 Ambient 
L-9 TfS-2 Ambient 
L-3 PoS-1 19 PSIA 
L-4 PoS-2 19 PSIA 
L-3 ToS-1 Ambient 
L-4 ToS-2 Ambient 
L-7 -PgRL-1 19 PSIA 
V.A.B. 2 C-1 PoF-I I S 19 PSIA 
PAYLOAD INSTALLATION 
I., Repeat steps V.AOB. - 1, 2, 
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PRELAUNCH 
Connect electronics coolant GSE and Ground Power GSE. 
Power up 0CMS and all propulsion systems. 
Perform OCMS self-check. 
1. Remove the mechanical stops from V-i, 2, 8, 9, 25, 26, 
Verify: 
27. 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
PL 
P 
1 
I 
V-i 
V-2 
V-8 
V-9 
V-23 
V-26 
V-27 
LOIV-l 
LOIV-2 
LFIV-l 
LFIV-2 
LOIV-3 
LFIV-3 
LFIV-4 
I 
I 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Verify leak integrity: 
PL 2 T-3 
T-5 
T-6 
T-1 
T-2 
T-4 
L-17 
L-18 
L-20 
L-21 
L-3 
L-4 
L-8 
L-9 
L-14 
0-5 
L-16 
L-13 
0-3 
L-15 
C-5 
C-I 
L-7 
F-4 
PfT-I 
-P-f-T-2 
PfT-3 
PoT-I 
PoT-2 
PoT-3 
PoL-i 
PoL-2 
PoL-3 
PfL-i 
PfL-2 
PfL-3 
PfL-4 
PoS-1 
PoS-2 
PfS-I 
PfS-2 
PgF-I 
PgF-2 
PgF-3 
PgO-i 
PgO-2 
PgO-3 
PfF-l 
PoF-I 
PgRL-I 
PoL-10 
1 S 15-20 PSIA 
PL 2 F-5 PfL-14 1 S 15-20 PSIA 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
PL 3 NEC-I I S On 
PL 3 MEC-2 1 S On 
PL 3 MEC-3 1 S On 
Command and verify: 
PL 4 V-I LOIV-I i S Open 
V-2 LOIV-2 
V-8 LFIV-1I 
V-9 LFIV-2 
V-23 LOIV-3 
V-26 LFIV-3 
FL 4 V-27 LFIV-4 1 S Open 
Verify: 
PL 5 V-3 LOW-I 1 S Closed 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V-5 LOVV-3 
V-6 LOW-4 
V-7 LOFV-I 
V-10 LFTVV-1 
V-1i LFTVV-2 
V-12 LFTVV-3 
V-13 LFTW-4 
V-14 LFFV-l 
V-19 LOPCV-1 
V-21 LFPCV-I 
V-22 LFPCV-2 
V-23 LOIV-3 
V-24 LOTW-1 
V-25 LOTW-2 
V-28 LFTVV-5 
V-29 LFTVV-6 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
V-31 LFTVV-S 
V-32 LOPV-l 
V-33 LOPV-2 
V-34 LFPV-I 
V-35 LFPV-2 
C-I LOFC-1 
C-2 LEC-l, 2 
C-3 LFTVC-1 
c-4 LEC-3, 4 
C-5 LFFC-I 
0-6 LIC-5, 6 
C-8 LHC-7Y8 
PL 5 C-11V-20 LFVC-1LOPCV-2 SClosed 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
6. (a) Connect hydraulic GSE.
 
(b) Connect 0N2 purge GSE.
 
(c) 	M.E.C-1, 2 conduct dry main engine start and shutdown
 
sequence.
 
Status 	is reported to CCC.
 
Verify., 
PL 7 TR-(1-37) 
TR(I-37) 
LBIV-(I-37) 
LIOV-(l-37) 
I S Closed 
PL 7 
TR(I-37) 
TR(I-37) 
TR(I-37) 
LIFV-(i-37) 
VII-(l-37) 
IIE- (1-37) 1 S 
Closed 
0 VDC 
0 
Simulate: 
FL 7 TC- (1-37) PC-(1-37) I C/o 300 PSIA 
Verify: 
PL 
FL 
8 
8 
V-36 
V-37 
V-38 
V-39 
V-40 
V-41 
V-42 
V-43 
V-44 
V-70 
C-9 
C-10 
T-8 
T-9 
T-10 
T-11 
LOPV-3 
LOPV-4 
LOPV-5 
LOPV-6 
LFPV-3 
LFPV-4 
LFPV-5 
LFPV-6 
LOFV-2 
LFFV-2 
LOFC-2 
LFFC-2 
PoT-4 
PoT-5 
PfT-4 
PfT-5 
PoL-8 
PoL-9 
PfL-10,9 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
19 PSIA 
19 PSIA 
And simulate: 
PL 
PL 
8 
8 
F-6 
T-8 
T-8 
T-9 
T-9 
F-7 
PoL-6 
PoL-4 
PoT-6 
ToT-4 
ToT-5 
PoT-7 
PoL-5 
PoL-7 
PfL-7 
1 
I 
C/o 
C/o 
400 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
400 PSIA 
400 PSIA 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASURMNT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
PL 8 F-8 PfL-5 C/o 1500 PSIA 
T-10 PfT-6 1500 PSIA 
T-10 
T-11 TfT-4TfT-5 
T-11 PfT-7 1500 PSIA 
F-9 PfL-6 1500 PSIA 
8 PfL-8 c/o 400 PSIA 
Verify: 
PL 9 G0V-I LGOV-I i Closed 
GOV-I LGOV-lI 
GOV-2 LGOV-2 
OOV-2 LGOV-21 
GOV-3 LGOV-3 
GOV-3 LGOV-3I 
GFV-I LGFV-1 
GFV-I LGFV-I 
GFV-2 LGFV-2 
GFV-2 LGFV-21 
GFV-3 LGFV-3 
GFV-3 LCFV-31 
V-52 LLIV-1 
V-52 LPSV-I 
V-53 LLIV-2 
V-53 LPSV-2 
V-54 LLIV-3 
V-54 LPSV-3 
V-55 LFIV-1 
V-55 LPSV-4 
V-56 LFIV-2 
V-56 LPSV-5 
V-57 LFIV-3 
PL 9 V-57 LPSV-6 1 S Closed 
and: 
PL 9 G-1 LIOV-38 1 5 Closed 
G-1 LIFV-38 
G-2 LIOV-39 
G-2 LIFV-39 
G-3 LIOV-40 
G-3 LIFV-40 Closed 
G-1 VII-38 OV 
G-2 VII-39 OV 
G-3 VII-40 Ov 
G-1 VIEO-1 OVDC 
G-2 VIEO-2 OVDC 
G-3 VIEO-3 OVDC 
G-1 IIE-38 0 
G-2 IIE-39 0 
PL 9 G-3 IIE-40 1 S 0 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
PL 9 PT-i QPTL-I 1 S 
PL 9 PT-2 QPTL-2 I S 
PL 9 PT-3 QPTL-3 I S 
and simulate: 
PL 9 G-1 PC-38 I C1O 
G-2 P0-39 
G-3 PC-40 
G-i TC-i 
G-2 TC-2 
G-3 TC-3 
V-46 PCV-1 1500 PSIA 
V-49 PCV-4 
H-4 PHEO-i 
H-7 PHEO-4 1500 PSIA 
H-4 THE-i 
B-7 THE-4 
P-i PPD-I 1500 PSIA 
P-4 PPD-4 
V-47 PCV-2 
V-50 PCV-5 
H-5 
H-8 
PHEO-2 
PHEO-5 1500 PSIA 
B-5 THE-2 
PL H1-8 THE-5 I C/O 
and: 
PL 9 P-2 PPD-2 1 C/O 1500 PSIA 
P-5 PPD-5 
V-48 PCV-3 
V-51 PCV-6 
H-6 PHEO-3 
H1-9 PBIEO-6 1500 PSIA 
H-6 THE-3 
H-9 TBE-6 
P-3 PPD-3 1500 PSIA 
P-6 PFD-6 1500 PSIA 
U-I NT-I 
U-i AT-I 
U-2 NT-2 
U-2 AT-2 
U-3 NT-3 
U-3 AT-3 
P-I NP-i 
P-I AP-1 
PL 9 P-2 NP-2 C/O 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued)
 EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
FL 9 	 P-2 AP-2 1 C1o
 
P-3 NP-3
 
P-3 AP-3
 
P-4 NP-4
 
P-4 AP-4
 
P-5 NP-5
 
P-5 AP-5
 
P-6 NP-6
 
P-6 AP-6
 
PT-I NS-1
 
PT-2 NS-2
 
PT-3 NS-3
 
CL-i AC-i
 
CL:2 AC-2
 
CL-3 AC-3
 
ZL-4 AC-4
 
,CL-5 AC-5
 
CL-6 AC-6
 
CT7 AC-7
 
CL-8 AC-8
 
AC-9
CL-9 

PL 9 	 P-I TPB-i C/o 
And:
 
PL 9 	 P-2 TPB-2 C/o
 
P-3 TPB-3
 
P-4 TPB-4
 
P-5 TPB-5
 
P-6 TPB-6
 
PT-I TPTB-l
 
PT-2 TiTB-2
 
PT-3 TPTB-3
 
PT-I TPTL-1
 
PT-2 TPTL-2
 
PT-3 TPTL-3
 
PT-1 PPTL-I
 
PT-2 PPTL-2
 
PL 9 	 PT-3 PPTL-3 1 C/C 
COMS will conduct a dry A/B start.
 
Verify:
 
FL 10 V-58 LFIV-4 I S Closed
 
V-60 LFIV-5
 
V-62 LFIV-6
 
V-59 LPSV-7
 
V-61 LPSV-8
 
L 0 V-63 LPSV-9 	 1 S Closed
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PRELAUNCH (Continued)
 
PHASE 
PL 
STEP 
10 
ELEMENT 
G-4 
G-4 
MEASUREMENT 
VII-41 
IIE-41 
SAMPLES USE 
S 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
OVDC 
0 
G-4GFV-4 VIEO-4LGFV-41 0VDCClosed 
PL 10 
GFV-4 
GOV-4 
GOV-4 
PT-4 
LGFV-4 
LGOV-41 
LGOV-4 
QTPL-l 1 S 
Closed 
Simulate: 
PL 
FL 
10 
10 
U-4 
PT-4 
PT-4 
PT-4 
P-7 
P-7 
NT-4 
AT-4 
PTPL-I 
TTPL-l 
PPD-7 
AP-7 
1 
1 
C/o 
c/o 
50 PSIA 
Verify: 
FL 
I 
PL 
11 
11 
G-5 
G-5 
G-5 
GFV-5 
GFV-5 
GOV 5 
GOV-5 
PT-5 
VII-42 
IIE-42 
VIEO-5 
LGFV-51 
LGFV-5 
LGOV-5I 
LGOV-5 
QTPL-2 1S 
S OVDC 
0 
OVDC 
Closed 
Closed 
Simulate: 
PL 
PL 
11 
IU-5 
11 
U-5 
PT-5 
PT-5 
P-8 
P-8 
NT-5 
AT-5 
PTPL-2 
TTPL-2 
PPD-8 
AP-8 
1 C 
c/00 
50 PSIA 
Verify: 
PL 12 G-6C--6G-6 
VII-43IIE-43VIEO-6 
1 5 OVDC00VDC 
GFV-6 LGFV-6I Closed 
GFV-6 LGFV-6 
PL 12 
GOV-6 
GOV-6 
PT-6 
LGOV-61 
LGOV-6 
QTPL-3 S 
Closed 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued)
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Simulate: 
PL 12 U-6U-6 NT-6AT-6 I C/oI 
PL 12 
PT-6 
PT-6 
P-9 
P-9 
PTPL-3 
TTPL-3 
PPD-9 
AP-9 1 
1 
C/0 
50 PSIA 
Verify: 
PL 
PL 
13 
13 
EFV-l 
EFV-2 
EFV-3 
EFV-4 
EFV-5 
EFV-6 
EFV-7 
EFV-8 
EFV-9 
EFV-10 
EFV-11 
EFV-12 
LEFV-1 
LEFV-2 
LEFV-3 
LEFV-4 
LEFV-5 
LEFV-6 
LEFV-7 
LEFV-8 
LEFV-9 
LEFV-10 
LEFV-lI 
LEFV-12 
PfL-Il 
PfL-12 
PfL-13 
1 S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
19 PSIA 
19 PSIA 
19 PSIA 
Simulate: 
PL 
PL 
PL 
13 
13 
13 
TfL-6 
TfL-7 
TfL-8 
1 
I 
I 
C/o 
C/0 
C/o 
A/B E.C.-1 will conduct a dry start of T.F.-I by 
verifying: 
PL 
PL 
14 
14 
FCA-1 
FCA-I 
FH-I 
PH-i 
IGN-1 
IGN-1 
IGN-I 
LA-i 
FCA-1 
LFIVA/B-l 
LCPRV-l 
VFH-1 
IFH-1 
VIIA/B-I 
III-I 
VIEO-I 
QLO-1 
LSPV-1 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
OVDC 
OADC 
OVDC 
0 
OVDC 
Closed 
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PRELAUNCH (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT 
and simulating: 
MEASUREMENT SANPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
PL 14 FCA-I 
FCA-I 
LA-I 
NVDVP-l 
PDVDVP-1 
PSPD-l 
I C/0 
LA-I 
FM-i 
TF-I 
FD-i 
TF-I 
TF-I 
TF-I 
TF-I 
TF-I 
TSPD-I 
FfF-I 
NBPT-I 
FLB-I 
PFI-I 
TIA-I 
NF-i 
PHPT-I 
THPT-I 
PL 
PL 
14 
14 
As well as: 
TF-I 
TF-I 
TF-I 
TF-I 
LA-I 
LA-i 
PED-I 
TED-I 
TLPTD-I 
TCI-i 
PG-I 
PLPD-I 
1 
I 
C/o 
C/0 
PL 
PL 
14 
14 
TF-i 
TF-I 
TF-I 
FCA-I 
FCA-I 
TF-i 
TF-i 
TF-I 
COMP-i 
COMP-I 
PfCCI-i 
TfCCI-I 
TTB-i 
TFH-I 
NVDVP-1 
AFFB-I 
AFCB-l 
ALPRB-i 
FIC-I 
ACEC-I 
1 
1 
C/o 
C/o 
A/B E.C.-2 will conduct a dry start of T.F.-2 by 
verifying: 
PL 
PL 
15 
15 
FCA-2 
FCA-2 
FH-2 
FH-2 
IGN-2 
IGN-2 
IGN-2 
LA-2 
FCA-2 
LFIVA/B-2 
LCPRV-2 
VFH-2 
IFH-2 
VITA/B-2 
111-2 
VIEO-2 
QLO-2 
LSPV-2 1 
S Closed 
Closed 
OVDC 
OADC 
OVDC 
0 
OVDC 
Closed 
And simulating: 
PL 15 FCA-2 
FCA-2 
LA-2 
LA-2 
LA-2 
NVDVP-2 
PDVDVP-2 
PLPD-2 
PSPD-2 
TSPD-2 
1 C/o 
L PL• I15 Fm-2TF-2 FfF-2NHPT-2 IIC/o I 
PRELAUNCH (Continued)
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
PL 15 	 FD-2 FLB-2 1 C/o
 
TF-2 PFI-2
 
TF-2 TIA-2
 
TF-2 NF-2
 
TF-2 PHPT-2
 
TF-2 THPT-2
 
TF-2 PED-2
 
TF-2 TED-2
 
TF-2 TLPTD-2
 
TF-2 TCI-2
 
PL 15 	 LA-2 PG-2 1 C0
 
As well as:
 
FL 15 	 TF-2 PfCCI-2 1 C/o
 
TF-2 TfCCI-2
 
TF-2 TTB-2
 
FCA-2 TFH-2
 
FCA-2 NVDVP-2
 
TF-2 AFFB-2
 
TF-2 AFCB-2
 
TF-2 ALPRB-2
 
FIC-2
COP-2 

PL 15 CONP-2 ACEC-2 1 c/o
 
A/B E.C.-3 will conduct a dry start of T.F.-3 by verifying:
 
PL 16 	 FCA-3 LFIVA/B-3 I S 

FCA-3 LCPRV-3 

FH-3 VFH-3 

FH-3 IFH-3 

IGN-3 VIIA/B-3 

IGN-3 111-3 

IGN-3 VIEO-3 

LA-3 QLO-3
 
PL 16 FCA-3 LSPV-3 1 S 

And simulating:
 
PL 16 	 FCA-3 NVDVP-3 1 C/o
 
FCA-3 PDVDVF-3,
 
LA-3 PLPD-3
 
LA-3 PSPD-3
 
LA-3 TSPD-3
 
FM-3 FfF-3
 
TF-3 NEPT-3
 
D-3 FLB-3
 
TF-3 PFI-3
 
TF-3 TIA-3
 
TF-3 NF-3
 
TF-3 PHPT-3
 
PL 16 	 TF-3 TEPT-3 C/o
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EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Closed
 
Closed
 
OVDC
 
OADC 
0VDC 
0
 
0VD C 
Closed
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PRELAUNCH (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTEE 
VALUE 
PL 
PL 
16 
16 
TF-3 
TF-3 
TF-3 
TF-3
LA-3 
PED-3 
TED-3 
TLPTD-3 
TCI-3IIPG-3 
1 
I 
C/o 
C/o 
As well as: 
PL 
PL 
16 
16 
TF-3 
TF-3 
TF-3 
FCA-3 
FCA-3 
TF-3 
TF-3 
TF-3 
COMP-3 
COMP-3 
PfCCI-3 
TfCCI-3 
TTB-3 
TFH-3 
NVDVP-3 
AFFB-3 
AFCB-3 
ALPRB-3 
FIC-3 
ACEC-3 
I 
I 
C/o 
C/o 
Remove all solid start cartridges. 
A/B E.C.-l, 2, 3 will command and verify: 
PL 
PL 
PL 
17 
17 
17 
SC-I 
S0-2 
SC-3 
VC-I 
VC-2 
VC-3 
I 
1 
I 
C/o 
C/o 
C/o 
28 VDC 
28 VDC 
28 VDC 
Then command and verify: 
PL 
PL 
PL 
17 
17 
17 
SC-1 
SC-2 
SC-3 
VC-I 
VC-2 
VC-3 
I 
1 
1 
C/o 
C/o 
C/o 
OVDC 
OVDC 
OVDC 
Connect Zero-G lube pressurization GSE 
A/B E.C.- 1, 2j, 3 will verify: 
PL 
PL 
PL 
18 
18 
18 
LA-i 
LA-2 
LA-3 
PZGL-l 
PZGL-2 
PZGL-3 
I 
I 
I 
C/o 
C/o 
C/o 
Stop and disconnect Zero-G lube GSE. 
Replace all solid start cartridges. 
Command all propulsion systems off. 
Command all engine controllers off. 
Power down OCMS. 
Disconnect all GSE, 
Tow orbiter to pad. 
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LAUNCH
 
1. 	Connect orbiter to pad electrical interfaces.
 
Connect Electronic collant GSEo
 
2, 	Power up OCMS. Command OCMS self-check. 
Power up all engine controllers. Command controller self-checks. 
Power up all propulsion systems. 
3. 	Verify:
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
L 3 V-I LOIV-l 1 s Open 
V-2 LOIV-2 Open 
V-3 LOW-1 Closed 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V 5 LOVV-3 
V-6 LOVV-4 
V-7 LOFV-l Closed 
V-8 LFIV-l Open 
V-9 
V-10 
LFIV-2 
LFTVV-l 
Open 
Closed 
V-I LFTVV-2 
V-12 LFTVV-3 
V-13 LFTVV-4 
V-14 LFFV-l 
V-19 LOPCV-1 
V-20 LOPCV-2 
V-21 LFPCV-1 
V-22 LFPCV-2 Closed 
V-23 LOIV-3 Open 
V-24 LOTVV-l Closed 
V-25 LOTVV-2 Closed 
V-26 LFIV-3 Open 
V-27 
V-28 
LFIV-4 
LFTVV-5 
Open 
Closed 
V-29 LFTVV-6 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
V-31 LFTVV-8 
V-32 LOPV-l 
V-33 LOPV-2 
V-34 LFPV-l 
V-35 LFPV-2 
C-I LOFC-1 
C-2 LHC-I,2 
C-3 LFTVC-1 
c-4 LHC-3,4 
C-5 LFFC-1 
c-6 LHC-5,6 
C-8 LHC-7,8 
C-Il LFVC-l Closed 
T-3 PfT-1 15-20 PSIA 
T-5 PfT-2 # 
L 3 T-6 PfT-3 I S 15-20 PSIA 
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LAUNCH (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
L 3 T-1 PoT-I 1 S 15-20 PSIA 
T-2 PoT-2 
T-4 PoT-3 
PoL-i 
L-17 PoL -2 
L-18 PoL -3 
L-20 PfL-I 
PfL -2 
PfL-3 
L-21 PfL -4 
L-3 POS-i 
L-4L-8 POS -2PfS-I 
L-9 PfS-2 
C-5 PfF-I 
C-I PoF-I 
L-7 PgRL-1 
F-4 PoL-10 
F-5 PfL-14 
L-14 PgF-I 
0-5 PgF -2 
L-16 PgF -3 
L-130-3 PgO-iPgO -2 
L 3 L-15 PgO -3 1 S 15-20 PSIA 
M.E.C.-1,2,3 wili verify actuators locked, and igniters de-energized.
 
4. Remove all protective covers.
 
5. Verify RCS doors closed
 
Verify: 
L 6TR-(I-37) LBIV-(I-37) I Closed 
TR-(l-37) LMBV-(1-37)
TR- (1-37) LIOV-(1-37)
TR-(1-37) LIFV-(1-37) Closed 
TR-(1-37) VII-(1-37) OVDC 
V-36 LOPV-3 Closed
 
V-37 LOPV-4 
V-38 LOPV-5 
V-39 LOPV-6
 
V-40 LFPV-3 
V-41 LFPV-4 
V-42 LFPV-5 
V-43 LFPV-6
 
V-44 LOFV-2 
V-70 LFFV-2 
C-9 LOFC-2 
C-10 LFFC-2 Closed 
T-8 PoT-4 19 PSIA 
L T-9 PoT-5 1S 19 PSIA 
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LAUNCH (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
S T-10T-11 PfT-4f -3 I 19 PSIA 
L 6 
PoL-8 
PoL-9 
PfL-9PfL-10 1 19 PSIA 
Verify: 
L 7 GOV-1 
GOV-I 
LGOV-1 
LGOV-iI 
1 5 Closed 
GOV-2 
GOV-2 
GOV-3 
GOV-3 
GFV-I 
GFV-I 
GFV-2 
LGOV-2 
LGOV-2I 
LGOV-3 
LGOV-3I 
LGFV-1 
LGFV-I 
LGFV-2 
GFV-2 
GFV-3 
GFV-3 
LGFV-21 
LGFV-3 
LGFV-3I 
L 7 
V-52 
V-52 
V-53 
V-53 
V-54 
V-54 
V-55 
V-55 
V-56 
V-56 
V-57 
V-57 
G-1 
G-2 
G-3 
G-1 
G-2 
G-3 
G-1 
G-2 
G-3 
LLIV-1 
LPSV-1 
LLIV-2 
LPSV-2 
LLIV-3 
LPSV-3 
LFIV-1 
LPSV-4 
LFIV-2 
LPSV-5 
LFIV-3 
LPSV-6 
LIOV-38 
LIOV-39 
LIOV-40 
LIFV-38 
LIFV-39 
LIFV-40 
V11-38 
VII-39 
VII-40 S 
Closed 
OV 
OV 
OV 
Verify: 
8 GFV-4 
GFV-4 
GOV-4 
LGFV-41 
LGFV-4 
LGOV-41 
1 S Closed 
8 
GOV-4GFV-5 
GFV-5 
LGOV-4LGFV-51 
LGFV-5 S closed 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
L 8 GOV-5 LGOV-51 1 S Closed 
GOV-5 LGOV-5 
GFV-6 LGFV-61 
GFV-6 LGFV-6 
GOV-6 LGOV-61 
COV-6 LGOV-6 
V-58 LFIV-4 
V-59 LPSV-7 
V-60 LFIV-5 
V-61 LPSV-8 
V-62 LFIV-6 
V-63 LPSV-9 Closed 
G-1 VII-41 OVDC 
G-2 VII-42 
G-3 VII-43 OVDC 
EFV-1 LEFV-! Closed 
EFV-2 LEFV-2 
EFV-3 LEFV-3 
EFV-4 LEFV-4 
EFV-5 LEFV-5 
EFV-6 LEFV-6 
EFV-7 LEFV-7 
EFV-8 LEFV-8 
EFV-9 LEFV-9 
EFV-10 LEFV-10 
EFV-lI LEFV-1i 
EFV-12 LEFV-12 Closed 
PfL-l1 19 PSIA 
PfL -12 + 
L 8 PfL-13 1 S 19 PSIA 
A/B E.C.-,2,3 will verify: 
L 9 FCA-I LFIVA/B-l I S Closed 
FCA-l LCPRV-1 + 
FCA-i LSPV-1 Closed 
IGN-I VIIA/B-1 OVDC 
FCA-2 
FCA-2 
LFIVA/B-2 
LCPRV-2 
Closedt 
FCA-2 LSPV-2 Closed 
IGN-2 VIIA/B-2 OVDC 
FCA-3 LFIVA/B-3 Closed 
FCA-3 LCPRV-3 + 
FCA-3 LSPV-3 Closed 
IGN-3 VIIA/B-3 OVDC 
10 Connect helium servicing GSE to each main engine purge
 
accumulator and service with 2000 Psia dry helium.
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LAUNCH (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SANPLES USE VALUE 
Connect the Propellant-Servicing and Pressurization GSE to the following
 
couplings and verify:
 
L 11 C-i LOFC-1 1 S Op n 
C-2 LHC-1,2 
C-3 LFTVC-1 
C-4 LHC-3,4 
c-5 LFFC-l 
c-6 LHC-5,6 
C-8 LHC-7,8 
C-9 LOFC-2 
C-10 LFFC-2 
L 11 C-I LFVC-1 1 S Open 
Command pre-propellant loading purge sequence of the main engines.
 
When the main engine controllers indicate "ready for propellants",
 
command and verify:
 
L 12 	 V-i LOIV-I 1 Closed
 
V-2 LOIV-2 Closed

v-7 LOFV-l 	 Open
V-24 LOTVV-l 
L12 V-25 LOTVV-2 1 Open 
Command LOX transfer to slow mode.
 
Verify operations by checking: 
L 13 L-17 ToL-2 I S <200°R 
When: 
L 14 T-4 QoT-7 10/sec C Covered 
Command LOX recirculation helium on at C-2., and command LOX transfer to 
fast fill. 
When:
 
L 15 T-4 QoT-8 10/sec C Covered
 
Command LOX transfer to slow fill and command termination of helium
 
recirculation.
 
When:
 
L 16 T-4 QoT-9 10/sec C Covered
 
D-66 
LAUNCH (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command LOX to mode hold.
 
Verify:
 
164 + 30 RL 17 	 T-4 ToT-3 I S 
L-17 ToL-2 
L-3 ToS-1 
L-4 ToS-2 
L-17 PoL-2 
L-3 PoS-1
IIL-4 - PoS-2 
L 17 L-7 PgRL-I 1 S 
Visually check for leakage with scan cemeras. 
Commence monitoring for leakage with compartment gas analyzers.
 
Command and verify:
 
L 18 	 V-3 LOW-I 1 S Open 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V-5 LOVV-3 
V-6 LOVV-4 
V-I LOIV-I Open 
L 18 	 V-23 LOV-3 1 S Closed 
Command LOX transfer to slow mode.
 
Verify operation by checking:
 
L 19 ToL-l 1 S -<200OR 
When: 
L 20 	 T-1 QoT-1 10/see C Covered
 
Command LOX Recirculation helium on at C-2, and command LOX transfer to 
fast fill, 
When: 
L 21 T-1 QoT-2 10/see C Covered
 
Command LOX transfer to slow fill and command termination of helium
 
recirculation.
 
When:
 
L 22 T-1 QoT-3 10/sec C Covered
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LAUNCH (Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMLES USE VALUE 
Command LOX to mode hold.
 
Verify: 
L 234 T-1 ToT-I ToL-1 I S I 164+3
0R 
164%30R 
L 23 T-I PoL-I I S 
Command and verify: 
L 24 V-I LOIV-1 1 S Closed 
L 24 V-2 LOIV-2 1 S Open 
Command LOX transfer to slow mode. 
Verify operation by checking: 
L 25 L-18 ToL-3 I S <200°R 
When 
L 26 T-2 QoT-4 10/sec C Covered 
Command LOX recirculation helium on at C-2. and command LOX transfer 
to fast fill. 
When: 
L 27 T-2 QoT-5 10/sec C Covered 
Command LOX transfer to slow fill and command termination of helium re­
circulation. 
When; 
L 28 Tr2 QoT-6 10/sec C Covered 
Command LOX to mode hold. 
Verify: 
L 29 T-2 ToT-2 I S 164+30R 
# 4 L-18 ToL-3 f 4 1644.3OR 1 S ---L 29 L-18 PoL-3 
Command and verify: 
L 30 V-2 LOIV-2 1 8 Closed
 
L 30 V-7 LOFV-l 1 S Closed
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LAUNCH (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
L 31 V-44 LOFV-2 1 S Open 
When: 
L 32 T-8 PoT-4 I/sec S 14.7 PSIA 
L 32 T-9 PoT-5 I/sec S 14.7 PSIA 
Commence servicing T-8, 9 with G02. 
Monitor: 
L 33 T-8 PoT-6 1/sec C 1500 PSIA 
T-8 PoT-7T-9 PoT-7 1500 PSIA 
L 33 T-9 ToT-5 I/sec C 
Compute accumulator quantity, and send hold command to GSE at full load. 
Command and verify: 
L 34 V-44 LOFV-2 1 S Closed 
Monitor: 
L 35 T-8 PoT-6 1 M 1500 PSIA 
T-8 ToT-4IIT-9 POT-7 1500 PSIA
 
35 T-9 ToT-5 1 M 
For decay.
 
Command and verify: 
L 36 V-70 LFFV-2 I S Open 
When:
 
L 37 T-10 PfT-4 i/sec S 14.7 PSIA
 
L 37 T-11 PfT-5 I/sec S 14.7 PSIA 
Commence servicing T-l0, 11 with GH2. 
Monitor:
 
L 38 T-10 PfT-6 i/sec C 1500 PSIA 
T10 TfT-4 
T-11 PfT-7 1500 PSIA 
L 38 T-11 TfT-5 1/sec C 
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LAUNCH (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Compute accumulator quantity, and send hold command to GSE at full load. 
Command and verify: 
L 39 V-70 LFFV-2 i S Closed 
Monitor: 
L 
L40 
40 T-10 
T-10 
T-11T-11 
PfT-6 
TfT-4I 
PfT-7TfT-5 
i/sec 
I/seo 
M 
x 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
For decay, 
Reverify: 
L 41 PoL- 8 
PoL-9 
1 S 19 PSIA 
41 PfL-10 1 S 19 PSIA 
Connect vents to TR-15 and TR-9. 
Connect vents to TR-2 and TR-3. 
Verify: 
L 
L 
42 
42 
F-6 
F-7 
Fr8 
F-9 
PoL-4 
Pot-S
PfL-5 
PfL-6 
1 
I 
S 
S 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
43 
43 
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-9 
TR-9 
TR-9 
TR-9 
TR-15 
TR-15 
TR-15 
TR-15 
LBIV-2 
LMBV-2 
LIFV-2 
LIOV-2 
LBIV-3 
LMBV-3 
LIFV-3 
LIOV-3 
LBIV-9 
LMBV-9 
LIFV-9 
LIOV-9 
LBIV-15 
IMEV-15 
LIFV-15 
LIOV-15 
1 
I 
S 
S 
Ope 
Open 
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PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
L 
t 
44 
44 
PoL-8 
Pot -9 
PfL-9 
PfL-10 
1/sec A.R. 
4 
1/sec A.R. 
C 
C 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Command and verify: 
L 
L45 
45 TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-9 
TR-9 
TR-9 
TR-9 
TR-15 
TR-15 
TR-15 
TR-15 
LBIV-2 
LMV-2 
LIFV-2 
LIOV-2 
LBIV-3 
LMBV-3 
LIFV-3 
LIOV-3 
LBIV-9 
LMBV-9 
LIFV-9 
LIOV-9 
LBIV-15 
LBV-15 
LIFV-15 
LIOV-15 
1 
1SClosed 
S Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
46 
46 
V-36 
V-38 
V-40 
V-42 
LOPV-3 
tory-5 
LFPV-3 
LFPV-5 1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Verify : 
L 47 
47 
PoL-6 
PaL-7jI 
PfL-8 
I S 
S 
375-400 PSIA­
375-400 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
L 48 
48 
V-36 
V-38 
V-40V-42 
LOPV-3 
LOPV-5I 
LFPV-3LFPV-5 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Repeat steps L-43, 44, 45. 
L 
Command and verify: 
49 V-37 
V-39 
V-4149 V-43 
LOPV-4 
LOPV-6 
LFPV-4 
LFPV-6 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
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EXPECTEDPHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Repeat step L-47. 
Command and verify: 
L 50 V-37 LOPV-4 1 S Closed 
L 50 
V-41 
V-43 
LFPV-4 
LFPV-6 I S Closed 
Monitor: 
L 51 PoL-6 
PoL-V 
5/sdc M 375-400 PSIA 
L 51 PfL-8 5/sec N 375-400 PSIA 
For decay. 
Command and verify: 
L 52 V-36 
V-37 
V-38 
V-39 
V-40V-41 
LOPV-3 
LOPV-4 
LOPV-5 
LOPV-6 
LFPV-3LFPV-4 
1 S Open 
L 52 
V-42 
V-43 LFPV-5LFPV-6 S Open 
Command ard verify: 
L 53 TR-1 LBIV-1 I S Open 
Through: 
L 53 TR-37 LBIV-1 S Open 
Verifying: 
L 
L 
53 
53 
PoL-6 
PoL-7 
PfL~-7 
PfL-8 
I sap/step 
1 samp/step 
S 
tS 
375-400 PSIA 
7-0 00 PSIA 
Between each valve opening. 
54. Commence monitoring the pressures of step L-53 at 5 samples/sec.
 
Command and verify:
 
55 V-44 LOFV-2 1 S Open
 L 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Top T-8, 9 with 02 from C-9$ until 
L 
L 
56 
56 
T-8 
T-9 
PoT-6 
PoT-7 
I/sec 
I/sec 
C 
C 
1500 PSL 
1500 PSI 
Command GSK to Hold. and 
L 
L 
57 
57 
V-44 
V-70 
LOFV-2 
LFFV-2 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Open 
Top T-10, 11 with GH2 from C-10 until 
L 
L 
58 
58 
T-10 
T-11 
PfT-6 
PfT-7 
i/sec 
I/sec 
C 
C 
1500 PSI 
1500 ?SL 
Command GSE to hold, and 
L 59 V-70 LFFV-2 1 S Closed 
Disconnect the GSE vents from TR-2, 3, 9, 15. 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
60 
60 
V-8 
V-9 
V-28 
V-29 
V-30
V-31 
V-14 
LFIV-1 
LFIV-2 
LFTVV-5 
LFTVV-6 
LFTVV-7LFTVV-8 
LFFV-I 
1 
1 
S Closed 
Closed 
Ope 
Open 
Command fuel transfer to slow fill. 
Verify operation by checking: 
L 
L 
61 
+61 
L-20 
L-21 
TfL-l 
TfL-4 
TfL-5 
1 
# 
1 
S 
#S 
c50°R 
<500 R 
When both: 
L 
L 
62 
62 
T-5 
T-6 
QfT-4 
QfT-7 
10/sec 
10/sec 
C 
C 
Covered 
Covered 
Command helium recirculation from C-8 on, and 
LH2 transfer to fast fill. 
When: 
L 
L 
Or 
63 
63 
T-5 
T-6 
QfT-5 
QfT-8 
10/sec 
10/sec 
C 
C 
Covered 
Covered 
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
Terminate helium recirculation, and command transfer to slow fill.
 
When: 
L 64 T-5 QfT-6 10/sec C Covered 
Or: 
L 64 T-6 QfT-9 10/sec C Covered 
Command fuel transfer to mode hold when the other one covers. 
or TBD seconds after the first one covers. 
65. Monitor compartment analyzers for leakage. 
Monitor compartment fire detectors. 
Verify: 
L 
L 
66 
66 
T-5 
T-6 
L-20 
L-21 
L-8 
L-9 
L-8 
L-9 
TfT-2 
TfT-3 
TfL-I 
TfL-4 
TfS-i 
TfS-2 
PfS-! 
PfS-2 
I 
1 
S 
S 
36-40 0R 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
67 
67 
V-26 
V-27 
V-8V-9 
V-(10-13) 
LFIV-3 
LFIV-4 
LFIV-1LFIV-2# 
LFTVV--I-4) 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Open 
Open 
Command fuel transfer to slow fill. 
Verify operation by checking: 
L 
L 
68 
68 
TfL-2 
TfL-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
c-50oR 
<500 R 
When: 
L 69 T-3 QfT-l 1 S Covered 
Command helium recirculation on from C-8 and command fuel transfer to fast
 
fill.
 
When:
 
L 70 T-3 QfT-2 1 S Covered
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EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Terminate helium recirculation, and command fuel transfer to slow fill.
 
When: 
L 71 T-3 QfT-3 1 S Covered 
Command fuel transfer to mode hold. 
Verify: 
L 
f 
L 
72 
72 
T-3 TfT-l 
TfL-2tt 
TfL-3 
1 
I 
S 
S 
36-40'R 
36-40R 
Command and verify: 
L 73 V-14 LFFV-l 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
74 
74 
V-1 
V-7 
LOIV-l 
LOFV-l 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Top T-l until: 
L 75 T-l QoT-3 10/sec C Covered 
Terminate topping. 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
76 
76 
V-i 
V-2 
LOIV-I 
LOIV-2 1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Open 
Top T-2 until 
L 77 T-2 QoT-6 10/sec C Covered 
Terminate topping. 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
78 
78 
V-2 
V-23 
LOIV-2 
LOIV-3 
1 5 
S 
Closed 
Open 
Top T-4 untili 
L 79 T-4 QoT-9 10/sec C Covered 
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PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Terminate topping. 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
80 
80 
V-23 
V-7 
V-IV-2 
LOIV-3 
LOFV-I 
LOIV-1LOIV-2 
1 
1 
S j 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
OpenOpen 
Command and verify: 
L 81 V-14 LFFV-l 1 S Open 
Top T-3 until: 
L 82 T-3 QfT-3 10/sec C Covered 
Terminate topping. 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
82 
82 
V-8 
V-9 
V-26 
V-27 
LFIV-1 
LFIV-2 
LFIV-3 
LFIV-4 
1I 
1 
SI 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Open
Open 
Top T-5, 6 until: 
L 
L 
83 
83 
T-5 
T-6 
QfT-6 
QfT-9 
10/sec 
10/sec 
C 
C 
Covered 
Covered 
Terminate topping. 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
84 
84 
V-26 
V-27 
v-8 
V-9 
V-14 
LFIV-3 
LFIV-4 
LFIV-I 
LFIV-2 
LFFV-1 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Open 
Open 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
85 
85 
V-3 
V-4 
V-5 
V-6 
V-10 
V-I 
V-12 
V-13 
V-24 
LOW-I 
LOVV-2 
LOVV-3 
LOVV-4 
LFTVV-1 
LFTVV-2 
LFTVV-3 
LFTVV-4 
LOTVV-1 
1 
I 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
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PHASE STEP ELEMENT 
L 85 V-25I V-28 
V-29 
V-3085 V-31 
MEASUREMENT SAMPLES 
LOTVV-2 1 
LDFTVV-5j 
LFTVV-6 
LFTVV-7LFTVV-8 1 
USE 
S 
S 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
ClosedI 
Closed 
Verify: 
L1 
L 
86 
86 
T-8 
T-9 
T-4 
PoT-6 
PoT-7 
PoT-3 
1 t S 
S 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
<30 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
L 87 V-33 LOPV-2 S Open 
Verify: 
L 88 T-4 PoT-3 S 35-40 PSIA 
Command and verity: 
L 89 V-33 LOPV-2 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
90 
90 
V-24 
V-25 
LOTW-1 
LOTVV-2 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Verify: 
L 91 T-4 PoT-3 1 S Ambient 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
92 
92 
V-24 
V-25 
LOTVV-1 
LOTVV-2 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 93 V-32 LOPV-I I S Open 
Check: 
L 94 T-4 PoT-3 S 35-40 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
L 95 V-32 LOPV-l S Closed 
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PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Monitor: 
L 96 T-4 PoT-3 i/sec M 35-40 PSIA 
For decay. 
Verify: 
L 
L 
97 
97 
T-10 
T-I 
T-5T-6 
PfT-6 
PfT-7 
PfT-2PfT-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
< 30 PSIA<30 PSIA 
Command and verify: 
L 98 V-34 LFPV-1 1 S Open 
Verify: 
L 
L 
99 
99 
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
35-40 PSIA 
35-40 PSIA 
Command and verify 
L 100 V-34 LFPV-1 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
101 
101 
S 
V-28 
V-29 
V-30 
V-31 
LFTVV-5 
EFIVV-6
LFTVV-7 
LFTVV-8 
1. 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Verify: 
L 
L 
102 
102 
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Command and verify: 
L 
L 
I 
103+ 
103 
V-28 
V-29 
V-30 
V-31 
LFTVV-5 
EFTVV-6II 
LFTVV-7 
LFTVV-8 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
L 104 V-35 LFPV-2 1 S Open 
L 
L 
Verify: 
105 
105 
T-5 
T-6 
PfT-2 
PfT-3 
1 
I 
S 
S 
35-40 PSIA 
35-40 PSIA 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
L 106 V-35 LFPV-2 S Closed 
Monitor:
 
L 107 T-5 PfT-2 i/sec x 35-40 PSIA
 
L 107 T-6 PfT-3 1/sed M 35-40 PSIA
 
For decay. If none.
 
command and verify:
 
L 108 V-32 LOPV-1 1 S Open
 
V-33 LOPV-2II
 
V-34 LFPV-1
 
108 V-35 LFPV-2 1 S Open
 
Command Pressurization of T-1 and T-2 with helium from C-6
 
until:
 
L 109 T-1 PoT-I 10/sec C 35-40 PSIA
 
L 109 T-2 PoT-2 10/sec C 35-40 PSIA
 
Terminate pressurization from C-6.
 
Continue Monitoring:
 
L 110 T-1 PoT-I 10/sec x 35-40 PSIA
 
L 110 T-2 PoT-2 10/sec M 85-40 PSIA 
For decay. 
Command pressurization T-3 with helium from C-4, until 
L iI T-3 PfT-1 10/sec C 35-40 PSIA
 
Terminate-pressurization from C-4.
 
Continue monitoring:
 
L 112 T-3 PfT-I 10/sec M 35-40 PSIA
 
for decay.
 
113. Repeat steps L-55 through L-59. (Top gas accumulators, T-8,9,10,
 
1.)
 
Load and pressurization complete.
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Commence monitoring:
 
L 114 T-8 PoT-6 1/sec S 1500 PSIA
 
T-8 ToT-4 
T-9 PoT-7 1500 PSIA
 T-9 ToT-5 
T-10 PfT-6 1500 PSIA
 
T-10 TfT-4 I 
T-11 PfT-7 1500 PSIA 
L 114 T-11 TfT-5 I/see 
Compute and display accumulator quantity on request.
 
Command and verify: 
L 115 GOV-I LGOV-lI 1 S Open 
GOV-2 LGOV-21 
GOV-3 LGOV-3I
 
GYV-I LGFV-11
 
GFV-2 LGFV-21
 
GFV-3 LGFV-31 
V-52 LLIV-I
 
V-53 LLIV-2
 
V-54 LLIV-3
 
V-55 LFIV-l
 
V-56 LFIV-2
 
L 115 V-57 LFIV-3 1 S Open 
Command the APU shaft clutches to engage on all three sections.
 
Command and verify: 
L 116 G-1 VII-38 1 S 28VDCS -2 VUI-39 4 4 
L 116 G-3 VII-40 I S 28 VDC 
Command and verify:
 
L 117 G-1 LIOV-38 1 S Open 
Initiate igniter spark, verify:
 
L 118 G-1 IIE-38 i- 'S Pulses 
L 118 G-1 PC-38 I S 
Command and verify: 
L 119 G-1 LIFV-38 S Open 
L 119 G-1 PC-38 1 S 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
L 120 GOV-1 LOOV-I 1 S Open 
L 120 G-1 PC-38 1 S 
Command and verify: 
L 121 	 GFV-I LGFV-1 1 S Open 
L 121 G-1 PC-38 1 S
 
Check:
 
L 122 	 G-I TC-i 1 S
 
U-I NT-I 2/sec C
 
PT-i QPTL-1 1 S
 
PT-i QPTL-1 'I
 
L 122 PT-i TPTL-1 1 S
 
L 122 PT-i NS-1 1 S
 
When NT-i reaches steady-state, command igniter sparkoff, and verify: 
L -123 G-1 IIE-38 1S 	 OADC 
Command and verify: 
L 124 G-2 LIOV-39 1 S Open 
Initiate igniter spark, verify: 
L 125 G-2 IIE-39 1 S Pulses 
L 125 G-2 PC-39 1 S 
Command and verify: 
L - 126 G-2 LIFV-39 1 Open 
L 126 G-2 PC-39 I 5 
Command and verify: 
L 127 GOV-2 LGOV-2 1 5 Open 
L 127 G-2 PC-39 I S 
Command and verify: 
L 128 GFV-2 LGFV-2 1 S Open 
L 128 G-2 PC-39 I S 
Check:
 
L 129 G-2 TC-2 1 S
 
U-2 NT-2 2/sec C
 
PT-2 NS-2 I S
 
PT-2 QPTL-2
 
PT-2 PPTL-2
 
L 129 PT-2 TPTL-2 1 S
 
D-81
 
,LAUNCH(Continued)
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
When NT-2 reaches steady-state, command igniter spark off, and verify:
 
L 130 	 G-2 IIE-39 1 S OADc 
Command and verify: 
L 131 	 G-3 LIOV-40 1 S Open 
Initiate igniter 	spark; verify: 
L 132 G-3 IIE-40 1 S Pulses 
L 132 G-3 PC-40 I S 
Command and verify:
 
L 133 G-3 LIFV-40 1 S Open
 
L 133 G-3 PC-40 I S
 
Command and verify:
 
L 134 GOV-3 LGOV-3 1 S Open
 
L 134 G-3 PC-40 I S
 
Command and verify:
 
L 135 GFV-3 LGFV-3 I S Open
 
L 135 G-3 PC-40 I S
 
Check: 
L 136 	 G-3 TC-3 1 S
 
U-3 NT-3 2/sec C
 
PT-3 NS-3 1 S 
PT-3 QPTL-3
PT-3 PPTL-3 
L 136 	 PT-3 TPTL-3 I S 
When NT-3 reaches steady-state, command igniter spark off, verify:
 
L 137 	 G-3 IIE-40 1 S OADC 
Commence monitoring:
 
L 138 	 G-1 PC-38 I/sec M
 
G-1 TC-i I/sec
 
U-I NT-i 	 2/sec 
PT-I QPTL-1 1/2 see
 
PT-i PPTL-I 1/2 sec
 
PT-i TPTL-1 i/2 sec
 
PT-i NS-I 1/2 sec
 
G-2 PC-39 I/see
 
G-2 TC-2 I/sec
 
L 138 U-2 NT-2 2/sec M
 
L 138 PT-2 TPTL-2 1/2 sec M
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PEASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
L 
L 
138 
138 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
G-3 
G-3 
U-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
QPTL-2 
PPTL-2 
NS-2 
PC-40 
TO-3 
NT-3 
QPTL-3 
PPTL-3 
TPTL-3 
NS-3 
i/2sec 
i/2sec 
1/2sec 
I/sec 
1/sec 
2/sec 
1/2sec 
1/2sec 
l/2sec 
i/2sec 
M 
M 
139 Verify vehicle power. 
140 Execute power transfer. 
141 Disconnect all remaining GSE. 
Take final status. 
Verify: 
L 142 V-i 
V-2 
V-3 
V-4 
V-5 
V-6 
V-7 
V-8 
V-9 
V-10 
V-l1 
LOIV-1 
LOIV-2 
LOW-1 
LOW-2 
LOVV-3 
LOVV-4 
LOV-I 
LFIV-
LFIV-2 
LFTVV-l 
LFTW-V2 
1S Open 
Open 
Closed 
Closed 
Open 
Open 
Closed 
V-12 
V-13 
V-14 
LFTVV-3 
LFTVV-4 
LFFV-I 
V-19 
V-20 
LOPCV-1 
LOBCV-2 
V-21 
V-22 
V-23 
V-24 
LFPCV-l 
LFPCV-2 
LOIV-3 
LOTVV-I 
V-25 
V-26 
V-27 
V-28 
LOTVV-2 
LFIV-3 
LFIV-4 
LFTVV-5 
L 142 
V-29 
V-30 
V-31 
V-32 
V-33 
V-34 
V-35 
LFTVV-6 
LFTVV-7 
LFTVV-8 
LOPV-1 
LOPV-2 
LFPV-l 
LFPV-2 S 
Closed 
Cltsed 
Open 
Open 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
L 142 C-1 LOFC-I 1 S Closed 
C-2 LHC-i, 2 
C-3 LFTVC-I 
0-4 LHC-3,4 
C-5 LFFC-I 
C-6 LHC-5,6 
C-8 LHC-7j,8 
C-1 LFVC-l Closed 
T-3 PfT-1 35-40 PSIA 
T-3 QfT-2 
T-3 QfT-3 
T-1 PoT-i 35-40 PSIA 
T-1 ToT-i 164+30 R 
T-1 QoT-1 Covered 
T-I QoT-2 
T-1 QoT-3 Covered 
T-2 PoT-2 35-40 PSI 
T-2 ToT-2 164+30 R 
T-2 QoT-4 Covered 
T-2 QoT-5 4 
T-2 QoT-6 Covred 
T-4 PoT-3 35-40 PSIA 
T-4 ToT-3 164+30R 
T-4 QaT-7 Covered 
T-4 QoT-& 
T-4 QoT-9 Covered 
T-5 PfT-2 35-40 PSIA 
T-5 TfT-2 36-40°R 
T-5 QfT-4 Covered 
T-5 QfT-5 
T-5 QfT-6 Covered 
T-6 FfT-3 35-40 PSIA 
T-6 TfT-3 36-40OR 
T-6 QfT-7 Covered 
T-6 QfT-8 
T-6 QfT-9 
PoL-i 
L-17 PoL-2 
L-18 PoL-3 
Tol-I. 164+30R 
L-17 ToL-2 
L-18 ToL-3 
ToL-4 
L-20 PfL-1 
PfL-2 
PfL-3 
L-21 PfL-4 
L-20T TfL-I 
TfL-2 ' 
36-40 R 
L 142 TfL-3 1 S 36-40°R 
L 142 T-3 TfT-I 1 S 36-40oR 
L 142 T-3 QfT-I 1 S Covered 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
L 142 L-21 TfL-4 1 S 36-40OR 
TfL-5 36-40°R 
L-3 PoS-1 
L-4 PoS-2 
L-3 ToS-1 164+30R 
L-4 ToS-2 164--3OR 
L-8 PfS-I 
L-9 PfS-2 
L-8 TfS-1 36-40°R 
L-9 TfS-2 36-40OR 
C-5 PfF-I 
C-I PoF-1 
L-14 PgF-1 
0-5 PgF-2 
L-16 
L-13 
PgF-3
PgO-I 
0-3 PgO-2 
L-15 Pgo-3 
L-7 PgRL-1 
L-14 TgF-1 
L-14 TgF-2 
L 142 
L-13 
L-13 
TgO-1 
TgO-2 1 S 
and: 
L 143 C-9 LOFC-2 1 S Closed 
0-10 ILFFC-2 
v-44 LOFV-2 
L 143 V-70 _ LFFV-2 1 S Cloed 
and: 
L 144 GOV-4 LGOV-41 1 S Closed 
GOV-4 LGOV-4 
GOV-5 LGOV-5I 
GOV-5 LG0V-5 
GOV-6 LGOV-6I 
GOV-6 LGOV-6 
GFV-4 LGFV-41 
GFV-4 LGFV-4 
GFV-5 LGFV-51 
GFV-5 LGFV-5 
GFV-6 LGFV-61 
GFV-6 LGFV-6 
V-58 LFIV-4 
V-59 LPSV-7 
V-60 LFIV-5 
V-61 LPSV-8 
L 144 V-62 LFIV-6 I S Closed 
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EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
L 144 V-63 LPSV-9 1 S Closed 
EFV-1 LEFV-1
 
EFV-2 LEFV-2
 
EFV-3 LKFV-3
 
EFV-4 LEFV.-4
 
EFV-5 LEFV-5
 
EFV-6 LEFV-6
 
EFV-7 LEFV-7 
EFV-8 LEFV-8
 
EFV-9 LEFV-9
 
EFV-10 LEFV-10
 
EFV- I LEFV-11 
EFV-12 LEFV-12 Closed 
PfL-11 20 PSIA
 
PfL-12
 
L 144 PfL-13 1 S20 SIA 
145 Command the main and turbofan engine controllers to take
 
final status.
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Verify readiness: 
B V-I LOIV-I S Open 
V-2 LOIV-2 Open 
V-3 LOW-1 Closed 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V-5 LOVV-3 
V-6 
V-7 
LOW-4 
LOFV-1 Cl sed 
V-8 LFIV-1 Open 
V-9 
V-10 
LFIV-2 
LFTVV-l 
Open 
Closed 
V-I LFTVV-2 
V-12 LFTVV-3 
V-13 LFTVV-4 
V-14 LFFV-1 
V-19 LOPCV-I 
V-20 LOPCV-2 
V-21 LFPCV-l 
V-22 LFPCV-2 
V-23 LOIV-3 
V-24 LOTVV­
V-25 LOTVV-2 
V-26 LFIV-3 
V-21 LFIV-4 
V-28 LFTVV-5 
V-29 LFTVV-6 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
V-31 LFTVV-8 Closed 
V-432 LOPV-1 Open 
V-33 LOPV-2 
V-34 LFPV-1 
V-35 
C-i 
LFPV-2 
LOFC-i 
Open 
Closed 
C-2 LHC-i,2 
C-3 LFTVC-1 
c-4 LHC-3,4 
C-5 LFFC-I 
c-6C-8 LHC-5, 6LHC-7,8 I 
C-il LFVC-I Closed 
T-3. PfT-i 35-40 PSIA 
T-3 TfT-1 36-40OR 
T-3 
T-3 
QfT-1 
QfT-2 
Coveredt 
T-3 QfT-3 Covered 
T-i PoT-I 35-40 PSIA 
T-i ToT-i 164+30R 
T-1 QoT-i Covered 
T-i QoT-2 
B 1 T-1 QoT-3 S Covered 
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BOOST (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT NEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
B 1 T-2 PoT-2 1 S 35-40 PSIA 
T-2 ToT-2 164+3°R 
T-2 QoT-4 Covered 
T-2 QoT-5 # 
T-2 QoT-6 Covered 
T-4 PoT-3 35-40 PSIA 
T-4 ToT-3 164+30 R 
T-4 
T-4 
QoT-7 
QoT-8 
Coveredt 
T-4 QoT-9 Covered 
T-5 PfT-2 35-40 PSIA 
T-5 TfT-2 36-40OR 
T-5 
T-5 
QfT-4 
QfT-5 
Covered4' 
T-5 QfT-6 Covered 
T-6 PfT-3 35-40 PSIA 
T-6 TfT-3 36-40R 
T-6 QfT-7 Covered 
T-6 QfT-8 oe 
T-6 QfT-9 Covered 
PoL-i 
L-17 PoL-2 
L-18 PoL-3 
ToL-I 164+30R 
L-17 ToL-2 
L-18 ToL-3 
ToL-4 164+30R 
L-20 PfL-1 
PfL-2 
PfL-3 
L-21 PfL-4 
L-20 TfL-I 36-40%R 
L-21 TfL-4 4 
TfL-5 36-40° 
L-3 PoS-1 
L-4 PoS-2 
L-3 ToS-I 164+30R 
L-4 ToS-2 164+3%R 
L-8 PfS-I 
L-9 PfS-2 
L-8 TfS-I 36-40'R 
L-9 TfS-2 36-40oR 
C-5 PfF-1 
C-I PoF-i 
L-14 PgF-I 
0-5 PgF-2 
L-16 PgF-3 
L-13 PgO-I 
0-3 PgO-2 
B I L-15 PgO-3 1 S 
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BOOST 
PHASE 
(Continued) 
STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
B 1 L-7 
L-14 
L-14 
L-13 
PgRL-I 
TgF-1 
TgF-2
TgO-I 
I 
B I L-13 TgO-2 1 S 
Continue to monitor: 
B 2 PoL-6 5/sec M 375-400 PSIA 
B 2 
PoL-7PfL-7PfL-8 
5sc3540PI 
5/ee DO7540PSIA 
Continue to monitor: 
B 3 T-8 
T-8 
T-9 
T-9 
PoT-6 
ToT-4 
PoT-7 
ToT-5 
I/see S 1500 PSIA 
1500 PSIA 
T-10 
T-10 
PfT-6 
TfT-4 
1500 PSIA 
B 3 
fT-11 
T-I 
PfT-7 
TfT-5 
i 
I/sec S 
1500 PSIA 
Continue to monitor: 
B 
B 
4 
4 
G-1 
G-I 
U-i 
PT-I 
PT-I 
PT-I 
PT-i 
G-2 
G-2 
U-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
G-3 
G-3 
U-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PC-38 
TC-1 
NT-I 
QPTL-1 
PPTL-I 
TPTL-1 
NS-I 
PC-39 
TC-2 
NT-2 
QPTL-2 
PPTL-2 
TPTL-2 
NS-2 
PC-40 
TC-3 
NT-3 
QPTL-3 
PPTL-3 
TPTL-3 
NS-3 
I/sec 
1/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 see 
1/2 see 
1/2 see 
i/sec 
I/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 see 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
i/sec 
I/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
M 
M 
5. At T+153 seconds, command extension of main engine nozzles.
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SEPARATION (T+173 see)
 
1. 	 The CCC commands main engine start. 
At FS + 0.9 seconds, the main engine igniters are turned off. 
At Pc = 907, the main engine gimbal actuators are unlocked. 
At TBD , command and verify. 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
S 2 V-19 	 LOPCV-1 1 S Open
 
V-20 LOPCV-2I I 
V-21 LFPCV-IS 	 V-22 LFPCV-2 1 S Open
 
In addition to the main engine data, monitor.
 
S 3 T-3 PfT-1 10/sec M 35-40 PSIA 
T-3 TfT-I I/sec M 36-40OR 
T-3 QfT-2 10/sec S C/U 
T-3 QfT-1 10/sec C C/U 
T-I PoT-I 10/sec M 35-40 PSIA 
T-1 ToT-I 1/sec M 164+30R 
T-1 QoT-2 10/sec S C/U 
T-1 QoT-l 10/sec C C/u 
T-2 PoT-2 10/sec x 35-40 PSIA 
T-2 ToT-2 1/sec M 164+30R 
T-2 QoT-5 10/sec S C/U 
T-2 QoT-4 1O/sec C C/U 
L-S PfS-I 20/sec M 
L-9 PfS-2 20/sec 
L-8 TfS-I i/sec 36-40°R 
L-9 TfS-2 I/sec 36-400R 
L-3 PoS-1 20/sec 
L-4 PoS-2 20/sec 
L-3 ToS-I I/sec 164+30R 
S 3 L-4 	 ToS-2 I/sec M 164+30R 
Continue to monitor:
 
S 4 	 PoL-6 5/sec M 375-400 PSIA
 
PoL-7
 
S 	 PfL-8 5/sec M 375-400 PSIA 
Continue to monitor:
 
S 5 T-8 	 PoT-6 I/sec S 1500 PSIA 
T-8 ToT-4
 
T-9 PoT-7 1500 PSIA
 
T-9 ToT-5
 
T-10 PfT-6 1500 PSIA
 
T-10 TfT-4
 
T-11 PfT-7 1500 PSIA
 
S 5 T-I1 	 TfT-5 i/sec S 
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SEPARATION (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASIREMENT SAIPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Continue to monitor: 
s 6 
6 
G-1 
G-1 
U-i 
PT-I 
PT-I 
PT-I 
PT-I 
G-2 
G-2 
U-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
PT-2 
G-3 
G-3 
U-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PT-3 
PC-38 
TC-i 
NT-I 
QPTL-I 
PPTL-I 
TPTL-I 
NS-I 
PC-39 
TC-2 
NT-2 
QPTL-2 
PPTL-2 
TPTL-2 
NS-2 
PC-40 
TC-3 
NT-3 
QPTL-3 
PPTL-3 
TPTL-3 
NS-3 
-
i/sec 
I/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 see 
1/2 sec 
I/sec 
I/sec 
2/sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
1/2 sec 
I/sec 
I/see 
2/sec 
1/2 see 
1/2 see 
1/2 sec 
1/2 see 
M 
M 
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ASCENT
 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT 1MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
When:
 
A 1 T-1 QoT-2 10/sec S UNC
 
A 1 T-2 QoT-5 10/see S UNC
 
A 1 T-3 QfT-2 10/sec S UNC
 
The central computer makes an 	update of the engine cutoff prediction.
 
In addition to the main engine data, continue to monitor:
 
A 2 	 T-3 PfT-1 10/sec x 35-40 PSIA 
T-3 TfT-I 1/sec M 36-40oR 
T-3 QfT-2 10/sec S C/l 
T-3 QfT-I 10/see C C/U 
T-1 PoT-I 10/sec M 35-40 PSIA 
T-1 ToT-I I/see M 164+30R 
T-1 QoT-2 10/sec S C/U 
T-1 QoT-I 10/sec C C/U
T-2 PoT-2 10/sec M 35-40 PSIA
 
T-2 ToT-2 I/see M 164+30R 
T-2 QoT-5 10/sec S C/U 
T-2 QoT-4 10/sec C C/U 
L-8 PfS-I 20/see M 
L-9 PfS-2 20/see 
L-8 TfS-I 1/sec 36-40OR 
L-9 TfS-2 I/sec 36-40°R 
L-3 PoS-i 20/sec 
L-4 PoS-2 20/sec 
L-3 ToS-I 1/sec 164+30R 
A 2 L-4 ToS-2 I/sec M 164+30R 
3. When the 4g limit is reached, command the main engines to PL. 
4. At T + 200 seconds, command the RCS thermal protective doors
 
open.
 
Command and verify: 
A 5 TR-(1-37) VII-(1-37) 1 S 28 VDC
 
A 5 TR-(1-37) IIE- (1-37) 1 S 0 ADC
 
Continue to monitor:
 
A 6 	 PoL-6 5/see M 375-400 PSIA 
PoL-7PfL-7 	 !*4 
A 6 	 EfL-8 5/sc H 7-00 PSIA 
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ASCENT (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Continue to monitor:
 
A 7 T-8 PoT-6 I/see S 1500 PSIA 
T-8 ToT-4 
T-9 PoT-7 1500 PSIA 
T-9 ToT-5 
T-10 PfT-6 1500 PSIA 
T-10 TfT-4 
T-11 PfT-7 1500 PSIA 
A 7 T-I TfT-5 1/sec S 
Continue to monitor:
 
A 8 	 G-I PC-38 I/see x 
G-I TC-I I/sec 
U-i NT-I 2/sec 
PT-I QPTL-I 112 sec 
PT-I PPTL-I 1/2 see 
PT-I TPTL-I 1/2 sec 
PT-I NS-I 1/2 sec 
G-2 PC-39 1/sec 
G-2 TC-2 1/see 
U-2 NT-2 2/sec 
PT-2 QPTL-2 1/2 sec 
PT-2 PPTL-2 1/2 sec 
PT-2 TPTL-2 1/2 sec 
PT-2 NS-2 1/2 sec 
G-3 PC-40 I/sec 
G-3 TC-3 i/see 
U-3 NT-3 2/sec 
PT-3 QPTL-3 1/2 sec 
PT-3 PPTL-3 1/2 sec
 
PT-3 TPTL-3 1/2 sec M
 
A 8 PT-3 NS-3 1/2 sec 
When: 
9 T-I QoT-I 10/sec S UNC
 
A 9 	 T-2 QoT-4 10/sec S UNO 
A shutdown command is sent to the main engine controllers.
 
(nominally T + 357 sec.)
 
Conduct Post-Shutdown monitoring checks on the main engines and verify:
 
A 10 	 V-i LOIV- 1 S Open 
V-2 LOIV-2 	 Open
 
V-3 LOVV-I 	 Closed 
v-4 LOVV-2 4 
V-5 LOV1-3 
V-6 LOWV-4 
A 0 V-7 LOFV-1 I 	 C osed
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ASCENT (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
A 10 V-8 LFIV-1 1 S Open 
V-9 
V-10 
LFIV-2 
LFTVV-I 
Open
Closed 
V-l0 LFTVV-2 
V-12 
V-13 
LFTVV-3 
LFTVV-4 
V-14 LFFV-1 Closed 
V-19 LOPCV-1 Open 
V-20 LOPCV-2 
V-21 LFPCV-I 
V-22 LFPCV-2 Open 
V-23 LOIV-3 Closed 
V-24 LOTVV-l 
V-25 LOTVV-2 
V-26 LFIV-3 
V-27 LFIV-4 
V-28 LFTVV-5 
V-29 LFTVV-6 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
V-31 LFTVV-8 Closed 
V-32 LOPV-l Open 
V-33 LOPV-2 
V-34 LFPV-I 
V-35 LFPV-2 Open 
C-i LOFC-l Closed 
C-2 LHC-I, 2 
C-3 LFTVC-I 
c-4 LHC-3, 4 
C-5 LFFC-I 
c-6 LHC-5, 6 
C-8 LHC-7, 8 
A 10 C-I LFVC-I 1 S Closed 
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ON-ORBIT 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
0-0 V-1 LOIV-1 S Closed 
V-2
V-8 LOIV-2LFIV-1 
0-0 1 V-9 LFIV-2 i S Closed 
2. Retract the main engine nozzles. 
3. Command the main engines secure. 
Commence monitoring: 
0-0 4 V-i LOIV-I 1/hr S Closed 
V-2 LOIV-2 
V-3 LOW-1 
V-4 LOVV-2 
V-5 LOVV-3 
V-6 LOVV-4 
V-7 LOFV-1 
V-8 LFIV-1 
V-9 LFIV-2 
V-10 LFTVV-l 
V-1I LFTVV-2 
V-12 LFTVV-3 
V-13 LFTVV-4 
V-14 LFFV-i 
V-19 LOPCV-I 
V-20 LOPCV-2 
V-21 LFPCV-l 
V-22 LFPCV-2 
V-23 LOIV-3 
V-24 LOTVV-I 
V-25 LOTVV-2 
V-26 LFIV-3 
V-27 LFIV-4 
V-28 LFTVV-5 
V-29 LFTVV-6 
V-30 LFTVV-7 
V-31 LFTVV-8 Closed 
V-32 LOPV-l Open 
V-33 
V-34 
LOPV-2 
LFPV-l 4 
V-35 LFPV-2 Open 
C-I LOFC-I Closed 
C-2 LHC-I, 2 
C-3 LFTVC-1 
c-4 LHC-3, 4 
C-5 LFFC-1 
c-6 LHC-5, 6 
C-8 LHC-7, 8 
0-0 4 C-11 LFVC-I 1/hr S Closed 
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ON-ORBIT 
PHASE 
(Continued) 
STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
0-0 
0-0 
4 
4 
T-I 
T-2 
T-3 
L-8 
L-9 
L-3 
L-4C-5 
C-I 
PoT-I 
PoT-2 
PfT-I 
PfS-I 
PfS-2 
PoS-1 
PoS-2 
PfF-1 
PoF-I 
1/hr 
1/hr 
S 
S 
19 PSIA 
19 PSIA 
19 PSIA 
X 
<X 
Commence monitoring: 
0-0 
0-0 
5 
5 
T-4 
T-4 
T-4 
T-4 
T-4 
T-5 
T-5 
T-5 
T-5 
T-5 
T-6 
T-6 
T-6 
T-6 
T-6 
PoT-3 
ToT-3 
QoT-7 * 
QoT-8 * 
QoT-9 * 
PfT-2 
TfT-2 
QfT-4 * 
QfT-5 * 
QfT-6 * 
PfT-3 
TfT-3 
QfT-7 * 
QfT-8 * 
QfT-9 * 
I/sec 
I/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
1/sec 
I/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
10sec A.R. 
1/sec 
1/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
10/sec A.R. 
S 
S 
35-40 PSIA 
164+3°R 
C/U 
C/U 
C/U 
35-40 PSIA 
36-40°R 
C/U 
C/U 
C/U 
35-40 PSIA 
36-40OR 
C/U 
C/U 
C!U 
• While accelerating in the proper attitude. 
When required to perform an RCS burn, verify: 
0-0 6 TR-X LBIV-X S Open 
Initiate igniter spark, verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
7 
7 
TR-X 
TR-X 
VII-X 
IIE-X 
I 
i 
S 
S 
28 VDC 
Pulses 
Command and verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
8 
8 
TR-X 
TR-X 
LIOV-X 
PC-X i 
S Open 
Command and verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
9 
9 
TR-X 
TR-X 
LIFV-X 
PC-X 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Open 
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ON-ORBIT (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
For small bit impulses, this would be the end of the thruster start
 
sequence. For larger burns, command and verify:
 
0-0 10 TR-X LNBV-X I S Open 
0-0 10 TR-X PC-X A.R. S 
At steady-state terminate igniter spark, verify:
 
0-0 11 TR-X flE-X 1 S 0 ADC 
During burn, monitor:
 
0-0 12 TR-X PC-X 10/sec S 300 PSIA
 
To shutdown, command and verify: 
+i 0-0 13 TR-X LMBV-X 1 
S Closed 
TR-X LIOV-X Closed 
TR-X LIFV-X IVClosed
0-0 13 TR-X PC-X 1 S Ambient
 
Continue to monitor:
 
0-0 14 PoL-6 5/sec S 375-400 PSIA
 
PfL-7, 
0 0 14 PfL-8 5/sec S 375-400 PSIA 
Continue to monitor: 
0-0 15 T-8 PoT-6 1/sec C 1500 PSIA 
T-8 ToT-4 S 
T-9 PoT-7 C 1500 PSIA
 
T-9 ToT-5 S 
T-10 PfT-6 C 1500 PSIA
 
T-10 TfT-4 S 
T-11 PfT-7 C 1500 PSIA 
0-0 15 T-11 TfT-5 I/sec S 
When:
 
0-0 16 T-8 PoT-6 I/sec C 1500-X PSIA 
Or: 
0-0 17 T-9 PoT-7 1/sec C 1500-X PSIA 
Verify: 
0-0 18 V-52 LLIV-I 1 S Open 
0-0 18 V-53 LLIV-2 I S Open 
0-0 18 V-54 LLIV-3 I S Open 
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ON-ORBIT (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify: 
0-0 19 V-52 LPSV-1 1 S Open 
0-0 19 V-53 LPSV-2 1 S Open 
0-0 19 V-54 LPSV-3 1 S Open 
Engage the clutches to P-i, 2, 3. 
During G02 resupply, monitor the following additional parameters: 
0-0 20 P-I PPD-I 2/sec S 1500 PSIA 
H-4 THE-I 1/2 sec 
H-4 PHEO-I 1/2 sec 1500 PSIA 
P-2 PPD-2 2/sec 1500 PSIA 
H-5 THE-2 1/2 see 
H-5 PHEO-2 1/2 see 1500 PSIA
 
P-3 PPD-3 2/sec 1500 PSIA
 
H-6 THE-3 112 sec
 
0-0 20 H-6 PHEO-3 1/2 sec S 1500 PSIA
 
When:
 
0-0 21 T-8 PoT-6 i/sec C 1500 PSIA 
0-0 21 T-9 PoT-7 I/sec C 1500 PSIA 
Disengage the clutches to P-I, 2, 3.
 
Discontinue resupply monitors.
 
Command and verify:
 
0-0 22 V-52 LPSV-l 1 S Closed
 
0-0 22 V-53 LPSV-2 1 S Closed
 
0-0 22 V-54 LPSV-3 1 S Closed
 
When:
 
0-0 23 T-10 PfT-6 i/sec C 1500-X PSIA 
Or: 
0-0 24 T-11 PfT-7 I/sec C 1500-X PSIA 
Verify: 
0-0 25 V-55 LFIV-1 I S Open 
0-0 25 V-56 LFIV-2 1 S Open 
0-0 25 V-57 LFIV-3 1 S Open 
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ON-ORBIT (Continued) 
EXPECTED 
PHASE STEP ELMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify:
 
0-0 26 V-55 LPSV-4 1 S Open
 
0-0 26 V-56 LPSV-5 1 S Open
 
0-0 26 V-57 LPSV-6 1 S Open
 
Engage the clutches to P-4, 5, 6.
 
During G@2 resupply, monitor the following additional parameters:
 
0-0 27 	 P-4 PPD-4 2/sec S 1500 PSIA
 
H-7 THE-4 1/2 see
 
H-7 PHEO-4 1/2 sec 1500 PSIA
 
P-5 PPD-5 2/sec 1500 PSIA
 
H-8 THE-5 1/2 see
 
H-8 PBEO-5 1/2 see 1500 PSIA
 
P-6 PPD-6 2/sec 1500 PSIA
 
0 H-9 THE-6 1/2 sec
 
0 27 H-9 PHEO-6 1/2 see S 1500 PSIA
 
When:
 
0-0 28 T-10 PfT-6 i/sec C 1500 PSIA
 
0-0 28 T-ll PfT-7 1/sec C 1500 PSIA
 
Disengage clutches 	to P-4, 5, 6.
 
Discontinue resupply monitors.
 
Command and verify:
 
0-0 29 V-55 LPSV-4 1 S Closed 
0-0 29 V-56 LPSV-5 1 S Closed 
0-0 29 V-57 LPSV-6 1 S Closed 
Continue to monitor:
 
0 0 30 	 G-1 PC-38 1/sec M
 
G-I TC-t l/sec
 
U-1 NT-I 2/sec
 
PT-I QPTL-1 1/2 sec
 
PT-I PPTL-1 1/2 sec
 
PT-I TPTL-1 1/2 see
 
PT-1 NS-1 1/2 sec
 
G-2 PC-39 1/sec
 
G-2 TC-2 i/sec
 
U-2 NT-2 2/sec
 
PT-2 QPTL-2 1/2 see
 
PT-2 PPTL-2 1/2 sec
 
PT-2 TPTL-2 1/2 sec
 
PT-2 NS-2 1/2 see
 
0-0 30 	 G-3 PC-40 1/sec M
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ON-ORBIT 
PHASE 
(Continued) 
STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
0-0 
0-0 
0-0 
3 TC-3 1/sec 
U-3 NT-3 2/sec 
PT-3 QPTL-3 1/2 sec 
PT-3 PP2-3 1/2 sec 
PT-3 TPTL-3 1/2 sec 
30 PT-3 NS-3 1/2 sec 
When required to perform an OMS burn, verify: 
31 TR-1 LBIV-1 I 
TR-3 LBIV-3 
M 
x 
S Open 
0-0 31 TR-4 LBIV-4 1 S Open 
Initiate igniter spark, verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
32 
IIF Ilr 
32 
TR-2 
+R-
TR-3 
TR-4 
IIE-1 
IIE-2 
IlIE-3 
IIE-4 
14 
l 
1 
S
'4 
I 
S 
Pulses 
l 
Pulses 
Command and verify: 
0 33 TR-1 
TR-I 
TR-2 
TR-2 
LIOV-1 
PC-2 
LIOV-2 
PC-2 
1 S Open 
Open 
0-0 33 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-4 
TR-4 
LIOV-3 
PC-3 
LIOV-4 
PC-4 1 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
34 
34 
TR-I 
TR-
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-3 
TR-3 
TR-4 
TR-4 
LIFV-I 
BC-I 
LIFV-2 
PC-2 
LIFV-3 
PC-3 
LIFV-4 
PC-4 
1 S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify: 
0-0 35 TR-1 
TR-I 
TR-2 
TR-2 
TR-3TR-3 
LMBV-I 
PC-I 
LMBV-2 
PC-2 
LMBV-3PC-3 
i 1 
A.R. 
I 
A.R. 
IA.R.| 
Open 
Open 
Open 
0-0 35 TR-4 
STR-4LMAV-4 
PC-4 
1 
A.R. S 
Open 
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ON-ORBIT (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMIENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
At steady-state Pc, terminate spark, verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
36 
36 
TR-1 
TR-2 
TR-3TR-4 
IIE-i 
IIE-2 
TIE-3IIE-4 
1 
I 
S 
lS 
OADC 
lOADC 
0-0 
During burn, monitor: 
37 TM-1 PC-i 10/sec S 300 PSIA 
0-0 
IFIr 
37 
TR-2 
TR-3 
TR-4 
PC-2 
PC-3 
PC-4 
II+F' 
10/sec S 300 PSIA 
To shutdown, command and verify: 
0-0 38 TR-i 
TR-3 
LNBV-1 
LMBV-3 
I S Closed 
0-0 38 TR-4 LNBV-4 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
0-0 
0-0 
I 39* 
39 
TR-i 
TR-2 
TR-3 
TR-4 
LIOV-1 
LIOV-2I 
LIOV-3 
LIOV-4 
1 
I 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
0-0 40 TR-I 
TR-2 
TR-3 
LIFV-l 
LIFV-2 
LIFV-3 
1 S Closed 
0-0 40 
TR-4 
TR-i 
TR-2 
TR-3 
TR-4 
LIFV-4 
PC-I 
PC-2 
PC-3 
PC-4 1 S 
Closed 
Ambient 
e 
Ambient 
Commence monitoring: 
0-0 
0-0 
41 
I 
41 
LA-I 
LA-2 
LA-3 
PT-4 
PT-5 
PT-6 
PT-4 
PT-5 
PT-6 
PZGL-l 
PZGL-2 
PZGL-3 
QTPL-l 
QTPL-2 
QTPL-3 
PTPL-1 
PTPL-2 
PTPL-3 
1/hr 
i/hr 
S 
S 
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DOCKING
 
1. Continue monitoring the Main Propulsion System as in steps On-Orbit 4, 5.
 
2. 	To execute and RCS or OMS burn
 
repeat steps On-Orbit (6-13) or (31-40) respectively.
 
3. 	Continue to monitor APS gas pressures and temperatures as in
 
steps On-Orbit - 14, 15.
 
4. 	To execute resupply of the APS accumulators, perform steps
 
On-Orbit - (16-29).
 
5. 	Continue to monitor Propellant Conditioning System operation as in step
 
On-Orbit - 30.
 
6. 	Continue to monitor A/B lube pressurization systems as in step
 
On-Orbit - 41.
 
DOCKED 
1. Continue monitoring the Main Propulsion System as in Docking step 1.
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
Command and verify:
 
DD 2 TR-(I-37) VII-(I-37) 1 S OVDC 
Command and verify: 
DD 3 TR-(1-37) LBIV-(1-37) 1 S Closed 
Command the RCS doors closed.
 
4. 	Continue to monitor as APS gas pressures and temperatures as in steps On-

Orbit - 14, 15.
 
5. Continue to monitor A/B lube systems as in step On-Orbit -41.
 
6, Continue operation of the Propellant Conditioning Subsystem until
 
command is received for APU shutdown. Continue monitoring as in Docking
 
step 30 until shutdown. Upon command to shutdown, perform steps 
P-F- (5-22)0 
7. The Propellant Conditioning Subsystem will be operated 10 minutes per
 
day while on orbit for hydraulic system conditioning. To perform this
 
operation~or to restart the subsystem prior to undocking, perform
 
steps L-115 through L-138.
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DOCKED 
8. Before undocking, open the RCS doors, and command and verify: 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
DD 9 TR-(1-37) VII-(1-37) I S 28 VDC 
and, 
DD 10 TR-(1-37) LBIV-(1-37) I S Open 
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DESCENT - Same as 	Docking
 
REENTRY
 
1. 	Continue monitoring the Main Propulsion System as in steps on-orbit- 4, 5.
 
2. 	Secure the RCS and OMS subsystems as in steps Docked - 2, 3.
 
3. 	Continue monitoring APS pressures and temperatures as in steps on-orbit ­
14, 15.
 
4. 	Operate the Propellant Conditioning Subsystem in the resupply mode as in
 
steps on-orbit - (16-29) as required, otherwise monitor as in step on-orbit
 
30
 
Terminate zero-g pressurization of the turbofan lube systems and command
 
r6adiniss checks on the turbofan engines:
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
R 5 	 FCA-1 LFIV A/B-I I R Closed 
FCA-I LCPRV-I Closed 
FCA-I LSPV-I Closed 
LA-i QLO-I 
FCA-2 LFIV A/B-2 Closed
 
FCA-2 LCPRV-2 Closed
 
FCA-2 LSPV-2 Closed
 
LA-2 QLO-2 
FCA-3 LFIV A/B-3 Closed
 
FCA-3 LCPRV-3 Closed
 
FCA-3 LSPV-3 Closed
 
R 5 	 LA-3 QLO-3 1 R 
Terminate zero-g pressurization of the A/B Propellant Management Power
 
Train Lube Systems and verify:
 
R 6 	 GFV-4 LGFV-41 1 S Closed
 
GFV-4 LGFV-4
 
GOV-4 LGOV-4T
 
GOV-4 LGOV-4
 
GFV-5 LGFV-51 
GFV-5 LGFV-5 
GOV-5 LGOV-51
 
GOV-5 LGOV-5
 
GFV-6 LGFV-61
 
GFV-6 LGFV-6
 
GOV-6 LGOV-61
 
GOV-6 LGOV-6
 
V-58 LFIV-4
 
V-59 LPSV-7
 
V-60 LFIV-5
 
V-61 LPSV-8
 
V-62 LFIV-6
 
R 6 	 V-63 LPSV-9 I S Closed
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REENTRY (Continued)
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
R 6 	 G-1 VII-41 1 OVDC 
G-2 VI-42 + 
G-3 VII-43 OVDC 
EFV-l LEFV-1 Closed 
EFV-2 LEFV-2
 
EFV-3 LEFV-3
 
EFV-4 LEFV-4 
EFV-5 LEFV-5
 
EFV-6 LEFV-6
 
EFV-7 LEFV-7
 
EFV-8 LEFV-8
 
EFV-9 LEFV=9
 
EFV-10 LEFV-10 
EFV-11 LEFV-11 
EFV-12 LEFV-12 Closed 
PfL-1I
 
PfL-12 
PfL-13 
PT-4 QTPL-l 
PT-5 QTPL-2 
R 6 PT-6 QTPL-3 S 
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APPROACH & LANDING - (Orbital)
 
1. 	Continue to monitor the Main Propulsion System as in steps on-orbit- 4, 5.
 
2. 	Continue to monitor ABS gas parameters as in step on-orbit - 15. 
3. 	To resupply the APS gas accumulators execute steps on-orbit - (16-29), 
otherwise monitor the Propellant Conditioning Subsystem parameters as in 
step on-orbit - 30. 
4. 	Command the A/B engine cradles to be lowered.
 
5. 	The A/B Propulsion System is activated and monitored as in Ferry Pre­
flight, steps 92 through 136 except that windmilling is the primary mode
 
of start, with solid start cartridges as back-up, instead of ground
 
start GSE.
 
6. 	After landing, taxi to the revetment area.
 
7. 	Shutdown the A/B Propulsion System as in steps 3 through 23 of Ferry
 
Approach and Landing.
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POSTFLIGHT 
- (Orbital)
 
I. 	Tow the Orbiter into the revetment. Chock and tie down.
 
2. 	Connect ground power GSE.
 
3. 	Execute power transfer.
 
4. 	Continue monitoring Propellant Conditioning Subsystem operation as in
 
step on-orbit - 30, until the APU shutdown command is received. Upon
 
receipt of the APU shutdown command, execute steps 5 - 22 of Postflight-

Ferry.
 
5. 	Take a final status sample of the Main Propulsion System parameters of
 
steps on-orbit - 4, 5.
 
6. 	Remove tape and hard copy, if any.
 
Debrief crew as required.
 
Review in-flight data and fault-isolation output.
 
7. 	Connect Drain and Purge GSE and verify as in step 28, Postflight-Ferry,
 
(P-F).
 
8. 	Command and verify:
 
EXPECTED
 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE
 
P-0 8 	 V-32 LOPV-I 1 S Closed
 
V-33 LOPV-2
 
V-34 LFPV-l
 
- 8 V-35 LFPV-2 1 S Closed 
Command and verify: 
-0 V-36 LOPV-3 1 S Closed 
V-37 LOPV-4 
V-38 LOPV-5
 
V-39 LOPV-6
 
V-40 LPV-3
 
V-41 LFPV-4
- 2 FP -5 
P-0 9 V-43 LFPV-6 1 S 	 Closed
 
10. 	Perform a purge of the main LH2 system by executing steps 30 through 40
 
of Postflight-Ferry.
 
11. 	Perform a purge of the main LOX system by executing steps 41 through 52
 
of Postflight-Ferry.
 
Command and verify:
 
P-c 	 12 V-36 LOPV-3 I S Open 
V-37 LOPV-4 I t 
P-012 V-38 LPOV-5 I S Opt 
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POSTFLIGHT - (Orbital) (Continued) 
PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUMENT 
P-O 12 V-38 LOPV-5IOV-39 LOPV-6 
V-40 LFPV-3 
V-41 LFPV-4 
V-42 LFPV-5 
PO 12 V-43 LFPV-6 
SAMPLES 
I 
1 
USE 
S 
S 
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
Open 
Open 
Command and verify: 
P-O 13 TR-(14-28) LBIV-(14-28) 1 S Open 
Command and verify: 
P-a 14 TR-(14-28) 
TR-(14-28) 
LMV-(14-28) 
LIpV-(14-28) 
1 
I 
S Open 
# 
After two seconds, command and verify: 
P-a 
-0 
15 
p 
15 
TR-(14-28) 
TR-(14-28) 
TR-(14-28) 
LMBV-(14-28) 
LIOV-(14-28) 
LIFV-(14-28) 
1 
1 
S 
I 
S 
Closed 
I * 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-0J+ 
p-a 
16 V-38 
V-39 
V-42 
V-43 
LOPV-5 
LOPV-6II 
LFPV-5 
LFPV-6 
I 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-O 
P-O 
17 
17 
TR-21 
TR-21 
LIOV-21 
LIFV-21 
I 
I 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
Until: 
P-O 
P-O 
18 
18 
PoL-9 
PfL-10 
A.R. 
A.R. 
C 
C 
19PSIA 
19PSIA 
Then, command and verify: 
P-O 
P 
19 
19 
TR-21 
TR-21 
TR-(14-28) 
LIOV-21 
LIFV-21t** 
LBIV-(14-28) 
1 
1 
S 
S 
Closed 
Closed 
Command and verify: 
P-O 
P-O 
20 
20 
TR-(1-13) 
TR-(29-37) 
LBIV-(1-13) 
LBIV-(29-37) 
1 
I 
S 
S 
Open 
Open 
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POSTFLIGHT - (Orbital) (Continued)
 
EXPECTED

PHASE STEP ELEMENT MEASUREMENT SAMPLES USE VALUE 
Command and verify:
 
P021 TR-(1-13)
TR-(1-13) LMBV-(1-13)LIOV-(1-13) 1 S Open 
TR-(1-13) LIFV-(1-13) 
TR-(29-37) LMBV-(29-37) 
P-O 21 
TR-(29-37) 
TR-(29-37) 
LIOV-(29-37) 
LIFV-(29-37) I S Open 
After two seconds, command and verify: 
22 TR-(l-13)(I-  LI0V-MB (l-13)(1-13) 1 S Closed
TR-(l-13) LIFV-(l-13) 
TR-(29-37) LMV-(29-37) 
TR-(29-37) LIOV-(29-37)
P-O 22 TR-(29-37) LIFV-(29-37) 1 S Cl sed 
Command and verify:
 
P-O 23 V-36 LOPV-3 	 1 S Closed 
V-37 LOPV-4 
V-40 LFPV-3 
P- 23 V-41 LFPV-4 	 1 S Closed
 
Command and verify:
 
P-O 24 TR-l LIOV-I 1 S Open
P-O 24 TR-l LIFV-1 1 S Open 
Until:
 
P-O 25 PoL-8 A.R. C 19PSIA 
P-O 25 PfL-9 A.R. C 19PSIA 
Then command and verify:
 
P-0 26 TR-l LIOV-I 	 I S ClosedTR-I LIFV-I 
TR-(1-13) LBIV-(1-13)

P-O 26 TR-(29-37) LBIV-(29-37) 1 S Closed
 
27. 	Purge the gas lines of the Propellant Conditioning Subsystem and A/B
 
Propellant Management Subsystem by executing steps 53-56 of Postflight-

Ferry.
 
28. 	Purge remaining LH2 system, less main engines, by executing steps 57-65
 
of Postflight-Ferry.
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POSTFLIGHT - (Orbital) (Continued)
 
29. 	 Purge remaining LOX system, less main engines, by executing steps 66-69
 
of Postflight-Ferry.
 
30. 	 Complete main engine purge.
 
31. 	 Secure and disconnect the Drain and Purge GS. Verify propellant coupling
 
status as in step 71 or Postflight-Ferry. Purge complete.
 
32. 	 Inspect all subsystems for mechanical disorders.
 
33. 	Attach covers and install desicants where required.
 
34. 	 Command RCS doors closed.
 
35. 	 Secure and verify the MPS isolation valves as in step 72 of Postflight-

Ferry.
 
36. 	 Power down all propulsion systems and OCMS.
 
37. 	 Input flight data to processing system for trend analysis, performance
 
evaluation, and/or maintenance report.
 
